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A B S T R A C T
This investigation has three purposes which are described in the 
following: The first was to explore the concept of strategy-making
as a major discipline within the field of strategic management. 
The enquiry describes how the analytical concepts, models and 
techniques of strategy-making were developed and assesses whether 
or not the essential elements of this discipline can be used to 
stimulate innovation.
In the literature review phase, this investigation reviewed some of 
the main arguments on strategy-making that have been put forward 
depending chi three factors: whether or not they were advocates of a  
broad or a narrow goal-setting process; whether they believed that 
strategy is best formed deliberately or by a pattern of incremental 
decisions; and whether the approaches for strategy formulation were 
determined as being either rational-analytical, intuitive-emotional 
or behavioural-political. The enquiry concluded with a sumary of 
the lessons gained from the ancient and military concepts of 
strategy and the development of a Table charting the evolutionary 
changes of business strategy into the field of strategic management 
during the past ninety years.
The second purpose of the study was to conduct an empirical 
investigation among 190 responding firms in Scotland as to how 
they stimulate innovation. The sample is divided into two groups: 
those users of a formal strategy to innovate and non-users. By 
this grouping, the investigation compares the elements of 
innovation used by both groups within the domestic firms of 
Scotland, and from internationals firms of North America, and
Other Overseas firms as well as those companies from the other 
parts of the United Kingdom •
The third purpose was to link the essential elements found in 
strategy-making with 83 elements used by managers in Scotland which 
stimulate innovation. To this purpose, a typology of seven 
technological strategies was developed and an explanation as to how 
they differ by their strategic focus.
Overall, the investigation was designed to fill a gap in the 
literature linking the elements of strategy-making to the elements 
of innovation. It provides a catalogue of empirical evidence of 
those factors used by managers within Scotland and analyses a band 
of small, medium and large firms, creating a representative and 
stratified sample rather than focussing on one firm or a few 
industries. In addition to a ranking of 36 firms found to be the 
most innovative, it provides a set of implications for further 
research, a glossary of terms, and a series of hypothesises.
THE GUIDE TO HOW THE STUDY IS ORGANISED
In addition to the Table of Contents outlining each chapter and its 
paragraphs, the material in the study is organised in the following 
six ways:
1. There are two distinct and separate sections: the enquiry 
into the field of strategic management is followed by primary 
research Data. They can be read separately or in total.
2. Each chapter has an introduction and ends with a summary. 
They highlight the main points and purpose of each chapter with 
implications arising as a subheading in the summary section.
3. A glossary of key terms is provided in the appendices 
defining certain words and phrases as they are used in the study.
4. Key tables are presented within the text and are numbered 
sequentially throughout the study.
5. All diagrams, figures, models, and illustrations are 
numbered according to the chapter in which it first appeared.
6. All exhibits, in the appendices, are numbered in the order 
that they are first mentioned.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.0 OVERVIEW
This investigation proceeds in the following sequence:
Firstly, it provides an enquiry into the field of strategic 
management linking strategy-making to those elements needed to 
stimulate innovation. This was done in the form of a literature 
review.
Secondly, following a review of the literature, this study 
analyses a number of factors linking strategy to innovation based 
on a general survey of 396 firms in Scotland. The survey used a 
postal questionnaire constructed around a field of 32 multi­
tiered questions. Its purpose was to probe 83 specific elements 
which were reputed to stimulate innovation within a firm.
Thirdly, this study tests the definitions of informal and 
formal strategies for the stimulation of innovation as developed 
by Baker (1975:147). For example, the term "informal" is to be 
used where there is no clear hierarchy (organisational structure) 
to stimulate innovation. This occurs when the authority and the 
responsibility to innovate are based more on short term goals 
rather than a strategy. A firm would have few, if any, written 
rules or procedures as to how it would develop an innovation. In 
short, the firm lacks a history as to how it would handle 
innovation.
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Whilst in contrast, the term "formal" is to be used when the 
firm has a distinct hierarchy of responsibility to innovate 
beginning with a strategic mission statement to having 
organisational development plans coordinated by special 
programmes. An employee's limits of authority to fund, develop, 
and test innovation are very clearly laid down. There is an 
exhaustive set of written "standard operating procedures" (SOP's) 
based on its previous experience covering most eventualities 
arising from a firm's or its employees' attempts to innovate.
Fourthly, the responses were totaled from a pivotal question 
being asked whether or not they used a formal strategy to 
stimulate innovation. From the 190 responding firms, 103 of them, 
who indicated they used a formal strategy for innovation, were 
classified as "users". The remaining 87, who did not use a formal 
strategy for innovation, were called "non-users" for the purpose 
of this study.
Based upon these responses, the sample was divided into two 
main groups.
Gkoup 1 -Those who did not use a formal strategy = 87 
Gkoup 2 -Those who did use a formal strategy = 103
Fifthly, from this dichotomous grouping, firms were re­
classified based on their responses to nine different elements. 
After which, the respondents' overall receptivity for being 
innovative were to be ranked statistically so that further 
comparisons could be made. These comparisons would reveal the 
pertinent differences between these groups of respondents and 
contrasted a number of general characteristics by separating them 
into different types of innovating firms.
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Then, a further grouping of respondents was done based on the 
technological-marketing strategy, strategic focus and the 
organisational structure being used by each firm. Using these 
three characteristics, a typology of seven relatively distinct 
organisational forms was developed. This typology was constructed 
using a series of technological strategies, the type of strategic 
focus being used by a firm and its structure (i.e. Pioneer, 
Follower, Imitator, Traditionalist, Dependent, Fatalist and 
Opportunist).
Sixth, based on a further analysis of this survey, a series 
of interviews were held with some of the respondents and a follow- 
up attitudinal survey with 12 questions was posted to 130 of the 
respondents to clarify the findings of the survey.
Finally, after a discussion of the general, specific, and 
group elements as developed from the analysis of the field work, 
this study ends with conclusions and implications for further 
research.
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
Attempts to link innovation, and technological strategies are 
neither new nor unusual: they had been made in theory and are 
supported by empirical evidence in several ways.
First, on a macro level, Posner’s (1971) technological gap 
hypothesis and Vernon’s (1966) product life cycle provided the 
conceptual foundation to use the field of strategy as an 
explanatory factor of how a firm could become more innovative. 
Bnpirical work (Hufbauer 1970; Hirsch, 1965; Freeman, 1963; and 
Wells, 1969) has lent support to these neo-technological theories.
Second, on a micro-level, innovativeness, business strategy, 
and technological superiority are widely regarded as prerequisites
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for corporate success. Examples are studies by Pimey, 1971; 
Quinn, 1988; and Tushman, 1989 to name a few. However, it is a 
lack of attention toward the management processes required to 
stimulate innovation which formed a gap in the literature (Miles 
and Snow, 1978:260).
Third, other evidence emphasising the importance of 
innovation - creating new products and services- as a determinant 
of a firm's growth and survival has been provided by Peters, 1988; 
Waterman, 1988; and Kanter, 1985. This body of literature supports 
the need for more research to address the gap between the 
managerial process of innovation and strategy.
The literature review starts with the topic of strategy. 
First of all, it must be stated that business strategy is a 
relatively new and complex business concept. Even in its brief 
period as a topic for study \riien compared to other disciplines, 
the theories of choice and formulation of the decision-making 
process for strategy have perhaps received the greatest attention 
to date by scholars in the field of management. Indeed, at the 
expense of other topics, Schroder et al. (1986) who reviewed the 
literature on innovation declared that most models of innovation 
appear to rely uncritically upon prescriptive process models. He 
argued that if the knowledge of this field is to be advanced then 
alternative methods must be pursued.
Further, setting aside the fact that the first academic 
article on using the elements of strategy to stimulate innovation 
was by Lawrence (1954), there has been little exploration of 
innovation and strategy as a joint topic.
Some thirty -five years later and the field still lacks 
definition and clarity about how strategy is to be used with other 
variables, such as structure, technology, process, and 
uncertainty. In fact, the most definitive explanation of
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strategy as a unifying element within a business was from Ansoff 
(1961), who stated,
"Strategy is a set of guidelines which consist of a 
firm's product-market position, the directions in 
which the firm seeks to grow and change, the 
competitive tools it will employ, the means by which 
it will employ its resources, the strengths which a 
firm will use to exploit, and conversely its 
weaknesses it will seek to avoid. All in all these 
make up strategy as the concept of the firm's business 
which provides an unifying theme for all of its 
activities ".
Building upon this definition of Ansoff, Wilson (1966) 
proposed that a business strategy (on a corporate, competitive and 
functional level) should seek to include the principles of the 
product life cycle as the raison d' etre in its ability to 
innovate. He argues that it is not until a relationship between 
the strategy and a product life cycle is realised can innovation 
take place. It was in this secular way that the ability to 
innovate- to create new knowledge/ products for solving existing 
problems as a competitive edge- was discussed as a strategic 
theory.
While there have been many new theories since to explain 
why innovation should occupy a central stage in all diverse and 
eclectic types of strategies (Calvert, 1981), a scant amount of 
them have dealt empirically with how strategy, technology, and 
innovation were linked. One of the main reasons that many 
researchers tend to avoid this linkage is because the innovation 
process is considered by many theoreticians (Drucker, 1980; 
Kanter, 1983) to be one of the most complex of the organisational 
process. This is also the reason why this thesis will not offer 
any stylized representations of innovation or strategy in an 
attempt to disguise the complexity of this linkage.
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Even though many researchers have attempted to do so 
(Littler, 1988; Peters, 1989) and some have suceeded, it shall not 
be attempted here. For example, Clark and Staunton (1989) believe 
that innovation is a focalised process. They theorise that 
innovation in the 1990's will take on all the dimensions and 
benefits of the economies of scale as an operating concept.
On the other hand, Nadler (1980) suggests that there are 
only four components (the task, individuals, organisational 
arrangements, and the informal organisation) for innovation and 
when they are related to each other, harmoniously, then change and 
innovation will occur. Little attention is given to the role of 
strategy in making innovation happen.
1.2 AIMS
With the above background in mind, the general aim of this 
research is to investigate the relationship between the elements 
of strategy (being informally or formally linked) and the 
stimulation of innovation.
This investigation will attempt to measure and compare the 
non-users and users of a strategy to innovate. An effort will be 
made assess the relationship between management style, mission 
statement, policies, culture, and the strengths and weaknesses of 
each firm using a formal strategy. These firms will, in turn, be 
compared to firms classified as non-users.
The foremost method of assessing this data will be a 
questionnaire with five categories designed to capture the 
essential strategic elements needed in a formal strategy and 
those elements identified by well-known innovative firms as key 
factors needed for successful innovation.
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To these aims, the overall research design conceptually is 
shown below in Figure 1.1.
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NGt
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D U I G N
Specifically, this study sets out to investigate first what 
were the enabling factors for innovation that brought about 
change, and second, whether firms using a formal strategy could be 
distinguished from those firms using an informal strategy to 
stimulate innovation. To assess the feasibility of this study, 
five primary questions need to be answered to illustrate the 
positioning of this research:
1) Why should one be concerned with the elements affecting the 
use of strategic planning for innovation?
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2) What are the differences between a formal strategy for 
innovation and a strategy of informality which a firm may 
select?
3) Are there any common or individual characteristics which 
can be used to group a set of companies? And would they 
include the impact of the parent firm’s nationality, type of 
strategies used, and its receptivity for innovation?
4) Why should this research be done in Scotland and what 
empirical comparisons can be made here?
5) Why were certain firms excluded (those with less than 51 
employees and an operating age of less than seven
years ) from this study?
1.2,1 Why Should Strategic Planning For Innovation be Studied?
Considering these five questions in turn, firstly concerning the 
need to investigate the strategic elements for innovation, it 
should be noted that there was empirical evidence which 
demonstrated a clear association between firms using a strategy 
for innovation, and their overall performance.
In fact, the users of strategies for innovation achieved 
better performance records than their non-innovative competitors 
who avoided using a similar strategy (Kanter, 1984; Burgelman, 
1984; Roberts and Berry, 1985). This is supported by historic 
research which indicated that innovative firms had measures of 
performance \diich yielded an average return on equity of at least
22.9 percent and never less than 15 percent for any ten year 
period since 1974 (Loomis, 1984).
Other measurements differ in sales growth and the return of 
equity ratios. For example, firms with innovative strategies have
Page 8
Introduction- Chapter One
annual sales growth \diich averaged over 16.6 percent per year with 
a better than 38 percent return on total capital. Conversely, 
non-imovative firms experienced a lower sales growth (12.6%), up 
to less than 12 percent return on total capital and a return on 
equity of less than 14.5 percent in the same periods.
Besides being users of strategies, other differences were 
revealed (Sherman, 1984) as factors that made them important and 
worthy of further study. For example, innovating firms did three 
things much better than non-innovative firms:
First, they seemed to excel at predicting future product/market 
definitions because they were keen observers of the marketplace 
and had a superior understanding of their own strengths and 
weaknesses. They were able to use knowledge of the market place 
and customers needs as the measure to what products they should 
innovate, for whom and at what profit margin.
Second, they as a group seemed to have a better-designed 
business system (identified by their innovative operating 
concepts, flexible organisational structure, and entrepreneurial 
employee base that enable them to out perform competitors in 
producing and delivering their products/services).
And third, they seemed, intuitively, to manage their overall 
business systems better. Perhaps by the actual practice of 
innovation, they learnt to understand that innovation is a 
complex and demanding task that included not only the management 
of the interrelationship within the organisation, but an 
understanding of the external relationships between their 
suppliers, customers, and competitors.
In addition to the three factors stated above, the 
continuously successful innovators - IBM, Matsushita, Glaxo, 3M, 
General Electric, Nestle, Shell and Boeing, for instance- out
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perform their corporate rivals perennially when it came to 
introducing commercial innovations.
A case in point is 3M Corporation when utilising a formal 
strategy for innovation, generated over £800 million (1988) from 
390 new products developed over the past four years. These new and 
inproved products of 3M represented about 25 percent of its 
revenue.
Other research studies attempting to measure objectively the 
anticipated connection between formal strategic planning and 
corporate performance have found mixed results. For example, 
studies by Ansoff, Thune, and House, Herold, Burt, Eastlack and 
Macdonald, Wood and La Forge, Karger and Malik, Miller and 
Friesen, and Welch found that corporations that engaged in 
strategic planning outperformed those that did not.
On the other hand, studies by Rue and Fulmer, Leontiades,and 
Tezel, Fredicksen and Mitchell, as well as by Lindsay, Boulton, 
Franklin, and Freeman found no pay-off from strategic planning. 
Lamb (1983), however, tried to explain these contradictory 
findings by using industrial variations. He found a positive 
association between strategic planning and performance, whether it 
was in focused in specific areas such as budgeting, marketing or 
new products or in an overall corporate strategy. The key, he 
stated," was separating the less-evolved planning processing from 
those using and knowing the true principles of strategic 
management".
Based on the above literature, a better understanding of the 
principles and history of strategic management was required and 
the types of strategies arising from its principles. But exactly 
what were these differences when it came to an informal strategy?
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1.2.2 What Are The Differences Between Strategies ?
In contrast to those successful firms with a formal strategy for 
innovation, secondly, there should be an effort to understand the 
differences between them and non-users of a formal strategy to 
innovate.
This is important because there was evidence which showed 
that a large number of companies do not use a formal programme to 
stimulate innovation, and yet are considered innovative (Peterson 
and Berger,1971; Von Hippel, 1979; Drucker, 1985). Firms headed by 
entrepreneurs and scientists which randomly explore the realms of 
new product development fell into this area. They are considered 
to be innovative, generally, without a formal plan.
The literature, also, abounds with examples of informally- 
created innovations occurring within it. They can be classified 
into four different types of non-users (innovating without a 
plan), and that each of these dimensions has a core of ideas to 
explain how it occurred other than using a plan.
The first dimension is described here as the "serendipity 
factor" and offers examples of accidental discovery ranging from 
ivory soap as the soap that floated due to an employee leaving the 
mixing of the batter on too long, to the unplanned discovery of a 
cure for rubber.
The second dimension is described here as the "random 
events by individuals" and is based on the school of thought that 
innovation can never be planned. The belief is that innovation 
happens by circumstances, not by demand, a school of thought 
practicing that the informal strategy is best. Some core ideas 
excerpted from this concept of informality include:
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that inventors are the only true innovators and all 
others are followers, emulating their achievements;
innovation can not be created upon demand, regardless 
of methods used;
innovation disrupts and should be avoided at any cost; and
when innovation does occur, it is the sole creative act of 
the individual as a genius. They argue that this is the true 
force for imovation, and it can not be marshalled.
The third dimension is that " the size of an enterprise 
determines its ability to innovate” • It offers a host of 
theories. Most of its theorists seek to explain how the interplay 
between environment and market conduct overides the value of a 
formal planning system for innovation.
Such proponents, also, believe that the rise of innovation 
depended more on the size of an enterprise, and the type of 
industry a company competes in rather than employing a formal 
strategy.
This was evidenced by two major findings in the literature: 
(1) Haspeslagh (1988), who reported that about 65 percent of the 
USA top 500 firms used a formal programme for innovation. 
This study updates a similar survey conducted in 1978 in which 
only about 36 percent reported such a programme. In the European 
context; (2) Andrews and Pettigrew ( 1986) reports that only about 
21 percent of the 200 firms surveyed there had a formal plan for 
innovation.
Both of these studies broadly hinted that smaller 
enterprises (less than 25 employees) or certain industries (ship­
building, agricultural, and job-shopping in the metal forming
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sector) accounted for most process innovations but without a 
formal strategy. These are often used as examples for the types 
of firms which lacked formal planning systems or even avoided the 
regular use of one. They preferred to use other stimulants for 
innovation, such as having a flat organisation, being close to the 
customer, or being a bold risk-taker. These practices were mostly 
clustered among these smaller firms (51 to 251 employees), 
regardless of the parent company’s nationality of ownership or 
age.
These studies bring up the issue of the smaller versus the 
bigger firm in which is more innovative. The issue of the smaller 
firm was explored by local studies such as the one conducted by 
Peat, Marwick & McLintock (1989) in Scotland which indicated that 
less than 13 percent of the smaller firms had any type of 
expansion strategy for new markets or products.
Other research also found, even in relative terms, that 
small and medium-sized firms spend considerably less on new 
product development than larger firms and often fail to conduct 
any type of market research with customers on what innovations 
they need (Hooley and West, 1984).
Thus, a better understanding of the factors affecting the 
field of strategic management and formal programmes for 
innovation, particularly with a regard to smaller firms and medium 
sized companies, is required.
The fourth dimension of non-users is described here as "the 
lure of the market place" where core ideas are created by the 
interaction between competition, market structure, behaviour of 
the firm and the risk-uncertainty of the firm’s environment. These 
are mostly external stimulators for innovation within a firm.
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This school of management practiced the belief that the 
combination of these forces become the driving force for 
innovation and can only be stimulated by the reward of greater 
profits. To support their theories, this school sought to explain 
how innovations are most likely to be discovered in the sunset 
period of an industry (excess resources) or in the sunrise period 
of an emerging industry (scarcity of resources); and only then, 
will market forces midwife an innovation into existence.
The literature shows how a substantial number of firms have 
chosen to ignore a formal strategy \diich could improve their 
abilities to be more innovative, and have instead selected other 
stimulants to create innovation. These include the practices of 
giving financial incentives for suggestions that innovate, 
intrapreneurship schemes (stock options, ownership, promotions, 
etc.) to create product champions; and the purchase of patents 
and acquisitions.
1.2.3 Bow Should Hie Companies be Grouped?
It would be helpful to group the companies by common 
characteristics where possible and thirdly this research sets out 
to discover the different elements which determined whether or not 
a firm belonged to users of a formal programme for innovation.
The descriptions for these nine major elements were taken 
from the research of previous studies (Andrews, 1971; SAPPHO, 
1972; Freeman, 1974; Andrews and Pettigrew, 1986). This body of 
research denoted that the first element is a complete formal plan 
in which there are three types of overlapping strategies within it 
(one each for corporate, competitive and functional activities).
There would also be: (2) a budget to finance innovation; 
(3) a scanning and forcasting system; (4) a strategic focus geared 
to the key environmental elements (buyers/markets) where an
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innovation could best be marketed; (5) a method in how 
technological advances are evaluated and developed; (6) a 
structure opened to the investigating and assisting of innovation; 
and (7) the use of a formal programme (policy) for innovation 
\riiich operates by having a number of procedures for stimulating 
and nurturing innovative employees, and a name ( e. g. Pathfinder 
being the name of the programme used at 3M Corporation).
Two other key elements were: (8) whether the firms offered 
training programmes in corporate entrepreneurship; and (9) the use 
of a mission statement which sets a specific amount of business 
to be generated by either new products or new markets. Firms with 
five or more of these nine elements were accepted as "users" of a 
formal strategy for innovation; others were re-classified.
For contrast, as part of the research logic used in this 
study, firms employing an informal strategy were called "non­
users" when less than five of these nine elements were present; 
irrespective of how the firm evaluated itself.
The problems of determining these nine characteristics and 
making a comparison of variables were addressed by using interval, 
nominal, and ordinal scaling methods. The questionnaire was 
designed so it could be re-coded for computer manipulation in 
order that the score of the various scales could be treated 
numerically.
This re-coding procedure was useful and enabled the computer 
to distinguish between four types of characteristics: a general 
element where it contributed to all the items on the scale; a 
group element which contributed to more than one group, but not to 
all items; and a specific element which contributed to only one 
item. Elements contributing to more than one item, and within more 
than one group were termed common. From all of these elements, 
correlations were made between all possible items scored.
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Further, the attempt to make comparisons between the 
respondents can be justified on three grounds. One was conceptual 
in that any comparative and empirical study refines our 
understanding of issues (Wind and Douglas, 1982). The second point 
was the test of managerial usefulness. This refers to the 
uncovering of any actionable similarities and differences which 
illustrated how a technique used by one respondent's firm in 
stimulating innovation amongst its workforce was assessed as being 
useful and transferable for use by other managers.
The third point was how managers in Scotland differed on 
the topic of innovation. Their comments might not only be of 
interest to future researchers, but also of use by companies 
attempting to identify new business opportunities in Scotland.
1.2.4 Why Was Scotland Selected ?
Fourthly, the question whether Scotland contained enough diversity 
to be suitable as the survey site was a critical one.
In selecting Scotland over other developed economies, the 
concerns about the diversity of survey site were reviewed. 
However, secondary research indicated that Scotland is a fertile 
survey area with 189 North American manufacturing firms and 200 
foreign ones operating within its borders (SDA, October, 1987). 
Plus, when Scottish-based firms were compared with firms based in 
France, Germany, Japan, and other successful economies, an unique 
feature of the Scottish economy stood out,
'not anywhere else is there such as mixture of firms 
by different nationalities, and size to the degree 
that a third of Scotland's manufacturing employment is 
directly controlled by overseas firms... and for 
contrast are there so many home firms which are 
entrepreneurial deficient-" doing the same old 
things"- yet Scotland is a host country to the 
subsidiaries to over 130 worldwide technological 
leaders, all existing within 60 miles of the same 
business comnunity which makes Scotland an unique
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economy'( Commission on Scottish Economy; Alexander 
1989:142)
The combination of these points rendered Scotland as a very
suitable site for empirical research related to innovation.
1.2.5 Why Were Certain Firms Excluded ?
Finally, the question about what minimum age that an enterprise 
should be included in the sample frame was considered.
Research indicated the best rationale was not to post 
questionnaires to firms with less than seven years of operation in 
Scotland. This was based on the American -based study by Biggidike 
(1979) that it takes on average about seven years for a new
venture of a North American Multinational subsidiary to reach 
break even and to yield a return on its investment. It was felt 
during this period, that most subsidiaries were too tightly 
controlled by the parent headquarters to experiment with on-site 
innovations and product development.
In an European context, a similar study (Wilson, 1984) 
indicated that eight years was an average for a new venture to
reach break-even with some ventures taking up to twelve years.
The issue of size constraints was furnished from the research 
of Drucker (1980) that firms with less than fifty employees, 
generally do not engage in strategic planning or new product 
development. When firms with less than 50 employees engaged in 
such activities, and were successful, they either did not remain 
small for long or were acquired. This was especially true of 
start-up high tech and biochemical firms. However, on the whole, 
he projected that it was only when the firm started to increase to 
over 50 employees, or the firm had been in business over 14 years 
that strategic activities were pursued.
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Based on this research, it was decided that firms with less 
than 51 employees and operating less for than seven years in 
Scotland would be excluded from the survey.
1.3 CCKERIBDTIONS TO RESEARCH
Overall, the positioning of this research differs from previous 
contributions in three important respects:
1. This study analysed a band of small, medium and large 
firms, creating a representative and stratified sample rather than 
a study which focused on just one firm or concentrated solely on 
either larger or smaller firms.
2. This study contrasted users and non-users of strategies 
for innovation, and described those elements found in companies 
that used formal strategies from those companies that conducted 
any kind of informal strategies. Also comparisons were made to 
detect possible country-ownership nationality differences for the 
entire sample including Scottish firms.
3. This study provides new empirical evidence of the factors 
affecting the use of strategies and other techniques used by 
managers to stimulate innovation. Further, it contributes to the 
understanding of intercultural differences and enables a 
comparison of respondents from one management style to another to 
be made.
1.3.1 Supplementary Research Issues
In conducting this study, a series of peripheral and mnemonic 
questions related to innovation were developed. These questions 
are supplementary ones rather than supplanting the five primary 
questions as stated earlier.
Page 18
Introduction- Chapter One
These supplementary questions were as follows:
Do patterns of stimulating innovation operate the same way in 
the world of the business firm, irrespective of whether the 
firm is considered large or small?
Does innovation exist within the broad discipline of 
management as a separate watertight theory or is it more a 
practice which exists apart from, but alongside, other 
business economic theories and managerial systems?
Is it best to present innovation as one of the means by 
which a company can exploit change or is it best approached 
as a strategy in establishing a different product, business 
or a different service ?
Central to these supplementary questions is the question 
whether or not those isolated and specific elements which enable 
a firm to be more innovative can be unearthed by a questionnaire?
And should this research address the issue of 
entrepreneurship: is it possible to project how, and to what 
degree, a company or a group of companies become 
entrepreneurial?
In turn, do certain types of companies as a group address 
an innovation differently from other companies?
In a sense, do they ask what innovation means to their 
competitive positions and \dien an innovation should be exploited?
Lastly, is there a pattern of managerial practices being 
used currently, but not known to academics, Triiich enables an 
innovation to be done faster, more profitably and at a lower cost?
Page 19
Introduction - Chapter One
1.4 THE NEED FOR AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS RESEARCH
As a study it would be fair to simply state that this is just an 
attempt to understand better the topic of strategy and innovation 
from a managerial process perspective rather than a theoretical 
one.
But in reality, this may be a task more likely to illustrate 
how complex and convoluted the topics of strategy and innovation 
really are within the field of management. Since innovation is a 
huge subject lending itself to many disciplines ( being studied by 
economists, marketing specialists, engineers, designers, 
historians, and many more besides) each offering a contrasting 
view to the other, this study concentrates only upon the 
combination of two basic topics: strategy and innovation. This 
study will argue that the linkage of strategy and innovation must 
be used with other methods to combat the rising obsolescence of an 
employee's skills. Then, the building block to being an innovative 
firm begins.
To these aims, this study concerns itself more with strategy 
implementation rising from the narrower fields of strategic 
management empirically rather than as a theoretical study of 
decision-making and change. Pettigrew (1987:3-5) writes on some of 
the problems of the field as a whole, including the bias of 
existing literature on strategic management toward strategy 
formulation.
He discusses pointedly the limited amount of attention given 
to the surveying of managers' attitudes for their opinions about 
how innovation can best be stimulated.
Pettigrew, also, outlines how there is too much emphasis on 
prescriptive writing and the consequent under-concern with the 
description, analysis and understanding of the definitional
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problems of strategy from the manager's point of view. He quoted 
how most major research projects were geared to determine as to 
which area of strategy were most likely to be implemented with few 
on how the strategy should be implemented. Secondly, he argued 
that most studies did not contain any replicating measurement 
which could be used by other researchers.
Another study noteworthy to this point was that by Zajac and 
Bowman (1985), who analysed the articles appearing in The 
Strategic Management Journal, over a ten year period, which 
concluded that most studies eschewed quantitative studies of any 
type.
They noted that the few strategy implementation studies 
conducted by researchers on how it was done were more likely to 
use inductive theorizing, small samples, and intensive qualitative 
methodologies. The major findings in their article were that 
studies of strategy formulation far exceeded those of strategy 
implementation by some 90 percent. In fact, less than 10 percent 
of the implementation studies dealt with issues of strategic 
implementation over a time series using a longitudinal 
methodology.
Two other findings were considered by this researcher. One 
was the criticism voiced by Van de Ven that most studies of 
innovation to date have been retrospective case histories.
The other was by Pettigrew (1989:331) on how the gap in the 
field for empirical studies is growing and few, if any, deal with 
an on-going survey of managers in a study of strategy and 
innovation. This view is supported by Foxall (1984: 12-6), who 
stated,
"When it comes to the management of innovation, too 
many academic researchers are speaking in the terms of 
averages. There is a tendency of these writers to 
offer a distillation of knowledge, observation and
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experience gathered from one case when it comes to 
strategy. Often more likely they result in useless 
intellectualisation rather than applicable 
conclusions. The current need is not for more 
managerial prescriptions, but to understand much 
better the innovative process. There is an urgent need 
to perceive and conceptualise the innovative process 
in an empirical sense."
Likewise the topic of stimulating innovation in multinational 
corporations (MMUs) has received relatively little research 
attention.
Not one of the more than 4,000 studies on the topic of 
innovation (Gordon et al.,1975; Kelly and Kranzberg, 1978; Mohr, 
1982; Ghoshal and Barlett,1987) has focused specifically on the 
innovation process and strategy in the setting of a multi­
nationals corporation. Similarly in the field of management for 
MNCs, past research has focused overwhelmingly on technological 
strategy when it has been defined implicitly as the way to 
enhance the efficiency of a current operation. While some efforts 
have been made to investigate the relationship between marketing, 
strategy and innovation (Foxall, 1984; Terpstra, 1977; 
Chisnall,1989), there has been a dearth of information compared to 
the volume of studies completed.
Whilst most schools of theorists agree that the strategy for 
and the management of innovation are best portrayed as the 
Achilles heel of the organisational sciences, as a topic it 
warrants more and new research. Unfortunately there is still a 
debate raging within the field of management as to whether 
research on innovation can best be fostered by examining how 
deliberate formal strategies are formulated or by isolating the 
series of events leading up to and after an innovation.
The debate is not an argument whether the study of 
deliberate strategy versus the examination of infreqi^nt and
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dramatic innovative events can reveal simplistic empirical 
receipes and studies, but one of approach. Therefore, it is 
better to treat this as an investigation, as an effort, to 
understand better these contrasts which form the foundation for 
an empirical study of innovation.
Thus, the researcher will argue that this study has 
relevance, even though the past two decades have seen an ever- 
increasing interest by managers in the stimulation of innovation. 
This is evident in the growing amount of literature in the field.
Witness, for example, the common call for stimulating 
innovation in management books by Ouchi (1981), Rodgers (1981), 
Pascale and Athos (1981), Peters and Waterman (1982), Kanter 
(1984), Drucker (1985), Peters (1987), Handy (1989) and Tushman, 
(1989). Partly responsible for this growing interest appears to be 
the realisation that, in the past, most of the normative 
literature has been written not in the assumption that companies 
can adopt a "rational and formal" approach to innovation: an 
assumption which is now being challenged empirically (Tushman and 
Moore, 1988; Pettigrew, 1987; Quinn, 1988).
All of these studies indicate that a flexible strategy within 
a flat organisational structure which emphasizes that efforts of 
its employees to be entrepreneurial, may yield more innovation 
than firms which do not use any of these means. As Levitt 
(1989:) points out,
"there is a rising and growing consensus within the 
management field that strategy and the forces of 
innovation within an organisation are intertwined.
After the fads and theories of strategic management 
such as in a search of excellence, boston box, 
portfolio management, strategic planning, and 
intrapreneurship, are placed aside; the remaining 
principles, which are constant and in the final 
analysis may be the true strategic elements of 
entrepreneurship and innovation. Once we understand
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these two elements better then the field of business 
strategy can be fully developed",
1.5 LIMITATIONS AND OMISSIONS
Three points needs to be made about the content of this research.
First, some areas of research have had to be omitted: partly 
because of time and space constraints, but more importantly 
because they might best be dealt with satisfactorily elseidiere in 
other studies. These include the retail trade, and the role of the 
smaller innovative firm employing less than 50 employees and/or 
operating as an entity for less than seven years old.
Second, some other topics are dealt with herein in a wider 
context and may thus appear either to have been omitted altogether 
or to have been given insufficient emphasis. These include costing 
conditions (including the extent of economies of scale), the 
organisational theories of managing innovation, the costs and 
benefits of innovation, the role of research and development, and 
the financial impact of innovation. These have been dealt with in 
the context of market structure and the theory of the firm.
Third, whenever possible U. K. data have been used 
throughout the text.
1.6 ORGANISATION OF TEE STODI
This study is composed of nine further chapters and is presented 
in two main sections. The first section covers Chapter Two 
through Chapter Six.
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Chapter Two contains a development of the field of Strategic 
Management as a contextual background for this research. In order 
to gain a historical perspective of the development of business 
strategy, it was written chronologically.
Chapter Three reviews strategy as a topic within the field 
of strategic management and its past contribution, if any, to the 
stimulation of innovation. Its focus was deliberately restricted 
to highlight only some of the major thinkings and research in the 
field of innovation.
Chapter Four provides an outline of the generic strategic 
models being used in the field of management and reviews the 
applicability of each as a device to stimulate innovation.
Chapter Five analyses the topic of innovation, externally, 
from the relationship of the firm, its market conduct and market 
structure. It explores many aspects of the the arguments advanced 
in the field as to whether size, market structure and conduct 
inhibit or nurture the rise of innovation.
Chapter Six examines the topic of innovation by the internal 
elements of the firm which stimulate the acts of innovation. This 
chapter concludes Section One of this study.
The second major section of this study starts out with Chapter 
Seven.
Chapter Seven sets forth the methodology used in the study 
and the hypotheses used to test the data gathered from the postal 
questionnaires, and interviews.
Chapter Eight discusses the results and findings of the 
study. The purpose of this chapter is to underline the more 
important aspects of the study.
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Chapter Nine sets out the major points gleaned from the 
analysis of the survey data. Major conclusions and some key 
tables are presented for discussion with implications of the study 
as a basis for further research.
Finally, the Appendix Section contains supplementary data, a 
glossary of terms, statistical tables, readings, and a 
bibliography.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
2.0 AIMS OF THIS CHAPTER
This chapter is divided into two main sections.
The first section offers a historical perspective on how 
strategy evolved from its military use into a discipline within 
the field of strategic management. It sets forth the various 
schools of business strategists and the major thrust in each of 
their arguments.
The second section moves chronologically. Its aim is to 
explore under what business conditions the core of strategic 
terms and concepts were created, and why strategic management is 
the preferred term to be used in the 1980’s.
This chapter provides a compendium chart (Table No. 1) 
depicting the evolution of strategic management. Its purpose is 
to provide a snapshot view of the major influences which caused 
the field to evolve from the pre-World War I era to the year 
2000. There is a discussion on the environmental factors in 
Appendix A which spurred the rapid development of this field and 
a glossary for the various types of business strategies in 
Appendix B.
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2.1 SECTION I -THE CONCEPTS OF STRATEGY
This section of this chapter reviews the overall traditional 
concepts of strategy, and outlines the difficulties in reducing 
the concepts of strategy to one single definition.
The difficulty in understanding strategy became evident over 
the past few years as increasing interest surfaced within the 
business community debating whether military planning could be 
used as an analogy for corporate planning.
To see signs of this interest as a military metaphor, one 
can turn to the business community which purchase books on the 
topic or to academics who pursue research on the effects of its 
strategic concepts. More significantly, many of the leading 
management schools and trainers have begun to offer strategic 
courses that promise to bring the lessons of the battlefield to 
the marketplace. This is relevant because military leaders and 
researchers have done more thinking about strategic principles 
than many business leaders and researchers.
The omission of many academics not to address or clarify 
the relationship of military strategy and business elements is a 
major flaw found in many studies of strategy. This is suggested 
and acknowledged by some business writers (Tilles, 1963; Jay, 
1967; Anthony, 1965; Cawood, 1984; Quinn, 1988) that a preamble 
on the parallels between the military and business should be 
included in the study of corporate strategy whenever possible.
To this point, Jay suggests., "the first transference to 
studying management terms is to read about military conflict". 
Anthony, in a similar vein, counsels... "the way military does 
strategic planning should be carefully explored (p.27) and... 
there is a tendency among business students and business leaders 
to leave out of their models, the dynamic impact of military
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principles "(p.156). Cawood projects.." although some 
contemporary writers (K. Weick) attack the military metaphor, but 
as executives struggle with change, more and more parallels 
emerge which are relevant" (p.62).
Supporting this, (Miles and Snow, 1978:249) also argue that 
early theory and research have largely ignored the process of 
relationship and the elements of strategy linking it to other 
variables. If strategy had been studied in a wider sense, then 
the various "schools of strategists" writing in the field of 
strategic management could be classified. This they feel would 
bring some stability and less confusion to the field.
2.2 DEFINITIONS OF STRATEGY
Perhaps the most interesting aspects of on what is to follow are 
those lessons to be gained from the ancient concepts of 
strategy. Precisely because they will illustrate how strategy 
evolved from one concept into three conceptual levels: (i)
leadership, (ii) logistics-the movement of supplies, and (iii) 
tactics.
Strategy is a discipline existing within the field of 
strategic management. It as a planning concept evolved from the 
military and the practice of warfare on three conceptual levels: 
objectives, operations, and tactics. In this context, it has 
been, traditionally, defined as the process of bring these 
elements onto the battlefield (Cushman, 1984).
As a concept, strategy was originally shaped in a military 
setting. It is derived from the Greek word, "stratego" which 
means to "lead an army or generalship" and the French word," 
strategie", meaning a plan or design for achieving one’s aims 
(Collier, 1985).
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Military strategy from an European perspective means the 
purposeful combining of tactics and logistics by acts of 
leadership to conduct an operation of warfare (Jones 1988:54, 
648). The term for "Leadership" indicates that it is an planning 
exercise of motivating, directing and executing affirmatively so 
others will follow voluntarily before the troops are in the field 
of battle.
" Tactics", on the other hand, implies an array of movement 
for directing the troops when they are in contact with the enemy. 
"Logistic" includes providing everything necessary from food to 
methods of comminication, and even rewards to induce one’s troops 
to win.
These terms from the military and their underlying concepts 
have come to be viewed as of having a direct value in the process 
of strategic business planning. Current definitions indicate that 
military strategy is in essence, "the determination and setting 
forth, a complete plan of war "(Cushman, 1987). In contrast 
corporate strategy is best defined as "a purposeful pattern of 
action, position and ploy and perspective" (Quinn, Mintzberg, 
1988:13).
These two definitions flow from a traditional definition 
(Jones, 1988) in which strategy has three purposes: Grand,
Combat, and Tactical. Grand strategy is for the purpose of 
gaining a political objective by military means using a broad or 
grand outline for the conduct of war. It is generally reflected 
by a type of declaration which is announced to all as to the 
intended purpose for warfare: foe or friend. By this
declaration, resources can be mobilized accordingly to one common 
objective; be it peace, retaliation or aggression.
Combat strategies are the movements of resources (troops) 
for a purpose of concentration or retreat. These can be
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overriding grand strategies and can be described in either a " 
defensively or offensively" context. They are best termed as 
defensive when one seeks to protect territories or offensive when 
the purpose is to invade another lands. Whilst tactics, the
lowest branch of strategy, involves the best type of activities
to be used when the conditions for combat change or are known.
They* generally, provoke short term and rapid action compatible
to actual battle conditions.
Strategies can be further distinguished as being either 
"persisting" or "raiding" ones. These are interchangeable with 
the terms of "direct or indirect " from the Asian school of 
warfare and "overt action or guerrilla" respectively from the 
European perspective of warfare (Clavell 1983; Jones 1988; 
Cushman 1987).
They are called "persisting" when one seeks to permanently 
occupy a territory. This strategy works best \dien one has 
superior forces or resources. Conversely, strategies are 
labelled "raiding" when the resources are limited and the goal is 
not to overthrow the enemy overtly. Its purpose, incrementally, 
is to penalize foreign troops occupying another territory and to 
reduce their resources.
The relationship of these four basic strategies are defined 
by the matrix in schematic 2.1 as shown on the next page.
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Persisting Raiding
Combat:
Logistic:
Schematic 2.1 (Source: Jones 1988, p.82)
From these four strategies, scores of permutations and variations 
of different strategies can be developed.
2.3 LESSONS FROM THE ANCIENT RULES FOR STRATEGY
An review of ancient strategy ( Jay, 1967; Jones, 1988; 
Clavell, 1983; Roberts, 1989; Griffith, 1963; Cushman,1987) 
indicated there were some common rules to be followed when a 
strategy is executed and for leadership to know.
For example, leadership has the explicit task of 
inspiring friends and discouraging enemies to a cause for waging 
war. It is an essential ingredient of leadership to recognise 
that most followers are not sequacious by nature and need to be 
galvanised into action. The selection of a reason for entering a 
war and how it will be used in attracting followers requires much 
forethought and explanation. The cause should be clear enough or 
the reputation of the leader great enough so others would support 
the war voluntarily. The ability to inspire by words or action 
should be exploited as a mean to mobilize others to follow. How 
leaders selected an objective and their abilities to convince 
others to follow are enabling elements flowing from the ancient 
concepts of strategy.
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Other lessons taken from ancient strategists reveal how 
strategy maybe formulated. For example, ancient leaders (e.g. Sun 
Tzu, Attila, Caesar, Alexander) believed that when troops were on 
home lands or retreating to home lands, they would fight more 
gallantly. Their strategies often encompass this belief.
Even their tactics for battle were based on similar types 
of beliefs. For example, they believed that the ratio of forces 
under their command when compared to the enemy dictated in many 
cases what the combat strategy would be: if the one’s forces are 
superior by a ratio of ten to one, the enemy would be surrounded 
(encirclement); if five to one, attack him; if twice as numerous, 
divide and attack from two sides at once (flanking); if equal in 
number, delay and use a raiding strategy until bad weather or the 
lack of supplies defeated the enemy (seige and delay).
In a logistic sense, efforts were made by the most 
successful leaders to ensure that their troops would have the 
fastest horses, strongest weapons and the best disciplined 
forces to win most of the time. Military games, sporting events, 
contests of endurance and strengths, and dances simulating hand- 
to- hand combat assured this readiness, even in times of peace. 
The axioms for battle conditions to be avoided indicated what 
strategy to be used; for example, troops were not to advance 
uphill against the enemy nor oppose them when they were coming 
downhill•
Other examples cited: were not to fight facing the enemy 
with a river at your back or facing the sun. A fair amount of 
planning and resources were used to ensure that the passage of 
all emissaries either to and from the enemy’s camps would be 
stopped as well as the bearers of supplies and information, 
these were important strategic elements in warfare.
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2.3.1 Riabliqg Rules of Ancient Strategy
Ancient military history (Jones 1988: 704-707) indicates 
that the "enabling" rules of strategy as axiomatic strategic 
definitions could be summarized as follows:
•Purpose for the war determined how troops will fight;
•sizes of opposing forces dictated the tactics to be 
used and the type of weapons to be deployed;
•the best-equipped army nearest homeland usually won; 
•conditions in \diich the battle is fought are critical; 
•information and supply lines must be controlled
It is possible to boil the problems and opportunities of 
strategy in ancient times down to one dichotomous decision: 
■vdiether a general should aim his forces at the enemy’s territory 
or at an advancing army. This decision forged the grand strategy 
for all other tactics and was adjudicated accordingly.
Equally important was whether a leader used a persisting or 
raiding strategy. Since it was believed that a persisting 
strategy was deemed superior to a raiding one, a guerrilla tactic 
would be used only as a last resort. The persisting strategy- 
being viewed here as a more formal method of strategy and the 
raiding strategy being viewed as one of informality. But, the 
ultimate strategy was the idea of "winning with the least 
effort"; this as an enabling rule guided many of the past 
commanders in how they decided among the alternatives and when to 
combine more than one method or strategy to win.
The literature also indicates how the cross bow became 
inferior to gun powder and so on to the effect that it was the 
advance of weaponry by the acts of innovation which changed the 
use of these enabling rules. Jones (1984:103) illustrated how the 
stirrup did more for military superiority than any strategy. This
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innovation made mediocre horsemen perform well because the
hazards of falling off were reduced when swinging a sword and
could increase the height above an opponent on foot by standing 
in them. Likewise when steel replaced iron, conferring the 
advantages of lighter and stronger weapons, the strategy changed.
To this point, Baker (1975:176) states "the best way to change 
the competitive situation of one's superiority over another, in 
both military and business struggles, is the use of innovation ". 
In simple terms, it was the advance of innovation which 
frequently led to a decisive outcome in ancient military 
struggles. This could be called the strategy of innovation.
2.4 STRATEGY INTO COMMERCE
Consistent to the language of war, commerce has adopted the
concepts of strategy. The following citations from the 
literature will illustrate this adoption. First, the renowned 
nineteenth century philosopher of war K. von Clausewitz (1976) 
wrote "war does not belong in the realm of arts and science
...rather we could more accurately compare it to commerce".
It was also the view of von Clausewitz that war has only 
one purpose as "a necessary means to pursue national self- 
interest, its objective being to vanquish the enemy by achieving 
unconditional surrender". On the other hand, Liddell Hart, the 
greatest twentieth-century military theorist, saw 'the objective 
of war to be a better state of peace' and was severely critical 
of Clausewitz's theory of total annihilation.
Although this issue of "destroy or be destroyed" is not 
popularly endorsed by contemporary business, it sets a tone for 
the ultimate grand strategy of commerce. This type of 
competitiveness is still present. As noted by Day (1984) the 
military analogy is most insightful "^ dien the objective of a
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strategy is first interpreted by the primary question is it best 
to achieve a peace or to annihilate the competition ?" (p.15). 
This type of dichotomous choice reflects the basic patterns of 
most grand strategies: attack or defend; compromise or conquer; 
lead or follow..so on.
Expressed in business terms, the grand strategy is when a 
firm has decided that it is best to enter a new business area or 
to stay in a current business position which would give them 
specific advantages.
Ideally, this occurs when a firm uses a grand offensive 
strategy to be in a high growth market, or defensive one to keep 
competitors away. Then, in either situation, they would use 
competences to protect its markets or defeat its competitors 
-sriienever possible by a strategy. Andrews (1965) refers to them 
as "Distinctive Competences of Advantages" which strategic 
positions are built upon or changed. He stated, " these 
advantages can normally be traced to one of three roots: (i) 
superior resources; (ii) superior skills; (iii) or superior 
position". They will be discussed later with some detail in 
Chapter Three.
Even today, business people and specialists have found it 
convenient to use these military terms to describe their modem 
day competitive situations (Kotler and Singh 1981). They are 
aptly used by the business literature to express in military 
terms when companies were engaged in price "wars" and the 
"capture" of each other customers (territories).
Whilst one can see how strategy has been incorporated by 
commerce from the traditional and military concepts of strategy, 
the question becomes what additional assumptions can be gained by 
this review to a better understanding of the role of strategy in 
the business literature?
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2.5 ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE ENABLING HJEMENTS OF STRATEGY
The next approach to understanding the assumptions about strategy 
from a wider perspective, is to review the various schools of 
writing on the enabling elements of strategy which the literature 
provides.
For that reason, what follows provides three separate and 
distinct sets of definitions for clarity.
The first is used to state general guide lines imbued in 
strategy by several definitions. For example, Porter (1980)
argues that competitive strategy involves " the positioning to 
maximize the value of competences that distinguish it from its 
competitors” (p.47).
The second set of assumptions deals with the selection of 
alternatives. To this point, Tilles (1963) believes "it is 
significant when organizations are faced with choices how it 
selects the best choice" (p.111). Ansoff (1965) maintains that " 
strategy is a set of decision-making rules for guidance or 
organisational behaviour based on conditions of ignorance, risk 
and uncertainty" (pp.119-20).
The third set deals with finding the strategic fit. Day 
(1984) claims strategy to be "the direction the organisation will 
pursue in getting a strategic fit within a chosen
environment" (p. 1).
From these contrasting definitions, strategy could be 
thought of as being just a steering device, since it is often 
portrayed in literature this way, or is it a concept (in both a 
descriptive and prescriptive sense) for guiding an organisation, 
loosely?
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Some theorists disagree with both definitions, (e.g. 
Ansoff 1984; Day 1984; Hamermesh 1986; Porter 1986), and suggest 
a strategy implies a commitment to action by a rationally-created 
plan with a formulation, implementation and evaluation stages.
This is the body of literature from the "rational- 
comprehensive school" which argues that the goal of a strategy is 
selected first and then adjusted by a constant stream of action 
and reactions to the stated goal. In the interim between the 
objective of the strategy and final action, this school believes 
that there is a continuous re-examination of one's objectives 
between other competitors, customers and suppliers. From this 
interplay, the purpose of strategy is to measure the progress 
being made in achieving the stated goal against these three 
forces. These may be called the enabling elements of the 
"rational school of strategists" and are examined accordingly:
2.5.1 Hiabling Elements of Strategy- Rational School
In a business sense from the first set of definitions above, 
the following underlying assumptions may be deduced as being 
"enabling elements" from those definitions above:
• market positioning is important;
. strategy is the best selection of choices;
. how resources are directed is critical;
. objectives should be clear and environment known;
• competitors and their strengths should be evaluated.
This school of management science theorists further set forth 
three basic assumptions: (1) that goals and objectives are
clearly identified and agreed upon; (2) that the strategist has 
access to complete information; and (3) that the selected 
strategy is rationally chosen by all members of the organisation.
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They believe that any final strategic decision made should be 
done in full awareness of all available feasible alternatives.
Their approach is rational, analytical and comprehensive. 
They vigorously contend that an analytical model developed 
including the needs of many parties will objectively set a 
better strategic goal. By this, they prophesied that only a 
strategic model will ensure adequate attention is given to the 
consequences of their decisions upon others.
The main flaw in their arguments which they begrudgingly 
agree to is that their modelling concept has some peccadilloes. 
First, they have to accept from time to time, circumstances 
preclude a decision-maker the luxury of awaiting for a strategic 
choice based on the output of a model or a chance to discuss it 
fully with others within their organisations. Conversely they 
argue such decision-making situations are rarely requiring rapid 
action and generally are not of the magnitude to affect a 
deliberately set objective made earlier. However, the lack of a 
dynamic mechanism to cope with a fast moving business environment 
is a major disadvantage of the rational approach of strategy- 
making.
2.5.2 Enabling ELements-Incrementalist School
The second set of definitions, \riiich reinforces the"enabling 
elements " for the concepts of strategy, is for the strategy to 
be flexible and for its objectives to be changeable at will. They 
can be summarized as:
•strategy should constantly be revised at will;
•uncertainty can never be overcome;
•strategy has an uneven stream of objectives.
Page 39
Strategy- Chapter Two
This set of definitions reflects the evanescent elements of 
strategy and that it is "a series of conscious and objective 
actions developed in a plan for an intended purpose which may 
be changed by a pattern of behaviour during the act” (Spender, 
1980; Pettigrew, 1987; Mintzberg 1985; Quinn 1988). They argue 
that plans and patterns can be quite independent of each other 
with the following distinctions: How objectives are realized 
(fulfilled) from their intended purposes are crucial. When plans 
are realized exactly as intended, they are "deliberate". When a 
pattern of action and plans are not realized exactly, they are 
"emergent" which are more descriptive of reality (Quinn: pp.14- 
6).
This "school of disjointed-incrementalism" directly challenged 
the views of the rational-analytical approach. These context- 
descriptive theorists argue that it is virtually impossible for 
a decision-making unit to have all of the facts to consider all 
of the alternatives .
They further argue that the most effective decisions are 
formed unintentionally on a day- by- day and a case- by- case 
basis. They feel a strategy "emerges" as a pattern in a 
disjointed stream of decisions.
The admitted weakness in their position is that the 
intuitive (recipe) and judgmental approach (rule of thumb) may 
discourage the decision-makers from using all of the managerial 
tools (computers, modelling, task forces, reports) available to 
them
2.5.3 Enabling Element -Situationalist School
Another and the third point of view is how the mission of the 
firm when objectively determined will direct the strategy. The 
"enabling" assumptions under this set of definitions indicate:
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•mission statement monitors the strategic goals 
•planning is not a substitute for action and change; 
•completeness is one of the objectives of planning; 
•information governs the human design of planning;
This set of definitions describes those who believe that 
strategy is an interactive process between analytical and 
intuitive issues. These theorists are best labelled as 
"situationalists". In theory versus practice, they do prescribe 
how the analytical component of a strategy should be larger than 
its intuitive component or, in an restated sense that it is a 
rationally-arrived at approach tempered by the realities of a 
situation.
They as contents-prescriptive specialists argue that 
decision-makers, who fail to integrate and digest both the 
analytical and intuitive issues will become "myopia-bounded", and 
eventually their organisations will become static and non­
entrepreneur ial .
The proponents of this strategic thinking (Miller and 
Friesen,1978; McGinnis, 1984) argue that over time top management 
will began to receive rencountered information away from formal 
planning sessions. Their subordinates will speak to them in the 
mode of a strategic language which is biased. For example, the 
communicators (subordinate managers) will talk about risk in 
terms of quantitative facts to an analytical manager devoid of 
the manager's intuitions about a situation; or will set aside 
the recommendations of a technical planning system in order to 
appeal to a recipe-directed manager by talking in industrial 
cliches.
The key feature of this set of definitions is that strategy 
should be devised separately from how it is implemented. The
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only overriding concern is that an attempt be made to make the 
strategy as complete a plan as possible.
Supporting this etymologically, Fowler (1988) states 
"strategy is generalship exhibited by a commander-in-chief 
planning before leading his forces into contact with the enemy, 
and tactics is the art of strategy after the forces are in 
contact with the enemy" (p. 593) It is only during the actual 
engagement that the original plan should be modified. When 
conditions change then, tactics change accordingly. So it is 
argued that the central feature of a plan is for it to be 
flexible. But every attempt should be made to ensure the plan is 
complete before engagement.
To this point of completeness, Von Neumann (1928, 1944, 
1953) argues "strategy is a complete plan specifying every 
possible choice in conformity to the pattern of information 
available at that time" (p. 79). This is the Game Theory Strategy 
which concerns itself with voluntary action based on 
information. Then an informed player will make a better choice 
when conditions change.
2.6 LESSONS FROM THE LITERATURE
As discussed above in the ancient military milieu, there is no 
single definition of strategy as a concept agreed upon in the
business literature. So it is important to understand how
commerce treats strategy as a concept.
By using three different sets of definitions, it is clear
that strategy could be defined in a holistic sense: by the
behaviour of its employee in an operational pattern; the 
completeness of its plans;, and the implied permission for an 
employee, in affirmatively sense, to act on new information
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provided that the objective of the strategy is clear and exact.
 ^ This is the process of " how to do it".
It is, also, perspicuous that the relationship between the 
different sets of definitions and its mission statement provide 
a perspective as to how a company will view its world. And based 
on this view, how its decision making units will act according to 
whether they are being threatened or seek to threaten others. 
The issue of resources at hand determines whether the firm will 
choose to use "attack, defence or delay " tactics as methods of 
strategy. These are some of the lessons from the past.
By seeking to understand the various definitions in their 
proper contexts, the concept of strategy is enriched. In the 
final analysis a strategy is a set of goals, no matter how 
loosely defined. The underpinnings for these assumptions are 
that it is the first role of leadership to ensure all players 
understand the overall strategic mission (goal) and are acting 
in concert to the same database of information and the 
willingness to let employees act differently when conditions or 
information change.
From the literatures in each of the schools of thought, there 
is an inplied attempt to develop a strategic theory. 
Individually or in combination, the development of such a theory 
still escapes this discipline as will be discussed below:
2.7 IN SEARCH OF A STRATEGIC THEORY
In the earlier quests for a strategic theory, most observers 
excavated terms and definitions from the field of economics. They 
began by using formulations such as achieving a gain in profits 
by either increasing market share or realizing cost savings 
using economies of scale.
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These in principle comprised two main strands of thought and 
research. One was "neo-classical". It was in 1921 that Knight 
et al first wrote of an implied relationship between economics 
and strategic competition. Hie took the theory of perfect 
competition to the austere extreme and asserted that a firm's 
strategic position was of little consequence. The terms of risk, 
and uncertainty were explained from the perspectives of 
consolidation and specialization. The basic theory stressed a 
strategy of efficiencies using a highly abstract analysis.
The other theory used the principles of a " realistic"
approach. This theory embraced some of the thinking of
economists (Berle, 1932; Robinson, 1933; and Bums, 1936) as
they expostulated how real-world roles determined ways in which a 
♦
firm ^performance could be improved strategically at the expense 
of competitors, suppliers and customers. A strategy should be 
used for a firm to become a monopoly or protect its market 
position by making the entrance barriers too high for new 
competitors.
2.7.1 Attempts To Formulate A Strategic Theory
As discussed above, it is from this ferment of rethinking and 
rhetoric during the 1930's that the topic of strategy began to 
appear in need of a theory. It took some three decades as a 
field before any new theories on strategic concepts began to 
appear in the I960's.
Ansoff (1968) was the first to argue that by examining the 
micro-economic theory of a firm in a competitive environment, a 
relationship between input and output factors can be manipulated 
strategically in a way to maximize the profits of a firm.
This could be used as a strategic theory, but he had to 
agree that this theory does not explain how a firm may have
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other strategic objectives other than profits. He attempted to 
disprove those views which contended that strategic behaviour has 
so many variables that an expected output from these variables 
cannot be predicted.
Ansoff argues that it is not the identification of the 
strategic factors or the classification of variables which is 
the problem. He was able to prove that the important variables 
(information, behaviour, objectives) could be isolated. And that 
they could be classified in either a descriptive or prescriptive 
way, but a specific relationship between these variables is what 
is needed.
The literature is able to supply an context-descriptive 
theory of the missing relationship of a firm having objectives 
other than profits. The missing element for variables between the 
theoretical formulation of this relationship was modelled by 
Cyert and March (1963). On a purely descriptive dimension, they 
argued that a relation can be modelled between strategic action, 
information and behaviour. But in the real world, in a 
prescriptive sense, data on a strategic theory can not be 
quantified because of the long lead time between a strategic 
action and its outcome. Thus, there is not a complete strategic 
theory in which a strategy for innovation can be tested.
SECTION H-STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
This section introduces strategic management, and how it evolved 
from military practice into a field of management.
2.8 DEFINING THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
Whilst the roots of strategy may go back over 2,000 years as 
a cognitive skill, strategic management and business policy are 
current and fast-developing fields of study. These disciplines
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looked at firms as a whole and attempt to explain why some firms 
develop and thrive \diilst others stagnate and go bankrupt. As a 
field of study, it focuses on analysing the environmental 
problems and opportunities faced by people in top management.
It is still best to view strategic management as a field of 
managerial practice rather than a series of theories. Even 
though, it is currently defined " as the process of agreements 
reached by top management about how the company should determine 
long-term goals and how should position itself to take advantage 
of future market opportunity and to outdo its competitors " 
(Chandler, 1962; Andrews, 1981). This view that it is a practice 
rather than a theory is based on several, different reasons:
First, as discussed earlier, throughout its history, this 
field is comprised of disciplines rather than theories. Whilst it 
is accepted as beginning with American management practice in the 
1950fs, Whyte (1930), a British writer, outlined its principles 
much earlier, when he stated: " Any great industrial enterprise 
needs a vision of some distant goal, and a planning expedition 
for the struggle against human inertia and material 
difficulties". Since then, there had been little attention in the 
business literature to the formulation of a theory.
Second, The development of strategy as a field of study has 
been sporadic due to the failure of many academics to recognise 
the significance of its concepts until after World War II, and 
the inabilities of its practitioners (strategists) to effect an 
organisational change sought by many top managers in the late 
1970's.
The demission of corporate planners began when strategy 
professionals, at that time, failed to project unforeseen 
environmental changes (oil prices increases, the rise of 
international competitors). These caused a turning away by many
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multinationals firm from a strategic method of planning to a 
business portfolio method of planning. This attitude by top 
management and theorists on "corporate strategists" lasted until 
the middle 1980's.
Top management did not make the change directly. Instead 
they diplomatically distanced themselves from the planners. These 
strategists sensed the distancing on the part of top management 
and adapted by producing more complete analyses, hoping to 
satisfy their superiors. The top managment, in turn, saw the more 
complete studies as excess paper. Only in the late 1980's has 
there been a renaissance in the development of strategic 
management. However even using its elements of planning from the 
1900's to its international business practice of today, this 
field of study still lacks an overall strategic theory.
Third, the failure of current writers and theorists to 
recognize and write about the concepts of strategic planning as 
they developed in commerce. For example, as a practice, several 
American executives (i.e. Henry Ford, Alfred Sloane, and Pierre 
Du Pont) were using the principles of strategy in the 1920's and 
throughout the 1940's without it being labelled as such. There 
was a group of authors (Barnard, 1938; Newman, 1948) writing 
about planning principles. However, they wrote more of the 
process of setting objectives rather than addressing strategy as 
a concept.
Early writers, such as Professor Newman of the Columbia 
Business School for example, defined strategy "as a follow-up 
plan to evaluate the anticipated reactions of customers, fellow 
executives and suppliers" He never addressed the process of 
planning as approaching a concept of management or attempted in 
literature to separate it from the other duties of an 
administrator. In short, this was more about explaining the
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concepts of Fayol (1961) as the elements of administration rather 
than strategy as a managerial process.
2.8.1 Hie Development of Strategic Management Principles
It was not until much later that the genesis of strategy as a 
managerial process was first academically implied by a business 
writer. This was done by Drucker (1954) in the framing of his 
question to managers by asking " Do you know what is your main 
business and what business you should be in? And when you 
answering this question, all else should follow".
Yet, it was some ten more years before the first wave of 
American writers (Alfred Chandler, 1962; Kenneth Andrews, 1965) 
focused explicitly on the concept of strategy, followed by 
writers in the European context (Igor Ansoff, 1965; Robert 
Heller, 1967; Kenneth Taylor, 1971).
However as a concept, it was Chandler (1962) in his 
seminal research of structure and strategy that first broached 
the concept of strategy by stating, "strategy is the 
determination of long-term goals and the allocation of resources 
necessary to carry them out".
But it was Andrews, who first combined the procedural 
thinking of Drucker, the current practice of some managers, and 
Chandler's concept of strategy into current usage by stating, 
"corporate strategy is the pattern of decisions in a company that 
determines its goals, reveals its objectives, and produces a 
policy for achieving those goals... it is an organisational 
process inseparable from the culture, structure, and behaviour of 
a company "(pp.l- 4).
Ansoff, on the other hand, defined strategy as the "common 
thread" combining a company activities, growth vector,
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competitive advantage, synergy of joint efforts and its 
products /markets interface (p.163). A definition encompassing 
most of the principles of strategic management.
2.8.2 The Terms and Hie Role of Strategic Management
From these contrasting views, strategic management as a field 
of study has been labelled at various times "policy­
making", "strategic planning" and "business strategy". Even today, 
the definition of strategy hinges on whether it is a broad goal- 
setting focus (Andrews) or a narrow one (Ansoff); whether there 
are many separate components (Ansoff) or is just a process of 
thinking strategically (Andrews).
From the sample of writings above, the general area of 
strategy shows that the practice of strategy has been changing, 
and the search for terms and definitions goes on. As the subject 
area has become broader, the problem of choosing job titles /areas 
of expertise has become more difficult, and the agreement on 
common terms seems to be more remote.
After some seventy-five years of being practised, the term 
"strategic management" has evolved to be the preferred 
nomenclature by the majority of its practitioners and subject 
matter specialists. For example, business policy as a term 
traditionally associated with the course in business schools is 
no longer accepted by researchers (Glueck and Jauch, 1984:4). 
This was confirmed when the American Assembly of Collegiate 
Schools of Business (1976) strongly suggested that accredited 
schools teach strategic management rather than business policy. 
Gradually from that point on, the term -strategic management- has 
been deemed to be more precise to the role representative of the 
task which "business strategy makers" will play throughout the 
1990's (see Appendix A for a discussion of professionals' 
attempts to adopt the term). It was the beginning of a trend.
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2.9 MAJOR INFLUENCES
Like everyone else, managers in companies react to trends. These 
trends represent a particular application of strategic influences 
which were coming into vogue by the most forward-thinking 
managers rather than as the most dominant managerial practice. To 
give a historical perspective on the rise of each of these major 
influences on strategic management within a period of time that 
they first appeared, Table No. 1 was constructed. Any 
projections of the key strategic thrust and methods to be used 
by managers shown on this Table 1 from 1990 through the year 
2000 are speculative. This is not the case in the time periods 
from the 1900's through 1980.
Very little of the literature provides any indication as 
to how strategy was developed. Drucker attempted it in his book 
on management (1973) to piece together a picture how management 
in general was developed. But it is the research of Chandler 
(1977) that indicates that a combination of trends that overall 
developed the field of management and business strategy. Using 
this as a research map, five factors seem to be the major trend­
setters. They are reflected in Table No. 1 on the next page.
The five dominant influences arising in each period were as 
follow: (1) Product-Market Composite; (2) Emerging Organisational 
Structure; (3) Key Governance Process; (4) Most Popular 
Management Model; and (5) The Number of Business Schools. These 
were, further, developed from a number of writers (Chandler, 
1977; Adams, 1986; Quinn and Mintzberg, 1988; Drucker, 1973). The 
interplay between each of them as influences either enhanced or 
developed strategy-making from a primitive "trial and error" 
process to one of concepts and principles. In short, they are 
contextual factors for the rise of strategic management.
Page 50
Ta
bl
e 
I.
 
TH
E 
EV
OL
UT
IO
N 
OP
 
ST
RA
TE
GY
 
AS
 
A 
TO
PI
C 
OV
ER
 
TH
E 
PA
ST
 
NI
NE
TY
 
Y
E
A
R
S
Stcategy*”Chapber Two
Ob
o r o 0 O O
OT CO >««* i n «/■' O O O
•  CO J 2: CO O O O
o u o CM L i 3
a s  z  o L i
M  E O JC
< - > « u e L i 03
»s\ d  co L i c L i
L i  03 <c L i 3 3
oc c L i CJ CJ
c c  — a (4 re
3 L i L i  CJ • 4 CJ 3  C re
V c L i L i 3  «e L i  3 C  L i L i
L i 0 . 3  — CJ CJ C  L i CJ 3 re l i 3
£ - J  O  n c CD Cl >  Cl Cl
a> r  • n i l 3  • L 01 L i  —* Li
—4 0; 1 L i I L L -  OS L i  Cl L i U l i H c  reL i
s l i  0 CJ 0 L i C a  « :  c c  1 • re CJ c C
u O — u r  u O  «  — C  c: O re j r  c —  s o CJ
«• 1 <*-! —  d  re 03 c.* l» O  3  E  - * L i  E  o c  0 re re —
H c 05 - J J-> 1 CJ L i  C  C  • —i  5J CJ L i «  cj L i  L i U  CC L l •
os as 0 03 L i c c s >  L i  3 L i  L i  OS I? L i OC XT L l c i re cj 3
<  w ■^4 a i c cj c  o r L i C  O CJ —i  (L CJ a: re cj C E E u
j  r  co 05 0 re L i x CJ L i  Cl c  e  c  3 c  c  3  c c j re 3 0
a  u  j » O — 3 3  C S'. O  CJ 3 ^  «  3 ei re c  3 O  £  L i CJ
a .  u  fa] -^4 Li cj a  c  c 3  U  <0 fa i L i  e  cj 0 £  re L -
O  <  c> r CL CO «C C  s CO U L i
a -  2:  c
- * <  £
« r  £ L i
e
«  CJ c
*—» r v L i •  CJ re 0
fC 05 C  CJ 00<Li L v  —
—  u CJ «J faS CJ •  0) JC l i
c ; —4 c Li >■> .- u  0 >« 01 u > *  0 re
C  J-> 0 C  05 CJ L I 3  3  <C C JC l i  L i ^ 3  —  c
O  — S  f f  L I Os CJ C E  C L i  > E  L i
3  —  CJ 3  C  4> L i  -  E 1-4 03 CJ L l —  " L  ci 03
00 a j  O c .  oc C  CJ O  C  L l u 0 l i  re c i O  03 L i L i
O  CO •*4 CL 05 L l w i  *7^ 3  s L i O  O  O u  c> L l 05 U  Cl C re
>4 z  c/3 05 L i  —• O  LI r S3 Li l i L i  03 L i L i  J it  L i L i  3  — faS
00 <  w *-* v5 —  O u  s i r L i O  —• c  u  3  U C  L i C  L i c  — i i
w  z  c 3 (L i —> LJ LJ L i  L i  (Li O  CJ C  CJ 0 re 0 0 0 re fa i re
«  0 c r  u 0  3 C  er 3 C  L i O 0  3  0  3 0  e  c j <Li 0  >  0 s
' s M a 0 <c u  X O «  C O  CJ L.
n  >  cu <  2 a .  « 0  e  C5 0  3  3
w O
U
—
0 3 V
— 1 CJ re 3 re
— u  c L i L i C  CJ L i
* 3  5 <T c JS 0 05 • L  i-L
O  L. re 0 fS C X  1 c L l L i  M i re re —
0 z —  0 c  1 C O - i  - 4  O O L i  - i 3  l  re
z  0 j r  xj re > . O L i U  L i  - 4 a  re re X  u £
u w U a  co u  — M i o: L i  L i  L i L i  C  l i CJ E  O
( J H s Li C - —> 4-J L i C  3  C CJ L l L i Z  CJ —
os <  3 <0 0? 0 e CJ > z  z  z Z  CJ E CJ 0
oa co H > • L  3 u  re c L i L i  CJ CJ
r  —  0 0 0) O LJ fa. 3 e C  CJ 3
W  Z  3 < •p* c fa. L 3  '— —  03
«  as OS ST m3 fa ] «3 03 LJ
— '  U  f - O L i L i re
N  K  « 3 CJ CJ OS fa] JS
w  O < 1 CJ t c 3 3  C t r 0 CJ -  L i
00 3  C  03 0 3 3  L i 03 L i 0 >  03 re
OS - U  —i  4J 0 C  ' L O  OC CJ CJ £ —  Cl £
3 L i  — a  -  9 r L i L i L l C X  CJ -3S 08 L l  CJ
CO O  X 3  JS 3 a  - i 3  o B0 CJ 3  L i CJ J re —  —
> -  H V 3  E r  u  u 0 c  <c a 3  >  re 3 < >  >  re
u  u CO W > 3  O a  cj a z 3  C  C <i? 0 0 O 3  L i E  L i t - i C  L l c
b ]  XC 3 L i O  — L i  r  e L i CJ L i  O O > £ e  a i l » oe E  re 0
H  OS O ? u  e r 05 3 z L i  L i L i < 3  —1 »J5 0 05 Cl 05 S c  re —
<  <  fa] — «u U fid O . CJ C __‘ z L i  (0 L i OS L i L i  03 U CJ 3  3 OJ L i  L i
K t H O p-4 T <2 L i 03 3  L i f t < L i  z  (S 05 0 re o  a j l » > • i j  3  3 z vc  re
H  1 — M 3  L i O ft) —. L i a - 11 a s O cr s  l i 3 3  >  ~ i  s j Li fas »  C fa] >» E
CO H  CO O  *-» £ —  —■ a> 0 L 1 O o . L i *  l i  CJ < C  O J ' . ' C H —> 03 3  —• OS L i  05 L i
CJ 0 bo —* X 00  X  .V < - < 3  — C) CJ CJ J-' ao re c  re L. 3 JE 3  — 3 . c  3  re
3 - 3  0 . as U  05 C  CJ Li n? P  "J u 1 >  C  LJ L i os «j  c  u  re < OC O  L i 3 fa] f t :  0 l i
w  0 £ t c —  0  « U v  u  e L i  —  C  X 3 CO —• t/5 E a L i  O  O  C OS —  0 E
V  0 0 «e «£ < C/3 —  E 3 J  -1 z 0 c  —  L i  E 03 < E  t . " Z  re fc E  —
OS U < fa] Z
.  a . > - 00 00 re J fcO fa]
— os » OS <
< fid 3 J z H
H £ CO < 0 O Z
t—■ w z Li fa]
J X tc c CO OS ■J
Li fiu z L i CO 0 <
z w — CO fa] 0 >
a * s L i b i E > i
9, H 0 > O 3 O
0 5 •< ee < O
0 fa] £ 0 a . 3
O ' .. .. O ..
| O 0 0 O O
O CM < r sD O' O
u <7> O ' O ' O' O
Page 51
Ta
bl
e 
ad
ap
te
d 
fr
om
 
te
rm
s 
an
d 
co
nc
ep
ts
 
of
 
J.
 
Q
u
l
n
n
/
M
l
n
t
z
b
e
r
g
(
l
9
8
8
)
; 
R.
 
Mi
le
s 
(1
98
5)
; 
an
d 
R
.A
da
in
s(
19
85
)
Strategy1- Chapter Two
The table, on the previous page, uses the following 
contextual factors as taken from the literature. For example, 
Chandler described the product-market composite as "the centre 
core of activities from which a firm received most of its 
revenue"; Quinn/ Mintzberg indicated that the organisational 
structure is "the type of relationship in how technology, span 
of control, and operations were structured "; Mintzberg wrote 
that the governance process "reflected the chief control and 
direction by the way that a strategy would be judged".
The other two contributing factors were from Adams, who 
indicated that the management models were "the most up-to-date 
methods in how managers, generally, operated or reflected the 
training in how they should operate"; and from Drucker, who wrote 
how the number of business schools "by their growth inplied the 
level of sophistication and standardization of strategy being 
taught to future strategy-makers".
Overall, the table shows how each influence has an unique 
context; how the managers' perceptions and interpretations of 
the contextual factors in each period influenced their method of 
strategy and the results being sought. The description for each 
period is as follows:
2.9.1 The Periods Preceding 1900: Military & Religious
Bureaucracy Period. These periods were best characterised as when 
strategy was used as the military parlance for warfare and
political control. It could be stated that it was taught in some 
form or other since the birth of civilization, but it was first
documented as being done by Sun Tzu two and a half thousand
years ago. Its importance as a topic of study goes back to 1513 
when Nicolo Machiavelli in his counsel to the Prince, Lorenzo De 
Medici stated .... "he , who rules others shall have no other aim 
or thought for study than war and its rules "(chapter XIV).
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Strategy, in this period, was primarily a military device 
for the seizure of land and wealth. For these reasons, the key 
products and markets used were labelled agricultural (i.e. tea, 
land, cotton) and extractive ( i.e. gold, iron and silver). They 
were periods of religious crusades (into Palestine in 1099) and 
European warfare. Their purposes as a strategic process were to 
conquer, in the acquisitional sense, the land and goods of others 
for either God, king or country. The strategy-making was done by 
those who gained their power by a hierarchical structure using a 
downward span of control.
The power to manage being delegated by either a royal birth, 
legacy, church or military organisation, and symbolized by those 
carried in a gestatorial (ceremonial) chair. The literature 
indicates that its management style would be labelled as 
"missionary", for it operated based on an common ideology, had 
little specialization of skills, and was decentralized 
( Quinn/Mint zberg, 1988).
Up through the medieval ages into the 1900's, revolutions in 
industry, and agriculture converted the need for strategy from a 
military use to a commercial one.
It was in this period that the growth of markets were made 
possible by larger ships and improved highways which permitted 
the efficiency of an expended division of labour. Productivity 
was aided by such development as steam power, electricity and 
improved metal working. Scientific and mechanized agriculture 
increased output and the efficiency of labour in food production. 
However, markets were local, and shops were small in scale and 
workforce. This was the general pattern of commerce until World 
War I.
After the 1900's, the Table is calibrated into six 20 years 
periods. These periods are not to be exact and may overlap by 5
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to 10 years. The key governance process within each period
reflected the most dominant type of strategy being produced at 
that time. What follows is a succinct summary of each.
2.9.2 The Period of 1900-1920: Entrepreneurial Mode. This 
period up to World War I, began the rise of large-scale 
organisations which were mostly managed by entrepreneurial
individuals or their families. The product was generally a single 
product and the markets were regional.
The key governance process was profits at any cause and 
managed by the principles of Fredrick Taylor "where employees 
were viewed as economic units". The first business school, Amos 
Tuck Business School of Dartmouth College, was established in
1901 where business policy (strategy) as a topic was first
taught. It was followed shortly by the Wharton School of Commerce 
and the Harvard Business School. In this mode, strategy-making 
was dominated by the active search for new opportunities using 
big bold steps.
2.9.3 Period of 1920-1940: Machine Bureaucracy Mode. This period 
ushered in the standardization of work and management. It was 
because products became more sophisticated and were multi-lines 
with some international markets and the expansion of national 
markets.
Also, the basic organisation became functional and was 
controlled by master plans as prepared by analysts. The analyst 
assumes major planning responsibility alongside the manager. 
Factory workers were being recruited from the agricultural 
sector into an industrial economy which used apprenticeship 
schemes as the prevailing management models for increased 
productivity.
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Strategy-making was directed more to how the firm could 
gain a better strategic fit with its business environment which 
was now becoming more hostile and competitive.
2.9.4 The Period of 1940-60: Divisional- Planning Mode. The
diversification of product and customers became evident in this 
period. Organisation became more complex with three or more 
layers of management.
The management focus was more analytical using profit and 
cost centres for control and growth. Special training for front 
line supervisors and the staffing of technical personnel in 
areas such as marketing, accounting and engineering was the 
management model. Strategy-making was, mostly, geared to the 
defence of regional markets and expansion into national markets.
2.9.5 The Period of 1960-80: Professional Bureaucracy. In this 
period was the rise of administration and the specialization of 
skills. They were created because existing products had to be 
standardised for increasing demands and new products had to be 
developed for an increasingly more complex and technically- 
advanced global market.
In this period, strategy-making became one of the skills 
being required for better internal coordination of multi­
divisional structures. To meet this demand, professional managers 
were now being hired from business schools in growing numbers and 
placed over multi-structured organisations using market, 
product and regional control systems. The thrust was a 
combination of growth and expansion strategies. They were used 
for either acquisitions, vertical and/or horizonal 
integrations of customers and suppliers from national markets 
into international ones.
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2.9.6 The Period of 1980-2000: Adhocracy and Adaptive Mode.
The business environment in this period is projected to continue 
on a rapid and complex ascent by the pressures of new and 
international competitors.
It is further projected that expertise will require the 
hiring of specially-trained staff with international experience 
in the areas of management, finance, production, and planning to 
cope with the rising uncertainty of international markets. 
Flexibility and adaptability will be the dominant factors used in 
the setting of goals and reacting to problems.
Decisions will increasingly be made by both the 
departmental heads of functions and production. Freedom will 
start to be given to divisions located in off-shore operations to 
make production and service decisions, but the headquarters will 
continue to have control over most marketing and financing 
departments. The network is becoming moderately flexible, and 
decisions will be centralised with power being given to experts.
These everts, whose knowledge and skills have been highly 
developed in training programmes and business schools, will be 
controlled by an extensive international communication system. 
Strategy-making will become more fragmented, more flexible, and 
enable local divisions to react decisively to the newest or 
strongest threat arising from the environment.
2.9.7 The Year 2000: Polyvalent- Entrepreneurial Mode.
Management in this period must deal with the short term problem 
of rapid change, whilst developing more innovative products. 
Competition will become tougher,ever changing as the customers 
become more sophisticated in specifying value over cost. Due to 
the levelling effect of technology, smaller firms will be able 
to compete head on with larger ones. Downsizing and restructuring
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into smaller units by many of the larger international firms will 
take place.
Contemporary writers (Peters, 1987:31; Waterman, 1989:102) 
estimate that up to 75 percent of most larger firms1 middle 
managers will be reduced and the lead time for developing new 
products to market will be slashed by some 90 percent. Risk- 
taking, entrepreneurship, independent action and flexibility will 
be the chief modes of management • Employees will be expected to 
be polyvalent- able to deal simultaneously with current and 
future problems at the same time.
In his vision of the future, Handy (1989) projects that a 
significant amount of the workforce within some firms will become 
self-employed and hired through personal contracts. Others in 
the workforce will be hired and trained for their 
entrepreneurial and technical skills.
Based on Handy, the governance process will be to seek new 
opportunities and competitive advantages by more and better 
innovation. Worldwide operations will be completely autogenous 
from one workstation to another; using a flexible and linked 
(nexus) organisational structure with one project manager 
reporting to another.
In this period, all aspects of a project will be 
distributed all over the world building on values indigenous to 
certain areas of the globe. For example, a product may be 
designed in North America, manufactured in Thailand, tested for 
quality in Japan, assembled in Germany and sold in Britain. It 
will be later serviced by a subsidiary of the parent company. 
This is the type of linked project manufacturing-service company 
being forecasted in the year 2000 by the studies at Boston 
University (Miller et al,1983).
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This international dimension of production, communication 
and operations will be linked by computers, and joint cooperative 
agreements forced upon them by knowledgeable customers ( e. g. 
airbus, motor car). The emerging management model will be for 
employees to be granted freedom to innovate and experiment on 
company time. The overall organisational structure will be 
extremely flexible and training will be offered to combat 
obsolescence and to stimulate innovation amongst the workforce.
It is projected that strategy-making will be punctuated and 
multi-layered to provide a series of co-ordinal technological, 
behavioural, and human resource strategies to combat occupational 
obsolescence. Discussion of the strategic elements to be used by 
this mode will be illustrated in Chapter Five.
2.10 DISCUSSION ON BON BUSINESS STRATEGY WAS DEVELOPED
The literature (Chandler, 1977) describes how major impetus in 
the development of strategic management owed its origins largely 
to rapid and hostile changes being faced by businesses.
These hostile changes go as far back as the 1920’s and 
intensified through the 1940's. It was in this twenty year 
period of fluxion that strategy became recognized as being 
important and useful to the conduct of business. Business 
concepts before this period were directed more to functional and 
task specializations.
The period of time as exhibited in Table No.l, (1920-40: 
MACHINE BUREAUCRACY) was the watershed for strategy development 
and awareness. This was the period when the business environment 
became increasingly more competitive.
Out of a body of literature including the research of 
Forrester (1961); Chandler (1977); Smith (1963); and Ansoff
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(1965) there seem to be nine different factors with a direct 
bearing on the need for gaining a better strategic perspective 
within the field of management • They range from factors in the 
environment to the development of strategy as a discipline within 
the field of management, and are discussed in the Appendix 
Section of this study.
These factors as ranked in importance were:
1. Business Environment became more hostile.
2. The spread of foreign markets and operations.
3. Unforeseen decline of markets and products.
4. Rise in technical and pecuniary economies theories.
5. Investment cycles became longer and risk greater.
6. Organisational structure became more complex.
7. Management education providers increased.
8. Wealth-creation opportunities in management,
9. Standardization of strategy as a managerial tool.
A combination of these factors, therein, forced business 
leaders to use more rational approaches in their efforts to 
understand, control and exploit these changes.
The major development of this discipline was the 
recognition by corporate planners in the 1980fs that the 
nomenclature of being "a planner rather than a manager "was 
misleading and by its continuous use isolated the planners from 
the mainstream of management. It is in the ADHOCRACY MODE that 
the proponents of strategic planning began to question the 
overall effectiveness of its practice, and to concentrate 
academically and professionally on the search for an overall 
theory.
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2.11 Summary
The literature on military strategy offers a series of enabling 
rules as to how strategy should be executed. However, it was the 
acts of innovation (stirrup, and improved weaponry) which changed 
the strategic superiority of one force over another. This 
supports the argument that a strategy of innovation is the 
ultimate strategy for changing the rules of competition.
This chapter also shows that the field of strategic 
management is not contained in any applied science, but its core 
ideas are now being incorporated into industrial organisation 
research and is one of the central fields in modem business 
theory and practice. The field of strategy is best described by 
Hofer (1984) who explained how the field must now concern itself 
with two main cores of study.
The first core of strategic management should deal with all 
aspects of strategy formulation and execution; and the second 
being the macro-organisational design and behaviour pattern of 
managers in a business situation. These two core ideas give a 
guide to how a strategic paradigm within the boundaries of this 
field should be designed.
In the managers' quest for answers, the chapter outlined 
how attempts were made academically to formulate a strategic 
theory. In short, the stakeholders in business increased from the 
will of the few to the concerns of many. The understanding gained 
here as to how the field of strategy was developed will become 
increasingly more important as the need for all types of firms to 
innovate becomes the new thrust in the field of strategic 
management.
This chapter provides a strong contextual background to the 
development of this thesis. This review of the literature
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indicated how the convergence of the factors discussed in 
Appendix A, and business conditions in the early 1900fs 
intensified the efforts of modem business managers to develop a 
study of strategy. It also discusses as to how by 1930, strategy 
evolved into a a tool for managers to acquire, expand or merge 
their firms more competitively than in the 1920's.
Up through this period, the general thinking about 
strategic issues varied little from the first article on the 
topic written in the Harvard Business Review (1922), descriptive 
on what has been done or prescriptive on what should be done. 
Either way, the planning styles were, by and large, 
retrospective in nature.
Further, the researchers, in the past, precluded the 
consideration of widely differing options, resulting in an 
intellectual planning strait jacket of concepts. Their analytical 
approach was based on decimal points and consolidation of 
disciplines, but not on the strategic direction needed for the 
future. A strategic approach requiring the need for innovation 
and flexibility was often missing in their planning schemes. They 
failed to understand that a corporate strategic profile should be 
considered only as the initial steps in a competitive strategy. 
It is secondary to the drafting and negotiating of a mission 
statement which must be articulated to and understood by all 
employees. The mission statement will then form the unifying 
thread for strategic implementation as stated by Ansoff.
By contrast, current researchers (e.g. Hofer, Glueck and 
Jauch, Tilles, Quinn) indicates that strategic management 
includes formulation, and implementation, plus evaluation and 
control. They focus on how the mission of the corporation 
derived from the interaction of internal and external 
environmental factors, modified by the needs and values of top 
management is the key strategic ingredient. They argue how a
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precise statement of mission is needed to guide the firm in the 
setting of objectives and the formulation of strategy and 
policies. Then, strategy is implemented through specific 
programmes, budgets and procedures. They understand that 
corporate strategy and business policy only explore the ways a 
firm can develop a "portfolio strategy" for its many activities.
They, now, believe that a firm needs three levels of 
strategy- corporate, business, and functional- to form a 
hierarchy of strategy interacting for a firm to be successful. It 
is by the monitoring of these separate strategies that management 
can evaluate its performance toward future, not just the 
formulation.
It was during these periods (from 1920 through the 60 fs as 
exhibited in Table 1 that the field of strategy developed from 
a single concept of planning into a multi-purposed one dealing 
with uncertainty by using an overall organisational approach to 
solving strategic problems. However, it was not until the
rise of professionalism era in the 1960 * s that the field of 
strategic management was stimulated. A force created by the 
needs of management and an increasing complex business 
environment. As businesses in the USA and other developed 
countries flourished, the number of business schools 
proliferated, growing from three in the nineteenth century to 50 
by 1920, and to 85 by 1940. The emergence of a need for this new 
skill became the major reason why many entered business schools. 
It was when managers sought a greater variety of systems that 
there was a rise in the field of strategic management.
2.11.1 Implications Arising
From the literature review, it is clearer now why the present and 
future climates of change require more dynamic models than those 
used previously. It, also, indicated how that strategic models
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in the future will require more stimulation from innovation and 
more entrepreneurial acts by all employees to a specific mission.
Discussions will be presented in the following chapters and 
in the Appendix section on how the "nescient principle "(a belief 
that most top managers will be operating in ignorance) governs 
when managers totally start to believe in either the analytical 
school or the intuitive schools of strategy. And how the 
sovereignty principle is the" supreme element" (as to what type 
of business and experience the firm has previously been 
successful in) will dictate how strategic choices are selected 
(Andrews 1965: quoting Stephenson (1976) states that "the
knowledge and experience of the firm are the truly key links 
which determine a firm's core competences"•
These principles which form the basis for this research 
raise questions such as:
i) Is there one principle or a series of patterns as to 
how a strategy for innovation will be developed?
ii) What are the enabling elements a manager should
incorporate into a successful strategy for innovation?
iii) Is a strategy for innovation (change) different from 
one of growth or one of profit?
To these questions, the elements which are needed to have 
the most enabling type of strategy will be argued elsewhere in 
this thesis. It will be argued that there are up to nine 
"enabling" elements for a successful strategy, especially in the 
development of an innovation.
Research indicates that the key five elements are: (1) The 
mission statement is the sovereignty element in which all
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alternatives are evaluated; (2) Most plans are incomplete unless 
employees at every level are trained to communicate without bias 
about what is happening in their environment; (3) The company 
should have a plan to combat occupational obsolescence so 
innovation can occur when an employee has time away to learn; (4) 
The company should have funds allocate for the specific 
investigation and development of innovation; and (5) The 
strategy should be able to reward all types of employees that 
contribute with new ways and be willing to bend to internal 
forces as well as external ones.
Central to all of these sets of definitions is the need to 
mobilize others to a plan which includes as much information as 
possible. The presence of certain factors ( goals, base of 
information, mission statement, action) constitute a strategy 
whether it is a process, concept or plan. A strategy, at its 
best, can provide a degree of certainty that one is acting 
"proactively" in an uncertain environment, but it is not a 
guarantee of success.
Hopefully, the next stage of development within the field 
of strategic management will concern itself as to how change, 
innovation, and entrepreneurship will take leading roles which 
will assist in the development of a strategic theory. This is one 
of the central themes in this thesis.
In support of this theme, the nine strategic elements, as 
outlined above, were developed into specific questions \diich were 
dispersed throughout the questionnaire. The linkage of these 
questions will determine whether or not each respondent is truly 
using a formal strategy. The construction and reference for these 
strategic elements are shown in Exhibit No. 1 and in the 
Supplementary Ghart- Exhibit 1A on the next page.
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CHART EXHIBIT IA
LINKING STRATEGIC ELEMENTS TO QUESTIONNAIRE IN EXHIBIT No. I
Topic:
Disciplines:
Elements:
Levels:
Schools:
Field:
Essential Principles:
Nine Strategic Elements as 
enumerated [ ] on Questionnaire:
[21] [14]
Business Corporate Functional
Classic
Adaptive
Content
Normative
Intuitive
Recipes
Context
Processual
Rational
Analytical
Incremental
Patterns
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
-Analysis
-Formulation
-Implementation
-Evaluation
-Objective
-Mission
-Weaponry
-Logistics
-Training
-Concentration
-Surprise
-Information
-Goals
-Policy-making
-Core Skills
-Resources
-Motivation
-Economy of Scale
-Speed
-Evaluation
External Best Multi-tiered Resource Forecasted Internal Contingent Monitor &
Assessment Choice Goals/plans Allocation Assumptions Assessment Plans Scanning
ELEMENTS NEEDED TO CREATE A FORMAL STRATEGY [3] THAT STIMULATES INNOVATION
CHAPTER THREE
INNOVATION AND STRATEGY 
3.0 AIMS
This chapter provides some traditional definitions, and concepts on 
innovation as they relate to strategy.
It starts by outlining two basic types of innovation and the 
sequences of their development from basic research to placing a 
product on the market. Then, it explores the various schools of 
writing and how they defined the causes of innovation. The 
understanding of these concepts and arguments shapes one of the 
conceptual foundations for this study.
3.1 INTRODDCTION
Although this study is primarily concerned with a broad definition of 
innovation (the effective application of a new idea), the literature 
supports many other definitions. For instance, specifically:
(a) There is a technical definition (Littler, 1988) that 
technological innovation occurs "when technology replaces a skill or 
enhances a skill" to the degree that it coined a new name or spawned 
a new industry (e.g. from hand lettering to typing to word 
processing);
(b) There is a scientific definition as stipulated by CLark 
(1961) that "innovation is the end process of any invention which has 
been commercially tested";
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(c) There is a marketing definition as suggested by Gerlach and 
Wainwright (1968) and covers six types of product innovation, namely:
1. A process or product new to a firm, but not new to the world
2. A different size, or weight
3. A new package, form or delivery
4. A different material or physical form
5. An improved version of an existing product/service
6. A truly new product rising from an invention
(d) Finally there is a strategic definition of innovation as 
defined by Henderson (1989:141) that "innovation is the evolution of 
change for a competitive advantage whether it is a new product, idea, 
or process. The planning for this change requires a deliberate 
search and that is the mission of a strategy for innovation ".
Clearly the range of these definitions opens the way to many 
others. However, this study discusses just two of the definitions 
for innovation: the technical process and the strategic view. From 
these two definitions, several questions will be answered as to how 
innovation is linked to other strategic issues in the literature.
The first recurring question is whether innovation is defined 
differently when it used for developing new products than \rtien it is 
used if one is just seeking improvements in existing ones. Other keys 
questions are: is there a difference in the literature depending on 
whether the innovation is service or production -oriented? Or is 
there a different way in which product innovation varies from process 
innovation in terms as to how they are stimulated? These questions 
are debated in several different ways.
Braun (1981) argues that existing theories do not fully 
explain our requirements for understanding how innovation is created. 
Moreover, he prophesied "if one could understand the circumstances,
Page 66
Innovation & Strategy - Chapter Three
at least, innovation could be nurtured, directed or assisted in its 
development".
First, the literature tends to wander how certain activities 
lead to innovation, but does crystalize on several points. One is 
the Constellation of Circumstances Theory advanced by Braun that the 
first step toward innovation is the identification of a weak link in 
an existing manufacturing or servicing system. This link may be 
revealed from a variety of individual circumstances: skill shortage, 
lack of material, wastage of energy, returned goods, loss of key 
customers, inadequate output, safety regulations, unreliable 
equipment, high costs, and poor working conditions. This list is not 
exhaustive.
The second point is that generally an actor turns to existing 
technology (machinery, process, knowledge) to solve the problem. This 
actor may be an innovation champion acting independently or a wide 
range of personnel. These actors borrowing from other theories of 
innovation are: gate-keepers, researchers, managers, intrapreneurs, 
product champions, etc. The key element is the belief of an actor(s) 
that a problem can be solved or must be solved.
To this point, Braun argues that only \tfien these actors failed 
to solve the problem with existing methods or technology that 
innovation begins. For it is in this next phase (when an actor tries 
to modify current technology to solve the problem or begin a 
programme to solve the problem) that the second phase of innovation 
begins.
From these two stages, implementation and commercial acceptance 
may proceed incrementally or in large leaps. The essential element is 
that actors will follow certain steps when circumstances lead to the 
discovery of a weak link; when there are actors wanting a change; and 
that there must be some type of testing before offering it 
commercially. It seems from these points that innovation requires a
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plan of discovery based on monitoring circumstances and structuring 
a programme as to how innovation will work. Some argue that 
organisational development of such a plan provides a strategic focus 
for innovation within a firm (Quinn, 1989:637; Burgelman 1984:34).
In a similar vein, there seems to be an increasing belief that 
the practice of innovation should be incorporated into the field of 
strategic management as one of the mainstays for dealing with keener 
competition, declining markets, drops in market shares, and 
environmental turbulence (Drucker, 1985).
Others (Hounshell and Smith, 1988) believe the most successful 
innovation systems aren’t systems at all. Drawing lines between 
strategy, management, theoretical and applied research are arbitrary 
acts, for it is the environment which stimulates innovation.
They argue for environments hospitable to people with innovative 
thoughts. For economic policies which encourage people to explore new 
paths and take meaningful risks at reasonable costs. For companies 
idiere innovation is nurtured and curiosity is a highly valued skill. 
But a justified criticism is that the proponents of this 
environmental approach do not show how skills and values should be 
managed differently within such environments.
The other parts of the debate are whether the elements of being 
innovative are best stimulated formally or informally. A third 
recurring theme is the nettlesome dichotomy between the larger firm 
and the smaller one. Is the ideal organisational setting for the 
stimulation of innovation, a division of a large firm, an 
unstructured team of experts, or one man within a smaller firm?
Does innovation occur easier in a formal research and development 
programme using professional researchers or best brought to fruition 
by a tinkering self-motivated employee?
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Some corporate strategists (Roberts, 1965; Andrews, 1971) 
believe pure science and applied technology should remain separate 
and unequal. They argue that companies should be more interested in 
the creation of market share rather than the creation of knowledge 
unless the two somehow are linked. For example, some firms quite 
wisely do virtually no research and development (R & D) and others 
rely on a formal R&D programme to accomplish the same.
Between these extremes there are many variations and theories as 
to how innovation is simulated. Because of this array of opinions, an 
overview on the process of innovation follows.
3.2 DEFINITIONS OF THE INNOVATIVE PROCESS
Depending as to which literature of technological change and 
management is reviewed, the process of innovation can be one of two 
distinct yet closely related connotation.
In the technical sector, innovation is seen as a a sequence of 
evolutionary steps. As proposed by Bright (1969), the six stages of 
innovation are:
1. Basic Research- investigating the scientific dimensions 
of a physical phenomenon without any defined use in the mind of the 
researchers.
2. Applied Research- identifying a specific use or application 
of the knowledge gained in basic research.
3. Developmental- testing and modelling a potential application 
into a set of specifications \diich can show the capabilities of a 
new product or process.
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4. Experimental- converting a process model or prototype into 
cost factors so the economic concerns for its overall feasibility as 
an innovation is established.
5. Commercial- designing and assembling the manufacturing or 
process equipment, then modifying it until a full manufacturing 
operation is able to produce the innovation and to reach acceptable 
efficiencies needed in a commercial venture.
6. Marketing- overcoming any technical problems of distribution 
and customer use by a new marketing method or an older one.
In practice, the separation of these six stages of technological 
innovation is fuzzy. The sequence is not inimitable, (e.g. steps 3 and 
4 may precede step 2). Problems encountered at any one stage may 
require backtracking to a previous stage. For instance, a difficulty 
uncovered in a pilot project may signal the need for further 
development or more applied research.
Similarly, management practice requires forward bridging of 
these sequences from time to time. Thus, basic research shades into 
applied research, and applied research shades into development. 
Especially important is a frequent checking of market potential and 
market requirements during all of the stages except basic research.
Further, the type of output projected for each phase is 
revealing. Table no. 2, to follow, presents an outline of these six 
stages of technological innovation with respect to output, 
predictability of results, and types of personnel involved.
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Sible No. 2: Nocaal Stages of a Technological Imovation
Stages Out pot
Ability to 
Predict Results
Kinds of Persomel 
Involved
1.Basic research Knowledge None Scientists/researchers
2.Applied research Application Little Inventors and engineers
3.Development Operationally tested Scne Proposer to Managers
4.Pilot Project Boonoaic factors Moderate Organisation sponsored
5.Integration Systematic Approach Moderate Managers, Specialists
6.Marketing Buyer acceptance High Marketing personnel
Sources: adapted froa Littler, 1988; Pincbot, 1966; Ne m an and Logan, 1976
This table outlines how technological innovation, 
starting with basic research, is dominated generally by trained 
personnel through its development process (Newman and Logan, 
1976:159). It also illustrates the key features of technological 
innovation and how personnel is controlled and the predictability of 
results at each stage. It implies that a strategy is in place 
because few companies allow their personnel to organise their own 
work without approval or a defined objective.
The feature of how and why these personnel are controlled is 
something that the literature does not address adequately. The 
variations as to how these personnel could be controlled are numerous 
of just a few. But they must be controlled to some type of plan.
The question arising about structure and innovation is whether 
or not employees of a firm are managed in a style and structure and 
using a type of a technological strategy that may be loosely defined 
or tightly controlled ? For instance, certain companies permit their 
researchers to devote, say, 20% of their time to anything that 
intrigue them. Other companies inpose tight budgets and firm 
deadlines for each stage of development. These types of guide lines -
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policy- focus the effort and are directly derived from some type of 
a company strategy.
For an contrasting view in the business literature, innovation 
is sometimes regarded as an act-the commercial exploitation of an 
invention - for a strategic advantage. Followers of this more 
restricted view are observing the distinction between invention and 
innovation first advanced by Schumpeter (1942). One of the debates 
within this body of literature is whether innovation and invention 
are separate activities or the latter development of the same. The 
literature clearly states that invention is an essential perquisite 
of innovation, but it does not argue that innovation, itself, is a 
sufficient condition of invention.
In fact, much of the literature overlooks how the ingenious 
marriage of exploiting an invention’s features and developing a 
marketable innovation often gives a company an unique strength. It 
also overlooks the view that it is not the improving of the features 
of an invention, but the marketing of its benefits that is one of the 
concepts to successful strategic innovation. It does not emphasize 
enough how the scanning of the environment, and the management 
structure and style determine the pace and urgency to which an 
innovation is developed. The technical literature explains at great 
length about the process of innovation and invention, but not the 
variety of personnel and the strategic concepts to which they 
operate. The adoption of these concepts is best done in six
steps as shown in Table No. 3:
Table No. 3: Normal Stages of a Strategic Innovation
Stage Output
Ability To 
Predict Results
Types of fersonnel 
Involved
1. Conceptualizing An Idea Little Unkerers, Intrapreneurs
2. Industry Analysis Feasibility Little Flamers, Top Management
3. Seaming Procedure Competitive Edge Moderate Nev Business Specialists
A. Development Feasibility Moderate Engineers, Specialists
S. Customer Research New Market High Marketing researchers
6. Education of Buyers Ca^etitive Edge High Sales Specialists
Source: Pinchoc, 1986; Quim, 1968;and Dcucker, 1990.
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Table No. 3 shows how the sequential steps in a strategic sense 
differs from the technological innovation in several different ways. 
First, unlike the technological innovation, it is not primarily used 
to solve a problem, but to compete using innovation for lower costs 
or product differentiation strategies (Porter, 1986). Second, it 
generally starts from a conceptualizing stage rather than from basic 
research and goes from applied research to educating the customers 
(Burgelman, 1984). The competitive advantage is the speed in which a 
firm goes from one stage to another. Third, a systematic scanning of 
the industry is recommended before the development of an innovation 
is attempted. While these may seem to reflect a similar flow to the 
steps in a normal technological development cycle, then what is its 
strategic advantage?
In short, how fast, after applied research, the idea is 
transferred into market acceptance determines its strategic value. 
The speed of the innovation in passing through a sequence of
development is increased by some and deliberately slowed down by
others, each depending on its previous strategic history of either 
being innovative as a pioneer or a market follower.
These concepts of strategies for innovation were based upon the 
tacit acceptance of the Schumpeterian distinction that the technology 
transfer or the organisational slack between application and full 
conmercial development constituted the strategic element.
The next question is how does a firm decide to innovate. This can 
be approached by two separate and parallel tracks. First, there is
the formal method based on an industry analysis, which is a
prerequisite for drawing up a company strategy. Or secondly, there 
are informal methods propelled by external forces of competition, 
customers or suppliers, these are generally found in a maturing 
industry. For in a mature industry lower costs are necessary to meet 
price competition. Then the attempt to imovate resulting in lower 
costs, cheaper material, etc. may be crucial. One approach used by
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many firms is to deal only with improvements where the savings are 
significant (e.g. not less than 12 percent as used by Pratt & Whitney 
Aircraft). On the other hand, newly designed products may be the 
primary success factors in another industry, so there the focus would 
be on products.
Other decisions rising from the overall strategic decision to 
innovate still leave open the question of which type of product to 
concentrate on. Does a firm stick to existing products or does it 
seek to capture new markets with new products? Does a firm develop 
products that are (a) new, (b) patentable and (c) consumable (repeat 
business) or just concentrate on core product improvements? Does it 
acquire another firm as a forward integration method of 
diversification in an attempt to innovate or seek to enter another 
market where its core skills are transferable ( e.g. Du Pont 
development of nylon by its paint division).
Business literature, further, argues that the purpose of 
innovation is to gain a competitive edge. To be truly competitive, 
one may ask whether the elements of surprise and the speed in 
developing the innovation must then be viewed as the essential 
features. While dramatic innovations such as Carlson's Xerography or 
Land's Polariod are mentioned as examples of innovation in business, 
in reality, these are poor illustrations of innovation in practice. 
To dwell on major discoveries are the fallacies of some and tend to 
discount the incremental cycle of innovation.
Generally, the success of strategic innovation does not depend 
solely on major breakthrough innovations, but more on a succession of 
small improvements, built one upon another, that in total add up to a 
major change. Does this indicates strongly that innovation is more 
an evolutionary process rather than a revolutionary process? But can 
innovation be evolutionary and still possesses a competitive 
advantage when other companies are aware of it being developed. This
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view opens up another dimension in how successful innovation can be 
described, is it best defined as evolutionary or revolutionary?
The issue as to whether innovation is best described as being 
evolutionary or revolutionary is also argued in the literature, 
Quinn (1985) states that by his research "few, if any, major 
innovations result from highly structured planning systems”. The 
operative word is major, for he argued while major innovations in 
mature organisation can pose problems,” flexible structures can 
produce a stream of moderate innovations incrementally almost at 
will”.
For contrast, the literature gives examples of Hewlett-Packard, 
3M, Intel and Dewey & Almy, suppliers of highly technical 
specialities, who innovate around and through formal planning 
systems. They, either by policies such as Intel, allow up to 20 
percent of each employee's time to bring innovations to the 
marketplace. Other companies form parallel programs to test new 
technologies before system wide commitments. These programmes 
incorporate the incremental character of innovation and provide a 
more common description of the process than the random breakthrough 
assumptions of some writers.
The other fallacy, argued in the literature, is the 
relationship between the patents and innovation. Klein (1977:639) 
argues that only the holders of patents possess strategic advantages 
within an industry. Bright (1969:244) disagrees and believe it is the 
firm's relationship with either sources of supply or buyers that 
created a strategic advantage. He argues that while the basic 
invention being protected by a patent is a great competitive 
advantage, the majority of innovations are done without such 
protection.
He explains that it is the firm's speed to innovate past the 
conceptual stage of an invention that determine its strategic
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advantage. Most firms advance an innovation a step at a time, and 
their success is measured by who is stepping fastest. Other firms 
build on the advances of another, enter the market late by a plan and 
still are successful. He found that companies using a combination of 
strategies with a delayed method of marketing, but an accelerated 
method of product development were common practices within certain 
industries (e. g. chemical, electronics, and manufacturing).
What follows are the theoretical distinctions offered for 
innovation and how the literature debates whether the process of 
innovation is a strategic element or not; when and how a firm gains a 
competitive advantage.
3.3 THEORETICAL DISTINCTIONS
The theoretical distinction between what is innovation and invention 
has been discussed by a wide range of management writers (Schumpeter, 
1939, Fishlock, 1987; Mansfield, 1969; Blundell,1968; Jewkes,1969; 
Bright, 1970; Little, 1988; Von Hoppel,1979; Drucker, 1985; Kanter, 
1986). Each contributed to sharpen the definition between the 
concepts according to whether they treated innovation as a commercial 
process or a technical one.
These writers and theorists can be grouped into several 
different schools. They range from those t^fio view innovation as 
either an expression of economics, a human endeavour, scientific 
pursuit, to the school of the universalists, whom embrace any type of 
measurable change as the same. Briefly each will be discussed as 
follows:
From the economist school and one of the earliest writers 
reviewed was Schumpeter. He regarded the process of innovation as 
quite distinct from that of invention. He maintained that invention 
could exist either independently of, or yet be combined with 
innovation.
Page 76
Innovation & Strategy - Chapter Three
In his view, he asserted that "invention is something which 
never existed in the world or experienced by humans before, while •• 
"innovations can be traced to some earlier conquest in the realm of 
practical or theoretical knowledge that has occurred earlier (in the 
remote past or immediate)". He further argued that invention may not 
have any economic relevance, but an innovation should have an 
economic effect. His argument has an oddly up-to-date ring, not so 
much in the terms of how the two concepts differ, but how they 
should be measured from a commercial perspective.
On the other hand, from a humanist perspective, Mansfield 
applied the term," innovation" to be the sole province of applied 
invention. He stated that economists have traditionally argued, and 
wrongly, that an invention has little or no economic significance 
until it is applied and accepted commercially. He felt that an 
innovation began when an invention is exploited fully by mankind 
whether or not it has a comnercial value.
Also supporting this humanistic point of view is Rogers, who 
philosophised that innovation is "any idea perceived as new to the 
individual". To this school, it really matters little so far as the 
human behaviour is concerned, whether or not the idea is objectively 
new to the world or how much amount of time has elapsed since its 
discovery. It is the newness of the idea to the individuals using it 
for the first time and if they determine it to be useful regardless 
how long it has been around". To other theorists, this type of 
definition seemed too broad and impractical to be useful.
For a more pragmatic view, one turns to Drucker (p.16,30), who 
declared that" innovation is the specific tool of entrepreneurs as 
means by which they exploit change... It is capable of being 
presented as a discipline, capable of being learned and practised. It 
is the creation of value".
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Similarly, Kanter in her research (p. 395) quoted several 
definitions from Thompson, Roberts, and others, who believed, 'that 
innovation is the process of developing any new and novel problem­
solving idea to impact on something already in existence1•
Thus, from this statement and using other definitions, the range 
of innovation could be expressed as a new way of budgeting, writing 
music, or making a product - the willingness of people to gamble on 
the future in order to gain an advantage. Whilst Kanter expresses a 
universal point of view that any type of improvement valued by humans 
to improve their existence is innovation, it does not explain the 
scope of innovation from a scientific viewpoint.
3.4 SCOPE OF INNOVATION
The scientific scope and range of innovation as a concept conveys 
several meanings. This is particular true because the term is used in 
many different ways across disciplines and industries.
For example, in some disciplines, it means the creation of 
something new is stressed (e.g. in psychology and economics). Other 
disciplines use it to emphasize the adoption of something new to 
the adopter (e.g. in marketing and organisational science). Or, as 
used in diagram 3.1, it describes the diffusion process of 
acceptance, i.e. how the adoption of a new product, process or idea 
is spread throughout a social milieu over time by different sections 
of a community of users (Rogers,1983,1962).
Diagram 3.1:Time and Adoption of Innovations
^  1 3V t%  
Early adopters
Tim* at adoptlo* of iaoovatioM
!*>un* Bcvliwn fruro Evrrm M. Dtffuoon of lmauiaom (Nc* York: Free P rra . 1962). p. 162
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This diagram illustrates how people can be classified in their 
readiness to try new products. The adoption process can be 
represented as a normal distribution when plotted over time, and each 
of the five adopter groups has a differing value. Whether this 
adopter classification of time by Rogers can be used by an innovating 
firm is the question. It will be argued that the conversion of these 
terms of Rogers could be correlated to be the same as the strategies 
of a company: innovators (Pioneers and Opportunists) willing to try 
new ideas at some risk; early adopters (Imitators) willing to adopt 
new ideas early, but carefully; whilst early majority (Followers) 
will adopt innovation only after the leaders in their industries do; 
late majority (Dependents and Fatalists), on the other hand, will 
adopt only when customers and standards of the industry force them to 
do so; laggers (Traditionalists and Fatalists) will adopt an 
innovation only when it has taken on the measure of tradition itself.
As to how this chart can be used, Rogers (1976:139) further 
noted"... many innovations go through many extensive revisions, 
essentially announcing this as "reinventing", in the process of 
their adoption to be conceived as better than those in existence ". 
He suggests that an innovating firm would use this adoption cycle in 
a couple ways. One is to research potential users of an innovation 
and to phase sales comnunication material over time accordingly. 
Second, the willingness of companies to innovate depends on the 
mixture of its workforce recruited from the community at large. 
Certain communities tend to have more people, who are innovators, 
adopters, etc. and who are drawn there by education, life style, and 
employment opportunities dictated by their skills. Thus, a firm 
should locate in this type of community and then use its marketing 
forces to inform all potential users of the benefits of an 
innovation. This process of newness using employees and location 
will stimulate innovation, internally and externally. Drucker refers 
to this total concept as "the creative imitation process" and states 
it begins with an employee with a new idea and ends only when it is 
purchased with the expectation by a buyer, who welcome innovation.
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Even when applying the basic concept of newness to the scope of 
innovation, the field denies common terms. Also, it is lucidly clear 
that the use of the word innovation by so many sources and 
disciplines makes it so wide-ranging a topic that to render an edited 
view is to narrow the power and complexity of the subject.
Two seminal definitions bearing out this conclusion. First from 
the Central Advisory Council Report (1968) for Science and technology 
where it is stated," innovation can imply simple investment in new 
manufacturing equipment or any technical measures to improve the 
methods of production; whether it might means the whole sequence of 
scientific research, market research, invention, development, design, 
tooling, first production and marketing of a new product".
And later from the Project SAPPHO, a British-based study of 43 
different industrial innovations in 1972 at the University of Sussex, 
which qualified innovation as "a complex sequence of events, 
involving scientific research from its invention to its 
technological development resulting in management, production and 
selling of it as a new product".
As a summary of the above definitions, innovation depends on 
inventions, but inventions must be harnessed to commercial activities 
before they can contribute to society or an organisation. If any 
conclusion can be drawn from the review of these writers it is that 
a managerial, or scientific perspective differs as to what is an 
innovation. Different people offer different meanings, but can it be 
reduced down to one definition is the question.
Different schools of thought indicate that innovations may 
involve fundamentally new inventions, as well as they could refer to 
any commercial improvements in existing methods of manufacturing/ 
service/ research. The key point is ...do they result in new versions 
that can be measured economically superior to existing
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products/processes? In short, innovation is any novelty that has an 
economic purpose.
3.5 INNOVATION AS A TOPIC FOR RESEARCH
For the purposes of this research, innovation as a concept and as a 
logic for future research is defined herein: the conceptualizing, 
development and introduction of new methods, tools, techniques, of 
new approaches, philosophy, way of thinking; and new themes in an 
existing field of application (Kanter,1983).
By these definitions, then, innovation could be interpreted as 
anything that provide a competitive advantage. Examples of its 
concepts are: a new accounting system, televideo as a new form of 
communication. Examples of new approaches may comprise using a new 
management theory or the use of a matrix organisational structure.
New themes may contain topics such as intrapreneurship, corporate
culture, participation management or just the improved well-being of 
one’s workforce. New fields of its use, for examples, could include 
the application of technology and a new type of organisation 
theory; all can be included under this definition.
Setting aside the plethora of definitions in the literature, in 
a strategic sense, a narrower definition is needed. The preferred
definition that best fits the need of strategic planning (MGinnis,
1984:47; Shepard,1967:470-7) perhaps is the following:
"innovation occurs when a firm through its employees 
learns to do something it did not do before, and then 
proceeds to do it in a sustained way... or... learns not 
to do something it formerly did, and proceeds not to do 
it in a sustained way".
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This means that the innovative firm or its employees are willing to 
learn new ways and the firm is willing to bend when it is useful for a 
purpose. By this definition, it is the opposite of being "obsolescent”. 
This being a term when a process, idea, skill, or product is no longer 
useful and has been clearly and authoritatively defined, both, in the 
social science and engineering fields (Ferdinard, 1965; Mali, 1970; 
Malmros, 1988). In other words, to innovate is to combat obsolescence 
for a strategic advantage.
In a sense, this implies that strategic innovation is a contrast 
to old and established methods, approaches, themes, and fields of 
application. It is a dichotomy which can be made between the old and 
new, the existing and the new, and supports a common definition and even 
labels, regardless of industry. However, research does indicate in all 
cases, that it requires a risk-taking entrepreneurial attitude toward 
change (Leavitt,1973; Pettigrew, 1988; Drucker, 1985).
3.6 CATEGORIES OF INNOVATION
Further research indicates that the categories of innovation reflect to 
some degree the difficulty which arises in defining the term of 
innovation without placing it in a context first. Whenever this is done, 
it increases its value as a concept.
The value in placing innovation as a practice or a process into 
categories can ameliorate the concept from a vague murky topic of 
interest into a multi-faceted discipline. In doing so, it approaches a 
theory for innovation in two different ways.
First, it ascertains that innovation can broadly be bifurcated into 
two distinct and definite groups: one which either enhances current
skills and products or one which displaces them depending on the 
constellation of circumstances which created them. Innovation represents 
the most useful data, technique, process or product available at that 
time. It is the opposite of being "obsolescent"-no longer useful.
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Secondly, it is more important and easier to classify them along a 
continuum of impact which reflects the advances they have made whether 
they are minor, major or radical improvements over that already 
existing.
This is illustrated best when placed at the extreme end of the 
continuum are the radical earth-shattering innovations (mentioned 
earlier) which are generally rare events: the polariod camera or the 
dry-copying process of Xerox are two unique examples of this ilk. And to 
cluster at the other end of the continuum, the minor innovations 
comprised mostly of small improvements made incrementally. These 
generally do not gain the headlines and attention, but their 
contribution can be just as real and the gain may be substantial.
From this attempt to place innovations into categories, the impact 
of two other key elements should be discussed. The first is how the 
behaviour of individuals dictate the pattern of innovation and second, 
how they use information.
3.7 INNOVATION BY THE INDIVIDUAL
The behaviour of the individual to innovate is the untapped reserve 
which probably accounts for most of the accomplishments of mankind in 
the field of innovation. There is a rich field of the literature 
(Collins and Moore, 1970; Madidique, 1980) existing on the heroic 
independent efforts of individuals to find innovative solutions or to 
chart new courses for existing ways.
During the past two decades, new literature has emerged on 
entrepreneurship (Quinn, 1980; Schon, 1963) and product champions 
(Pinchot, 1986) within firms who carry the burden of innovation against 
organisational structure and resistance. The significance of such an 
individual has been recognised for at least the last two centuries. It 
was J. B. Say, the French economist, who first mentioned the
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entrepreneurial behaviour of the innovator as" the pivot on which 
everything turns" (Schumpeter, 1954:554).
The first academic to write extensively about these individuals, 
who championed innovation, was A. D. Schon. Schon (1963:84) found that 
the "new idea either finds a champion or dies". His analysis led him to 
four basic conclusions:
1. At the outset, the new idea encounters sharp resistance.
2. Overcoming this resistance requires vigorous self-promotion.
3. Proponents of the idea would work primarily through the informal 
systems of an organisation rather than the formal structure to 
win acceptance and sponsorship of its concept.
4. Typically one person emerged as the champion of the idea.
In the decades following Schon!s work, new names for the old roles 
of championing ideas within a corporation that he wrote about began to 
appear in the literature such as " internal entrepreneurs, business 
innovators, change agents, sponsors, and intrapreneurs " (Tushman, 
1988:567).
Studies by others (Collins and Moore, 1964; Duschesneau and Olsen, 
1977) found similar correlations between independently-acting managers, 
entrepreneurs and product champions. One of the common characteristics 
of these individuals was the way they were able to convert existing 
information into ideas for innovation. It seems that this body of 
literature clearly indicates that one of the keys to stimulating 
innovation within a firm starts when the structure of the firm allows 
these types of individuals time to experiment, and question existing 
methods using the sponsorship by some type of corporate programme.
3.8 THE USE OF INFORMATION TO NURTURE INNOVATION
Studies indicate that information can be a doubled edged weapon for 
innovation; if used well, it can support new, imaginative developments 
and be used to convince potential sponsors to approve its adoption and
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at the same time be used to quell criticism or to nullify opposition. 
The literature (Myers and Marquis, 1969; Burgelman, 1984) outlines how 
there are three main areas in which information could be used by 
innovators to support an innovation adoption and to suppress resistance 
to it:
1. Exploratory Areas- Innovation by its definition involves leading 
edge activities, whether an organisation is producing pure research or 
introducing new practices. The key component for these activities is 
the skilful use of information to identify problems or opportunities. 
One of the roles for information in this area is to ensure that the 
perceived benefits of innovation are repeated at each junction of the 
innovation development. In this way, it sharpens the objective and scope 
of the innovation. The other is the development of options. They, both, 
are central to the innovative effort in its incubatory stages of 
exploration. Techniques \diich promote and aid these processes can make a 
significant contribution and the use of well-documented reports is one 
of them. This is a skill \diich can be taught.
2. Presentation of Ideas- Innovators often have difficulty in 
presenting their entrepreneurial vision in a convincing fashion. Most 
are not aware that a new idea should be conveyed in both an analytical 
and commercial way. The ability to present a new idea with both of these 
views intact greatly improves the acceptance of an innovation.
3. Planning Techniques- The implementation of innovations is often 
fraught with difficulties. While standard managerial techniques are 
important, planning for entirely new ideas needs even greater 
communication skills to lay out opportunities and problems clearly so 
sponsors of an innovation can understand why things went wrong or right 
to ensure continued financial and corporate support.
To these three points, Glueck (1985:59) agrees that whilst 
innovation needs a champion, who is single-minded, creative, talented 
and knowledgeable to spark an idea into an innovation, he states, "I
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suggest that there are two other attributes the product champion needs: 
these attributes distinguish this type of individual from all others: 
(1) the possession of an ability to store a tremendous amount of raw 
information; and (2) the skill to communicate, combine, order or connect 
information in a novel and better way so all can understand what is 
being newly created”.
3.9 SD1WARY
From this section of the literature review, it is clear that a 
distinction can be made between invention and innovation. An invention 
can be defined as the discovery of something new- such as a new 
production technique or a new product- not existing in the world before. 
An innovation, on the other hand, can be defined either as the final 
sequence after the introduction of an invention before its use 
commercially or as a measured planned improvement of an existing 
process, product or service.
Among theorists, regardless of their disciplines, it is accepted 
that innovation is nurtured best and quickest when circumstances dictate 
a need for it. Further, these theorists believe that new products or 
processes will not be introduced unless it appeared profitable to do so 
and the world can exploit it fully.
Also arising from the literature, the development of five hypotheses 
can be put forward: (1) innovation is a random process occurring because 
of unsatisfactory circumstances and the curiosity of human nature create 
a search for a better way. In the final analysis, it is a process of 
trial and error in which thousands of attempts may be made before a 
successful way is found; (2) innovation also occurs by individuals as 
responses to the type of organisational structure in which they work. 
The flexibility of the organisation structure, the use of information, a 
firm's policy of allowing experimentation, the reaction of its 
supervisory rank, and the type of business which the firm is in can 
either retard or stimulate the process of innovation. The linkage of
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these factors determines if innovation has any strategic importance 
attached to it.
Thus, innovation may be an external by-product of a firm's
environment, but it is more likely to be the product of a firm, its 
structure, and its employees' efforts to innovate; (3) innovation is 
the product of science and is the second scientific stage after
invention. This proposes that science has a logic and momentum of its 
own which propels the advancement of an innovation. This school of 
thought believes that each technological age has a time which will 
produce a fair amount of innovations depending on whether an industry is 
going through a time of great scarcity or surplus; (4) innovation occurs 
because of a well-timed, well-financed., and committed strategy to
innovate; and (5) innovation is propelled, most often, by the drive for 
more profits.
3.9.1 Implications Arising
This thesis argues that all innovations inherently, to some degree,
have a strategic element attached to them and for an innovation to occur 
systematically (being conceptualized and developed within an 
organisation), it needs some type of a model for decision-making. 
Examples for some of these models will be present in (Chapter Four and 
as to how these elements of innovation form a strategic linkage will be 
discussed in Chapter Five.
To discover which of these elements were used by non-users or users 
in an effort to stimulate innovation and which of them are linked into 
a formal strategy for innovation, a series of questions were framed in 
the questionnaire as shown in Exhibit No. 1. As to how these elements 
were linked by the questionnaire, Supplementary Chart- Exhibit IB (on 
the next page) was constructed to display this linkage.
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CHAPTER POOR
ELEMENTS FOR BUILDING A STRATEGY-MAKING MODEL
4.0 AIMS
This chapter provides an examination of a wide range of the most 
popular planning and strategic models used in business and in 
how they are generally selected, formulated, and implemented.
The chapter begins with a blending of views about the 
quality of the general elements required in a strategic 
decision-making model. Then it discusses how specific elements 
in most of the models, in varying degrees of sophistication, are 
traceable to five major motors of strategic thinking: (1)
Intuition; (2) the Experience Curve Theory; (3) Strategic 
Business Units; (4) the Product life Cycle; and (5) Portfolio 
Planning.
The suitability of some key models will be discussed in 
respect of how each may develop the strategic element for 
innovation as outlined in Chapter Three. The chapter concludes by 
stating what are the most practicable purposes for each of 
the models discussed. And whether each model will yield a view 
of the firm’s world which is measurable, understandable and 
predictable to its users for the stimulation of innovation.
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
One of the goals of contemporary strategic management is to 
develop a philosophy and an approach as to how it will analyse 
and solve a problem strategically.
Philosophically it assumes that any of the causes that 
creates a strategic problem can be explained and solved, provided 
a systematic approach is used. Andrews (1971) states "when a 
problem is studied systematically with a defined set of 
variables, whether it is being used formally or informally by 
managers then it is proper to call it a model". The strategic 
choice arising from such a model can be no more sophisticated or 
rational than the method of analysis embodied in the model 
itself.
The distinction given to a strategic model is that it should 
be able to determine environmental problems as well as be able to 
analyses them by a pattern of information. It should draw upon 
observable elements for a comparison of where a company is in 
relation to its environment, and provide a better understanding 
of what the future holds to its user.
The inputs should be parsimonious and draw upon definable and 
essential data which should enable a company to compete, survive, 
and prosper. The outputs of the model should contain enough 
useful information which will assist in the most feasible choice 
possible.
4.3 DEFINITIONS OF A MODEL AND ITS ELEMENTS
Aczel (1989: 422) defined a model as a framework of evaluation 
(or paradigm) which is a representation of something real.
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It should show important relationships among variables 
therein, and be able to predict or explain \diat could or has 
happened - an artificial description of the real world in 
miniature- controllable, measurable and manageable in a scaled 
down size.
In reality most models fall short in fully duplicating their 
real world counterpart, but they can give one a simplified
version of a problem. Even with this admitted statement of
incompleteness, one can deal with the essential elements and
concentrate on the heart of a problem.
Encapsulated within each model are qualitative and 
quantitative elements which are included in its construction.
Each of these elements should contribute enough useful 
information so that the most rational decision can be made at 
that time when consolidated. Each element of the model as a 
variable should meet the tests of usefulness, accessibility, 
suitability , and feasibility which will assist in the rationale 
for the selection of one alternative over another.
Drucker ((1973) has identified other key elements needed in 
a model for business planning. Succinctly, he outlined how the 
features of dealing with the future, and digesting the most 
current information available were the threshold elements needed 
for managers to organize for action properly. He stated that a 
strategic model 'is a continuous process of making present 
entrepreneurial decisions systematically and with the best 
possible knowledge of their futurity, organising systematically 
the effort needed to carry out these decisions against 
expectations through an organised feedback'.
A further definition was offered by Ansoff (1965) that a 
strategic decision-making model should encompass the elements of 
system, implementation, and measurement: making decisions
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systematically; preparing programmes for their implementation; 
and measuring actual performance against programmes. Management 
planning requires, therefore, a method to sustain all of these 
efforts within precise standards by which one can evaluate 
their performance. The underpinnings demand that a continuous 
monitoring device be deployed to ensure that all resources are 
being optimized toward a goal. Without such a monitoring, chaos 
takes over and soon reduces any kind of organisation to a 
miserable shamble.
Fayol (1961), a leading management specialist, listed four 
general elements for an effective plan: unity, continuity,
flexibility and precision. He argues that these characteristics 
are interdependent.
Unity implies that only one organisational plan should be 
operating at any one time; if more than one plan is put into 
action, confusion will result and organisational resources will 
be used inefficiently. Continuity refers to the linking of 
successive strategies over time so that long-term objectives are 
finally attained. Flexibility is needed so the plan will be 
dynamic to avoid the static property of being locked into an 
untenable decision. Precision demands disciplined methods of 
measuring and forecasting. Without reliable data and these 
characteristics, strategy cannot be formulated with reasonable 
chances of success or be monitored for its tactical 
effectiveness.
Andrews (1971) also addressed what key elements are needed 
in a strategic model. They can be best described as "limiting 
factors" and resources allocation" elements. He sharply defined 
how the factors of judgement and strategic choices are bounded by 
these elements. The quality of a strategy rests upon the type of 
information that decision-makers (DMU's) have at their commands, 
and in his opinion, "It is one of the chief reasons for planning
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in order that the limit of one's resources are made known to a 
DMU; only then a strategy can be determined".
Diagram 4.1: Theoretical Decision-making Model
Input s-Informat ion Outputs-Benefits
Awareness A Problem Exist
Dimensions of the Problem STRATEGIC
Why It 0ccurred-Causes <---MODEL — >
Variables and Relationships 
Future Impact of the Problem
Best Choice Available 
Flexibility of Action 
Unity of Resources 
Precision of Data 
Continuity of Goals
4.4 ELEMENTS OF STRATEGIC CODICES IN A DECISION-MAKING MODEL
All strategic choices began with a bifurcated option of either 
a" do nothing " or a " this is the time to do something" 
decision point. It is from the latter decision of taking action 
that the level of a strategic analysis began and may over time 
gradually develop into more sophisticated methodology. Springing 
forth from this decision to take action there is a need for a 
measurement based on a reference point. Change without reference 
to an objective accumulation of data is meaningless. Turning to 
the insightful comments of Nisbet (1969) " the perception that 
there is a need for change without the dimension of time or an 
instrument of rationality to measure alternatives, may in the 
final analysis be fruitless".
To evaluate the alternatives available, one must choose a 
criterion to distinguish between what constitutes a " good" 
choice and a desirable end result from what would be considered 
a " bad "or unsatisfactory choice. To do so, a manager must
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feel he/she does know or at least Is confident that the model 
will furnish all the choices available to his/her company. This 
is a primary test of choice and usefulness.
Deciding which is the most appropriate form and type of 
model to use is the first part of the equation for the primary 
test of choice. The answer depends on the purpose of the
analysis, the nature of the problem, and the level of detail
required. The final answer is guided by two overriding
considerations, What kind of information is needed to make a
decision that is reasonably accurate, and how fast will the model 
produce such an answer?
These results when gained from a model or by an attempt to 
receive them can yield valuable insights such as: (1) forcing 
the users of the models to recognise a problem area and to decide 
what types of decisions are required; (2) identifying the 
variables which are most likely to affect the performance of the 
overall system; (3) gaining some knowledge of the magnitude of 
certain actions; and (4) recognising any of the trade-offs and 
relationships based on costs and profits.
The process for most strategic decisions, in addition to 
those results mentioned above, usually involve several other 
major elements. First is the recognition that a problem, an 
obstacle to achieving a goal, even exists. Second, attempts must 
be made to identify all alternatives, to evaluate them, to 
select one best alternative, and be able to implement the 
decision accordingly. In the process of evaluating and selecting 
the best choice available, a series of "in-between" steps must be 
considered peripheral to the decision: namely, identifying the 
criteria, isolating relevant variables and experimenting on what 
can be measured or observed.
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Central to most decision-making and strategic thinking is 
the belief that all possible strategic models will (by a 
systematic comparison of strengths, trade-offs and weaknesses) 
make an informed choice which is best at that time and under that 
circumstance. This is the second test of a model's usefulness, 
the one of "strategic fit" or suitability. It is first decided 
when a firm dichotomously select a strategy which either builds 
upon its strengths, or seeks to overcome weaknesses and in both 
cases to take advantage of an opportunity. It must do so whilst 
minimising or circumventing the environmental threats facing it 
at the same time.
Some (Andrews,1971; Ansoff, 1964; Pettigrew 1989) argue that 
the ultimate purpose of a strategic model is its ability to 
reduce the uncertainty in a firm's environment by measuring the 
effects of change. They believe the model is most effective when 
it is able to measure change before, after, or during its use.
This belief is indirectly based on the assumptions of the 
Alpha, Beta, Gamma Discovery Theory (Terborg et al, 1982:293) •
This theory, in brief, recognises that change of any kind can be 
measured in one of three ways: Alpha- is a perceptual measure 
that reflects a stable dimension of reality because people are 
now aware a change is taking place; Beta- is a change in the 
perception of a problem because it is viewed differently based 
upon new inputs (facts); and Gamma- is that a change becomes 
measurable because there has been an intervention which can show 
a "pre" and "post" empirical observation. This theory covers 
some of the elements of the Constellation of Circumstances Theory 
(Braun, 1981) for innovation discussed earlier in Chapter Three, 
herein.
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4.5 GENERAL LIMITATIONS OF STRATEGIC MDDELS
The synergical triad of most strategic models are based on the 
argument (Porter, 1985; Levitt,1960; Alexander, 1988; Derek, 
1980; Peters, 1980; Chisnell, 1989, Foxall,1984) that the firm, 
its employees and its customers are in a dynamic coexistence.
All sides in this trinity have advantages to be gained from 
the exchanges between them. The implication from this is a view 
that a firm's resources and time should be spent in searching 
each other out, understanding the nature of any issue of mutual 
concerns and dealing openly and constantly with a flow of 
information between them. It is felt that this exchange becomes 
the flywheel for strategic issues and is used as the motor for 
keeping a model in motion.
The motor or theoretical model propelling strategic choices 
depends on the type of prevailing sovereignty being practised by 
a firm. These may range from 'the Customer is king; profits at 
any sacrifice; or the firm should seek to be the first producer 
of new products'. They are referred to as the firm's sovereignty 
principle (Srivastava and Shocker, 1987). Thus the action for 
any strategic change is based on a large degree around this 
sovereignty principle. This is another dimension to the 
perception that something should be changed but only if it 
support a sovereignty view.
Unfortunately, this conversion of variables into a 
diagnostic tool does not solve the problem of an emotional 
sovereignty as an overriding and supreme strategic element 
(Chamber 1986:1238)). Later in this thesis there will be 
discussion how all outputs from an analytical perspective will be 
tested against the sovereignty principle which may be inherent to 
the culture of a firm.
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Most research (e.g. Urban and Hauser, 1980) agrees 
vigorously that in blending a consumer principle of sovereignty 
with a competitive reality, a firm is able to discover and 
balance out the opportunities that are desirable to pursue. 
However, at the same time, by accepting this overriding 
perspective such as the"customer is king" and by organizing 
around such themes, other more logical approaches may be 
excluded as an analytical tools for defining both the products 
and people who comprise a product market. By viewing strategic 
options such as new products abstractly in the terms of 
benefit/cost bundles, it is then possible to consider choices 
more objectively. The measurements by perceptions of either 
employees, suppliers and customers are inchoately conceived, but 
are building blocks of innovation. However, the points as 
registered have several of the following implications and 
limitations:
First, for example when the firm is very young, it is not 
aided by history, time, or tradition in making a strategic 
choice and can deploy its resources with the fewest of 
constraints. But at the same time it should have the most 
difficulty in implementing its strategy because its newness 
imposes larger risks and trade-offs from the environment. In 
contrast, an older firm must bear both the advantages and 
limitations imposed by its history and track record.
Secondly, a new product in a new firm, serves as a prototype 
in which all other entrants will be compared. And when there are 
not any existing standards, then a new product will set them. 
Its success or failure will loom much larger as a framework of 
evaluation than would be the case in an older firm which has 
launched new products previously. On the other hand, a product 
new to the firm, but not to the market must conform to market 
norms, and carry both the advantages and liabilities associated 
with the past and present products in an older firms' portfolio.
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The point being made that an incomplete analysis of a product 
that caused a failure will linger long after the product has been 
scrapped or sales have ceased.
The other major issue of measurement is more often than not 
made in relative terms by comparing success with competitors' 
past performances. When there are not absolute standards, the 
firm tends to accept less than it could achieve with the same 
resources if it was only aware.
This principle of sovereignty will vary a measurement based 
on an empirical observation over time and will distort the 
awareness by a DMU as to what needs to be done even when some 
type of analysis has been carried out. This perception can be 
measured from the outputs generated from a simple one-step 
process or radiating from a computerised multidimensional 
analysis. From these outputs, a strategic choice is made. This 
is particularly true when a firm decides to innovate as a 
strategy.
4.6 LEVELS OF ANALYSIS AS MODELS
The types of analyses from which a strategic choice is made are: 
(i) Gap Analysis
(ii) Situation Analysis
(iii) Scenarios
(iv) Heuristics
and to understand how they work, a review of them is as 
follows:
4.6.1 Gap Analysis
The gap analysis is the most primitive strategic choice arising 
from a "Doing Nothing" type of thinking by a manager to one
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that "Sometime Action Must be Taken". This generally occurs when 
a manager is desiring an outcome in the future better than one 
presently confronting him/her as a decision-making unit( DMC).
Diagram 4.2: Gap Analysis
Desired ou tco m e (ideal)
Past stra tegy
-P e rfo rm a n c e  gaps
E xpected  ou tco m e (anticipated) .
h
Glueck and Jauch (1984: 22) outline how several conditions 
must exist in the nature of a gap before decisions are made to 
make a change or even to entertain a proposal for making such a 
decision. There are three minimum levels of perceptions and 
emotions that a EMC should possess: (1) the gap must be seen as 
large enough that a DMC will feel emotionally-bound to do 
something about it; (2) the trade-off or desired outcome (ideal) 
must motivate the DMC enough to overcome any perceived risk in 
making the said change; and (3) the DMC must feel philosophically 
in tune with the thought that the gap can be reduced and the 
expected outcome (anticipated) can be accomplished with the 
resources available to him. If these three conditions are not 
present, it is highly unlikely that any change will be made or 
even contemplated by the DMC.
The first process of innovation requires an acknowledgement by 
the DMC that a gap is occurring technologically or circumstances 
are forcing the desire for a better performance. This 
acknowledgement forms the gap analysis leading to the 
formulation of a strategy in which innovation is welcomed or 
attempts are made to stimulate it.
A gap analysis is a process more emotionally-based than 
rationally- based. A gap may be perceived because a firm is
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suffering declining sales or a significant shrinkage in profits, 
before the DMU may began to think some type of action should be 
taken. In the term of Simon "it is more about satisfying rather 
than maximising the opportunities to do better".
The gap-filling process may be labelled several different 
ways: (1) a "blue sky" outlook with no specific objective in 
sight but just a desire to be bigger, more profitable, etc.; (2) 
a "rose-coloured spectacles" perspective that sees the future 
better than it really is; or (3) a "green grass" mentality which 
drives the M U  to feel without facts that another market, product 
or core business would be better than ones they are in. In 
short, the gap analysis is based on a perception for change 
rather than being based on facts. It is driven, more often, by 
a psychological need (from ambition, greed, fear, to revenge) of 
the strategist to improve upon his firm's present position than 
reality.
However, a gap analysis for innovation requires a more 
sophisticated diagnostic tool. First, it requires a systematic 
attempt to measure internally other members of the firm's 
perceptions of its position (i. e. attitudinal surveys, delphi, 
qualitative audits of employee perceptions), then tries to 
measure externally the attitudes of its customers and others on 
their perceptions of the firm's products, image, and brands.
Therefore, innovation must be viewed in two ways. First the 
internally-directed gap analysis will test the resistibility of 
making a change and the employees' abilities to support a 
change. Whilst, externally -formed gaps will appraise the 
competitiveness of others affected by said change. In both 
cases, they can often reveal whether the firm has the resources 
(equipment, cash, skills, etc.) to make a change or that some 
resources are not being deployed properly which could make a 
change possible. Still the three intitutive conditions must be
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in force: a perception that a gap exists, motivation to take 
action, and the belief that it is reducible.
To counterbalance the strategists tendency in the earliest 
stage of decision-making to overestimate (Blue sky) to 
misinterpret (rose-coloured spectacles ) and to ignore its own 
strengths (green grass), a gap analysis should be attempted as 
rationally as possible.
Externally, a gap in the market and a need for a strategic 
product change can be realized by using a multi-dimensional 
attitudinal tool (Green, 1975) which measures perceptions, 
loyalties and emotional preferences of customers toward a brand 
or product. This utilizes a scaling mechanism calibrating the 
customer's most salient viewpoints about a firm's image, brands, 
performance, or pricing strategies as a communications device. 
Many of the components of the customer framework, i.e. the 
competitive array, product portions, segment of market, and the 
like, can be represented in a chart or diagram. The effects of 
such pictorial representation can communicate rationally what 
type of strategic choice is required.
Either type of a gap analysis, whether it is internal or 
external, should stimulate the managerial vision of the DMU to 
reduce or expand its objectives based upon the data received. 
They are the first distinctive elements starting the innovative 
process of making change. From these elements, a DMU creates 
his/her strategic vision after gathering other stakeholders ' 
views in a systematic way and measuring them against a scale.
As noted by Rothwell (1981), innovation within a firm 
must ultimately be decided by either the ultimate user (the 
customer) or the ultimate creator (the innovative employee). 
Awareness of the problem/ opportunity starts with assessing a 
customer perception as to the degree that one customer or a
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consensus of same indicates that a gap exists in the market 
place. To these concerns, a scale is needed to match opportunity 
to innovate with the needs of the customers as balanced by the
competences of the employees to make change. The scale should be
well-developed to met all of these objectives.
4.6.2 Situation Analysis
The situation analysis is an objective audit of the resources of 
a firm, identifying strengths and weaknesses of existing skills: 
technological, marketing, production, financial, and 
adminis trative•
This analysis is grounded in the assessment of two 
specific elements: the principle of the limiting factor; and the
leverage factor. They are needed to assess the level of
resources and skills available to a firm. These factors may be 
strengths, obstacles or constraints which exist in an 
organisation and must be classified accordingly. All will have 
properties of limitation and leverage.
The principle of limiting factor can be dissected in 
several different ways. The first assessment is where the firm 
is at present; secondly, that all resources have a limit 
regardless of a firm size; and thirdly, the actual conditions at 
the time and place will dictate what new controls are necessary. 
These views form the basis for the first "limiting" factor 
comprising a situation analysis.
To the first view of determining where a firm is at present, 
Sir John Harvey-Jones (1988) states in a pragmatic way '... there 
is no point in deciding where your business is going until you 
have actually decided with great clarity where you are now... to 
arrive at this crossroad, one needs a situation analysis. This
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like practically everything in business is easier said than 
done'.
To the second view, Ansoff (1968) has observed that a large 
majority of corporate decisions have to be made within the 
framework of limited total resources, no matter what size the 
organisation may be. There are alternative uses for scarce 
resources, and the objective 'is to produce a resource-allocation 
pattern which offers the best potential for a firm's objectives 
related to its situation'.
The third view of assessing conditions required by the 
principle of limiting factor is exemplified by Chester Barnard 
(1938), who writes '... The limiting factor is the one whose 
control, in the right form, at the right place and time, will 
establish a new system or set of conditions which meets the 
purpose of that situation'.
Finance (cash position), of course, is often the most 
common situational analysis made by a firm, but there are many 
other ways such an audit could be performed.
This principle of leverage, not to be confused with its 
usage in the financial sense, is an essential part of a situation 
analysis. It reflects the concept of comparative advantage 
advanced by David Ricardo and others in the early-nineteenth 
century classic economic theory of international trade. It means 
to identify the major strength or distinctive advantage a 
possessor (nation, firm, or person) has over others and to 
leverage it.
In more modem business terms (Porter, 1986; Blios, 1980; 
Peters and Waterman, 1982; Andrews, 1971) all counsel that firms 
should identify the main advantages or skills they have over 
their competitors. There should be an deliberate attempt to
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isolate those distinctive abilities \diich are attractive to 
customers. Porter refers to them as "the key links in a value 
chain"; Peters called them " the central strengths which all 
strategies are built upon"; Andrews classified them " to be the 
distinctive elements, the critical success factors (CFS),in why a 
customer picks one service, product, etc. over another".
Identifying these competences is only part of the process. 
Blios pointed out tht whilst the concept of leverage is well 
known and understood, it has the additional problems of 
application and its erosion by time. He stressed "how any 
competence will change over time in line with environmental 
change and should be assessed regularly by some type of analysis 
". This reinforces the condition of obsolescence, the 
counterpart of not being innovative.
There are many ways in which "leverage" can be developed; it 
may, for instance, be related to specific patents, or superb 
after-sales service, or to efficient distribution arrangements, 
or brand-name or financial resources.
Leontiades (1983) cited how the international strategy and 
consulting firm of McKinsey and Company studied the management 
practice and strategy-formulation processes of 37 different 
companies. Among other findings, he quotes how it was concluded 
that the distinguishing characterises shared by these companies 
was that they did one thing well; be it marketing, producing, 
training, etc. These companies had developed a significant 
strength in one feature of their business which gave them the 
comparative advantage over their competitors.
It is extremely important for a situation analysis to be 
done as one of the first steps to understanding the environmental 
acceptance of new products, sales methods, strategy, etc based 
off the principles of limitness and leverage. This analysis
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forms the strategic thinking which will spark innovation around a 
firm's existing products and markets either by exploiting its 
strengths or eliminating its weaknesses.
4.6.3 Scenarios
Next in the hierarchy of strategy-making is the use of scenarios. 
They are the structured, but simple forms of strategic choice 
created by the use of contingency plans based on the possibility 
of certain events happening in the future.
This method, essentially non-quantitative, is popularly 
called "scenarios strategies" because it uses the phrases," What 
if., or \diat would we do if...." • It remains solely qualitative 
even when the Delphi Technique is computer-assisted or when 
mathematical models are used to show alternative scenarios of the 
future. In effect, the DMU is forced to consider the possible 
future strategies, reactions, and behaviours of competitors, 
governments, suppliers and customers.
The making of contingency plans to counteract or to 
incorporate the outcomes when certain environmental forces act 
in a specific way. This type of planning builds in the 
flexibility element as stressed by Fayol and mentioned earlier. 
Johnson and Scholes (1984) outlined several types of scenario- 
building strategies used by Shell UK Ltd. to examine trends in 
growth of the UK GNP. They divided them into unresolved 
conflicts, revival, and progress scenarios for action based on 
some possible future outcomes.
These types of analyses are totally unsuitable for 
determining a formal strategy for innovation. They draw heavily 
on the predictability of the future and long-term growth trends. 
However, innovation by its very nature denies measurement which 
is based on a static unchanging and predictable environment.
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4.6.4 Heuristics
Heuristics is a way (strategy) of using a rule of thumb or 
defined recipe to solve a problem. Spender (1980) defined them 
as industry-based recipes, or perceived wisdom, used as a basis 
to measure, control or predict a business strategically. They 
may not be the best possible solution to a problem; instead, they 
provide quick and satisfactory solutions. They are generally used 
by the more experienced managers within an industry, who have 
accumulated some fairly simple and similar ways of analysing a 
business•
For example, the May Company and similar USA big retail 
stores in the 1950's used a rule of thumb that their home 
consumer appliances retailing departments should contribute about 
25 percent of a store's total monthly sales. Even \dien the sales 
traceable to home appliances doubled in less than four years, 
this company stubbornly refused to accept this as an indication 
that a new consumer trend was under way and spent thousands of 
pounds trying to rectify the lower sales with sales from other 
parts of the store. They thought the other areas were declining 
rather than the fact the appliances were increasing 
disproportionate to the previous historic data of consumer 
purchases.
Generally in this type of prescribed strategic accounting 
system, its users become locked into believing that most problems 
and opportunities can be easily defined based on their previous 
experiences. The major flaws are that innovative ideas and 
emerging opportunities are discarded when they prove contrary to 
their conventional thinking and rules of thumb.
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4.6.5 Financial
There are a number of financial analytical techniques that can 
contribute to an assessment of strategic options. Most are solely 
concerned with the criterion of profitability, risk, and cash 
flow.
The simplest of these is a break even analysis. It tests 
the effect of volume, variable costs and fixed expenses to the 
feasibility of a strategy. Others are sensitivity measuring 
techniques which determine financial risk and project a 
calculated amount of uncertainty against a degree of confidence.
More complex financial analyses employ the use of funds flow 
forecasting, pay-back analysis, and profitability projections 
as strategy forming techniques. In most cases, they are 
primarily used to determine the feasibility of a strategy 
projecting when funds can be reasonably anticipated.
It is important to note that most innovations fail to 
measure up to the tests of acceptability, profitability and 
feasibility when these analyses are used. The graveyard of missed 
opportunities contains many innovations owing their early deaths 
to these financial strategic techniques.
4.7 PLANNING CONCEPTS AND GENERIC STRATEGIES
As shown in the preceding levels of analysis section, the 
first step in planning is some type of analysis and the 
development of external assumptions or scenarios, which describe 
the outside world of the firm.
This outside world is best judged as the environment in 
which the firm will be doing business during its planning period. 
From this view, multiple scenarios are constructed in prose that
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can be clearly and fully understood by operating managers as 
well as top managers.
For the next steps of planning, an effort should be 
directed to identify the critical factors for success (CFS) as 
discussed by Andrews et al in the situation analysis for levering 
a firm's strengths. It is in this phase that an opportunity 
analysis is constructed to reveal the resources available for 
deployment and future strategic options. The key factors 
investigated are financial, physical, human, intangible assets 
(reputation, brand name,etc) and assumptions of what is needed 
from customers and suppliers.
From these analyses, planning as a concept centres around 
the elements of contingency and measureability into the twin 
camps of objectives and constraints. Contingency being the 
eventuality that what is planned has to be changed due to 
unforeseen events occurring and measureability is needed so 
these pending changes can be measured easily at reasonable 
expense.
O'Connor (1981:23) argues that most good planning should 
be projected with a measurable contingency built-in •• "if 
certain changes are determined as possible to happen before their 
occurrence then a plan objective does not have to change. This 
requires some type of system to measure when and how often a 
change is made to trigger a contingency plan of action".
The other planning elements expressed as constraints and 
objectives stress the importance of having potentially 
conflicting business aims within a plan. Gluck et al (1978) 
stipulated that "constraints are to be satisfied, not necessarily 
exceeded. While objectives are to be maximised, subject to 
satisfying the constraints." He explains that having these twin 
aims can cause management to think about what they really want
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from a business (for a specified period) and what they are 
prepared to give up in terms of minimum constraints levels to get 
it.
The overall comprehensive process of strategic planning has 
been skilfully summarized by Ohmae (1982:242-243). He suggests 
that there are five conditions in a winning strategy: (1) the 
business domain is clearly defined; (2) The forces within the 
environment are extrapolated into the future on the basis of 
cause and effect; (3) Many planning options are reviewed, but 
only a few are chosen; (4) The firm paces its plan according to 
its resources; and (5) Management adheres to a plan's basic 
assumptions as long as these assumptions hold, but will change 
when other conditions (feedback and monitoring) dictate it is 
best to do so.
4.8 STRATEGIC CONCEPTS AND GENERIC MODELS
One of the first developments in the strategic field was 
the separation of strategies into distinct and different 
analytical categories (Ansoff, 1971; Hofer, 1984). The principal 
differences between a generic strategic model and a competitive 
one is that the generic model deals with problems between the 
firm and its environment, whilst the competitive model deals 
with the differences between competitors in the same industry or 
selling in the same trade area.
Just as there are hierarchies in planning and analysis, so 
are there three hierarchical levels in strategic management: (1) 
corporate level; (2) business level; and (3) functional level.
At the corporate level of strategy, there are four 
principal tasks: (1) determining the firm's attractiveness for 
present and future investment; (2) determining whether such 
investment in total (synergy) will permit the firm to achieve its
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overall objectives; (3) identifying the various gap- closing 
options available to the firm; and (4) identifying and evaluating 
other business areas in which the firm can invest. Corporate 
planning is generally more valuable in analysing existing 
business sectors which can not offer an attractive return than 
in seeking areas for innovation.
At the second tier, there is the business level of strategy, 
its focus is on how a firm will compete in a particular industry 
or product/market segment. It is in this level that the 
distinctive competences (CSF'S) as described by Andrews (1965, 
1971) are determined.
At the lower and third level of strategy, there is the 
functional planning of short term goals. Its principal focus is 
to test the liquidity and ability of the firm to marshal 
resources and how they should be managed. The combination of 
these levels set the generic and grand strategies of planning 
which have been determined by research (Kotler, Glueck, 
Henderson, Andrews, Ansoff, Porter et al) to be: (1) Building; 
(2) Holding; (3) Harvesting; and (4) Divesting.
(i) Building Strategies are based on planning efforts to 
increase market share through new products and/or new markets. 
Other terms to describe the same are expansion, offensive, 
acquisitions, and growth. In the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) 
Matrix, it is called the "star-making" strategy.
(ii) Holding strategies are designed to maintain existing 
markets or customers: preserving the status quo. They are
sometime describe as tenable, defensive, internal retrenchment, 
protecting and concentric. In the BCG matrix, it is called a 
"milking the cash cow "strategy.
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(iii)Harvesting strategies are deliberate policies of allowing 
market share to fall hoping to secure higher short-term earnings 
and increased cash flows. Some popular terms are disinvestment, 
loss-leaders and cash-enhanced strategies. In BCG terms, they are 
"dumping the problem child or curbing the dog" strategies.
(iv) Divesting strategies are aimed at selling or liquidating a 
non-core business because other business opportunities offer
prospects of greater growth and profitability. These are various 
forms of external retrenchment, and asset-stripping strategies. 
In BCG matrix terms, this strategy might be applied to dogs and 
question mark/ problem children.
By practice and philosophy, in addition to the harvest to 
divestment strategies mentioned, researchers (Freeman, 1974;
Harrigan and Porter, 1983) propose that most companies' 
strategies can further be classified into various different 
types of operating strategic policies: (i) Leaders; (ii)
Followers; (iii) Pioneers; (iv) Dependents; (v) Imitators; (vi)
Traditionalists; and others (see glossary of key concepts- 
Appendix B).
These could be called the "grand strategies" of companies and 
would be governed by the sovereign element of a firm using 
specific policies and programmes. The leadership type of 
strategy, for example, is the theory of management that it will 
reap above average profits if it controls or leads an industry 
technologically or by size (e.g. IBM, ICI, 3M).
Other examples of these grand strategies are: being the 
first with the newest product/service (pioneers); to innovate 
only to a specific customer need or niche (dependants); to enter 
a market in its growth stage (followers); to improve on another 
firm's innovation (imitators); to innovate for the purpose to 
make a quick profit and exit (opportunists).
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Since the glossary of other grand strategies are described 
in Appendix Bt an assessment of the most popular strategic 
models as to how they can be used in planning for innovation 
follows:
4.8.1 Experience Curve Model
The experience curve was a derivative of the learning curve 
theory that arose from the observations of the commander of 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, in 1925. It was 
observed that production worker hours for airplane manufacturing 
appeared to decline as the volume of production increased. It 
was coined "the experience curve " in 1960 by Bruce Henderson of 
the Boston Consulting Group (BCG), whom converted it into a 
strategic model which can indicate a strategic positiion using 
the market share and competitive dynamics of a firm.
Simply stated, the experience curve theory is the hypothesis 
that the relative costs of two competitors are a function of 
their relative accumulated production volumes.
It prophesied that a market-share leader would enjoy an 
inherent cost advantage over smaller competitors. This cost 
advantage could be exploited by setting industry price levels to 
provide itself, but not its higher-cost competitors with a 
satisfactory return on the investment. This was an amazing 
observation and not at all self-evident. The remarkable discovery 
was that it was applicable to a large number of industries. 
Product cost dropped each time the number of units manufactured 
doubled, and then levelled out to a fixed, but constant 
percentage of the original cost.
The experience curve model has attracted its share of 
critics and supporters in recent years. Kiechel (1981) writes 
cautiously about its use as a management tool...1 it requires
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constant managerial attention and to get costs to decline down 
the curve can be very difficult, if not impossible in certain 
industries1.,.. Alan Zakon, who now heads BCG and quoted in
the article by Kiechel, also indicated another one of its 
limitations, 1 it relies too heavily on industries \riiere there 
must be big-growth potential to work properly and sometimes it 
requires an economies of scale which can not be sustained, 
especially in the areas of distribution and manufacturing of 
consumer related items'
Furthermore, case studies and research by Hall (1980) 
demonstrated convincingly how some low-cost producers (Inland 
steel, Whirlpool Corporation, and others) have achieved their 
lowest cost positions without the benefit of high relative market 
share.
Yet, the supporters of this concept were able to cite an 
equal number of examples where the experience curve was able to 
communicate as a flexible strategic tool to great profits 
(DeNeui, 1980).
In fact, the key to the experience curve's uniqueness is 
that product costs drop as a result of a combination of things:
(1) material cost; (2) change in product design technology; (3) 
manufacturing process improvements; (4) "learning" among 
production workers; (5) specialisation among suppliers, workers 
and equipment; and (6) better inventory control.
In theory, none of these factors alone can account for the 
experience-curve rate of decline and the impact of each factor 
vary from industry to industry. This planning concept teaches 
that the share of the market (exceeding 20 percent or to double 
one's sales volume) is an early measure of future profitability.
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Diagram 4.3 Experience Curve Model
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The experience curve model (Diagram 4.3) could be extremely 
important in the development of innovation and new products where 
there is no existing history on what the future costs will be 
and what share of the market is needed to be profitable.
When used as a guide rather than as strategy-making model, 
it can motivate and communicate strategy very effectively. Since 
the model is based on reaching at least 20 percent share of a 
market and projecting future profits, it could be used to test 
when and how much a new innovation should cost to reach that 
level. Imagine for a firm about to produce a new product to know 
what the cost of a product will be before it is designed. Or 
imagine knowing how competition will price their next-generation 
products. While the tool is approximate, it is rational. It can 
be adjusted and manipulated and if used as a strategic planning 
tool for innovation, it could be invaluable.
4.8.2 Product Life Cycle Model
Basically, the Product Life Cycle (PLC) theory states that 
products, company, or industry tend to follow a pattern of growth 
similar to a biological entity: a birth to growth, maturity and 
then eventual decline and death. This well-known strategic model
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of a finite life span as a bell-shaped curve has been depicted 
by researchers to have from four to six phases.
Diagram 4.4 Product Life Cycle
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The validity of the PLC and in particular whether it is 
bell-shaped or not have been challenged by many researchers; and 
at the same time been promoted as a powerful management tool. Day 
(1984) poses the critical question is whether a change in the 
product cycle justifies a separate life cycle analysis. He cites 
examples to demonstrate that PLCs summarise the effects of many 
concurrent forces in a product market; acting together which may 
help or hinder the rate of a product's growth. In some cases, 
these influences may not dictate a new cycle.
The debate still rages as to what constitutes a life cycle. 
Rink and Swan (1979) suggest new products could be classified 
into several new degrees of newness. They argue that a product 
may be better classified based on customer perception and its 
introduction as either being entirely new, partially new, 
major, and minor change of newness rather than developed by 
stages in a life cycle pattern.
The major flaw of the PLC and not addressed by several of 
its proponents is its failure to recognise how a length of a 
product/process may vary. Critics point out the cycles of a 
product life depends on guesswork by management as to when a
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product is entering or exiting a growth and decline stage. They 
make their arguments in several different ways. First, they argue 
that an injection of cash in the form of advertising and 
improvements and other resources or the withdrawal of either can 
artificially affect the commercial life of a product/service.
Secondly, the length of a product's life will tend to vary 
significantly to the generic type of product/service/entity and 
the type of competitor it is competing with and the market 
structure. Further the life can be shortened pre-maturely by 
substitutions or new technological developments in an existing 
market; or lengthened by the discovery of new uses or demand 
within a new market.
Innovation-based work tends to be very different from other 
organisational activities. To be successful, they need specific 
goal or goals, a defined beginning and end, and a limited budget. 
Whether the project is headed by a product champion or a team of 
specialists, a high level of communication and coordination is 
needed to control role overload, cost-profit goals, frenetic 
activity and a focussing of mission. A multiple-factors product 
life cycle provides all of these (Slevin and Pinto, 1987:27).
So when a firm uses a PLC's multiple-factor model of 
critical success factors and determines which factors become more 
critical at different points in a product life cycle, then the 
following occurs:
(1) The conceptualizing and planning of an innovation can 
receive the review and commitment of the firm early.
(2) It creates a strategic plan of communication through 
each stage of the innovation development to all areas of the 
firm.
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(3) Cost and schedule overruns are reduced because definite 
cut-off or revitalize adjustment periods are determined early.
Research (Rhodes and Wield, 1985) indicates that for the 
planning and stimulation of innovation, the product life cycle 
provides a useful framework for looking at strategic implications 
of a firm's products or services over time. Within each cycle of 
the innovation, critical success factors can be developed to 
ensure the effort of the firm is focused on the "how" instead of 
the "what” factors of an innovation. These "how" factors of 
training, stimulating, and managing used in a PLC become embedded 
in specific action steps of an overall strategy.
4.8.3 Matrix Portfolio and Planning Models
These models illustrate where different product/ markets being 
operated by the same company or in the same industry are compared 
for attractiveness of investment or disinvestment and growth. 
They are the most primitive analyses of those based on product/ 
portfolio models. It is designed to classify product/market on 
one axis and its competitive position on the other. However there 
are two major flaws with this type of strategic model.
First, some researchers (Linneman and Thomas,1982) wisely 
observed that defining the product/markets group correctly 
depends on how they are technologically related, competitively- 
impacted, and geographically-linked, but the degree they attract 
managerial attention and corporate resources from one to another 
remain a difficulty with this type of model.
Secondly, the models are generally not applied correctly by 
most of their users. The concept of a planning theory for a 
diversified business portfolio or a strategic business unit 
(SBU) was developed in the mid-1960's by the General Electric 
Company (USA) as a guide for budgeting. Even when it was refined
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in the 1970's, its purpose was to measure performance and to 
develop an entrepreneurial thrust (Springer, 1973), not to plan 
strategy.
But it has a strategic value. Its value is limited, but 
its concept of an SBU being synonymous with product/marketing 
unit or organisation does create strategic thinking. This is the 
principle of synergism ( the creation of values by having one 
business unit supporting and complementing another).
The other features of the model (Springer, 1973;
Anthony, 1965; Andrews, 1964 ; Ansoff, 1961) do ensure that the 
allocation of resources across an organisation are the best 
possible; and the development simultaneously of two core 
business strategies (the product-market investment which 
encompasses the market scope/ investment intensity) and the 
identification of those competences or assets which give a firm a 
sustainable competitive strategy over its competitors. These are 
useful features for a generic portfolio planning theory.
Diagram 4.5 Ansoff's Generic Product-Market Model
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The dimensions used in tms product/market matrix as first 
developed by Ansoff (1961,1968) can use market share, profit 
sectors, competitive position, brand name, products and 
industries. The variations are endless. The generic guide lines, 
if not theory, determine how each business by product or market 
should be classified as (a) Strategic business units (SBU) which
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can stand alone from other business; (b) one manager should have 
accountability and control of each SBU's resources; (c) be unique 
enough to have a separate market focus and large enough to have a 
measurable scale as to growth or profits; and (d) should embrace 
the autonomy principle in which a SBU will set its objectives in 
concert with others, but singularly responsible for controlling 
its personnel and operating costs.
The problem with using this model can be reduced down to 
three major points. First, this portfolio planning theory, 
inherently, fails to deal with the administrative problem of 
"corporate turf-fighting and the power that profits generating 
units have over others" when seeking to convert its principles 
into managerial practice.
Second, there is a tendency for many of its users to 
generate a great amount of internal debate about its analytical 
techniques of what and how to measure sales, markets, and the 
impact of direct competitors. Too often, the core strategic 
issues which should be addressed are ignored when this debate 
begins.
Third, it is often used only when there is a crisis. The 
practice of this strategic method was evaluated (Haspeslagh, 
1982) by a survey of the USA top 1000 firms in 1979. He reported 
that 75 percent of the respondents found separating a SBU from 
one operating unit into another was the major hurdle in 
developing a strategy. Most of the firms turned to portfolio 
management when they suffered a performance crisis or when 
'triggered by a need to allocate resources in a capital- 
constrained environment'•
The most serious limitation of the portfolio planning 
method is its inability to create the need for new products and 
innovation. Issues about earned short term profits and market
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share, too often, dominated the planning process to the degree 
that most of the reporting firms (45 percent) indicated that 
specific programmes for new product development had to be 
developed outside the SBU and matrix method of planning. 
Haspeslagh does state that its merit would be its abilities to 
provide a framework for balancing the needs of one unit with 
another and greatly increased a company* s strategic control 
against competitors.
At least four product portfolio models, internationally, 
attract varying levels of support. These will now be described 
and compared.
4.8.3.1 Boston Consulting Gtoup (BOG) Growth Share Matrix
This model is based on the generation of cash flow as a measure 
of success and how future cash injections should be allocated to 
a particular product group or SBU.
Its portfolio dynamics are based on the premise of the 
experience curve and that high growth products (SBUs) require 
cash, while low growth products should provide cash. The matrix 
is divided into four quadrants using two definitive parameters, 
vertically and horizontally.
Diagram 4.6 BCG's Portfolio Model
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The concept of this model (Diagram 4.6) is that there are 
four basic categories of SBUs within each quadrant of the matrix 
euphemistically called: Star, Problem child, Cash Cow, and Dog. 
Utilising the experience curve principle, all four of the generic 
strategies (harvesting, holding, etc) mentioned previously can be 
related to the following quadrants of the BCG matrix.
(i) In the top left quadrant, there are the "stars" which are 
high market share, high market growth SBUs. These are market 
leaders and growing fast, but needing substantial amounts of cash 
to maintain their growth (Ennis, 1980). They hold the company's 
future growth and profits, once they are settled down into "cash 
cows" and require aggressive strategies in their introduction and 
early growth stages. Corporate stellifaction (star-making) occurs 
by knowing just when to stop investing and start to harvest the 
profits of this SBU and is the key strategic decision related to 
this strategy.
(ii) In the bottom left quadrant, there are the "cash cows" 
which are high market share,low market growth SBUs. They are 
former "stars" which are maturing. At this point, rather than 
using large amount of cash, they are generating large revenue in 
excess of their expenses which can be invested elsewhere. The 
strategy, here, is tenable and one of protection against new 
market entrants.
(iii) In the top right quadrant one finds the 
"questionmarks/problem children" which have low market share, but 
high market growth SBUs. They need large amount of cash just to 
survive and may turn into "stars" or "dogs" depending if the 
market share increases or declines after investments are made.
Management has to decide whether to spend a lot to make and 
build the products into leaders or to withdraw them from the 
market or to license-sell off the product for a small profit. The
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key strategic factor, here, is timing the investment to gain the 
largest returns possible at the lowest risk by not investing too 
soon or too late.
(iv) In the bottom right quadrant, is where the SBUs, called the 
"dogs", are located showing a low market share and a low market 
growth. These SBUs, with a poor competitive position, are barely 
surviving in a rapidly declining market. They exhibit low 
profits, but require large amounts of cash in excess of what they 
are earning. The future prospect of any type of a return from 
this SBU is relatively low. Unless they represent brand names, 
or produce a complementary product (supplier) for the core 
business, they become subject to strategies of disinvestment.
Dividing the matrix up axially, there are two axis: the 
vertical axis is the market growth indicator and the relative 
market share of SBU to its largest competitor is the horizontal 
axis. These form the basis for making strategy. They reflect the 
logarithmic principle of the experience curve which argues that 
the decline of costs and the rise of profits are related 
proportionately to volume of sales increases when exceeding a 20 
percent market share or the doubling of a firm's sales.
The ideal strategies are to transfer cash from the cash cows 
to problem children, \diilst the product or business flow 
(learning and managerial experience) transforms a problem child 
to star and a star to cash cow. Dogs are stripped of assets or 
disinvested for a profit.
Henderson (1960) and Wind (1982) argue that it is by the 
learning effect of employees and their experiences of developing, 
producing and marketing its products that a firm gains an 
advantage over smaller competitors and new entrants.
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In other words, where knowledge and technological skills are 
readily available in an industry, a company can outpace its 
competitors by rapidly acquiring and utilising these resources. 
This strategic principle, a central theme in this study, is how 
to combat employee obsolescence and build on the abilities of 
each employee to collectively gain knowledge entwined within the 
experience curve.
4.8.3.2 Profit Impact of Marketing Strategy (PIMS)
This model shows the strategic relationship between the market 
position and profits of a SBU as determined by Harvard Business 
School and the Marketing Science Institute in 1973.
Diagram 4.7 Profit- Market Share Model
Under 10% 10-20%
Relationship beraeen market share and pre-ux Rol (Source: Buzzell et aJ.a )
This matrix shows the results of studying 620 businesses 
over a three year period which determined that there was a 
positive correlation between market share and return on 
investment ( ROI). On average, it was found that ’ a difference 
of 10 percent in a market share is accompanied by an increase of 
about 5 percent in pretax ROI1 (Harvard Business School: 1981).
Using the PIMS model, explanations were given that it was 
the advancement of three possible factors why this occurred; (1) 
economies of scale for larger volumes achieved by an overall 
sales increase, the buying, manufacturing and marketing on a
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larger scale will assist in lower costs and higher profits based 
on the experience curve; (2) market power and purchasing power of 
the large volume producers enabled them to negotiate with 
suppliers or buyers for a more profitable arrangement vertically 
and horizontally; (3) the management engaged in more training of 
its key employees and attracted a higher quality of employee, 
initially.
These three explanations are not mutually exclusive: since 
PIMS requires by its practice for management to engage in 
understanding the impact and overall strategic relationships of 
its SBUs. The effect of larger size upon a firm’s profitability 
was supported by Drucker (1974), who stated, ’size has a major 
impact on strategy and strategy, in turn, has a major impact on 
size'. The larger size enable a firm to better control its 
environment and the players operating within it because of its 
resources. The firms identified as leaders, followers, imitators, 
etc ( Eastman Kodak, IBM, Xerox, Bendix) clearly show their grand 
strategies enabled them to exploit the market better.
Later research by Porter (1980) on the competitive forces 
and the negotiating power between suppliers and the large firm 
supported the principles that a firm must choose to be either a 
leader, follower or niche filling firm, not to seek to be more 
than one at a time. Selecting one generic strategy and sticking 
to it is a key way to be competitive according to Porter.
The PIMS concept of market share is theoretically tidy and 
impressive, but its critics pointed out that the market can be 
defined in too many different ways for such a neat equation. Day 
(1977) has noted it is not easy to measure a firm’s market share 
because the data to do so is incomplete. Also the quality of the 
products of the firms surveyed ranged from high quality and high 
price to low cost commodities in some cases. The effect of this
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discordance may explain that the profitability of a firm depended 
on pricing and type of competitors as much as the market share.
This model is often misapplied when size at any price 
becomes its chief strategic feature. Even Porter parted company 
with the research of PIMS in stating that "any firm which 
concentrated on just size or volume increases at any price is 
likely to lead to corporate suicide. Strategy must be balanced by 
other factors than share, or profit".
When using a PIMS model as an innovation stimulating device 
there are problems. This type of model works against a firm's 
decision to invest in newer products or innovation for capturing 
future markets. The emphasis is on share and profits rather than 
research, and development expenditures. A firm may be
characterized as conducting "navel-gazing" if they become too
occupied with either the size enhancement or quick profit 
improvement strategies and decide not to consider other viable 
strategies.
4.8.3.3 McKinsey/GE Expanded Assessment Model
This model has a nine-cell portfolio matrix with a horizontal 
axis representing industry (market dimension) and the vertical 
representing business dimension (product strength) of a SBU (see 
Diagram 4.8)
It was developed by the McKinsey consulting firm for the 
General Electric Company in 1959 as one of the first model to 
assess business investments. The model assess the industrial
attractiveness of a business opportunity and is based on a
rating of market growth, size, profit margin, competitive 
intensity, seasonality and economies of scale.
Each feature is weighted numerically against each other to
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determine whether a particular industry is "high, medium or low 
"in the terms of attractiveness for future investment. An 
analysis using a grid of of more than ten variables (.01) should 
be avoided as being too many and one with less than five (.20) 
may give be too few. So constructing an elegant but meaningful 
scale between 5 and 9 variables is the key to this model being 
effective.
Diagram 4.8: GE Business Screen Model
c tndvmry artraciiveneu
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Figure 64  McKinsey/GE Business Screen.
Source: Reprinted, by permission of the publisher, from Corporate Planning Tedmiques and 
Applications, edited by R. J. Ailio and M. W Pennington, p. 214, ©1979 AMACOM, a division of 
American Management Association, New York. All rights reserved.
The business strength (vertical axis of the model) 
summarises the ability of a firm to compete in a specific 
industry provided certain competences are present. They would 
include factors which are weighted such as: relative market 
share, price, competitiveness, product quality, knowledge of 
customer, sale effectiveness, and geography.
The generic guide lines for these type of matrix are to 
combine a quantitative rating system with a qualitative process 
(judgement) to gain a partly subjective view of and hopefully an 
objectively-derived strategic point. This should be done, at the 
least, annually in a planning format which will be evaluated 
before investing. Ennis discusses how these are used in 
conjunction with other models. For example, the BCG matrix is
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used to classify Aether the SBU is a Star, Problem Child, Dog,
etc. and later the attractiveness matrix (e.g. GE ) is used to go
into greater detail. Then a final decision is made.
Modifications of these models can integrate the principles 
of the product life cycle, the BCG strategy modes, and the 
experience curve theory for a specific function, such as in the 
analysis of customers, competitive position, and investment 
criteria. Currently, the expanded versions of the PLC' models 
are used in this manner by the A.D. Little business profile 
matrix or the Shell international directional matrix (Johnson and 
Scholes, 1984). The basic concepts of these as found in the 
BCG’s model are not radically different.
The key of these models is that every one of the grids 
provides a systematic way of evaluating and communicating the 
competitive strategic options resulting from a business cycle 
stage. Rather than describe their businesses as "animals in a 
zoo", they use terms such as "Invest Grow" for the Star;
"Maintenance " for the Cash Cow, "Limit Investment" for the Dog, 
and "Selectively Invest" for the Question Mark. Others such as 
the Booz-Allen Hamilton Approach (Gardner, Rachlin and Sweeny, 
1986) based their portfolio attractiveness models on the
qualifications of the company versus market position; or the 
technology position of a firm as indicated by the technological 
leverage of its products (uniqueness, complexity).
All of these models are intended to supplement, not 
supplant, managerial judgement. Wind (1980) and others have 
counselled against their use without other data to verify their 
conclusions. He warns," despite their abilities to show a 
business/ market attractiveness as a ready answer ... most of 
them as prescriptions ignore many other relevant dimensions 
and therefore they must be considered misleading, unless 
additional reports and analysis are done to confirm the same".
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Other critics such as James Farley of Booze-Alien Hamilton 
stated in the firm’s annual report in 1965 that "their model 
based on technological leverage was developed because the BCG 
and McKinsey Models using an experience curve do not hold in 
high technology businesses". His argument was that, whenever 
technology changes, high-tech businesses started down a different 
experience curve and then shifted at a faster rate when 
technologies emerged. He reasoned there must be some type of 
mechanism to incorporate this likely change in technology.
The major criticism and the principal difficulty with the 
GE business screen is that it does not depict as effectively as 
it might the positions of new businesses that are just starting 
to grow in new industries. Thus, it has limited useful in 
establishing strategies for innovation.
4.8.3.4 Product/Mission Matrix Model
This model is a later version of the one developed by Ansoff 
(1973). It is based on a new or present product growth vector 
going horizontally and mission (type of marketing options 
available from greater market penetration to diversification) 
vector going vertically is often used to show the non financial 
types of relationships which exist among a firm’s business.
Diagram 4.9 Product/ Mission Matrix
N^Product
M ission^
Present New
Present
Market
penetration
Product
development
New Market
development
Diversification
H. Igor Ansoff, Corporate Strategy, McGraw Hill, 
New York. 1965 (p. 109).
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This model (see above) depicts the permutation of options 
from the greater market penetration of an existing product to new 
products in new markets as well as diversification.
Ansoff proposes that his model could be used at four 
different levels of strategy; market penetration; new product 
development; market development; and diversification. These are 
explained as follows:
The market penetration involves the expansion of the firm's 
existing market; (2) new product development involves the 
expansion of an existing market through the creation of a new 
product, even though the firm mission remains the same; (3) 
market development concerns the search for additional missions 
which can be met by existing products; and (4) diversification 
requires the firm to invest in other businesses which involve a 
new mission for the firm.
This and other expanded hybrid models using the four main 
strategic categories when combined with other classifications 
could be useful in determining which industry (growth rate, 
customers potential) a firm should expand into. They may be 
used as key directional indicators for innovation and new product 
development, externally. Or internally they could be used to 
determine what type of a new product is needed for entrance based 
on a firm's existing competences.
Braksdale and Harris (1982) in their studies came to the 
same conclusions and aptly commented, " while an expended matrix 
does have problems in accurately defining all products and 
every market or eliminating all of the ambiguity encountered in 
trying to define rates of growth, they do provide a more 
comprehensive framework for strategic decision-making and future 
R & D efforts"
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4.8.4 Industry Structure Model
This model provides an approach devised to determine how a firm 
is doing against competitors within a specific industry. This 
generic model deals with the irrelationships between a firm's 
competitive strategy and industry structure (see Diagram 4.10).
This modelling as developed by Michael E. Porter, a 
professor at the Harvard Business School, dispenses with the 
unidimensional concept of competition, Instead it stresses how 
competition is the rivalry of firms doing business in the same 
industry. Porter contends the state of competition depends on 
five basic competitive forces: (1) the rivalry between firms; (2) 
the bargaining powers of buyers; (3) the threat of new entrants;
(4) the bargaining power of suppliers; and (5) and the threat of 
substitute products or service.
Diagram 4.10 Industry St»w*-«ire Competitiveness Model
Threat
new
entrants
Bargaining 
power of 
suppliers
Bargaining
power
buyers
Threat of 
substitute 
products 
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Source: Michael E. Porter. C om petitive Strategy.
. Free Press. New York. 1980
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S U B S T I T U T E S
P O T E N T I A L  E N T R A N T S
I N D U S T R Y
C O M P E T I T O R S
Rivalry among 
existing firms
This model shows the types of generic strategic choices 
available to a firm in order to gain a greater share of profits. 
It illustrates how to "cope with these five forces by selecting 
one of three generic strategies: (1) being an overall cost
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leader; (2) differentiation by creating something new or 
different that is perceived industry wide as being unique; or (3) 
focus their skills to concentrating on a particular buyer group, 
segment of a product line or within a geographic market.
The implication of this model to this study indicates that 
greater profit by differentiation leads to the practice of 
innovation. This model assists management in selecting a 
strategy not simply in response to rival companies, but to the 
other four forces driving industry competition as well: 
substitution, customers, suppliers, and potential entrants. The 
selection of the strategy to be a cost leader is probably best 
restricted to the larger firms whilst the focus strategy is 
better suited to the smaller firm.
4.8.5 Value-Based Models
These types of models emerged in the early 1980's as ways to 
look at a company portfolio of SBU based on a value-created 
strategy. They were developed ( Waterman, 1982; Peters, 1982; 
Porter, 1980) to exploit the value-chain of specialised 
activities of a company.
The model's emphasis (shown below in Diagram 4.11) is on the 
visionary- abilities of top management to set objectives based 
on a clear assessment of a firm's strengths and weaknesses, and 
the strategic questions such as what markets to compete in, how 
it will compete using its uniqueness (excellence) and the use of 
major action programmes.
Peters (1982) writes, "The companies who practice 
excellence, do it daily by sticking to their knitting and 
motivating their people to a high degree of standards". Its guide 
lines are based on the principle that most people, by their
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nature, resist change. Thus, management must introduce training 
and systems to overcome this resistance.
Diagram 4.11: McKinsey's Model
Structure
Strategy Systems
Shared
values
Skills
Staff
Source: McKinsey & Company. Inc.. 1982
McKinsey’s 7-S model argues that organisational effectiveness 
stems from the multiple factors of structure, strategy, systems, 
style, skills, staff, and shared values. Waterman (1988) writes 
"these seven factors bring about organisational change through 
the interrelationships and orchestration of value-driven 
objectives i. e. excellence, customer service, innovation"•
For a more externally directed value-chain model, Porter 
(1980) created one using upstream (internal operating controls) 
and downstream (marketing, sales) activities type of matrix all 
linked to support a customer-directed strategy. It is a complex 
web of values and beliefs requiring the support and belief of 
each employee from the conception of a product to how service is 
rendered after its purchase. It is monitored by a constant
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feedback from one end of a company to another, much akin to a 
corporate quality circle with the customer in the centre.
Diagram 4.12: Value-Chain Model
Source: Strategic Planning Associates.
L o w  H ig h
Product mystique
This is a 1980's-style of portfolio planning approach, 
developed by Strategic Planning Associates of the USA. It 
suggests in a 2 X 2 porfolio matrix with vertical axis 
dimensioning the "customer price sensitivity" to a value and the 
horiziontal axis measuring a "product mystique". A firm positions 
its business as to how their customers value their products. If 
it is a commodity then the strategy is to offer more for less. If 
it is a specialty, then a firm continues to add value (quality, 
uniqueness, etc.) to sets it product apart from others.
The chief flaw with the value-based model is that innovation 
must be valued by potential customers, even when its ultimate 
value has not been defined by its innovator. Thus a firm must 
under price its innovation in order to lure some customers to try 
it. Early critics (Fayol, 1961; Anthony, 1965;) and current 
critics (Drucker,1987; Quinn, 1988) write with caution of the 
practices of under pricing and the difficulty of doing a value- 
based strategy. There are two basic things wrong with this type 
of strategy. First, in respect to innovation, a firm's current 
customers tend not to value it or even to ignore it. Secondly, 
products are generally promoted based on getting a quick return
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and to engage in pricing wars with competitiors. It is a reactive 
type of strategy.
To the same point, Quinn stated, "strategic decisions 
are best made incrementally by top management., strategy totally 
based on customer reactions, whose loyalties are temporary, will 
over time lead the organisation to astray from its best strategy 
too often they react too slow or too hasty for solid planning". 
The implied strength of this strategy is that firms need a better 
understanding as to who their customers are, how they think and 
what they will spend for a particular value. But many innovation 
can not be valued externally and customers take their time about 
using them, and values change. Photocopying at one point was a 
specialty, but now must be valued as a commodity, unless a firm 
understand the transitional process, its strategy will misfire.
4.8.6 International Strategic Models
There are many different kinds of global strategies. Their 
variations depend on a firm’s choices about configuration and 
coordination of activities using the the elements of the value 
chain models discussed earlier.
The earliest one was developed by Stopford and Wells (1972) 
as a descriptive model in an effort to simplify the choices 
between the development of products overseas or at home. Their 
model (Diagram 4.13 below) outlines the paths of development that 
a firm may choose in becoming an international firm. The key 
feature is that the amount of foreign sales and diversity of 
foreign products will dictate the best global or area strategy 
that a firm should use. Its major weakness is the use of 
universal simple solutions to the diverse and complex problems 
of co-ordination of production and marketing which 
internationalism demands.
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This structural model depicts the foreign product diversity 
and foreign sales can dictate the overall strategy of a firm. The 
need to spread escalating technological development costs over 
shorter product life cycles tend to create the need for greater 
global coordination of effort between operations. Other than the 
problems of production, management and distribution, the 
strategic issue is which paths of development should a firm use 
to innovate. Should research and development (R & D) be done by 
either a worldwide product division or local divisions? Should it 
be done within one international department or across many 
departments in many different divisions?
Later attempts by Porter and Fuller (1986:338) determine 
that there is a pattern of international strategy that dictates 
how activities (such as R &D or new product development) should 
be done and by what type of an international company. Diagram 
4.14, on the next page, shows several possibilities of the many 
options available to an international firm.
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Diagram 4.14 Patterns of International Strategies
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The model indicates that international firms with a high 
foreign investment in top left comer may seek to develop R & D 
activities parallel to or in concert with a home firm. Whilst 
firms located in the lower left-hand comer of Diagram 4.14 will 
seek to form coalitions with other firms in other countries which 
require little co-ordination.
On other hand, firms in the top right comer may seek 
technological joint ventures as a method to innovate or grow. In 
each case, the structural characteristics of an industry and the 
range of a company's activities can work for and against 
globalisation. The elements that favour concentrating an activity 
in one or few foreign locations are as follows:
(i) economies of scale in each activity
(ii) proprietary learning curve in each activity
(iii) coordination advantages of co-locating activities 
such as R & D, marketing and production.
(iv) government assistance and political environment
(v) relationship with foreign buyers and suppliers
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The major limitation of the international stages model and 
configuration of activities models is that they (as Stopford's 
model) purport to provide universally simple solutions for 
diverse and complex business problems. A company can not develop 
an organisation that can innovate, analyse, and respond to the 
complexity of the international environment on such simple rules 
of thumb relating to product, configuration or geographic 
diversity. They are only effective when combined with other 
strategies.
4.9 SUMMARY
Specific examples of strategic models reviewed in this 
chapter were those of the gap analysis, situation appraisal, 
product life cycle analysis, and the portfolio strategic approach 
for SBUs.
In this review, it is important to note that all of these 
models provided a systematic approach for a firm's decision­
making units to evaluate and assess its strengths and weaknesses 
( internally and externally). Internally, it enables the firm to 
identify its critical success factors such as core skills, and 
other resources. The external analysis enables a firm to assess 
its strengths and weaknessess against competitors, with customers 
and suppliers, and the advantages of its location. These form the 
environmental elements of strategy-making.
Equally important is the desire of a decision-making unit 
(DMU) to want to close a gap between a current competitive 
position and a future one using a gap analysis model. This is a 
motivational element which compelles a DMU to train and motivate 
others within the firm to want to do the same.
Further, it was determined that effective strategy and 
objectives making were influenced by five specific elements: (1)
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measurability; (2) acceptability; (3) flexibility; (4) 
feasibility; and (5) precision.
Others distinct elements which created strategy were the 
limitation and allocation of resources imposed by the size, 
previous experience, and wealth of the firm. These formed the 
depth and range of the vision held by a EMU, the overall 
organisational structure and whether special programmes were used 
to support a stated mission of the firm to grow, to innovate, or 
to diversify.
This review revealed that the four broad groups of generic 
strategies (building, holding, harvesting and divesting) were 
condensed into many of the matrices type of models. Also, the 
portfolio planning theory entails the identification of these 
same four strategies in the management of strategic business 
units, SBUs. They would include funding patterns, how departments 
were managed, and the culture in which the staff operated. These 
same guidelines as contingent elements were embodied in many of 
the portfolio planning frameworks such as the Boston Consulting 
Group, McKinsey/GE, and other Value-based Models.
A word of caution is necessary in using these matrices. 
Misinterpretations abound with regard to reasons for classifying 
a business. For example, labelling a business as a Cash Cow is 
neither informative nor strategic and does not assist in managing 
the business. It takes more than the management of cash, but 
also skills and investment in plant, equipment, and people's 
time.
The additional misuse of these matrices is the widely held 
belief that any business can become a Star. This and the lack of 
experienced personnel for understanding this method of strategic 
portfolio management limitations, make it an expensive and 
dangerous game. The true value in the matrices are in their
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abilities to classify a business into opportunity and threats 
categories by a constant measurement and to know how to rank 
other competitors, strategically.
4.9.1 Implications Arising
Several implications arising in this study concern how the 
Product Life Cycle (PLC) may also be used as a strategic method 
to establish a life cycle for key technical information and 
employee obsolescence. These are the secondary themes in this 
thesis.
The other implication is how the growth-introduction
phase of a PLC can be delineated into sub-cycles comprising of
threshold, creation, leverage and revitalisation stages rather 
than the typical one or two stages with an introduction and 
growth cycle. These implications become evident if the principle 
that all business products and ideas have a finite life span 
becomes a strategic rule of thumb. By such a rule of thumb, a 
firm would project over some type of time scale that a strategic 
usefulness of either a product or idea should start to decline.
Thus, a firm would realise that it must engage in sometime
innovation on a regular basis in order to stay competitive. A 
feature which is missing in most of the strategic models 
reviewed. This is significant for a couple of reasons.
First, it supports the discovery in this review that 
product life cycle theory, Some aspects of the experience curve 
and a strategy for innovation are closely linked. Despite some 
critics, PLC has much to contribute for it emphasises as to how
each product or market has a limited life in which to earn
profits.
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Second, it reflects that more than one PLC curve may be 
evident in certain markets and strategists should use the theory 
of PLC analytically and creatively by developing various profiles 
of products in their product ranges. This also means that general 
administrative concepts, marketing, corporate image and other 
intangibles are subject to a period where they began to suffer a 
decline in their usefulnesses, the same as a product.
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CHAPTER FIVE
INNOVATION: EXTERNAL ELEMENTS
5.0 AIMS
This chapter introduces the environmental elements which 
stimulate innovation. These external elements form the market 
structure which is modified by a firm's size, and its
relationships between suppliers and buyers residing there.
First, it examines the classic arguments about the larger 
firm versus the smaller one as to which should be more
innovative. Then, it reviews the external elements: environment, 
market structure, firm size, and the pattern of an industry's 
growth as they relate to the stimulation of innovation.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Innovation - creating and introducing new solutions for existing 
problems or new products for an emerging market - is one of the 
greatest of challenges facing both the larger and smaller firm. 
But do they meet it differently ?
This raises the question what is the difference in size
between a small firm and a large one. From here on, the
international classification for a firm size as developed by 
Chandler (1986:410; SDA:1987) will be used: a small firm is one 
with less than 300 employees; a medium-sized firm is one with 301 
to 1,000 employees and one with more than 1,0001 is a larger 
firm.
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In order for a firm to be innovative, a linkage should be 
established between the environment, and those elements which 
stimulate innovation within a firm. This relationship between a 
firm 's environment, its size, its structure, its competitors, 
and customers is one argument that has intrigued business 
specialists and economists for a very long time. The argument has 
five dimensions to it.
The first dimension argues that most innovations occur 
through sheer accident. They believe that the role of the firm is 
only to exploit the innovations of others, by emulating, by 
purchasing or by licensing them when it is the best interests of 
the firm to do so. This dimension could be described as the 
"serendipity factor"
The second dimension argues that it is the presence of some 
internal elements (rising from a motivated workforce within a 
flexible and flat organisational structure) which stimulate 
innovation best. They believe that a firm creates an environment
where the innovator, intrapreneur and product champion are
nurtured in their self-imposed efforts to innovate. This is 
countered by those who believe that it is the self- motivated 
individual, who acts to his/her own needs, in spite of an
organisation's efforts to stimulate innovation. They argue that 
innovation can never be planned. This could be described as the 
argument of "random events by individuals" being the major force 
for innovation.
The third dimension argues that the market structure and 
the environment are the forces which create innovation within a 
firm. They believe that when large firms operate as a monopoly in 
a market, they tend to stifle innovation and technological
progress. Thus, smaller firms are the true innovators. This could 
be described as the argument tfiere " the size of the enterprise 
determines its ability to innovate".
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The fourth dimension argues that smaller firms may be the 
forces to advance an industry technologically, but they often 
fail to implement the proper marketing-technological strategy- 
needed to fully exploit this advantage. And if an innovation is 
to have commercial value to its users, then it is best done 
later on by larger firms stimulated by the reward of greater 
profits.
They believe that innovation occurs in two major ways: (1) 
when an industry has excess resources in the sunset period 
(maturity stage); or (2) in the sunrise period (early growth 
cycle) when the industry is just emerging and needs new 
applications for its resources. They argue that it is the 
interaction of the market place, the survival mode of the firm, 
and the maturity of the industry that create innovations. This is 
described as the argument that "the lure of market place" will 
periodically and informally stimulate innovations rather than any 
type of formal strategies of firms to produce innovations.
The fifth dimension is the argument that a firm using a 
formal strategy incorporating the distinctive elements of 
strategic management (measureability, precision, unity, and 
continuity) with a formal programme for innovation can stimulate 
a firm to be innovate with a higher than average probability.
They believe that the key external elements are a firm's 
relationships to buyers and suppliers in their business 
environment. They argue that there is a causal link between these 
elements and an innovative workforce, the visionary practices of 
management, the organisational structure of a firm, and that a 
corporate strategy creates the unifying force to stimulate 
innovation. This dimension is described here as "users of formal 
strategies to stimulate innovation"•
Page 143
Innovation: External Elements- Chapter Five
Setting aside the first two dimensions as being outside the 
realm of this review, much of the literature on this debate 
started with Schumpeter (1942) and his fifty year-old concept of 
"creative destruction". He argued that sheer size makes big firms 
captives of their own successes, and they cannot change as fast 
as smaller rivals. So when opportunities for innovation arise, 
the smaller firms will seize them first.
Time has changed since the literature of Schumpeter was 
first published. It could be contended in his time that big firms 
had less incentive to change. But circumstances have changed, 
turbulence in the fast-changing world economy has levelled the 
playing field, because it penalises big firms when they refuse to 
change. Bouncing currencies, fast-changing technologies and 
international competition can hurt any firm, big or small. 
However, the realization by many big firms that they must 
change to survive is itself a new force for innovation not 
considered by Schumpeter. Bigger firms are shaken apart by such 
turbulence, \diilst little firms can ride the waves of change. It 
is conclusive in today's business environment that both need to 
develop some type of technological marketing strategy to grow.
This type of findings has not been the case with research 
supporting market structure and innovation. Those studies 
(Kamien and Schwartz 1982; Hope, 1985) which have investigated 
the relationship between innovative activity and market structure 
have been inconclusive. The main criticism is that these studies 
vary too greatly in terms of approach, scope and methodology to 
be totally conclusive. But they were able to measure innovation 
as a dependent variable in relation to firm size, market 
position, and industrial concentration of buyers and suppliers.
The other part of the argument in the fourth dimension is 
that innovative activity will tend to be led by the smaller firms 
in a market because the larger firms elect to delay an
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innovation, letting smaller firms first try out the new ideas. 
Then the larger firm will imitate in a marketing effort to catch 
up with and supplant the smaller innovator. This raises the 
question whether this is a deliberate strategy (delay) rather 
than a lack of innovation being practiced by larger firms. Some 
pundits (Kendrick, 1961) believe it is the strategic thinking of 
larger firms to innovate and wait to see by market changes 
whether an innovation is worthy of further involvement. He argued 
that this delayed action gives a false indication that they are 
reluctant to innovate, when in reality, they are just as 
determined to innovate as a smaller firm.
In exploring the issues in the fifth dimension of the 
argument, researchers (Burgelman, 1984; Pinchot,1985; Drucker, 
1986) indicate that larger firms are turning more and more to 
the use of formal strategies combined with specific programmes to 
stimulate innovation. These are used with a set of management 
policies for training and motivating employees to be innovators. 
Likewise, recent articles (The Economist, 1989; The Harvard 
Business Review, 1990) indicate that smaller firms are using some 
of the same elements, informally and formally, to accomplish the 
same. Their studies prove conclusively that users of formal 
programmes to stimulate innovation can receive up to 25 percent 
of their revenue from new products and services not being offered 
by them just three years previously.
5.2 THE ARGUMENT ABOUT INNOVATION AND A FIRM SIZE
Published data on the relationship between firm size and market 
performance to being innovative through effective research and 
development has a long history.
A frequent starting point for the investigations of market 
conduct and performance is market structure. The basic theory 
found in economics is the fifty years- old contention that a
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large-scale establishment should be hailed as a stimulating and 
invigorating force forexpansion and growth. The most 
distinguished proponent of this position would be Joseph 
Schumpeter. He argues in his writing (Schumpeter, 1942) that "we 
must accept that a large-scale establishment in modem industrial 
condition is the most powerful engine of progress for long term 
output ".
Schumpeter stated his theory in rather general terms, and 
because of this there has been a lot of discussion and 
disagreement over the precise contents of his theory. A major 
source of confusion is that he did not pay enough attention to 
the distinction of the absolute size of a firm as opposed to 
relative size in relation to its market. Or to put it differently 
he did not distinguish clearly enough between structural 
conditions relating to a firm as a separate entity within a 
competitive environment. He no doubt differentiated between firm 
size and market power in his analysis, but was not explicit in 
disentangling their separate effects.
However, there can be no denying that he meant that both the 
absolute size and market power would encourage innovative effort 
by a firm and could lead to a higher rate of technological 
progress.
His argument can be distilled down into two basic elements. 
First, he argues that the monopoly position of a firm will 
stimulate it to a greater demand for innovation because a 
monopolist can use its market power to obtain a higher profit 
from the innovation than under competitive conditions. This type 
of firm is in a superior position to a newly entering firm to 
determine what the potential returns and impact of an innovation 
would be. Secondly, he argued that a monopoly firm will be able 
to generate a larger supply of innovation using the economies of
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scale which a smaller competitive firm would not have at its 
disposal.
Supporters of the Schumpeterian system (Galbraith, 1952) have 
taken a somewhat different direction with the emphasis moving 
to some extent from relative size to absolute size. As an 
example, Galbraith, who is a celebrated modem follower of 
Schumpeter gave a forceful statement of this shift," the large 
firm in a modem industry is almost a perfect instrument for 
inducing technical change. It is equipped for the financing of 
technical development and its organisation can provide strong 
incentives for undertaking such development"
Firstly, it is fair to state that while Galbraith and other 
Schumpeterian followers never managed to convince the majority of 
economists and business specialists of the comparative advantages 
of monopolies in furthering innovation, their arguments were 
strong enough to outweigh any counter argument of the innovation 
-scale function.
Secondly, it is clear that by Schumpeter's claim that the 
large firm (which by the implication also has the greater market 
power) is normally considered the basis for the argument that 
large firms are better innovators in general. This is the belief 
that a larger firm has more resources, and opportunities to 
innovate than a smaller firm. This belief is based on the 
relationship between competition, monopoly, and innovation.
One of the first formal analyses of this relationship 
between competition, innovation, and monopoly was done by Kenneth 
Arrow (1962), who stirred up some controversy arguing that 
environmental conditions affect innovation.
This converse argument by Arrow is that monopoly power may 
be giving larger and dominant market leaders increased profits
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and thereby reducing their incentives to invent and be 
innovative. He arrived at the conclusion that" the incentive to 
innovate is less under monopolistic conditions than under 
competitive conditions". He used econometric testing and 
formally introduced the concept that it is the type of strategy 
used by a firm which determines whether it is innovative. 
However, he failed to include "the concept of technological 
opportunities" and the use of a product life cycle model as being 
developed by the field of marketing. They are important factors 
to be overlooked. Clearly, it would be helpful to have a 
reconciliation of these conflicting arguments, though once again 
it is unlikely that any clear-cut conclusion will be found.
Now after setting forth the basic argument, the external 
elements related to innovation arising from environmental forces 
are discussed as follow:
5.3 EXTERNAL ELEMENTS: INDUSTRY GROWTH AND CHANGES
Research (Drucker, 1985; Kanter, 1986) does indicate that it 
there are three major visible signs of change in the industry 
structure which indicate conditions that are favourable for 
growth by innovation. When these changes are present, existing 
firms with a certain type of marketing strategy will share in 
this growth even when new firms are entering this industry. 
Other firms without a scanning system to pick up these changes 
will probably expire. However these changes may be just as 
visible to outside firms as well as existing firms within the 
industry and are as follow:
Firstly, the most reliable indicator would be a rapid growth 
of an industry. When an industry grew significantly faster than 
the economy or population as a whole, it could be predicated with 
high probability that its market structure would change 
drastically. If its volume has doubled, there is almost certainty
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that the bulk of the customers will accept and embrace any type 
of innovation that is reasonably priced. Only \dien existing 
firms ignore the signs of better than average growth or fail to 
innovate, can "newcomers or outsiders" change the market 
structure by capturing new customers. The most likely path to 
capturing some of an industry's growth is by innovation.
Secondly, another indicator is the convergence of 
technologies which hitherto were seen as distinctly separate. An 
example would be the application of computer technology to 
telephone switchboard operations, a breakthrough by innovation 
displaced Bell systems in America from a sixty-odd percent market 
share to less than thirty percent in less than four years by a 
small firm, RQLM. It took Bell systems more than 10 years to 
gain back some of the market share captured by this new 
competitor in the field of telecomnunication. In the end, it had 
to become known as being just as innovative as ROLM to do so.
Thirdly, an industry is ripe for basic structural change if 
the way in which business is normally done has changed. Medical 
and financial industrial sectors have some examples (scanning 
devices for medical problems and cash dispensing machines being 
used by newcomers into the market while the older and larger 
producers and suppliers cling to practices which ignore the 
electronic innovation of the day).
These examples show how innovation can exploit and bring 
about changes in industry structure when a few large 
manufacturers or suppliers dominate a market. Even -tfien there is 
no true monopoly, there is a tendency by dominant "insiders" to 
dismiss newcomers as insignificant and fail to diagnose the first 
visible signs of emerging innovation.
This failure to foresee a changing industry generally does 
does not occur when there is a market-driven strategy being used
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by a company. Precisely because such a strategy encompasses 
the need for a scanning and measuring phase which audits all 
customer or technology shifts (no matter how small) as part of 
its business strategy (Kotler 1976:447).
At its worst, when such changes are noted, a larger firm can 
make a strategic decision to measure such changes, delay and 
later exploit innovation when it reaches a certain critical 
volume mass.
It is clear that when larger firms are aware of a changing 
industry, it becomes a simple matter of timing for them to know 
when to harvest an innovation which others have developed. But 
the timing must be impeccable. Such timing requires a Decision 
Support System (DSS) as recommended by many marketers (Little 
1982: 50) which incorporate three important elements: (1)
managerial capability and resources to measure such shifts: (2) 
an analytical system to forecast alternative strategies under a 
variety of market conditions; and (3) the flexibility and speed 
to adapt quickly to changes.
5.4 THE ADVANTAGES OF THE LARGE FIRM AND BEING INNOVATIVE
Before discussing those elements which form these advantages, 
the basic argument for being innovative has four points to it:(l) 
that a large share of innovations will occur through research and 
development activities outcomes (R & D).
The other parts of the argument are: (2) that an established 
and large marketing network enables a firm to launch a new 
product more successfully; (3) the financial power of a larger 
firm often provides the funds for a long to develop and costly 
innovation; and (4) the large and diversified customer base of a 
larger firm will provide better inputs as to when an innovation 
is needed.
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The first point is that larger firms generally spend larger 
amounts on R & D than smaller firms and in doing so generate a 
more probable outcome that they will be more innovative. 
Therefore, it is fair to state that larger firms may well have 
important advantages in R&D outcomes when one considers the 
economies of scale in having more resources and greater profits 
to invest when needed to exploit a new product or process.
The next two points are about the residing market support 
and financial powers enjoyed by the larger firms in which there 
are greater opportunities for them to reap the rewards of 
successful innovation. By the virtue of their size financially 
large firms are better prepared to stand the failures and to 
feed long lead times before a project is expected to become 
profitable. Their financial strength may be important for the 
successful innovation and marketing of a new product and to help 
them overcome the negative cash flow often associated with the 
development and launch of a new product.
The final and fourth point had been suggested (Schott, 
1974:380) that the larger firm which is more diversified may find 
advantages because inventions tend to occur in unexpected areas. 
He further suggests that the diversified organisation has 
therefore a superior scanning system and a greater likelihood of 
capitulating upon these opportunities.
Equally it has been stated ( Littler, 1988: 121) that since 
most large firms do not generally operate within a niche and 
have a more stratified customer base, they can detect patterns 
of consumption that will indicate where an innovation will be 
commercially viable or when market forces indicate they are 
needed.
Against these points, it is still argued that the larger 
firms have some disadvantages in being innovative. They may well
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be more bureaucratic and consequently less likely to perceive 
new opportunities and may have a high risk aversion preference, 
concentrating upon projects with a short period of pay-off or 
proven market appeal. They may well have a vested interest in 
existing methods and products and may be unwilling to proceed 
with an innovation that threatens their own existing investments.
They may also find it is difficult to attract and retain 
sufficient entrepreneurial personnel needed to be more 
innovative. Operationally the managers of the larger firm will 
be selected, rewarded and promoted when they maintain profit 
margins and market share than to destroy either or both by being 
innovative, unless they operate under a policy that any efforts 
to innovate will not be held against them.
5.5 THE SMALL FIRM VS. THE LARGE FIRM AS INNOVATORS
Research (Pavitt, 1934) does give some reasonably clear 
conclusions about the relationship of firm size and new product 
development. He suggests that small firms are more likely to 
have the edge in invention, whilst the market position and 
financial strength of large firms are likely to gain the 
advantage in innovation and in the diffusion of an innovation. 
Other research ( Drucker and Porter, Jawekey et al) supports the 
fact that small firms remain still the most important sources of 
inventions though not of innovations.
While the actual level of threshold size varies from 
industry to industry, one finds that the amount of research 
expenditures per firm increases absolutely as the size of the 
firm increases. This is often used to argue that the larger firm 
is better at new product development than the smaller ones. 
However, when the proportion of sales for research is used the 
largest firm spends no more or possibly even less than a medium 
sized firm within the same industry.
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The other argument against the small firm is the body of 
statistics (Hall, 1986:34) that show the total amount of new 
product developments achieved and their sources would indicate 
that larger firm are better innovators.
Yet, the role of the larger firms as innovators could be 
argued in several ways even though the large firms' innovations 
account for a greater share of innovations in relation to the 
total inputs of innovation launched. First, it is argued that 
they are slow to take up developments that are offered to them by 
smaller firms. Second, research (Littler, 1988) indicates that 
the level of new product development by the larger firms is less 
than the level of medium sized firms.
Third, the literature (Hall, 1986) shows that smaller firms 
are more effective in new product development when measured in 
terms of R& D inputs or the number of new products per research 
dollar outputs. Based on these facts, some argue that for more 
efficient new product development, larger firms should be 
restricted from growing too big past a critical size where new 
product development will flourish.
Whether dismantling the large firms into medium sized ones 
or assisting a number of smaller firms to become larger, and 
thereby gaining a certain critical size, would speed up 
innovation or new product development is still an open question. 
But in some industries, such as chemicals and large durable goods 
manufacturing, this is not the case because there it is the 
larger firms that are responsible for most innovations. This 
creates the issue whether it is the firm size, its desire to 
grow, or the maturity of the industry which stimulate innovation 
better.
Research by Freeman (1981) does suggest that industry 
conditions, whether they are favourable for new product
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development, or hostile is what determines a firm 's rate of 
innovation. Most literature agrees that a business firm should 
innovate in order to grow, but there is a healthy disagreement as 
to how far a firm should persist in its growth.
The pursuit of growth, generally, must be a a major objective 
for a firm. To gain this growth, a firm has a choice of two 
alternative and fundamental methods to do so, either by internal 
or external means. To grow internally, many firms seek to 
expand by increasing their activity in existing product markets 
or to diversify by moving into new markets by offering new 
products and service. Others believe that external growth by 
mergers and acquisitions is the best way to grow.
Some commentators (Penrose, 1974) suggest that the 
decision to grow is more a response to particular opportunities 
or pressure rather than simply a managerial objective. Others 
such as Bama (1962) and Richardson (1964) project that the 
effects of technological change leading to rising productivity 
and growth cause a firm to seek new ways to use their surplus 
capacity as a stimulus for growth. However, Leyland (1979) 
argues that the primary reason for the pursuit of growth is the 
desire to preserve and occupy an existing management team. All 
of these are factors which have absolutely no relationship with a 
firm size and market structure as much as they have to do with a 
strategy for growth.
The disadvantages of the smaller firms in new product 
development are in many cases the obverse of those discussed as 
advantages for the large firms. But three possible advantages of 
the small firms are worthy of being noted.
First, research (Kanter, 1988:243) indicates that 
organisationally, they may have a more creative staff with a 
stronger commitment to the job since the employees feel that
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there Is a thin line between their firm's success and job 
security.
Second, there may be less of a bureaucratic structure which 
facilitates a closer coupling of R & D activity to other 
departments. This type of structure will allow a better 
coordination between the different product development
activities and invention and innovation.
Third, the owners of the small firms may be less motivated 
by monetary considerations, more willing to take risks and may be 
more willing to cooperate with other organisations in order to 
gain information, assistance and industrial research when it 
decides to be more innovative.
5.6 EXTERNAL HJ0®TT: MARKET STRUCTURE
Market structure is defined mainly by the size and distribution 
of firms within the market. Its importance strategically was 
addressed by Bain (1968) who states " market structure is one of 
those external characteristics of the industry that seem to 
exercise a strategic influence on the nature of competition... 
and market conduct is a pattern of behaviour that enterprises 
follow in adapting or adjusting to the industry in which they 
sell”.
These external elements include the concentration of buyers, 
sellers, product substitutions and entry conditions, and how a 
firm designs, prices, and sells a product or service. On the 
basis of the writings of Bain and others, the main elements 
comprising market structure are: the market share of firms,
concentration among the larger ones and the barriers they raise 
to new and potential firms to compete. This structure ranges 
from pure competition with many firms to loose and tight 
oligopoly, dominant firms and complete monopoly.
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Whether an industry is perfectly competitive, monopolistic 
or oligopolistic may have some impact on the rate and nature of 
technological change. But when it comes to the absolute and 
relative size of the firms comprising that industry, there are 
four other factors which should be considered
First, in the long run, if not the medium time frame, the 
intensity of competition may be not related to market structure. 
For example, the most highly concentrated industries 
(shipbuilding, steel-making, aircraft) cannot afford to be 
complacent because there is always the risk that a new firm from 
outside the industry (through its development of and its use of a 
new product) may overturn the market positions of established 
firms. Even a monopoly position established through patents is 
not totally secure since competitors may be stimulated to develop 
alternative technological solutions in order to bypass the 
patent•
Second, the stage of development of the innovation or 
technology is likely to be a significant influence on the nature 
and vigour of technological development and its marketing 
strategy. During the embryonic phase of the development of new 
technology, there is usually considerable scope for further 
technological improvement. This means the "innovating firm" would 
use a market-skimning prices strategy with high prices initially 
to skim the market, but it should not be too high as this will 
attract more competitors. Eventually, the scope for further 
technological improvements becomes limited, and it is likely that 
there will be diminishing returns to efforts to develop the 
technology further. Prices are lowered by a gradual introduction 
of a cost- effective distribution and production plan. At this 
point R & D resources may then be more productively allocated to 
alternatives, in particular newer technologies.
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Third, certain innovations may demand a minimum high level 
of expenditure as an "entrance fee” for a firm to market it. For 
instance, the cost to develop a new airframe will be in the 
billions, whereas the development of a food innovation may be in 
the order of a few thousand pounds. Thus those industries which 
involve larger scale innovation may require large firms which can 
afford the costs and smaller firms are attracted to industries 
(such as food, leisure, electronics, textiles, paper, and 
furniture) where lower amounts of investments are needed to make 
an innovation worthwhile. These types of industries rely more on 
ideas and skills than expensive research and development efforts 
as sources for new products.
Fourth, technological development and innovation are 
stimulated by the social and political factors of a country, by 
its policies of regulation, funding, population growth and 
environmental concerns. Industries such as in the pharmaceutical 
sectors and motor car manufacturing can be significantly changed 
by either demographic or governmental pressures which affect a 
firm and all competitors equally. So in these industries a firm's 
size, its rate of growth, market position and industrial 
concentration are not affected by the nature and path of 
innovation. It is more the case they are forced to survive by the 
process of innovation.
This review does indicate that industrial changes, market 
structure and size of the firm does stimulate or disable 
innovation in a couple of ways. First, a smaller firm may seek 
to be the first with the newest by developing an innovation 
which will fully exploit a market niche. Secondly, a monopolist, 
defined as a large firm dominating its market, can delay all the 
values of an innovation in its industry if it has a scanning 
system in place to be aware that the said innovation is emerging.
The delaying strategy used by IBM when it refused to allow its
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hardware to be compatible with the "easy to program " 
capabilities being offered by Apple Computer is a prime example.
Therefore, the argument that a monopolist, generally, will 
apply a restrictive policy to inventions and innovations of a 
smaller firm may hold true. And as Fellner (1975) argues, the 
competitive firms smaller in size will tend to innovate more 
fully than monopolists may be true. However, the larger firm 
should be more concerned about the fact that a new innovation 
will destroy some or all of the value of its existing technology. 
For example, satellite communication can make telephone cables 
worthless or at least worth less; or that a new computer model 
can alter the value of conventional measuring equipment.
5.7 EXTERNAL aEMEHTS : BUYE3? AM) SUPPLIER RELATIONSHIPS
The market structure is comprised of buyers and suppliers which 
are external to the firm. Research (Myers and Marquis, 1975; 
Hall, 1986) argues that innovation occurs in response to these 
external elements.
Innovation occurs either by the needs (pulling) of the buyers 
or the thrust (pushing) of the suppliers. This process of 
innovation, considered at some length in Chapter Three, has been 
shown neither to flow purely from market to producer (need-pull) 
nor purely from basic research to market (technology-push). Both 
elements are involved in a complex buying and supplying 
relationship. It is more an evolutionary process than a 
revolutionary one.
Myers and Marquis, went on to explore the evidence that 
most technological changes occurs in response to perceived 
market needs, concluding that 75 percent of the 657 innovations
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examined in five different industries "could be classified as 
responses to their buyers1 demands". Other researchers (Chisnall, 
1989; Hall, 1986; SAPPHO, 1972) have reached similar conclusions, 
and the single most important external factor determining 
successful innovation was the close monitoring of actual and 
potential buyers' needs.
It is central to a Schumpeterian development process that 
there is a long waiting period until the buyers are convinced of 
its value. This "wait and see" period starts once an initial 
innovation is offered, and one reason for the delay rests in the 
uncertainty about the innovation in general.
As Hoffman (1949) put it, all potential consumers have to 
acquire information about the innovation and learn new patterns 
for its application before they purchase a new product. Further, 
he argued that an industry may experience a rapid rate of growth 
"because it is a young industry busy creating a market for itself 
in the place of other products;in contrast to an old industry 
where the buyer has had a long time to decide on how much to 
use". So with new innovations, the risk is how much to order 
initially and at what cost.
It is not only the risk-cost factor working against the 
diffusion of an innovation, but lack of information by the buyer 
about how much to risk with the integrity, and quality of their 
own products. It is the poverty of information about an 
innovation that creates most buyer's uncertainty. This 
uncertainty tends to retard the development of the buyer's 
organisation as well as the early commercial success of an 
innovation. This, also, places a buyer in a dilemma regarding 
innovating products because their value to assist his/her own 
organisation have not been proven.
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It is for these reasons that the buying process for an 
innovation may include a technical review, and a trial period of 
use before making further commitments to buy. This is supported 
by research (Cuimigham and Elling, 1983; Cunnigham and White,
1974) which indicates that over 60 percent of all machinery 
purchases surveyed in the UK went to suppliers of which the 
buyers had previous experience. These surveys, also, highlighted 
the fact that in the purchase of machinery and material 
considered innovative, the buyers picked the innovations being 
offered by larger firm 82 percent of the time versus only 17 
percent of the time with smaller suppliers. Over a ten year 
period, this trend to pick larger firms and former suppliers over 
smaller and new suppliers has changed very little regardless of 
industries surveyed.
On the other hand, there are some buyers, who prefer to try new 
innovations at will, regardless of cost. This supports the 
adoption pattern of an industry that some will buy because it is 
new and others will reject for the same reason. This pattern 
was noted by Stoneman(1983:4l) in quoting Welbournen "when a new 
thing is offered, some men will pay more than it is worth, 
because it is new; other men will not buy it at all, even if you 
give it to them free- for the same reasons that others will buy, 
because it is new".
This pattern of adoption, researched by Rogers and Mansfield 
and as noted in Chapter Three, is outlined to show how some 
buyers represent pioneering firms, traditional ones and so on 
will consider buying an innovation based on three factors: (1) 
the technology of an industry (complexity offers the greatest 
opportunity while offering greatest reluctance to change); (2) 
the management policies of the buyer dictates whether that firm 
will, by past practice, welcome new ideas or not; and (3) the 
amount of educational effort exerted by the innovator in telling
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the industry as a whole of the benefits of an innovation in the 
marketing phase of the innovation chain.
Regarding as to how buyers of innovation should be 
persuaded, Abratt (1986) identified four techniques: (1)
innovating firms as part of the innovation process must 
recognize that the purchase of an innovation, in most cases, is a 
"high-risk" decision, and they should develop an early and close 
relationship with the most innovative segment of their potential 
buying market to overcome this; (2) the salesmen of innovation 
must realise that the buying process includes many more layers of 
management than the normal buying process so their presentations 
should be directed at technical and service managers as well as 
buyers; (3) From time to time, innovating suppliers should survey 
potential buyers to determine which of their problems could be 
solved by innovation before offering it to the market place and 
slant their selling material accordingly; and (4) innovators 
should share in-depth technical information about the benefits 
and features of an innovation as to how it would solve problems 
within the buyer's organisation.
Naturally all suppliers become buyers so the techniques for 
one are the same for the other.
5.8 EXTERNAL ELBiENTS: BUYING INNOVATION FROM OTHERS
Within the environment surrounding a firm are elements which 
could be acquired which may stimulate innovation: They include 
(1) innovating competitors acquired by either a merger or an 
acquisition; (2) innovating firms that have organisational and 
marketing skills that the firm does not possess, but need; and 
(3) firms and institutions which engage in basic and applied 
research.
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When using external methods, the acquisition of innovation, 
the firm may seek to buy new ideas, new products or to acquire 
"spin-offs" of other firms ( i.e. small entrepreneurial firms). 
However, the literature (Economist, 1983; Peters, 1982; 
Burgelman, 1983) provides three reasons as to why a firm should 
hesitate in selecting this (buy-into innovation) as a corporate 
strategy for innovation.
Firstly, a firm relying on extrenal methods, reduces the 
abilities of its employees to see and embrace internal 
opportunities to innovate within the firm. The most productive 
way to growth and profits by innovation is "home-grown " 
innovation.
Secondly, when external methods are used, innovative 
activities are put aside internally. Then the most creative and 
entrepreneurial persons will see this as a sign to leave. Thus, 
such a strategy will result in a brain-drain and the remaining 
employees will seek to be even more non-entrepreneurial. They not 
see any reward for being innovative as individuals.
In the purchasing of innovation, a firm does not build up 
the " experimenting- teaching -and- learning " experience 
necesary for developing the entire process of innovation from 
conception to commercial acceptance. A firm, without these 
learning experiences, increases the risk in the future that it 
would create a workforce which can not innovate even when 
management wants it to do so.
Thirdly, a firm should be aware that the purchase of a 
license or a right to exploit an innovation, provides a limited 
strategic advantage and should be considered carefully. 
Partnerships, and coalitions with universities, research 
laboratories and other firms should be approached with a full 
view of their costs as well as their benefits. Also the
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conflicts between the goals of dissimilar firms create many 
administrative and organisational problems which discourage this 
external method as being viable.
5.9 SUftfARY
This review indicates that there is ample evidence that the 
external elements for the stimulation of innovation and the 
causal links of these relationship have not been explored enough 
by its proponents in sufficient detail to justify many of the 
conclusions they reached, except for the following three 
observations:
1. Most firms within an industry should employ a scanning 
system to detect what is happening in the environment with 
sources of supplies, customers and technological development. 
This element to determine the key needs of customers seems to be 
the most important factor determining successful innovation. It 
is critical that the process of innovation requires a close 
monitoring of the environment, whether it is done by the larger 
firm or the smaller firm.
2. The ability to purchase or license innovation from others 
is an option which many larger firms can employ successful, it 
they are aware of what is happening in the environment. Their 
size, reputation, and marketing experience ease the adoption of 
the innovation.
3. A firm's size and whether its industry is entering a 
sunset or sunrise period can dictate its overall ability to 
innovate. A larger firm in a sunrise phase of an industry has a 
better than average chance of being innovative.
Many of the different studies cited confirm most of the 
innovations require some type of financial and marketing support
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from the firm, and the larger firm can offer more of them. 
However, there is more than ample evidence to show smaller firms 
generally have greater capabilities to invent than larger firms.
Further, it is argued that if one cuts through the heart and 
soul of the Schumpeterian theory, it can best be described as a 
threshold theory where a firm should be a certain size because of 
its marketing expertise and distribution system to flood a 
customer base with new technology. However, Schumpeter never did 
define a threshold level or quantitatively attempted to determine 
what would be the best firn size, concentration, diversification, 
or technological mix of firms to reach "peak" innovative 
activity as an industry. He only said, "a large firm in a 
modern industry". Besides, fifty years ago, the largest of firms 
would probably be outside the realm of possibility to Schumpeter 
as to what they are today in scale, employees, turnover, 
geographic area, etc. His description of a large firm of 
yesterday may be a medium -sized firm by today's dimensions and 
is relative to the industry, and country, etc.
The other concern is the way the body of literature 
expresses itself about the size of firm and innovative activity.
There has not been an attempt by the literature to project the 
effects of size differences between a small firm and a large 
oneas to marketing methods, and financial resources. Neither 
has there been an attempt by the literature to to show links 
between the size of a firm, buyers relationship, R & D and 
incidence of innovation. It seems a more fruitful approach would 
be to find out what specific advantages or disadvantages, a 
particular size of a firm or organisational structure would 
receive if and when it reached a certain rate of innovation.
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5.9.1 IMPLICATIONS ARISING
This section questions the argument advanced by SchifiHpeter 
that market structure is an overriding factor against the rate of 
innovation, which most modern business writers no longer accept. 
In support is Michael Porter (1980:169), who argues while market 
structure is a strong influence and often dictates the type of 
strategies to be used by a firm, "it is not the most important 
force".
However, he offers little comment on how market structure 
affects the rate of innovation except to acknowledge that " the 
strongest force of all is the rate of innovation" as they relate 
to his five competitive forces governing industry structure 
competitiveness as discussed in Chapter Four.
This reviews supports the concept which requires a firm to 
scan its environment and for innovators to develop an information 
sharing relationship with its suppliers and customers. These are 
the key external elements to be incorporated in any strategy for 
the stimulation of innovation in the process chain of innovation.
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CHAPTER SIX
INNOVATION: INTERNAL ELEMENTS
6.0 AIMS OF THIS CHAPTER
This chapter introduces three types of general elements found 
within a firm which could be used to stimulate innovation: 
distinctive, contingent, and motivational.
First, it presents those elements, either used independently 
or combined, which will distinctively stimulate innovation. 
These distinctive elements may be used by a top manager to 
accomplish the following six purposes: (1) to create an unique 
structure and strategic plan for innovation; (2) to stimulate 
innovation amongst a firm's workforce; (3) to develop culture 
which stimulates innovative action and a special type of human 
controls that best enable innovation to occur; (4) to provide an 
information system to assist innovation and its market process; 
(5) to assist a firm in selecting a distinctive technological 
strategy; and (6) to provide a feedback system with outputs as 
to whether the firm is meeting its mission.
Second, this chapter explains how those contingent elements 
are those embedded in a firm's decision to innovate and by their 
presence will energize the modes, life, form, and powers of this 
decision. This group of elements are operational and have to be 
continuously reinforced in four different ways: (1) by a firm's 
funding patterns; (2) a firm's culture created by the vision of 
its management; (3) the risk-time factors considered by its 
middle managers; and (4) a coaching type of relationship 
exhibited by a firm's supervisors to their work groups.
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Third, this chapter outlines the motivational elements used 
to stimulate innovation. These elements are the sumnary of human 
resource strategies used by innovative firms to reward and to 
motivate their employees accordingly.
This chapter will, also, indicate how these elements 
contribute to the strategic direction of the firm. The contents 
of this will reflects some current theories for structure, 
innovation, controls, and employees1 behaviour and will attempt 
to balance the difference of opinions expressed on these topics.
6.1 INERODOCTIOM
The mission of a firm and its structure are the building 
elements for stimulating innovation. From these elements, a 
firm's efforts to be more innovative start with some underlying 
idea and conception on how innovation is stimulated.
In formulating a strategy for innovation, the manager seeks 
to develop a link between its structure, the environment and at 
the same time create a vision of how innovation is stimulated. 
Then, the workforce is motivated to meet the firm's current 
operating plans while at the same time is encouraged to innovate 
for the future. Each of these tasks require a different element 
and when these elements are working together for the same 
mission, a strategy for innovation evolves.
In practice, those elements formulating structure, 
strategy, policies, human behaviour, and objectives operate much 
more loosely than as described in the theories of management 
from Mintzberg, Andrews and others.
In theory, these relationships are sharply defined, but in 
reality they can not be precisely measured and so many managers 
must plod ahead by trial and error to meet the objectives of a
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firm as if they had not done so earlier through a formal planning 
system. This is particularly true when the firm is complex and 
its business environment is highly uncertain. Then there is a 
high probability that their judgements will be based on such 
trials and errors.
For instance, the literature (Cyert & March, 1963; Downs & 
Mohr, 1976) has pointed out how a strategic goal may vary from 
one company to another. They argue that most goals are contingent 
based on the resources of the firm, its organisational slack, its 
culture, and the ease (timing, averse to risk, etc) in which 
decisions are made.
Further, the literature (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence 
and Lorsch, 1967; Quinn, Mintzberg and James, 1988; Freeman, 
1974; Ouchi, 1983) indicate that there are three distinctive 
business theories which clearly reflect which types of companies 
are most likely to be successful in being innovative: (1) how the 
company is organised; (2) how formal is its strategy for 
innovation; and (3) the selection of a technological strategy 
which best suited a firm's environment, experience, and 
management style.
To the first theory (see para. 6.2) of how the companies 
were organised, and whether they were hierarchical and structured 
formally or whether they were more flexible provides an 
assumption that:
Under changing conditions, a firm which is tightly 
structured in a bureaucratic sense (mechanistic) would 
stifle innovation; whilst a firm with a flexible 
(organic) structure would stimulate innovation.
The second theory (see para. 6.3) reflects the overriding 
management style of the companies, and their commitment to be
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innovative or not will depend on the formality of their 
strategies. Strategic decisions for innovation will be made on 
the nature of their environments, programmes, and previous 
experiences. The overall formality of their strategies provides 
an assumption that:
The more formal the strategy, the greater the number and 
variety of employees encouraged to innovate; and 
the more informal the strategy, the lesser the numbers of 
employees (generally just the self-motivated 
individuals) are encouraged to be innovative.
The third theory (see para. 6.4) deals with the type of 
strategy selected by a firm. The firm's strategy-making style 
and its effort to motivate employees will reflect the key 
sovereignty element of that company, its previous experience in 
being innovative being based on the following assumption:
Innovating firms will consciously adopt a technology 
strategy for directing and motivating their enployees; 
and non-innovative firms will subconsciously select a 
strategy without any plans as to how they will direct 
or motivate their employees
Note: A firm has more than seven technological strategies to 
chose from: pioneer, fatalist, opportunist, follower, imitator,
dependent, and traditionalist (see Appendix B for details)
Reviewing these three theories could provide some useful 
insight into the character of a company and the extent to which 
the company is innovative. From their examination, the following 
questions arise:
When innovation is stimulated under changing business 
conditions, what happens to the firm 's structure? Does it
Page 169
Innovation: Internal Elements - Chapter Six
becomes disjointed and form more of a "nexus" type of
relationship (linked by brand names and corporate identification) 
to others? Or does it become more flexible ?
If this is the case, does the organisational structure 
evolves and changes its classic adaptive strategies to those of 
a "punctuated type of strategy? The punctuated strategies being 
those (Forster, 1985) which propel a firm forward in developing 
a particular innovation to fruition by spurts of fits and starts: 
experimentation by trial and error that will reinforce a desired 
behaviour.
Can the behaviour patterns of some of the managers/employees 
within a corporation which generally initiate change and 
innovation within a firm be stimulated? Are these innovators
distinctly different in managerial style and personalities from 
other employees? If so, to what degree and in what type of 
organisational structure, do they thrive best?
This chapter should provide some answers to the questions as 
to what is needed in implementing a strategy for innovation, and 
it starts with strategic structuring.
6.2 DISTINCTIVE ELEMENTS
6.2.1 ELBffiNIS OF GOALS, STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION
Strategy planning and strategic management are often 
considered a major task (if not the sole responsibility) of top 
management (Ansoff, 1984; Day, 1984; Schendel and Hofer, 1979); 
this is reflected widely in many of their writings.
Some disagree and argue that it is a company wide task and 
not just the role of top managers (Waterman, 1988; Quinn, 1988), 
but both agree that one element of strategic planning which is
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the province of top management, is the setting of goals.
However, there are two salient distinctions between the 
goals developed by an executive and the formal goals developed to 
measure outputs. Etzioni (1971) and Perrow (1972) argue that 
there is a distinction between inplied goals and operative goals. 
Implied goals are the official ones as put forth in the charter, 
annual reports, and public documents of a company. Operative 
goals are different. States Etzioni, "they reflect the mission 
of the firm and tell others within it what the organisation is 
trying to do, regardless of what official goals say or what 
secondary goals emerge".
Granted, in order to achieve an agreed to strategic goal, 
the organisational activities have to be directed and coordinated 
by top management in two ways. First, by strategic goals which 
when they are treated as mission statements will influence 
culture, and dictate whom will be hired, promoted, and rewarded. 
Secondly they determine how people will work, and in what type 
of organisational structure that they will be managed with to 
reach said goals. In short, they bring order to a firm.
Thus, the structure provides routine, rules, and constraints 
to ensure people are working toward a common mission. Then, it 
could be interpreted that structure evolves from the mission of 
the firm and the mission of the firm evolves from the people in 
them. There is a volume of research (Handy:on Weber, 1963:192; 
Bums and Stalker, 1961) which indicates that people plan and 
work differently depending on whether they are in a hierarchical 
or an organic type of structure.
In these different types of structures, do they work 
differently because their tasks are different? Absolutely not, 
but the literature indicates that they do manage the stimulation 
of innovation differently (Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983). They argue
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that while the organisational characteristics and structures may 
vary, the tasks of most persons within them are more or less 
specialized, but.. .."it is how they manage and view their 
environments that is different".
They further state, "in most large firms, the low and middle 
levels of employees hold limited perspectives of the total set of 
strategic activities taking place within the firm as being
directed by top management. This is because of structure".
To the interaction of structure to innovation, Ouchi and his 
associates argue that there are three different types of
structure, i. e. the market, the bureaucracy and the clan which
may impede the internal coordination of a strategy. They argue
each affects the organisation differently, the employees in them, 
and the resulting activities radiating therein.
The various activities and skills, subsumed under a 
strategy, require that each individual employee at least knows 
what to do and how to do it in support of its success. Ouchi, 
further states in order to do so each organisation has to 
suffer an operating cost, at some point, to gain the motivation 
of each employee. But it must be done within the structuring 
imposed by the firm, yet the structure must allow employees to 
innovate against the routine inposed by the structure.
6.2.2 The Dilemma of Structuring versus Strategy
The crux of the dilemma, which frustrates most firms, is at what 
point does the structure become a disabling element rather than 
an enabling one to a firm's ability to innovate.
When a firm has rules and controls established by its 
structure and an employee wants to deviate from them in an 
effort to be innovative, does the structure become a hindrance to
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internal change and innovation? A common occurrence is the 
machine operator who develops a new device to simplify his work, 
but conceals its use because a company's rule states all devices 
must be evaluated by industrial engineering before use. This 
creates the interface between the control of the structure to 
manage and the employee's freedom to innovate.
This interface forms the administrative paradox faced by 
most business organisations. Moreover, when new innovations 
(Pinchot, 1985; Drucker,1984; Kanter, 1986) are in conflict with 
an agreed- to corporate strategy then what initiatives are 
needed to balance current goals against change? An example of 
this occurred in 1964 with the Bank of California, where, the 
corporate strategy was to increase the borrowing of larger firms, 
and to ignore the consumer market. Yet, an employee, Michael 
Phillips, introduced a series of consumer-directed banking 
innovations: credit cards; certificates of deposit; and interest- 
bearing checking accounts. Tney were launched without the 
approval of his senior officers and only the instant successes 
of his innovations saved his job (Pinchot, 1988: 58).
When such a paradox is created, management is counselled by 
certain pundits (Thompson, 1967; Day, 1984; Burgelman, 1983) that 
the firm must, simultaneously, seek less certainty and more 
flexibility. Thompson, for example, states " the dialectic 
component of management is to combine a search for certainty for 
what is new with a search for flexibility of its present goals ".
Supporting the need for corporate flexibility, Day stresses, 
"it is necessary for a firm to be a lot more flexible and a 
little less certain about a strategic objective in order 
innovation can flourish." And Burgleman writes, "firms must 
engage in strategic neglect from time to time in order to give 
innovators the flexibility needed to innovate".
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Here arises another dilemma of terms and theories found in 
the literature. For example, in a discussion of the theory of 
the firm as it relates to innovation, Cyert and March argue that 
"relatively unsuccessful firms were most likely to seek 
innovation than successful ones", but they, later on, supported 
the contention of this research by stating that •••• 
"innovation means a new solution to a problem currently facing 
the organisation". However it is their interpretation of 
organisational slack which forms a prior assumption of this 
research., that "organisational slack occurs away from the 
expected behaviour imposed by a structure in making a decision 
....and the more successful firms breed slack" (Chapter 3, pp. 
278-9).
While being contrary to their earlier statements about 
innovation being the province of unsuccessful firms,the second 
statement supports the arguments of Burgelman, Andrews, Gluck, 
and this about organisational flexibility. They argue that if 
the innovation is problem-oriented rather than long-term and 
directly related to the anticipated needs of the organisation, 
then the more slack (flexibility) is exhibited. Namely, the more 
flexible the organisation's structure, the more it can 
accommodate different types of innovation, and the more 
innovativeness it exhibits.
6.2.3 DISTINCTIVE ELBflENT: VISIONARY LEADERSHIP
Managers in innovative firms generally exhibit some form of 
visionary leadership qualities because they realize people under 
them are looking for a role model on how innovation should be 
handled.
Corporate and visionary leadership are important because 
they set a tone for the entire firm. Since most middle managers 
look to top management for guidance and direction, they tend to
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emulate the style, beliefs, and characteristics of the chief 
executive officer. In turn, the combination of these factors 
create the intrinsic culture setting of a firm which is a set of 
values and beliefs showing others how to act and react to 
situations, problems, and opportunities. Peters and Waterman 
(1982:26) reports that "associated with almost every excellent 
firm was a strong leader (or two) who seemed to have a vision of 
what was needed to make its firm excellent".
A two year study by McKinsey and Company as reported in the 
Wall Street Journal (August 29, 1983:12) found the leaders of 
medium-sized and high growth companies to "radiate enormous and 
contagious self-confidence about the firm's future ... and would 
take pain and time to communicate their strong sense of mission 
to all who come in contact with them".
Those business leaders with a clear sense of mission are 
often perceived as dynamic and charismatic leaders. They command 
respect and influence strategy formulation and implementation for 
innovation because they tend to have four key characteristics:
1. A role for others to identify with and to follow. They 
set the values and culture concerning the firm's mission and 
activities.
2. The ability to create an articulated vision and to give 
a transcendent goal designed to renew the meaning of everyone's 
work activities toward a strategic goal. ,
3. The belief that high performance standards are achievable 
and that these goals are communicated to all levels of the firm. 
They show that innovation and change are welcome, offering 
sponsorship by pledging emotional and financial support whenever 
an innovation is justified and to ensure that it is fostered in 
a timely manner.
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4. A desire to expend monies and time in the training and 
coaching of employees so each employee can learn to understand, 
and to process information and to communicate effectively about 
the benefits of innovation.
The other main element for innovation exhibited by the 
visionary type of leadership is faith that there will be a 
future. Dealing (1982:22) argues the innovation of a firm is 
directly reflected in the standard operating procedures of a 
firm as to how they create "a constancy of purpose and faith for 
the firm to experiment with new materials, to change methods of 
production, to up-grade old skills and to train employees. These 
are the foundations for the stimulation of innovation
6.2.4 DISTINCTIVE ELEMENTS: KEY PROGRAMMES
Research (Kanter, 1989:211) indicates that there are other types 
of elements which will, distinctly, stimulate innovation without 
changing a firm's basic structure. The following indicates 
there are specific programmes and how they may be used, 
independently or in combination. Specifically, they are:
(i) The use of working methods that include the redesign of 
production departments into work teams which help individuals to 
work in groups for the solving of problems. Job rotation and 
self-job design are other examples of the methods used. These 
have been applied to a greater extent by Japanese and Swedish 
firms than in American, Scottish or English ones (Ouchi, 1981).
(ii) The use of various information exchanging and training 
activities in order to create a shared understanding of the 
overall organisational tasks. These include seminars, meetings 
with the customers, and company-sponsored training on how to be 
more entrepreneurial (Kotler, 1984; Morano, 1983).
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(ili) The establishment of an operating culture which 
stimulates experimentation and plays down the failures caused by 
innovation. This becomes the main component in creating an
informal or formal strategy of corporate entrepreneurship 
(Burgelman, 1983; Links, 1987).
(iv) The establishment of on-site and off-site training courses 
to complement strategies by combatting the obsolescence of 
competences and the erosion of those skills belonging to
technical employees (Kidder, 1981; Levinson, 1978:155, 249).
(v) The use of corporate venturing techniques to fund new ideas 
which allow the participants to break .the organisational rules 
imposed by its structure. These include the use of a formal 
programme for innovation which allocates monies to experiment, 
grant time away from normal operational duties to develop
projects or the permission to travel in pursuit of a new
business development (Burgelman, 1983; Pinchot, 1985).
(vi) The sponsorship of product champions by using a formal 
strategy to reward and fund them based on their efforts to 
innovate rather than by the commercial success of their efforts 
alone. In this vein, supervisors are trained to give positive 
feedback and reinforcement on innovative ideas and activities. 
(Peters, 1982; Economist,1983)
(vii) The use of disconnected and informal organic types of 
organisational structures from skunkworks to matrix -designed as 
projects outside the regular structure. These encourage small 
group works and an easy flow of information (Bums and 
Stalker,1961; Peters, 1982; Drucker, 1984).
The list, above, is not intended to be exhaustive, but to 
reflect the common thread of flexibility which is needed to 
stimulate innovation and intrapreneurship (ways to regain
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entrepreneurial activities in large and mature structures). In 
total, the combination of these factors combat occupational 
obsolescence (see Appendix B for definition, herein) which will 
stifle innovation.
6.2.5 DISTINCTIVE ELEMENT: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE
The next issue is which organisational structure (divisional or 
functional) is deemed best for stimulating innovation.
Chandler (1966) argues that neither way functionally nor 
divisionally is always the "best ". He determined by surveys and 
comparisons of 100 top USA corporations that a firm "best 
organisational structure" reflects on the type and variety of 
the products, their technical similarity or diversity, the whole 
finn's size, geographic spread of the operations and the general 
economic condition of each business unit.
Other business theorists believe business size and product 
lines indicate what is the best business structure. A one-manager 
firm may do it all in one level argues Williamson ( 1970) and do 
it better than a multi-divisional firm. He states this is typical 
when the firm has a focus in one or few primary products, but as 
it grows it may gradually add layers of management and diversity 
into a whole range of products. At a each business size, he 
determines that there is one best structure being a "U" or "M" 
form depending on the degree of diversification that the firm's 
products have reached.
"U" form is a unified centralised form of decision-making, 
sometimes referred to a simple entrepreneurial form of 
organisation and "M" form is a multidivisional with functions and 
divisions among product lines. The choices between the two are
often wide open and debatable. Yet either form can be changed
by technology to reflect the other. For example, a large
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computerised reporting system can provide the single "U" form 
decision making in a large firm generally found in a smaller 
firm.
For a contrasting view, Quinn/Mintzberg/James (1988) argue 
that it is the combination of the internal forces within a firm, 
its technical situation and mechanisms of coordination which 
often determine the best strategic structure of a firm. At best 
these forces would be situational using five hypotheses based on 
size, age, standardization of tasks, professionalism of personnel 
and providing legitimate powers to the stakeholders to challenge 
and even change its environment.
The main force for change within an organisation is its 
people. The power to deal with change is delegated to its 
managers by the firm structure. Whether a firm has tens of 
employees, hundreds or thousands, there are only two basic ways 
to delegate this authority. The first is the functional way in 
which the manager of each subunit of a firm is given the power to 
perform a special task; and the second way is divisional where 
each division combines all the functional tasks and reports in 
parallel to a holding company. For these reasons, management 
policies must reflect and support entrepreneurial behaviour of 
its employees daily. 3M Corporation, for a specific case in 
point, allow up to 15 percent of its employees time away from 
operational duties as a corporate policy. This is a functional 
power delegated to each employee via their manager.
Central to these situational influences, Mintzberg (1979) 
argues that there are six basic configurations in six basic parts 
around six basic forces which determine the strategy-making modes 
of a firm. These are basic mechanisms for strategic direction, 
support staff structure, operating core of competences, and 
technical systems. How they are managed by the middle management
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depends upon the ideology as energized by the culture of the 
firm and its decision-makers toward a goal.
6.2.5.1 SPECIFIC TYPES OF ORGANISATIONS FOR INNOVATION
In many firms, there are specific organisations within them, 
whose sole purposes are to investigate and to produce new 
innovations. These innovation investigating organisations may 
range from research and development (R&D) departments with 
hundreds of employees to one person doing new product 
development within a small firm.
The literature (Littler, 1988:108; Schon,1967:203) indicates 
that there are two levels at which the organisation for this type 
of activities must be considered: the position of the R&D
function within the firm, and the specific type of organisation 
structuring the activity, itself.
There are three types of the positioning for these 
functions investigating innovation within a firm: (1) they can be 
centralised serving different parts of an organisation; (2) be 
decentralised with the activities and responsibilities being 
dispersed throughout an organisation; or (3) be confined into one 
or more special departments in which R&D, new product 
development, and new business development are combined under a 
single manager. In some cases, they reflect the same structure 
of their parent firm and in other cases they are completely 
different in structure and focus. Either way, the organisation 
for these activities can assume one of the several specific 
structures as follows:
(i) Discipline-based organisation, where the activity is 
structured according to a dominant scientific or technical 
discipline. The foremost advantage of this structure is that each 
employee is somewhat familiar with the tasks of other colleagues
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or how they relate to his/her speciality. Secondly, each 
employee can gain an intellectual stimulation from colleagues; 
and thirdly, the head of the department generally can assist less 
experienced members in a technical sense. The chief disadvantage 
is the narrow focus of the activities.
(ii) Project-based organisation, this means the activities 
are funded according to a project or task with a defined 
objective for a particular type of innovation. The advantages are 
the abilities of each project head to have total project control 
and budgets can be allocated accordingly. The disadvantage is the 
project moves or stops according to the availability of funds 
and the skills of the project without the assistance of outside 
help.
(iii) Traditional-based organisation, where the tasks are 
delegated downward ad hoc from a large and pyramidal type of 
organisation. The advantage is the support of a larger 
organisation with a greater amount of resources which can be 
directed when funds or greater skills are needed. The major 
disadvantage is that the organisation is subject to the pressures 
and whims of the larger group.
(iv) Venture-based organisation, this is a form of project 
management where the representatives of various other functions 
(i.e. marketing, finance, and production) set the task and how it 
should be managed. The principal advantage is that an innovation 
is viewed from several different perspectives from application 
through its commercial development. The disadvantage is that the 
project will only moves ahead by a consensus or controlled by the 
most powerful member of the committee.
(v) Matrix-formed organisation, where a combination of 
project heads and disciplines lave joint responsibilities for the 
overall development of a project. The chief advantage is that a
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project can be judged from a technical and commercial sense 
throughout Its development, and creates a better information flow 
between departments and disciplines. The major disadvantage is 
that some personnel report to more than one boss.
6.2.6 VARIATIONS OF INNOVATION INVESTIGATING ACTIVITIES
It is important to note that any of these organisations can 
operate within a parent organisation structure if it is allowed 
to operate in a disconnected way from the larger organisation.
When this is done, they take on the characteristics of a 
’’Skunkworks” function: a leaderless group of specialists
commissioned and funded to develop a specific innovation without 
interference of any kind from the funding source. Others in the 
larger organisation are warned to stay away and to ask "no 
questions” unless invited to review, participate with, or to fund 
a project, but only at the expressed request of the project head. 
In this way, they operate without the rules, constraints, and 
routines inposed by the structure of a more formal organisation.
Other variations for innovation-investigating and 
stimulating functions may include an employee suggestion scheme; 
task force; special committee for innovation; or a corporate 
intrapreneurial programme funded and formed to stimulate 
innovation from any employee of the workforce at large.
6.2.7 DISTINCTIVE ELEMENTS: FORMS OF CONTROLS
Research (Eztoni,1971; Perrow, 1972) supports the concepts that 
a firm is a complex set of human relationships formed for a 
variety of business purposes. They argue that the activities 
within the firm form human relationships which are dynamic, on­
going and changeable.
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The combination of these activities and the balancing of 
these varying purposes contributes to the complexity of the 
business firm and are addressed in the stakeholders theory. This 
theory (Freeman 1984:25) argues that the interests of all 
employees and others on the outside of the firm have to be 
satisfied and each has a legitimate stake in the survival and 
growth of the firm. The complexity of these relationships (with 
suppliers, investors, governments, and customers) varies 
according to the purposes and the type of organizational 
structure, in which a firm operates.
Because of this complexity, certain forms, techniques, 
control and rules are necessary to govern those human activities 
for the good of the organisation. Most of these rules are 
flexible. Tney seek to coordinate those activities needed to 
produce a product or to deliver a service. A few may be 
characterized as being very dynamic reflecting the driving force 
of the founders or the personal goals of its decision-makers to 
excel. Tney may be entrepreneurial in behaviour and by their 
patterns of action.
Others rules are more static and support the formal legal 
conditions of the firm -e.g. owners rights, organisation charts 
and responsibilities. In concert, these and certain activities 
may appear to be fixed and rigid from the outside. But like all 
human conditions, they express human efforts to innovate, and by 
being so indicate experiments which are changeable.
6.2.8 DISTINCTIVE ELEMENTS: STRATEGY
Strategy is discussed earlier in Chapter Three as "a plan which 
uses, allocates, and guides the resources of a firm for growth 
and survival". However, there are theories that strategy can be 
further classified into one of several other modes:such as being 
entrepreneurial, adaptive and functional.
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One of these theories is Mintzberg (1973) in which he states 
how three distinct grouping or "modes" are classified. The first 
and simplest mode is the entrepreneurial mode of strategy-making. 
This mode is typically dominated by the search for new 
opportunities in a dynamic environment. Its strategy is 
manifested by a series of bold steps toward growth with 
centralised one-man rule.
The second mode of strategy-making was outlined by 
Mintzberg as being "adaptive". This is best described as 
creating a web of relationships (stakeholders) which have an 
above average interest in the type of strategy a firm will use.
The strategic focus is more to resolving problems received from
the stakeholders rather than exploiting new opportunities. It is 
more a "putting out of fires" and done in incremental steps using 
the skills and knowledge of most stakeholders but with little 
coordination between them. Coined by Lindblom (1959) as 
"muddling through using a disjointed nibbling type of strategy 
venturing into the unknown " one employs a familiar method as a 
starting point as to how a problem should be solved. The 
decision-makers seek to cope and negotiate with this complex 
environment rather than change it, reacting to it without clear 
objectives as the guide for its strategy.
Tne third type of strategy is called the "planning mode". 
It is a combination of the entrepreneurial and adaptive modes, 
but uses a long term fixed objective. It is deliberate with
formal programmes and generally used by older and larger firms, 
who can control their business environment. Systematic in 
nature, it seeks to create a coalition of decision-makers
generally led by a professional planning department or an 
analytical decision -making and strategic mechanism. It thrives 
on information, and reaching a critical size for the deployment 
of the economies of scale to its advantage. Its strength is 
setting and implementing operational goals and generally
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operates best in a stable environment. It seeks to have control 
over its suppliers and to negotiate with employees and customers 
from a position of strength. As outlined by Porter (1986), these 
are its main strategic goals.
6.2.8.1 PUNCTUATED STRATEGIES
Between the planning mode as a type of strategy and the adaptive 
type of strategy are some other strategies which are considered 
to be short teDn, and more flexible. Forster (1985) defined them 
to be "punctuated ones" which operates differently from the 
adaptive strategies of action (triggered by changes in the 
environment) and strategies of structure (internally- focused to 
achieve the best configuration for a unified response to 
anticipated events).
He argues that these punctuated strategies can be divided 
into three generic types: (I) technological; (2) financial; and 
(3) human resources. Technological strategies offer longer term 
advantages (1-3 years) when they exploit a particular technology, 
in a consistent manner; financial strategies which group assets 
into a configuration for an immediate advantage (less than 1 
years) ; and human resources strategies which offer advantages 
for a medium term (1-2 years) by using human resources to combat 
occupational obsolescence.
Two of these punctuated strategies (technological and human 
resources) can be supported by employees when they choose to take 
training courses or engage in off the job learning to cope with 
the advance of technology.
An example of this was written by Kidder (1981), who 
indicated in his two year seminal study of Data General how its 
employees innovate in short random spurts of advancement toward 
solving a problem. He writes,
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"to reach a solution, they worked independently 
without an formal organisational structure, in 
some cases, or in small groups in others, but all 
utilized self-learning techniques to master new 
information. For weeks on end, they worked long 
hours, disappear for days and then go again. In 
turn, they were motivated by the reinforcement 
and feedback of their supervisors to continue 
and/or received some type of reward from the 
organisations for their efforts. In most cases, 
they were personalised strategies reflecting an 
employee's quest for personal solutions to current 
problems using new sources of information".
In a sense these strategies resemble the tactics from the 
ancient military concept of manoeuvres with short bursts and
starts to gain a compressed competitive advantage. They are
highly flexible, dissimilar, and feed off a flow of new 
information and a motivated workforce. They are different from 
military ones since they never end, but start all over again 
(whereas the military terms for tactics implies one short and 
final effort). But these are strategies with patterns of bursts 
and starts; which when reactivated after a time are extremely 
suitable to the human resource management area. For example, when
these types of strategies are reiterated every five years, they
can support and train individuals' quests to be innovative as 
the source of their power and upgrade core skills from time to 
time throughout the careers of employees.
IBM is an example as Sandra Chace of the Wall Street
Journal( April 8, 1982) writes:
" Besides its great success with computers, IBM
has a reputation for an almost proprietary concern 
with its employees* individual efforts.. 
Achievement and efforts of the employee to learn 
anew for personal development by company
sponsored training programmes are followed by 
immediate rewards... People works their brains
out..Supervisors are taught to give immediate
feedback... Innovation is welcome. These in the 
true sense are the long term strategies of IBM".
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6.2.8.3 TECHNOLOGICAL STRATEGIES
Firms, based on their previous* experiences, will over time
develop a particular type of technological strategy to coordinate 
all its activities needed to create, develop, upgrade, and to 
market its core skills. Tney reflect how any firm may exploit an 
innovation rather than being strictly used by high technology 
firms.
These strategies are used by service firms, non-profit
institution, manufacturing, and research firms. They are
consciously or subconsciously formulated by a decision-making 
unit as a method to investigate, evaluate, and launch new 
innovations. They range from the review of a technical proposal 
for a new computer by a non-profit entity to the development of a 
new research laboratory by a manufacturing firm. But they all 
have a strategic purpose behind their formulation and 
implementation, whether a firm is aware of it or not.
Freeman (1974) argues that these strategies reflect the 
extremes of the dominant orientation of a firm whether it is to 
be the first with the newest, or to be a follower within a market 
or industry. They are a combination of a firm's culture, 
management style, complexity of its product/service, 
competitiveness of its industry, education of its workforce, and 
its core competences.
In the past, researchers (Hofer and Schendel, 1978:28) 
classified a technological strategy as a functional strategy on 
par with an adminstrative, manufacturing, or marketing strategy. 
They argued that it has less importance in determining the scope 
of a firm 's mission when compared to a corporate or business 
strategy. However, over the past two decades, it has been
elevated by several firms (i. e. 3M, IBM, Glaxo) to be the 
unifying element (synergy) as to how they conduct their
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innovation-investigating and developing activities to create a 
competitive advantage. The classification of the various 
technological strategies is shown below in Table No. 4.
Table No. A: CLASSIFICATION OP TECHNOLOGICAL STRATEGIES
STRATEGY IN HOUSE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL FUNCTIONS WITHIN THE FIRM
Fundamental Applied Patents Economies Scanning Marketing Use of 
Research Research of Scales the Market Systems Information
Pioneer:
strong
Very
strong
Very
strong strong
Very
strong
Very
strong
Very
strong
Follower:
strong medium strong strong
Very
strong
Very
strong
Very
strong
Imitator:Very 
weak weak weak strong strong strong
Very
strong
Fatalist: Very 
strong strong medium
Very
strong
Very
strong
Very
weak
Very
weak
Dependent:Very 
weak
Very
weak
Very
weak weak
Very
weak
Very
weak
Very
strong
Opportunist:Very 
weak
Very
weak
Very
weak
Very
weak
Very
strong
Very
strong
Very
weak
Traditional:Very 
weak
Very
weak
Very
weak
Very
strong
Very
strong
Very
strong
Very
weak
Sources: This table adapted from Freeman (197A), Ranter (1939), and Burgelman (1985)
Table No. 4 summarises the strengths and weaknesses of a 
technological strategy, the principal features of each are as 
follow:
1. Pioneer: This strategy is extremely offensive, and seeks 
to be the first with the newest product /service whenever 
possible. It uses a mission statement, and tightly coordinated by 
a formal strategy for innovation which is supported by training 
and other human resource strategies.
2.Follower: This type of strategy is where a firm seeks to 
delay its marketing of an innovation until there are gaps in the 
market. Then it improves on a feature of a product developed by 
the Pioneer. Its position is to follow a leader and prefers to 
innovate around products that are in short demand.
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3. Imitator: This strategy is to copy, but tries to improve 
on a product whenever it can. Its use of marketing information is 
very strong.
4. Fatalist: This type of strategy follows the pattern of 
innovation by selected competitors because it must innovate to 
survive against similar-sized firms within the same industry.
5. Dependent: This strategy is a passive one reacting to 
certain customer's needs and to innovate only when their 
specifications are clear and explicit.
6. Opportunist: The chief feature of this strategy is its 
ability to receive high profits by entering the market during its 
early growth phase and exiting before early maturity. It is used 
most often by marketing-oriented types of firms.
7. Traditionalist: This strategy is geared for high volume 
production and earns its profits by using economies of scale. It 
does not plan to develop new products, but prefer to investigate 
how existing products can be made quicker and cheaper. It is most 
effective in a stable and benign environment.
More details explaining the way each strategy works can be 
found in Appendix B (the glossary of terms and strategies) and in 
Chapter Eight.
6.3 CONTINGENT ELEMENTS
These elements exert their pressures to innovate based on 
dominant beliefs, funding patterns, current configuration of the 
activities and the mixture of technical and function personnel, 
within a firm at any one time.
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6.3.1 CONTINGENT ELEMENT: COUTURE
Corporate culture has been defined (Wheelen and Hunger, 1986:113) 
as "a collection of beliefs, expectations, and values shared by a 
firm's members and transmitted from one generation of employees 
to another".
Culture create norms of conduct that defines acceptable 
rules of behaviour, views, myths and rituals which separate one 
firm intrinsically from another. The extrinsic culture of a 
firm's location by country or nationality takes on a entirely 
different meaning when impacted by a firm's culture. For 
instance, an American-based firm can take on the conservativeness 
of the British or the emotional management of an Italian's firm 
if its firm culture is based on its leader rather than where it 
is located.
For example, Dension (1984:22) found certain companies with 
a participatory culture (i.e. strong employee involvement in 
corporate decisions) not only had a better performance record 
than firms without such a culture, but the performance gap 
between the two types widened each year.
His research indicates that culture has four main 
functions: (1) creates a sense of identify for employees; (2) 
furnishes a guide on how to act and helps to generate commitments 
from employees and suppliers;(3) adds to the stability of the 
organisation; and (4) serves as a point of reference for an 
employee to make sense out of a firm's business purpose.
This supports the literature (Smircich, 1933:345; 
Wheelwright, 1984:79) that corporate culture generally reflect 
the mission of the firm and the vision of its leadership. The 
culture sets the dominant orientation of the firm. Some companies
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are market-oriented (e.g. IBM and John Deere). Others companies 
are material or product oriented (e.g. Ford Motors, ICI).
Still, others are technology-oriented. These companies 
define themselves in terms of the technology that they are 
organised to exploit. Eastman Kodak, for example, ignored the 
development of xerography because of its strong commitment to 
only film technology. Similarly, hi-tech firms in the Silicon 
Valley of California or Silicon Glen of Scotland think of 
themselves as "innovating entrepreneurs".
William Newman (1967:77) of The Columbia Business School, 
argues that "an understanding of a firm’s culture is imperative 
when a strategic change is being implemented". He believes that 
a firm's changes in mission, objectives, policies, and strategy 
are not likely to be successful if they are in opposition to a 
firm's culture. This does not means that a strategy should never 
be started if it is in conflict to an accepted culture, he 
states, "... but it should be realised that it is a major 
weakness if not considered in a firm's strategy-making"•
6.3.2 CONTINGENT ELEMENT: STAFF BEHAVIOURS
One of the key elements for stimulating innovation within the 
firm is the behaviour pattern of its staff. 
A considerable wealth of research information has been 
accumulating (Kirton, 1982; Drucker, 1965) which gives credence 
to the fact that there are different and distinct types of 
personalities within the organisation. Their research indicates 
that these employees' behaviour patterns can range from 
innovators to adaptors.
Within this body of research, for instance, Kirton has 
devised a continuum of scores ranging from highly adaptive to 
highly innovative which can identify those whom are innovators
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from those whom are adaptors. This rating scale is called the 
Kirton's Adaption-Innovation Inventory (KAI). This scale 
identified "the adaptor" as those person who initiate changes 
because they are motivated by an internal drive to "do thing 
better".
This group of individuals adapts into an innovation by 
stretching an existing definition of a problem until a likely 
solution emerges. Their pattern of behaviour is to look at 
problems in detail and proceed to arrive at a solution within the 
established structure (theories, policies, practices) of their 
organisations.
The other major types of "innovators", whom are defined by 
Drucker (1965) were those who learned through the organisation 
how to innovate. His thesis was that if the organisation 
exhibited a flexible structure (willingness to learn or bend) and 
this was combined with a formal strategy to innovate using 
programmes to attract, identify, reward and to nurture corporate 
entrepreneurship; within time, significant numbers of the 
workforce would become "innovative".
Both writers' classification of innovators are supported by 
related research ( Pinchot, 1985; Collins and Moore,1970; Kirton, 
1985) that certain entrepreneurial characteristics can separate 
a firm's workforce into either highly, innovative employees (Type 
II) or slightly, innovative employees (Type I).
Tney argue two main and common principles: (1) that the 
most innovative employees (Type II), demonstrated a high degree 
of independence and a dislike of formal and any type of 
authoritative procedure; and (2) the bulk of innovations will 
come from these Type II employees. They, on the whole, represent 
about five percent of the workforce and will innovate to their 
highest levels possible based on the information and freedom
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given them. By so doing, they will propel an organisation 
forward, entrepreneurially.
In contrast, the Type I employee, which can constitute up to 
sixty percent of most workforces, will innovate provided the 
organisation rewards and reinforces them accordingly; but only to 
the level of these organisational incentives. These observations 
seem to contradict the power of a formal strategy and whether it 
is possible to nurture the entrepreneurial behaviour needed to 
stimulate an innovation within a structured environment.
This suggests for an innovator to install something new it 
is necessary for them to break with the conformity of the 
structure or its strategy. This may require them to fight or 
change an organisation, which is not easy (Kidder, 1981) and the 
resisting organisation in retaliation may seek to strangle the 
entrepreneurial spirit of the employee or may even force the most 
innovative persons to leave the organisation. This is, in 
essence, the dilemma faced by most structures trying to implement 
strategy for innovation.
A noted case revealed by Kidder (1981) was how the Data 
General Company was started by former Digital Equipment 
Corporation’s employees, in 1975. When management decided to 
keep them from innovating on a new product, this caused them to 
leave (this was not the innovation that management had agreed to 
as being needed in its strategy).
6.3.3 CONTINGENT ELEMENTS: TIME, RISK, AND CHOICES
First, one must recognize that all strategies within an 
organisational setting formulate a future pattern of action which 
may be creative, difficult, or just risky. These patterns are 
formed by contingent elements: levels of funding available, the 
ease of getting approval( depending on timing, risk,, departmental
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goals) and the middle manager's personal choices on how they 
should be used.
6.3.3.I IN THE CONTEXT OF RISK
While it had been mentioned that the formulation of strategic 
choices, generally, are the provinces of top management (Drucker, 
1973; Quinn, 1988; Hofer,1984). And the first step in making a 
strategic decision is that a gap exists and action must be taken. 
But, even after top management has determined a gap is present 
and needs closing, the cornerstones for taking action are really 
contingent upon the desires of the managers of the various 
departments to take risk.
These writers argue that the risk in most strategic 
decisions can be classified in three main ways: (1) to protect 
steady sales is often used as an excuse for using a defensive 
strategy (slightly conservative) to innovate around existing 
products; (2) to have fast rising sales requires a strategy for 
innovation which is offensive (risky) for the development of new 
products for new markets; and (3) that rapidly falling profits, 
often, dictate a retrenchment strategy (time to take no action) 
when a firm delays a plan to innovate. These decisions could be 
referred to the grand strategies of innovation and affected by 
the following types of risk:
First, there is an individual manager's concept of risk. The 
context of risk is a part of the time dimension measured by how 
fast profits can be made or a strategy launched. Avoiding risk 
is a part of the uncertainty that can be relatively systematic 
and predictable in a time context but it is still subject to the 
personal motivation of the manager. Tilles (1963) refers to 
"risk as as a critical strategic choice which is controlled by 
the length of time, proportion of resources allocated to any one
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project and the overall amount of resources committed... the 
greater the quantities of each, the greater the risk involved".
Second, each manager has different experiences as to how 
to handle a risky strategy. This experience determines the speed 
in which a strategy will be implemented. This can help explain 
striking differences of how effective a strategy was when 
compared from one division to another of the same firm. This is 
often explained in the literature (Glueck and Lawrence, 1984:61) 
because of the aspirations of the managers and how a rational 
view of risk is a natural attribute for some and an acquired 
trait of others. But each manager has his/her own psychological 
imprint of risk based on his/her own experience, education and 
motivation which directly impact a strategy.
In theory, Drucker (1973) argues that these strategic 
elements will operate no better than the risk-averseness of the 
managers and their abilities under a perceived set of 
opportunities to create wealth. This means, in its purest form, 
that strategy requires a manager to act as an entrepreneur using 
an economist's definition of entrepreneurship as described by 
Schumpeter (1942) as " to create wealth by shaping a firm's 
economy without being part of the greater economy", but this task 
would require special talents not commonly found amongst 
managers.
Regardless of the grand strategy selected, it is the mind­
set of the operating manager and his subordinates which will 
determine whether or not an innovative strategy is too risky; or 
too conservative; or that its timing is correctly phased. Since 
many of the managers do not have a history of being 
entrepreneurial, when a firm selects a strategy to innovate 
either in a precise or in a rough and ready fashion, it is left 
for implementation by a manager in the final analysis who is not 
entrepreneurial. This is a key reason in Drucker's view why most
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innovating s trategies fail.
6.3.3.2 IN THE CONTEXT OF TIME
Another reason why strategies fail in Drucker’s opinion is that a 
lower level manager views the timing of a strategy differently 
from top management. He argues that most strategies will, later, 
be influenced by the time preferences of these managers rather 
than of top management. He points out that it is the operating 
manager in the final outcome determines whether a change is being 
made by a firm’s strategic choice is too fast. His performance 
reflecting this uncertainty about a fast-moving strategic choice.
Most business theorists (Cyert and March, 1963) agree in 
"optimizing choices" that most managers, regardless of size, 
structure or complexity generally work in two contexts of time. 
Whether the strategies should be implemented in post haste or 
gradually, it is the context of time which directly affects the 
situational influences for a strategy. This is argued by Quinn 
and Mintzberg (1988) in the following ways:
The first context of time is the willingness of the 
manager to move slowly or swiftly in how they will implement a 
strategic change. The context of time is easily understood as a 
dominating factor when a manager is responsible for managing 
current processes, employees and commitment and how they should 
be managed in the short term. But what about in the long term?
An imposed time factor or a top manager 's preference toward 
a particular strategic choice will not set the tone for a firm's 
long-term profit strategy. Trying to managing current resources 
to a squeezed margin of costs and expenses may be preferred by a 
manager whether a strategy of "retrenchment" was selected by top 
management or not. Reducing expenses from current operations can 
add to a manager's sense of status and affluence much more
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substantially than a successful long term strategy. Even 
replacing the "tight-fisted " manager with a "far- 
sighted"raanager, who believes monies invested now will be 
returned in greater amounts will not shift the strategy sharply.
Research indicates (Andrews, 1971; Childs,1972) that 
another reason why many strategies fail is the failure of top 
management to discount the context of time -risk factors and 
their impact on an operating manager. They fail to determine if a 
manager’s understanding of the gap is equal to theirs.
This gap mismatch does not occur when the strategic 
objectives are deemed to be attainable and even desirable by an 
operating manager. Corporate wide innovation is more easily 
stimulated when all managers in an organisation see the same 
opportunity that necessitates a new strategy.
Unfortunately, operating managers are too often viewed as 
ciphers, making mechanical decisions that maximizes profits. A 
supporting plan to have them internally-motivated is seldom 
addressed by many strategy-makers. Even though managers' 
training and experience are to make profits as one of their main 
goals, it is their personal motivation which may determine the 
outcomes. Thus, their motives need close attention as noted by 
Cyert and March, whom argue that there are three areas in which 
these differences express themselves.
The first contingent element is how managers view innovation,
i.e. Whether managers view the stimulation of innovation as a 
routine task or an extra burden being placed upon them.
The second managerial factor which impacts the viability 
of a strategy is how the strategist of the organisation 
determines what is routine and whether a manager agrees with that 
view. The managerial choice, in the final analysis, will
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determine what is routine as being efficient and maximizing 
outputs. The linkage between what is routine and what is 
innovative becomes one of the main concepts of a strategy for 
innovation.
The third managerial concern is social. Social motives are 
often implicit in a firm's actions toward a strategy for 
innovation. These motives can range from trying to create more 
jobs to a need that a firm must pander to the needs of special 
outside groups such as environmental or political concerns. 
Normally profits are reduced when such social aims alter a 
manager choice. For example, Booz, Allen and Hamilton (1989) 
indicated in their "Research In Why Firms Innovate" that over 31 
percent do so because of social reasons., trying to avoid 
pollution of a climate or to conform to a governmental directive 
to do so.
In their study of innovation, they cited the USA example where 
rubber tire manufacturers had to produce better tire designs to 
ensure 40,000 miles of wear by a government regulation. 
Previously, the average tire of a consumer's motor car only 
produced 18,000 miles of wear; however by using a social- 
govemment directive as an incentive to innovate, profits 
tripled.
6.3.4 CONTINGENT ELEMENT: THE PROCESSING OF INFORMATION
The processing of information between departments is often 
overlooked as a stimulation for innovation. Rogers (1983) argues 
that information is of primary importance and should be treated 
the same as other assets of a firm when he states:
" Whilst information lacks a physical presence on 
its own: it can be expressed in a material sense 
(ink on paper or in electrical impulses), but it 
is just as important as money and/or energy. 
Information behaves somewhat oddly from an
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economic sense in the fact one can give it away or 
sell it and still have it.,.. When it flows 
horizontally, it is the mother milk of innovation 
as well as the partner of change".
Information for making strategic decisions can be usefully 
classified in three broad categories: (1) information from the 
environment for making corporate strategies (e.g. whether or not 
to enter a particular market; or to diversify into new markets; 
or change a product feature-benefits); (2) information for 
tactical decisions and competitive strategies (e. g. planning of 
sales territories or new advertising policies or a new pricing 
policy); (3) information within a data bank of company records 
which receive periodic updating to ensure that it retains its 
usefulness (e.g. details of competitive products, market share 
analyses, demographics of workforce, cash and financial 
positions). These may be best classified as data needed for the 
implementation of functional strategies.
The by-products of an active firm are the extreme amount of 
information generated by its employees, and their activities, 
suppliers and customers. Some relate to decision-making, the bulk 
do not. As a result, some initial screening device on critical 
decisions must be made before entering a firm. Cyert and March 
argue that there are two aspects for screening and controlling a 
firm's flow of information: routing rules and filtering rules
(p.106).
"Routing rules are formal flows of information and specify 
who will comnunicate to whom about what". This is the formal 
channels of an organisation dictated by positions, titles and 
departments, often reflecting the standard organisational chart. 
"Filtering rules on the other hand, are informal rules". They are 
distorted, have bias to whom is talking and what is not said and 
the way information is coded.
Page 199
Innovation: Internal Elements - Chapter Six
Examples of distorted information are how the accounting 
department talks to sales, and sales to production , and so on; 
or how a lower ranked person will talk to their superior. Most, 
if not all, such exchanges of information within a firm are 
distorted to the type of the power relationship between the 
receivers and transmitter. This pattern of distortion is the 
major detriment to a successful strategy for innovation.
Therefore, a major task in the management of information is 
to be sure that everyone, who has a need, receives accessible and 
accurate facts. It must be accessible and digestible to the 
level and sophistication of its receivers-users. To this point, 
Heller (1975) writes, "Managers are additive to information as 
alcoholics are to booze. They consume enormous amounts, 
constantly crave more, but have the greatest of difficulty in 
digesting their in-takes to a level for proper use ".
Heller warns about the differences between data and useful 
information. He outlines how data accumulates, confuses and can 
be masqueraded as information in a tightly-structured 
organisation. When information is channelled through the formal 
reporting systems used multi-layered organisations, it inherits 
the properties of obsolescence. Unless there is a programme to 
combat this, the data and information will decay with time and 
have to be updated ruthlessly by company-imposed strategies or 
self-learning schemes by each innovative employee. Research has 
determined that useful information flows better in small groups 
(7 members or less) and in "U" shaped organisational structures 
(Williamson, 1970), but in divisional structure, it becomes 
restricted and loses its quality of being useful.
The theories about information in decision-making are set 
forth by Kaplan, Drath, and Kofodomis (1985). Based on a survey 
of 22 executives and 18 communication experts, they stated few
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executives seek feedback on how they are doing on their jobs and 
the consequence of their behaviour on others. Others may seek 
feedback on their long term decisions, although the bulk of them 
do not.
This study indicated that the pattern of communication of
most managers is to talk rather than listen to their people as to
whether a strategic decisions was too .risky, or that they are 
asking for too much from the operating managers. Few, if any, 
members of top management will seek a different view until a 
strategy is obviously failing.
The conclusion from this research was the higher you go, 
and the more structured the organisation, the more constricted
the feedback channels became, and the less subordinates talk
about problem solving and more about problem-hiding. Within a 
short period of time, the organisation becomes non- 
entrepreneurial and begins to resist change bureaucratically.
In contrast, Kanter (1986) indicates that most innovative 
firms encourage the informal, face to face, transfer of 
information. She also argued that channels carrying information 
should be formalised (newsletter, regular group meetings, open 
files, computer terminal, etc.), but the application of 
information for the stimulation of innovation means that its use 
should not be restricted. She referred to the informal use of 
information as "the airwaves for innovation"(p.161)
In most of the research cited (Quinn, Kanter, Andrews Cyert 
& March), it was argued that the best methods to control and 
upgrade the quality of the information (being processed around 
and through a firm) was to set the control for its use into a 
strategic mission statement, and to create a feedback systems on 
decisions made. This body of research indicates that decisions 
are the best devices for learning about the quality of
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information within a firm. If they are based on bad information, 
the decisions arising from them will prompt an immediate outcry; 
if the strategic decisions are based on good information, most 
managers adopt a try-wait- and see position.
6.4 MOTIVATIONAL ELEMENTS
Motivation (Vroom,1964) is stated to be "the forces acting upon 
an individual to expend an effort, voluntarily”. He argued that 
much of the behaviour in people is motivated by "the expectations 
in how others will value their action when observed ”.
His research explained how people behave rather than how 
their behaviour will be controlled. The main criticism with his 
work is its failure to define how and why people select one 
choice of behaviour over another. His theory and existing 
approaches such as human relations, scientific management, job 
enrichment, and self-actualisation theories are based on Maslow 
's theory of hierarchy. They are universalist in their 
prescriptions. Although some of them have some merit, they embody 
three implicit and erroneous assumptions:
First that all employees are alike; second, that all 
situations are the same; and third, the inference by the other 
two assumptions that there exists one best way to motivate 
employees (although each theory assumes a different way).
6.4.1 MOTIVATIONAL ELEMENTS: EXPECTANCY OF REWARDS
For the stimulation of innovation and strategy-making, the 
universalist theory has little value. However, the expectancy 
theory for motivation as developed by Nadler and Lawler (1977) is 
based on the belief that man is complex and the organisations 
they work in are also complex, thus strategies for their 
behaviour should be complex. This is more useful for it means
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that there is not one type of a reward which will please all 
types of workers. These theorists post four major assumptions:
The first is that behaviour is determined by a combination 
of forces in the individual and of forces in the environment. 
This means that how they are hired, their different skills, the 
different levels of education, where they are hired, and the 
market forces within an industry dictate how they expect to be 
treated.
The second main assumption is that people make decisions 
about their own behaviour in organisations. These decisions are 
of two kinds. First, there are decisions about membership 
behaviour as dictated by culture and leadership (see above 
elements). And people make decisions about how much effort should 
be directed to the mission of an organisation and what type of 
reward will be received from this effort.
The third assumption is that different people expect 
different types of rewards. This does not means that people are 
so different that each expects a totally different type of 
rewards, but they argue that different rewards can be lumped 
together to impact upon different groups of employees.
The fourth key assumption is that people make decisions 
among alternative plans of behaviours based on their expectations 
to what rewards will be given. This means that an individual's 
response to a management plan to innovate can be summarised in 
the following three questions:
1. Can I innovate for the company if I try?
2. If I try, what will happen?
3. How do I value the reward which is promised?
Page 203
Innovation: Internal Elements - Chapter Six
If motivation starts with an observed level of effort by the 
individual of others, then effort by itself is not enough. 
Although, the effort alone should prompt some type of reward, it 
is the continued effort which should receive the largest reward.
But it is the experience of the individual and the general 
culture of the firm that will determine whether a reward is 
expected.
The reward can come from one of three sources. The first 
source, extrinsic reward, comes from people and the environment 
outside the firm, a sense of pride for being hired, arising from 
one belonging and contributing to the success of a firm known as 
an innovator. An articulated and publicised mission statement 
that a firm is an innovator provides this.
The second source, intrinsic reward, comes from the 
corporate culture of the firm: its supervisors, from colleagues, 
or from the organisation’s formal reward system of financial 
awards, recognition, and promotions for being actively 
innovative.
The third source, personal satisfaction, comes from the 
feeling of accomplishment, and self-learning induced by company 
training courses, self-study and the entrepreneurial experiences 
of developing an innovation.
If management determines by its mission statement, selects 
a proper strategy to stimulate innovation and proves how it will 
reward, most employees will see the link between these as 
motivating forces. Nadler and Lawler claims that more than fifty 
studies have proved the overall validity of this argument. They 
argue that the most consistent performers tend to see a strong 
relationship between performing their jobs well, understanding 
their firm 's mission, and receiving the type of rewards they 
value.
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6.4.2 STRATEGIES FOR CHANGING BEHAVIOUR
As part of a mission statement to innovate, there are 
organisational development plans designed to meet the current 
obligations of a firm. Their purposes are to allocate resources 
and activities to meet short term (less than one year) operating 
goals.
But they, also, represent coaching opportunities for a firm 
to start changing the behaviour of its employee in order to be a 
"polyvalent firm". This is a term coined here for a firm, whose 
employees can meet current operational needs whilst 
simultaneously exhibiting behaviour useful in the development of 
innovations.
Three distinct strategies have been suggested for changing 
behaviour ( Adams and Everett, 1986:751; Chin and Benne, 1976). 
They argue that such strategies may help managers change the 
behaviours of both the supervisors and their operative workers: 
by reasoning to their self-interest; educating the workers to the 
facts and benefits of being innovative; and exerting the powers 
of their positions.
They are classified as follow:
1. Empirical-rational Strategies: These strategies assume 
that people are rational, that they will act in their own self- 
interest. If managers wish to advance change, they should show 
employees that change is not only desirable for the organisation, 
but for the employees* self-interest, too. When employees 
understand that change will benefit them, they will change their 
behaviour, accordingly.
2. Nonnative-reeducative Strategies: Following the
empirical-rational strategies are these strategies for
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organisational change, besides assuming that workers are 
rational, they presume that people act as a result of attitudes 
and values they acquired over time. Thus, changing behaviours 
involves not only presenting people with facts, but changing 
their attitudes, skills and relationships within a firm as well.
3. Power-coercive Strategy: This strategy is based on the 
concepts and the application of leadership, and organisational 
powers delegated to a manager. The legitimate power (formally 
delegated) and informal power (without organisational sanction) 
are brought into play. Pressure from peer groups, informal 
leaders, and economic realities or the fear of losing one's job 
are examples of how this strategy works.
6.4.3 MOTIVATIONAL ELEMENTS: CHAMPIONS, JOBS, AND TRAINING
The literature (Schon, 1967; Drucker, 1986; Pinchot, 1985) 
indicates that there are five other motivating elements which 
could be used in the stimulation of innovation. They are as 
follows:
First, there are product champions, who are living examples 
of how innovation can be stimulated. They motivate others in 
contact with them and serve to illustrate the benefits which 
ensure certain employees that innovative efforts and 
accomplishments will be rewarded accordingly.
Second, there are management policies which grant employees 
time away and on the job to experiment. This is a method used by 
3M Corporation and Intel.
Third, the enrichment of ones' jobs by the employees 
redesigning their own tasks, can be used to motivate some 
employees to perfom better. When there is a choice as stated in 
the expectancy theory, this is way for employees to receive
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intrinsic and personal rewards which will motivate them into 
being innovators.
Fourth, the use of training sessions on how to be creative 
and innovative can motivate the employees to try sooner and 
more often. They can reduce an employee’s anxieties about what to 
do and how.
Five, the setting of individual goals as to how a job can 
be upgraded (which are mutually negotiated by the employees with 
management as what is achievable and their understanding why it 
is) will motivate employees toward acts of innovation.
The combination of these elements will combat occupational 
obsolescence (the erosion of skills until an employee is no 
longer useful) and will help to create one of the driving forces 
for the stimulation of innovation, an experienced and 
technically-upgraded workforce.
6.5 SCMfARY
This section examined how the internal elements of a firm 
must be incorporated in a strategy for innovation. These elements 
were classified as being either distinctive, contingent or 
motivational as to how they may be linked in the stimulation of 
innovation.
The literature was reviewed relating to the theories on 
the relationship of a firm’s structure to innovation, the 
characteristics of the innovative employees, the motivational 
factors, and the impact of a firm's technological strategy.
From this review, the point is made that organisations and 
their subsystems are dynamic and in constant interaction with 
their environments. Managers must be aware of this process and
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how it affects their roles in the organisation.
It is, also, clear that the structuring of the organisation 
and the formality of a strategy can tend to strangle innovation 
and weed out entrepreneurship. Mainly because there are some 
barriers imposed within an organisation which cause them to be 
expected conditions. First, in fact, many organisations by their 
structures actively stand in the way of innovation because such 
activities represent a disturbance to the routine procedures, and 
commitments toward getting the current work done. Second, most 
managers and their subordinates will naturally resist change, 
some more than others.
Thus, all elements which may stimulate change and innovation 
should be examined. For example, work participation, job self­
design, time to experiment and other partial solutions can help 
to reduce these barriers, but innovation is, still, a formidable 
challenge.
That is why several aspects of change and the stimulation of 
innovation must be understood if either are to be successfully 
managed. First, one must recognize the need for innovation as 
signalled by internal or external indicators. Next the targets 
for change- structure, behaviour, and stimulating innovation - 
must be identified. Any or all of these processes are directly 
involved in the organisational developmental process.
The strategic structuring process arises from three sources 
of complexity. First are those arising from the 
interrelationships caused by its structure, its rules, its 
culture, and the aspirations of the managers for risk-taking. 
Second are those stemming from the interaction amongst functional 
areas (operations, finance and marketing, for example). Third, 
complexities arise from the inherent interrelationships of 
strategies and technology.
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The behaviour change process involves the decision to change 
a certain way by establishing a strategic mission for innovation 
and implementing a supportive behaviour change. Strategies for 
changing behaviour and learning on the job may be one or a 
combination of an empirical-rational strategy, a normative- 
reeducative strategy, or a power-coercive strategy.
The process of stimulating innovation is based on 
motivational elements, learning, punctuated strategies, and a 
system for rewarding a desired behaviour. But recognizing also 
that stimulating 100 percent of the workforce, at one time, will 
never be achieved. Nevertheless, certain types of employees will 
be innovative: Type I, "adaptors" and Type II, "innovators".
6.5.1 Implications Arising
These internal elements with those environmental elements in 
Chapter Five form the priori research logic for an empirical 
investigation as to which enabling elements stimulate a strategy 
for innovation for firms in Scotland.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
RESEARCH METHODS AND HYPOTHESES
7.0 AIMS
This chapter sets forth the six major phases of the methodological 
approach used in this study. Its aim is to explain the Methodological 
Chart (Figure 7.1) as shown on the next page.
The chart shows how in the first phase (enquiry) that a series of 
research issues were developed from the literature review. Also, in this 
phase, a symposium was held to discuss the issues of innovation from a 
manager's perspective and subsequently a questionnaire was constructed.
The next phase (the conceptual framework) explains how the data was 
collected, why a research model (Figure 7.2) was developed, and why, a 
combination of survey methods was needed. It explains in some detail the 
relationship of the variables in the research model and the five sets of 
variables contained in the survey instrument.
Phases three, four and five (the discussion of the data collected, 
post interviews and analysis by a series of the statistical techniques 
for the treatment of survey data and interviews) provide a basis for the 
final phase. For it is in phase six that the study's conclusions, and 
implications for further research were developed. These are contained 
in the next two chapters.
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FIGORE 7.1
Literature 
Review & Search
1st Symposium on Topics 
With 65 Participants
Selection of Sample
Hypotheses Developed
Development of Key Questions 
& Overall Research Model
Hypotheses Tested
Design of First' Questionnaire 
Posted to 396 Firms
First Questionnaire's Returns 
Of 190 Are Analysed (SPSS-X)
Second Questionnaire Posted 
& 105 Returns Are Analysed
Analysis of 
Interviews
Preliminary Findings 
Discussion of All Data
PHASE 2: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
PHASE 1: ENQUIRY OF THE TOPICS.
PHASE 6: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
PHASE 3: STATISTICAL INFERENCES 
PHASE 4: 2ND SYMPOSIUM HELD 
PHASE 5: POST INTERVIEWS
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7.1 rareoajCTiON
The literature indicates that there are many different ways to gather 
information within the field of management. Each has its own set of 
problems and approaches. Choosing which method to use among the 
alternatives is one dimension of the problem.
The methods for gathering information range from reviewing 
secondary research reports to conducting face to face interviews.
7.1.1 Pre-Survey Stage
The first stage to gathering information ( Moser and Kalton, 1985) 
requires that one of four combinations be considered: Theoretical- 
Quantitative; Bnpirical- Quantitative; Theoretical-Qualitative; and 
Empirical-Qualitative.
"Field-based empirical research within and across firms 
has always been fundamental and preferred in gaining a 
better understanding of the practice of management. When 
compared to other methods, it may be assessed as the most 
demanding. This method tells us the way business actually 
does function as well as a theoretical exploration of how it 
perhaps should function " (The Harvard Business School:
Porter, 1986) And... "Comparing & contrasting are excellent 
for understanding the limitations of theory and concepts"
(Hofer, Murray, Charan, and Pitts, 1934:30)
Based on these statements, the primary methodology (see Figure 7.1) 
was to be empirical-quantitative. This means that the bulk of this 
research will be guided by the practical experience of others as a 
primary source of knowledge and reported in a contrasting and 
quantitative way whenever possible. For that reason, surveys and 
interviews with operating managers were used and statistical means were 
employed.
However, there are some information gathering and reporting 
problems associated with these methods.
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Firstly, many managers of innovating firms do not follow " one best 
way" as a procedure for innovation. This means the survey method must 
use a range of terms and expressions to cover a multitude of procedures.
Secondly, the diversity of goods and services being providing by 
a range of small and larger firms (owned by British and Foreign firms) 
tends to add to the complexity of the research. With this type of 
complexity, the use of one survey document is bound to confuse some, to 
frustrate others, and cause many others not to respond at all because 
they might feel it is neither appropriate nor has any useful value to 
their particular firm.
Thirdly, some managers will not be qualified to answer because they 
lack „the education or insight to decipher the types of questions being 
asked. At first sight, it is widely accepted that the practice of 
scientific management is confined to a few, partly because there is a 
limited number of personnel working within each firm who were hired 
because of their education in the field of management. And there is no 
guarantee that those few receiving a copy of the questionnaire or 
agreeing to be interviewed are the best qualified sources either by 
their education or experience to answer.
Fourthly, many respondents will not qualify their responses by 
openly stating that their firms had failed in the stimulation of 
innovation; or they possess some very strong and unusual views about how 
to manage; or they do not understand the principles of management. 
Therefore, it is expected that some of the responses will be misleading 
and biased, accordingly.
7.1.2 RESEARCH PLAN FOR CONDUCTING THE SURVEY
The methodological problems of conducting a survey fall into four broad 
groups: (1) what is the objective of the survey; (2) from whom should 
the information be collected; (3) what methods are to be used in 
collecting the data; and (4) how to process, analyse and interpret the
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data. They should be addressed accordingly.
The first major task was to lay down the survey's objectives to 
clarify precisely as to what was to be accomplished.
As discussed earlier in Chapter One (see para. 1.2), these took 
the form of five primary questions: (1) to clarify the objectives; (2) 
to define what were the differences between a formal strategy and an 
informal one; (3) to set forth the elements as to how the types of 
firms surveyed would be grouped; (4) to establish the geographic 
boundaries; (5) and what limitations should to be imposed on the target 
population to be surveyed.
Based on answers to these questions, the target population was 
defined as firms that employed at least 51 persons and had been 
operating in Scotland for more than seven years. The primary research 
objective was to identify those strategic elements which stimulated a 
strategy for innovation. In order to reach this objective, it was 
decided that there would be four major research objectives: 
Specifically:
(1) That a series of exploratory discussions would be held with 
executives from multinational firms and business specialists to discover 
what factors they thought were important;
(2) That a conceptual research model would be designed to show the 
relationship of those elements revealed in the enquiry phase of this 
investigation. The selected survey method would examine this 
relationship and the discriminating power of each element to stimulate 
innovation;
(3). That a survey be targeted to an internationally- stratified 
sample of firms operating in Scotland for contrast and comparsion;
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(4). That the responses from the survey should provide a band of 
firms comprising an equal distribution of smaller firms, medium-sized 
firms, and larger ones, and that a follow-up survey would be conducted 
with up to 10 percent of these to clarify any findings.
The problem about whether to use a postal questionnaire or personal 
interviews was next considered.
7.1.2.1 The Postal Questionnaire
The major advantage of the questionnaire is that a large number of 
individuals/ firms can be involved at a relatively low cost. Assuming 
the questionnaire is well constructed, the data so gathered can be 
typically organised for numerical analysis on a computer. This in turn 
enables large masses of data to be sunmarised and manipulated to show 
key trends and highlight significant factors. Other advantages of this 
method are:
1. It promises to secure data with a minimum of time and expense.
2. It affords wider geographical contact.
3. Greater uniformity is obtained in the manner in which questions are 
posed.
4. A cut-off date for receiving and processing it can be set.
The main disadvantages of the questionnaire are:
1. The responses to the questionnaire can be low.
2. The attitude of the respondents can not be measured.
3. The non-respondents may have differing opinions from those who 
returned the questionnaire. So there is bias in all responses.
4. Validity of the responses depends on the willingness of the 
respondents to provide information without bias.
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7.1.2.2 The Organised Interviews
The organised interviews represent personal contacts between an 
interviewer and a respondent aimed to collect specific data. They are 
generally more difficult to administer (compared to the questionnaire) 
and are more expensive in time and money ( Mayntz, 1976: 100). The main 
advantages of this technique are:
1. It usually yields a high proportion of returns.
2. It can probe more deeply and can ensure that the respondents 
completely understand the question, since the interviewer can 
restate clearly if the answer to a question seemed to be 
misunderstood.
3. The quality of the responses are higher than from 
questionnaire surveys, and the amount of missing data is 
reduced.
4. The topic is of interest to the respondent otherwise they would 
not consent to an involvement.
5. Its method of administration is more flattering to the 
respondents so they are more willing to cooperate if a follow- 
up visit is needed.
The nature of the investigation, the diversity of the data sought, 
and the need to gain as large a sample as possible dictated that a 
combination of both questionnaire and personal interviews be used. First 
that a symposium would be the best method to explore the topics of 
stimulating innovation within a corporation. After this, a postal 
questionnaire would be used with a known population that could capture 
the elements of strategy that stimulated innovation. Then a series of 
post interviews were to be conducted (see para. 7.9 below) using a list 
of mnemonic questions as a guide for discussion.
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7.1.2.3 How to Report The Data
The problems with how to report the data can be summarised as follow:
1. How to ensure the processing of the data is done accurately and 
and presented in the simplest manner possible.
2. How to analyse the fields of data in such a way that the meaning 
is clear.
3. How to highlight and discriminate between the more important 
data and meaningless data.
After considering these problems associated with a field-based 
research, this investigation proceeds as shown in The Methodological 
Chart (Figure 7.1).
PHASE 1: FROM LITERATURE REVIEW INTO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
7.2 ENQUIRY OF THE TOPICS
The topics of strategy-making and innovation are such broad-ranging 
topics, and due to the growing interest by the business community in 
their exploration, the literature on these topics which attempts to 
address many of these diverse and conflicting interests is equally 
broad.
Thus, an enquiry of the literature was needed to review, and separate 
those topics related to innovation and strategy. Following this, a list 
of research questions was developed from which a series of statements 
for a hypotheses was created.
7.2.1 Hie Enquiry Leading to Research Questions
The enquiry was carried out in two basic ways: (1) in a general way by 
the literature review; and (2) specifically by a symposium in which the 
topic of how innovation is stimulated by an organisation was discussed.
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In general, the literature review revealed that there are many questions 
about the topics of strategy and innovation which should be 
investigated.
These questions were condensed down to answer four major concerns: 
(1) why is the research of innovating firms important; (2) how should it 
be positioned (as outlined in Chapter One); (3) what are the set of 
definitions for distinguishing firms which were the formal users of 
strategy for innovation from non-users; and (4) whether this 
investigation can indicate conclusively that innovation can be 
stimulated internally and externally by certain elements.
However, the literature was not able to explain how these 
elements were linked in a strategy. Thus the following five research 
questions were developed.
First: Whether, in the words of Ansoff (1961), the role of 
strategy is "to provide the unifying element for all of its activities" 
included the stimulation of innovation ?
Second: What were the general elements within the field of strategic 
management which should be incorporated into a strategy for innovation?
Third: Which were the common elements in a firm fs environment that 
enabled or hindered a firm from being innovative?
Fourth: Which were the common elements within a firm that enabled 
an innovation to be stimulated?
Fifth: Where specific elements were used in a strategy for 
innovation and to what degree do they stimulate a perceived 
innovativeness ?
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7.2.2 The First Symposium
Using the above questions as a springboard for further investigation, a 
symposium with managers and new business development specialists was 
held. Specifically, the symposium explored the empirical implications 
that innovation is a practice rather than a theory. This being the view 
of Drucker (1964) that "innovation is capable of being presented as a 
discipline which can be learned and practised". The symposium attempted 
to determine which parts of innovation as a discipline can be learned 
and practised by discussing the following questions:
First: Who used a strategy for innovation? Was there one basic 
approach in how innovation was developed by them? How should they be 
identified, grouped, compared and by what methods?
Second: Was there one or a series of elements in explaining how a 
strategy for innovation could be developed?
Third: Which of the elements were the enabling ones which a manager 
should incorporate into a successful strategy for innovation?
Fourth: Was a strategy for innovation (change) used by a manager 
different from one of growth, or one of profit? And why?
Fifth: Why did some firms select to use a strategy for innovation 
whilst others did not?
Sixth: What were the specific elements at either end of an 
innovation spectrum (from the most innovative to the least innovative) 
and how did they differ within those firms which were users of a 
formal strategy to those firms controlled by the non-users?
Seventh: Where and in which type of firm did a strategy for 
innovation operate best and in which was it least effective?
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Eighth: What are the most important factors to be dealt with that 
stand in the way of a company achieving more innovation and progress?
PHASE 2: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HYPOTHESES
7.3 HYPOTHESES
It was apparent in the literature review and in the first symposium that 
other elements such as the risk-experience pattern of the managers, and 
strategies for changing employees’ behaviour as discussed earlier in 
Chapter Six should be stated in a general hypothesis.
Formally stated the aim of undertaking this field research was 
conceived of as:
To confirm affirmatively or otherwise the hypothesised 
relationship between the elements of a firm's strategy- 
making, its organisational structure, its technological 
strategy, its culture-orientation, the behaviour of its 
employees, and a firm's receptivity to externally and 
internally- stimulated innovations.
Specifically, the statements within the hypothesis are:
1. There is an affirmative relationship between a firm’s receptivity 
for innovation and the application of information gathered from its 
environment. Specifically:
(a) The greater importance a firm attaches to the collection of new 
information and the greater this information is disseminated to 
employees at all levels for application, the greater a firm’s 
receptivity to innovation;
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(b) The greater the importance a firm attaches to the collection of 
information from buyers in their markets, the more it permits a firm 
to anticipate and forecast these needs, and the greater is a firm's 
strategic focus and its receptivity to innovation;
(c) The greater the age of a firm located in Scotland, then a 
greater effort is needed for innovation-investigating activities, but 
the greater the effort expended the greater becomes a firm 's 
receptivity to innovation.
2. The more a firm ventures into its environment by cooperating in field 
trials to test a buyer's needs, exchanges information with outside 
innovators, invests in ways to educate its customers and participates in 
joint ventures with other firms the greater is a firm's receptivity to 
innovation. Specifically:
(a) The more a firm tests newly-developed innovations for the 
reaction from a group of buyers the greater a firm's reactivity to 
innovate;
(b) The more a firm exchanges information with other innovators the 
greater a firm's receptivity to innovate;
(c) The more a firm invests in ways to inform and educate its 
customers the greater a firm's receptivity to innovate;
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(d) The more a firm participates with other firms in joint 
innovation the greater a firm's receptivity to innovate.
3. Where there is an affirmative relationship between a firm’s 
organisational structure, its flexibility and its openness the greater a 
firm's receptivity to innovate. Specifically:
(a) The more openness and flexibility exhibited by a firm's 
structure the greater is its receptivity for innovation;
(b) The more a firm coordinates its innovation-investigating 
activities and the less formal its structure, the greater is its 
receptivity to innovate;
(c) The greater variety of substructures a firm permits within and 
connects peripherally to its overall structure, the greater a firm's 
receptivity to innovate.
4. Where there is an affirmative relationship between a firm's 
strategies to train and motivate its employees by formal programmes to 
stimulate innovation and its technological strategy, and a firm's 
receptivity to innovate. Specifically:
(a) The more extensive a firm is committed to training throughout 
an employee's career the greater is a firm's receptivity to innovation;
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(b) The greater a firm is committed to combat occupational 
obsolescence created by the advances of technology, the greater is its 
receptivity to innovation;
(c) The greater the freedom give by a firm for its employees to 
experiment, to take time away for self-study, and to investigate 
innovation on the job, the greater is a firm's receptivity for 
innovation.
5. Where there is an affirmative relationship between a firm's mission 
to innovate, the vision of its leadership, and the greater number of 
policies initiated by its leadership to innovate, the greater is a 
firm's receptivity to innovation. Specifically:
(a) The more specific and far-reaching the stated mission of a firm 
to innovate, the greater is a firm's receptivity to innovation;
(b) The greater the visionary skills exhibited by a firm's 
leadership, the greater is a firm's receptivity to innovate;
(c) The more policies initiated by a firm's leaders in allowing a 
number of a firm's employees to deviate from current duties in their 
efforts to innovate, the greater is a firm's receptivity to innovate.
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6. The more ways a firm allocates resources to investigate, to 
stimulate, to reward, and to fund the acts of innovations the greater is 
a firm's receptivity to innovation. Specifically:
(a) The more funds used in a formal programme to stimulate 
innovation, the greater is a firm's receptivity to innovate;
(b) The more rewards given for acts of innovation, the greater is a 
firm's receptivity to innovation;
(c) The more resources allocated to investigate and to develop an 
innovation the greater is a firm's receptivity to innovate.
7. The more innovative a firm perceives itself, the greater attention 
and importance attached to manpower development, incorporating 
technological advances and the recruitment of certain types of 
individuals, the greater is a firm's receptivity to innovation. 
Specifically:
(a) The more innovative the culture exhibited by a firm in 
incorporating and purchasing technological advances embodied in new 
equipment, materials and systems, the greater is a firm's receptivity to 
innovate;
Page 224
Research Methods - Chapter Seven
(b) The more a firm's culture is perceived as being innovative, 
the more innovative candidates will be attracted, the more will be 
hired, and the greater becomes a firm's receptivity to innovation.
(c) The more a firm attracts, rewards, and trains entrepreneurial 
employees the greater is a firm's receptivity to innovation.
8. Where there is an affirmative relationship between the technological 
strategy selected by a firm, its previous history in using this 
strategy and the risk taking experiences of its managers, the greater is 
a firm's receptivity to innovate. Specifically:
(a) The more experience that a firm has in using a technological 
strategy, the more effective its strategy will be and the greater will 
be a firm's receptivity to innovate;
(b) The greater the success achieved with a selected technological 
strategy, the greater is a firm's receptivity to innovation;
(c) The greater the experiences of a firm's managers with using a 
technological strategy, the greater is a firm's receptivity for 
innovation.
9. The more a firm seeks to purchase innovation by acquiring licenses, 
patents and other innovating firms and the greater its diversifies, the 
greater will be a firm's receptivity to innovation. Specifically:
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(a) The more a firm seeks ways to diversify the greater a firm's 
receptivity to innovation.
10. The more a firm encourages small work groups and self-job design 
schemes and stimulates its personnel on ways to innovate using outside 
experts,the greater is a firm’s receptivity to innovate.
11. Where there is an affirmative relationship between a firm 's 
strategy-makers abilities to incorporate all of the assumptions stated 
above into a formal strategy to innovate (users) and a firm's 
receptivity to innovation. A progressively more negative relationship 
(non-users) will be exhibited when any or all of these assumptions are 
absent.
On the basis of these and other assumptions, the investigation 
proceeded along the following lines.
7.4 OVERALL METHODOLOGY
The first symposium also showed that there should be little difficulty 
in distinguishing innovating firms and the type of strategies used by 
them.
Accordingly, the following methodology was followed to distinguish 
"users’' of strategy for innovation from "non-users" firms. Specifically:
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(a) Select, survey, and interview a stratified group of firms 
which are essentially profit-motivated, had more than 51 employees in an 
unit, and had operated for more than seven years in Scotland;
(b) Ask each firm surveyed to identify itself as either being an
user or non-user of a formal strategy;
(c) Re-classify the firms based on their responses to nine
distinguishing elements taken from the literature;
(d) Identify a group of firms generally recognised as being highly 
innovative;
(e) Examine this group and isolate those elements which are common 
to all within that group;
(f) Rank the specific elements as having either high or little 
discriminatory power so that a firm can be classified as either highly 
innovative or exhibits a lower value of perceived innovativeness;
(g) Reject all specific elements common to both the users and non­
users of a formal strategy and analyse the residual elements 
respectively: by group; culture; behaviour of the employees; programme 
to combat obsolescence; receptivity for innovation; structural openness; 
use of information; special programmes; methods of handling technology; 
and strategic thrust.
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7.4 SURVEY INSTRUMENTS AND DETAILS OF METHODOLOGY
What follows, and described in some detail, are the survey methods used 
in this investigation. It starts with how and why the first interviews 
and symposium were held and ends with the construction of a research 
model.
7.4.1 Pre-survey Interviews-Focus Groups and Literature Review
Exploratory discussions on the topic of innovation-stimulating measures 
were conducted in two distinct and different ways:(l) a series of 
interviews was held with subject matter experts such as Professor James 
Brian Quinn of Dartmouth's Amos Tuck Business School in the USA and five 
managers of the UK's most noted firms for their record of innovation as 
listed in Appendix C; and (2) A symposium in Glasgow in June, 1989.
The first set of interviews were held from May, 1988 through 
December, 1988. From these interviews as shown in Appendix C, 10 
findings were developed as The Leadership Rules for Innovation By an 
Employee • These rules were used to develop the questions to be asked at 
the first symposium and as a mnemonic guide for post interviews (para. 
7.9) in the final phase of the investigation where conclusions are to be 
developed. As a reference, the findings are stated above each question 
which was to be asked in each post-interview.
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Second, 100 Scottish-based firms were invited to a symposium on 
innovation and intrapreneurship on the 8th of June, 1988 at which a 
total of 65 participants attended. They were asked their attitudes 
toward the stimulation of innovation within their corporations and what 
techniques, issues, and concerns should be considered in the 
investigation of this topic. They identified themselves as either users 
of a plan to innovate or non-users.
The format for the symposium used a modified delphic type of 
questioning in which participants were asked to record their ranking of 
the factors they believed contributed the most to innovation. The all­
day (10am to 4pm) session, and discussions of the topics in small 
groups of six persons, was audio-taped.
The topics were presented similarly to the research questions 
stated above (para. 7.2.1) The final ranking to the last question "What 
is the most important factor to be dealt with that stand in the way of 
your company achieving more innovation and progress ? ". The summary of 
the results are shown in Table No.5.
TABLE No. 5: RESPONSES OF 65 PARTICIPANTS AT FIRST SYMPOSIUM
Topic-Factor Frequency Mentioned X
Users Non-users
1. Obsolescence amongst workforce 59 49
2m Culture of the firm/problem-solving 38 47
3. Organisational Structure Openness 24 26
4. Resource Allocation of time/Progranmes 23 22
5. Lack of risk-taking/ Market Uncertainty 19 14
6. Poor Leadership/lack Vision 10 14
7. Lack of Financial Support/Sponsorship 8 5
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Based on the seven factors outlined in Table no. 5, a research 
model was designed to determine the relationship of these variables as 
factors needed to stimulate innovation and growth. It was constructed 
inductively and is illustrated below in Figure 7.2.
AN MODEL OF ENABLING FACTORS FOR INNOVATION WITHIN A CORPORATION
MmWnNG FACTORS
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Figure 7.2 Diagnostic and Research Model
This model outlines the relationships of factors cited by the 
managers as to how they believe that an innovative firm works. It 
illustrates the behaviour reinforcement patterns needed and the 
inputs of an overall strategy tc create a multi-dimensional process 
involving six groups of elements: Environmental Factors (EQ);
Management Policies and Strategies (W); Motivating Factors (A-G);
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Supervisory Relationship (K); Formal Programmes for Innovation (L) 
and Entrepreneurial Outputs (EO).
Legend for Equation Codes for Model
EO = updated fully innovative person (system outputs)
EQ = individual entering into the system (input)
W = Management policies and strategies toward the
environment which a firm operates and attract new 
employees accordingly.
K = Supervisory operating methods 
I = Group Work reaction
H = Entrepreneurial experience related to group work 
A-E = Motivating Factors to combat obsolescence 
X = Visionary leadership exhibited by overall strategies 
J = Internal culture originating from parent company 
L = Formal programmes components for innovation 
F-G = Rewards and recognition given for updating
The systems approach of this model (Figure 7.2) can be reduced 
down to three main variables: the individual, the firm, and the 
environment. Achievement motivation is the principal individual 
variable involved in this model as shown by the entrepreneurial 
outputs. The environmental and situational variables used in this 
model are: motivational aspects of supervisory behaviour,
organisational climate, on-the-job problem solving, peer and group 
interaction, and management policy.
The input to this system is the individual. Box EQ shows how 
the formal education of the employee is affected proportionately by 
four sub-elements:(a) the type of home country culture which the 
employee resides in (EQ1); (b) the individual skills as reflected by 
formal education at the time of entry (EQ2); (c) the level of
experience that the individual brings in being innovative (EQ3); and
(d) the current business environment as it impacts on the market
conditions for the type of product to \riiich the skills of the
individual would be applied (EQ4).
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Continuing into the main system, Box W represents the influence 
of management on possible methods to be used in recruiting, training 
and on how and where the individual will be used to advance the 
overall company strategy of innovation. It reflects the firm's 
previous experience in being entrepreneurial, method of organisation, 
supervisory methods, and visionary traits of top management.
Next are Boxes A through E which represent the various up-dating 
practices. These boxes represent the extent to which the organization 
provided employees time away from work or financial resources (Box 
D) for on-the-job training, time to experiment, group learning, the 
taking of courses, reading, off-site training at conferences, 
schools, professional associations, attendance at seminar and 
workshops. An individual can go through a combination of these 
internal motivating factors simultaneously or one at a time. The key 
external motivators are the types of reward (Box F) and recognition 
(Box G) that a person expects to gain by engaging in the up-dating of 
their skills and knowledge
Boxes I and II represent the positive effects of group and peer 
interaction as determined by the overall entrepreneurial experience 
of the firm. These are directly affected by Box K which represents 
the type of supervisory reaction to individuals engaged in updating 
their skills /knowledge. Positive feedback and reinforcement may or 
may not occur due to personality of the supervisor.
In the event no feedback occurs due to poor group 
interaction, inadequate supervision and/or lack of one's self­
achievement, the process can cycle back to the main system via the 
third feedback loop. Then the corporate culture intrinsic in Box J 
which directly nurtures the visionary practices and value system for 
innovation or self-achievement would over ride this lack of feedback. 
At that point, expressed and explicit management policies will 
reinforce the need for updating. The result is a Type I individual
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who is completely updated to the level of the company's requirements 
compatible to its overall strategy for innovation.
Type II individuals develope when they as self-motivating 
individuals propose to or act under a corporate entrepreneurship 
programme. It is a main feature of these programmes such as at 3M, 
Apple Computer, ICI and others that ’’on-line organisational 
"supervision will have little control over a truly "enterprising 
employee nurturing a new idea/innovation". Provided approval is given 
by the programme manager for the individual to exploit, experiment 
and develop a proposal to its commercial acceptance. At this stage, 
the employee does not work under a formal structure, and tends to 
make all decisions necessary to develop a complete new business 
venture. Also in this stage of development, the company can reward 
the person by funding the project directly or launching a spin-off 
business with the Type II person in charge.
In order for these types of innovation programme to work, the 
sponsoring firm should supply four sub-components: separate budgets 
(LI); a formal system of scanning to determine the strategic 
implications of a new product/idea being developed by the Type II 
employee (L2); support services to advise and motivate the employee 
(L3); and a network system to publicise the programme and the 
employee effort regardless of the success of the project (L4). In 
essence, this supports the effort of a highly motivated self-imposed 
drive by the employee to learn new information and undertake risk in 
an incubatory environment.
7.5 (XWSTRDCTING A QQESTIONNAIRE FROM THE RESEARCH MODEL
From the research questions and the the original hypotheses 
(para. 7.3), a 137 item, five-tiered questionnaire was constructed as 
shown in Appendix -Exhibit No. 1. The survey instrument was designed 
to capture the following five broad fields of data:
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1. Descriptive elements of the respondents
2. Discriminating elements for separating firms
3. Elements as to how strategy is formulated
4. Elements as to how innovation is stimulated
5. Elements linking innovation and strategy
8
5
40
30
54
137
These fields were divided into five sets of elements 
(variables) which were relevant to this research: (1) typological 
elements to categorise the firms in the sample into homogeneous 
“groupings; (2) organisational elements to provide a demographic 
profile of the firms in each group; (3) the strategic elements to 
indicate the type of technological strategy being used by a firm; (4) 
those distinctive elements linking strategic elements to innovation; 
and (5) the other general elements ( i.e. distinctive, environmental, 
contingent, and motivational) used to investigate potential 
differences among the groups in terms of how they motivated their 
employees to stimulate innovation.
A brief description of each set is shown in Appendix-D.
7.6 RESPONSES TO THE FJHJ) SURVEY
7.6.1 Returns from The Posted Survey
The survey was mailed to a named executive within 396 companies which 
were located in Scotland. Their names were taken from a list of firms 
furnished by the Scottish Development Agency (SDA 1987).
The questionnaires were posted in two batches: 200 in the last 
week of January, 1989; and 196 in the first week of February, 1989. 
The cut-off date was the 23rd of February, 1989.
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This national sample yielded 190 usable replies, representing an 
effective response rate of 52.4 percent as returns and mislabelled 
totalling 32 executives/firms were excluded.
7.6.2 Sample Stratification
The breakdown using the gross sample of 396 firms is displayed in 
Table No. 6 below:
Table 6; PARENT OWNERSHIP BY NATIONALITY OF SAMPLE
Number Original Sample Replies
of Firms (% of 396) (% of 190)
Scottish 200 50.5 % 45.8%
N. American 95 24.0 26.3
Other Overseas 40 10.1 7.4
Other UK 61 15.4 20.5
Table 1 indicates that the responses were adequately stratified 
with an international representation of foreign and other United 
Kingdom firms when compared to the overall targeted population as 
shown in Appendix E. This sample represents about 1.5 percent of the 
British firms in Scotland (excluding retailing and firms employing 
less than 51); and about 50 percent of North American-Overseas firms 
employing more than 51 employees in Scotland.
7.6.3 Band of Respondents by Size of Parent Company
The frequency and percent of the reporting firms by number of 
employees is shown in Table 7.
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Table Mb. 7; Reporting Units by Number of Employees
Sample Band 
51 to 300
%-Projected
33.3
%-Actual Reported 
31.6
No.of Firms 
60
301 to 1000 33.3 32.6 62
1,001 and over 33.3 35.8 68*
99.9 100.0 190
* the actual numbers of firms over 1,000: 1000-1,500 were 28; 1,501 -
2,000 were 14 ;and over 2,001 were 26 totalling 68 in all.
Table No. 7 indicates that the survey captured a fairly equal 
representation of smaller, medium -size, and larger firms as set 
forth in the investigation's design stage (para. 7.1.2)
PHASE 3: TO DETERMINE THE STATISTICAL INFHffiNCES OF THE DATA
The questionnaires were analysed with a SPSS programme. There were 
137 elements (variables) accumulated across all questions which 
receive both a frequency and cross-tabulation statistical treatment. 
The tabulated responses for all 137 elements were divided into users 
data and non-users data as shown in Exhibit No. 2.
7.7 STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES USED ON DATA C0LUBCTED
Whenever possible, interval and ratio measures were used on the 
elements as shown in Appendix E. These elements were subject to one 
of the the following four statistical techniques: (1) a series of 
tests for goodness of fit; (2) discriminatory analysis; (3) cross­
tabulation; and (4) Varimax factor loading.
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7.7.1 Goodness of Fit Measures
There were three "goodness of fit" techniques used to test whether 
statistically significant differences exist: Chi-square (x^ was used 
for nominal data, Mann-Whitney-U (U-M-W) for ordinal data and in the 
analysis of interval and ratio measures for grouped data, t-tests 
were employed.
7.7.1 Discriminant Analysis
Within this analysis, only 83 of the 137 different combinations of 
elements were analysed. It was found that 54 of them were highly 
correlated and lost their qualities as independent variables. Their 
presence created a condition of multicollinearity. One of the 
simplest and best solutions for this problem of highly correlated 
variables is to discard them until the condition is eliminated.
The key element for this analysis was how a respondent answered 
the question no. 3 in Exhibit No. 1, "Did your company use a 
strategy (formal programne or policy) to stimulate innovation or not 
over the past three years" (answered by yes or no). This was the 
primary discriminatory element and predictor. This analysis using the 
variable (Formalst) had two main purposes:
Firstly, an attempt to shed additional light on the 
characteristics was done by separating the users and non-users 
(formal/informal programmes), for which a stepwise discriminant 
analysis (WILKS) was used. For the assessment and the validity of the 
discriminant function, four standard measures were used:
Hie Eigenvalue. This measure tests the total variance existing in the 
discriminating variables. The higher the eigenvalue the better the 
function standard.
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The Canonical correlation. This measure indicates the association 
between the discriminant function and the variables which define 
group membership. The closer the coefficient is to 1.0, the better 
the function.
Wilkfs Lambda. This measure indicates the statistical significance of 
the discriminating information not accounted for by the function. Hie 
higher the measure the better the function.
Chi-square. This measure is used to test the significance of lambda 
into an approximation of the chi-square distribution.
Secondly, the other useful function of a discriminant analysis 
is its ability to classify and confirm whether a firm belongs to a 
users or non-users group. In the sample, 103 firms used a formal 
strategy and 87 used an informal strategy. From this sample ratio, 
each respondent1 s discriminant score was compared with a cutting or 
criterion score to predict group membership based on nine distinctive 
elements as set forth in Chapter One.
7.7.3 Cross-tabulation Analysis
A cross-tabulation analysis ( using SPSSX) was later performed. It 
provided a series of sub-tables using the nationality of the 
parent company, and one of business-marketing strategies used by the 
firms as independent variables. This business/marketing strategy was 
selected by each respondent from question no. 12 which contained a 
list and a description of seven different strategies (see Appendix B,
i.e. Pioneer, Follower, Fatalist, Opportunist, Imitator, Dependent, 
and Traditionalist).
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7.7.4 Varimax Rotation Analysis- Attitudinal Survey
This analysis was used to examine an attitudinal survey measuring the 
interrelationship of culture, decision-making, and efforts expended 
on new product development by a firm and its overall orientation to 
innovativeness activities. This analysis is a factor loading 
rotation procedure (Varimax) meaning that it will find any hidden 
relationships by loading heavily on one variable (to its maximum) and 
as low as possible on the other variables.
The importance of this additional questionnaire to the 
investigation became apparent during a field interview with one of 
the respondents, who argued that motivation and the attitude of users 
versus non-users would contribute immeasurably to this investigation. 
It was decided to develop a short "attitudinal measuring" 
questionnaire with ten statements and two questions.
7.7.4.1 Attitudinal Survey
This additional questionnaire (Exhibit No. 3) was designed 
differently and tabulated separately from the first one. The ten 
statements related to attitudes toward innovation were developed 
using a Likert-type rating scale from 1 through 5. The two questions 
were designed to reflect the reasons why training was taken.
Each respondent was asked to register the extent of their 
agreement/disagreement with each statement posed. On a supplementary 
basis, there were two questions asked. They were to probe the 
motivation for taking a training course and to test if there was a 
relationship between training and a firm's orientation toward new 
product development activities.
For example, the first question dealt with training courses used 
to combat obsolescence by asking, "Please indicate your foremost 
reason (a list of six indicators were given) for attending a course
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which may up-grade your skills or others as stated The second 
asked, "Overall, how important are new ventures and new product 
development to your firm?". The complete questionnaire is shown in 
Exhibit No. 3.
This questionnaire was dispatched to 130 different respondents 
with an invitation to attend a follow-up symposium on the 5th of 
May, 1989. They were selected for this mailing because on the first 
questionnaire they had indicated that they had achieved some type of 
innovation accomplishments over the past three years.
This sample was comprised of 93 "users" of a formal programme 
to innovate and 37 "non-users" of a formal programme. Fran this 
mailing, 105 firms returned this one-page survey for a 80.1 percent 
response rate; 74 of these firms were from "users" and 31 of them 
were from the "non-users". These findings are presented in (Chapter 
Eight.
PHASE 4: TO DISCUSS IMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM SURVET
On the 5th of May, 1989, a 2nd symposium was held at the University 
of Glasgow to gain a further insight on the implications arising from 
the findings of the first questionnaire. It was attended by 22 
different managers, and 14 other parties of interest (universities, 
SDA, and specialists).
The self-classification of those attending were as follows:
Academics from Universities 10
Managers within a UK-owned firm than Scottish 9
Managers within a Scottish-owned company 6
Managers within a North-American firm 4
Managers within an Overseas-European firm 3
Other specialists and interested parties 4
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7.8 FORMAT FOR SURVEY AT THE 2nd SYMPOSIUM
Before a presentation of findings and theories, participants were 
asked to rank their reaction to 22 statements as shown in Exhibit 4.
A five point scale was used: (1) strongly agree; (2) agree; (3) 
no opinion; (4) disagree; and (5) strongly disagree. After a 
presentation and discussion of each statement they rank the same 
scale again. A summary of results is discussed in Chapter Eight.
PHASE 5: POST INTERVIEWS TO CLARIFY THE PRACTICE OF INNOVATION
7.9 POST INTERVIEWS
There were 26 different respondents who agreed to a series of 2 hour 
interviews to discuss the 10 findings in the leadership's rules as 
shown in Appendix C.
All in this group had responded to the first and second 
questionnaires, and nine of them had attended each symposi urn.Based 
on their own self-descriptions, they are classified as follow in 
Table No. 8:
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Table No. 8: POST INTERVIEWS OF 26 RESPONDENTS
Technological % Of Strategic Group No. % To
Strategy Used Respondents (n=190) Interviewed Strategic Group
Pioneers 38.0 7 9.4
Dependents 19.1 6 15.0
Imitators 12.2 3 11.1
Followers 10.0 5 26.3
Fatalists 8.7 2 11.1
Opportunists 7.2 2 15.3
Traditionalists 4.8 1 11.1
Table No. 8 confirms that greater than 10 percent of the total 
respondents of 190 received post interviews, and that each strategic 
group was fairly represented. It, also, indicates that the interviews 
of the Followers exceeded the 10 percent goal as stated above (see 
para.7.1.2 ).
These interviews (conducted from July, 1989 through November, 
1989) concentrated on the survey*s findings, and how to construct a 
strategy for innovation. They proved to be useful in developing a 
conceptual strategic framework as to how a firm stimulates its
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workforce for innovation as presented in the conclusions of this 
investigation.
Other issues that were discussed included: (1) what was the best 
way to motivate their workforce to become more innovative, (2) the 
best type of organisational structure, and (3) which methods for 
training personnel/supervisory were being used by other industrial 
leaders in technology and manufacturing. The strategic use of the 
product life cycle theory and the effects of having or not having a 
management policy / strategy for innovation were, also, discussed. A 
summary of the post interviews is shown in Chapter Eight
7.10 INDEX FOR DETERMINING THE MOST INNOVATIVE FIRMS
Using those elements identified in the discriminant analysis as being 
present in the responses of firms known to be highly innovative 
(i.e. 3 M Corporation) and absent in a known non-innovating firm, an 
index was constructed accordingly.
This weighted scale was tested against a random sample of 
10 respondents: 5 users and 5 non-users of a formal strategy to 
determine whether the index was able to rank firms progressively. 
It was calculated further that 14 firms scored over 80 percent of the 
possible maximum points allowed. They were ranked as the most 
innovative firms of the 190 surveyed. The index and the names of 
those firms rating over 51 percent are shown in Appendix G.
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7.11 SIRMARY
Using the methodology described above, this investigation assesses 
whether the innovative (entrepreneurial) firms can be distinguished 
from non-innovative and (non-entrepreneurial) firms.
Firstly, the research will identify a group of enabling 
elements generally accepted as contributory to a highly innovative 
firm.
Secondly, the following hypotheses will be tested: (1) when 
those enabling elements for innovation are related affirmatively in a 
firm, will itexhibit a greater receptivity to be highly innovative; 
and (2) when those enabling elements are related negatively in a 
firm, will it exhibit a greater receptivity to be non-innovative.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS
8.0 AIMS
This chapter discusses the observations, assumptions, and findings of 
the investigation in this order.
It starts with a series of observations gleaned from the 
literature review of the field of strategic management and strategy 
as a discipline. Then, a preamble to the investigation's findings is 
presented in which assumptions are made about the responding firms, 
strategic focus, and environmental turbulence.
The chapter ends by presenting the highlights of major findings 
from the surveys (Exhibits No. 2 through 4) which form an empirical 
data base for the conclusions set forth in Chapter Nine.
8.1 FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS FROM THE LTn&ATURE REVIEW
There has been much written about innovation and about how management 
needs to adapt in order to meet the challenges of the 1990's or even 
to survive.
Some writers in the literature even go so far as to suggest that 
these challenges represent a paradigm shift in the strategic 
philosophy from the "old order" such as efficiency, authority and
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conformity to a "new order" where employees1 initiatives, visionary 
leadership and innovation will become essential. A common theme in 
much of this writing is the importance of the individual employee as 
a strategic element and, as a consequence, the need to nurture and 
develop this resource.
We observe that the findings from the literature could be 
classified into three main types. The first are those axiomatic 
observations which have been accepted by a dominant proportion of 
researchers. The second types are those themes which are debatable 
because we think each lacks a balanced perspective and probably will 
be re-examined by the field of management in the next decade. The 
third type is the group of theories emerging in the field which have 
not been confirmed by researchers or accepted completely into 
practice by managers (e.g. Porter's five forces of competition).
For example, one of the first developments in the field of 
management was the separation of managerial activities into different 
categories (Fayol, 1949), They are best known as planning, 
organising, directing, and controlling activities. Up until 
recently, it was believed that each level of a firm would be 
responsible for different aspects of these activities. Top 
management would do the planning, middle management would do the 
controlling, and the directing of personnel would best be left to 
first level managers. Most writing through the 1980's reflects this 
concept.
8.1.1 THE TASK OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
In the review of the literature as it relates to strategy, we believe 
four general findings should be stated about the field of strategic 
management.
The first is evident after reviewing the work of Quinn, Mintzberg 
and James (1988) and others, it is a clear observation that all
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levels of management perform all of the classic four activities: 
planning, organising, controlling, and directing. These tasks are not 
restricted to the province of top management, as some practice. We, 
firmly, believe that only the gap analysis portion of planning should 
remain solely a task of top management. However, portions of this 
task being delegated down (but not abdicated) to other levels when it 
is most appropriate.
Second, we observe that the controlling and planning process of 
strategy-making requires much more human system management and 
behaviour guiding activities than most current writers of strategic 
management address. And we argue that the stimulation of innovation 
requires even more of these activities than any other type of 
strategy.
Third, the strategy-making and planning activities have fast 
become a series of bureaucratic, costly paper-shuffling exercises 
divorced from the actual process of management. This observation 
holds up well when it comes to the stimulation of innovation which is 
stifled by such meaningless energies.
Four, we observe that an overwhelming amount of management 
literature concentrates on developing two extreme schools of thought 
when it comes to strategy. On one side is the rational management 
science school of strategy-making developing more and more 
sophisticated models and at the other side is the nescient school's 
approach using recipes, portfolio grids and quick solutions. Whilst 
both may be contributing to the advancement of management as a 
theory, they lend little support to the empirical evidence as to what 
managers believe in or practice.
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8.1.2 Axiomatic and Corroborated by Literature Review
Earlier, we observed that there were some findings in the literature 
which were axiomatic and are directly transferable into the field of 
strategic management.
We called those findings "axiomatic" when two main tests are 
met: (1) when they reflect theories which are self-evident and
universally recognised as being applicable whether the firm is small 
or large; and (2) when they have been corroborated by field research 
and are generally accepted by most theorists in the field as being of 
value, except those, who practice the principles of neiscience 
management.
Based on this definition as to what is axiomatic, the following 
seven observations are offered:
1. The structure of an organisation follows its strategy or lack 
of it. The success/survival of an organisation depends on an 
interface between a firm's ability to fit within its environment. 
This has been corroborated by Chandler (1962); Channon (1972) 
Williamson (1975); and Rumelt (1974). As the field of management has 
advanced over the past 25 years the force of their conclusions had 
not been weakened. Indeed, we believe that they are impervious to any 
new research any where on the horizon which may discount their 
research.
2. The expectancy motivational theory about the behaviour of the 
individual within an organisation indicates that each of us are 
motivated by the aspiration for security and some type of a reward. 
The strength of an organisation to move forward depends to a large 
degree on the bulk of individuals within it being motivated 
accordingly. This means strategy-making must depends on rewarding and 
motivating those who work toward its goals. This axiom has been
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reinforced by the research of Vroom (1964,1968); Likert (1961); and 
Maslow (1959)
3. Research indicates that a structure of an organisation takes one 
of two basic forms: (1) Mechanistic; and (2) Organic. The first 
reflects a mechanistic and bureaucratic structure with hard rules to 
follow. They must be obeyed without questions or deviation from its 
procedures and rules. When such rules are followed the organisation 
becomes more efficient in producing its core products/services (e.g. 
Macdonald Restaurants).
But in direct contrast, the second structure is an organic one 
’vriiich is flexible and dictate that rules, at their best, are only 
rough guide lines for the routine. More over, employees when they 
deviate from them for a specific cause or to solve a problem, their 
behaviour is tolerated. Thus, the more flexible organic structure is 
generally best for the stimulation of innovation.
However we observed that some theorists point out that most 
organisations are not at either ends of this continuum at all times, 
but a pattern of how it prefers to operate does develop. Yet, to a 
degree, we argue that an organisation over time can be identified as 
having the symptoms of being either mechanistic or organic in how its 
manage its workforce. The research of Bums and Stalker (1961); and 
Weber (1942) corroborate this axiom.
4. We accept as being axiomatic the observation that innovation can 
best be defined as a new idea challenging existing ideas and only has 
to be perceived as being new by the individuals involved. Although 
there are many other definitions offered in the literature, we prefer 
the view of Van de Van (1986) "as long as the idea is new to the 
people involved, it is an innovation, even though it may appear to 
others to be an imitation of something that exists elsewhere". The 
acceptance of this finding is supported by Zaltman, Duncan and Holbek 
(1973); Mansfield (1977); and Rogers (1982).
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5. All innovations must be actively welcomed as good things by 
management. I argue that this is an essential first step in a gap 
analysis needed to stimulate innovation. The second is the 
constellation of circumstances theory in which an actor decide to 
take action on a problem and does not find an existing answer, then 
innovation starts. These factors must be incorporated into a gap 
analysis which establishes the background for most strategic 
formulations and for a strategic decision to innovate. This attitude 
"to take action" is generally- formed and emotionally-developed by 
management before implementing a company wide plan to innovate.
Those, who accept that only good commercially-valued and 
immediately useful innovation is welcomed, are doomed to failure. 
Unfortunately most non-innovative managers view innovations two ways; 
if it works, it is good, but if it does not work it is a punishable 
mistake. However even before these types of dichotomous judgements 
(that innovation is good or bad) are formed, an attempt may be made 
because certain circumstances are leading people to take action. 
This view is corroborated by Braun (1981); Drucker (1985); Kimberly 
(1981); Maitland (1982); and Schon (1971).
6. There is a contingency theory about how firms behave in 
negotiating and as to how they set goals within an organisation. 
This theory liberated managers and management theorists from being 
prisoners trapped in the view that "there is only one way". 
Basically, we argue that most organisations, managers, goals and 
strategic situations are not identical. Thus only a firm in that 
exact situation can decide what is best.
Even though we understand that sometime the contingency theory 
can be a theory of excuses and rationalising and that it can become 
overly-deterministic, to the point, that where every manager believe 
that they can decide which variable of strategy-making is important, 
we still support it. We support the principles of this theory 
because it does reflect a theory of choice. Thus, it allows a
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decision-making unit the opportunity to absorb the impact of 
technology, its environment, and the type of management structure it 
wishes to operate in, etc. to the degree that it feels is important 
when formulating a firm's goals.
The main criticism we have with this theory is that it does not 
take in full account the differing aspirations of managers and 
employees when they were in conflict over a strategic goal. This is 
one of the major features of a contingency approach to strategy- 
making as to how some firms are able to develop a series of closely- 
corodinated programmes of training, stimulating, funding and 
investigating to support a strategy. They are trying to motivate and 
get as many of their employees involved as possible in working toward 
a common goal.
However some pundits of this theory do not recognize that 
people within an organisation may have conflicting goals as to how 
they will operate within a firm. Thus, it only becomes axiomatic in 
our opinion for its use in the stimulation of innovation when that 
does occur.
This recognition of conflicting goals other than profits 
combined with the seminal research of Cyert and March, the theory 
does indeed become an axiomatic observation. This is because their 
research of strategic choice and behaviour is an extremely important 
development in the advancement of the contingency theory. For its 
acts as an antidote to the tendencies of some managers to over work 
the use of setting strategic goals without taking into account the 
personal goals of people working within an organisation. The 
contingency theory in the past 15 years has been reflected in a 
plethora of articles, but Cyert and March (1963); Simon (1964); 
Kanter, (1985,1988) and Waterman (1989) have corroborated our 
observations.
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7. Strategic management has three distinct and separate levels of 
strategies and they contain, no less, than nine essential elements. 
And an effective strategy must go through the following type of
development: it is formulated, implemented, and monitored
accordingly. Both British and American academics have established 
this. A summary of these elements are listed below in Table No. 9.
TABLE No. 9: Essential Elements of Strategic Management
1. Formulation: a formulation of gap-filling goals is the 
first step. Supporting a firm's mission statement.
2. Multi-tiered Goals: goals must be established at three 
levels (corporate, competitive and function).
3. External Assessment: some type of environmental
assessment must be made of forces in a firm's industry. They 
would include the social, economic, competitive and 
technological advances a firm must face.
A. Internal Assessment: a firm must make an analysis of its 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SHOT) and 
a strategic-marketing appraisal of its critical success 
factors (CSFs).
5. Assumption-based: certain scenarios, assumptions and 
forecasts must be made either qualitatively or 
quantitatively about a firm's future.
6. Contingent Plans: a variety of alternatives and 
conflicting strategies must be developed.
7. Selecting the Best Choice: a one- best choice of the 
alternatives must be written into an organisational 
development plan for current operations and a long term plan 
in support of a mission statement.
8. Resource Allocation: an allocation of how a firm's 
resources will be used should be specifically addressed in 
both sets of plans.
9. Monitor: both set of plans should be reviewed 
periodically with an objective and accurate feedback system 
for each.
Adapted from Taylor & Sparkes (1977) and Ansoff (1^ 61)
Table No. 9 outlines the essential elements in a firm's strategy 
regardless of size, age, geographic location, product mix, workforce, 
management style, or customer base. These are corroborated by Anthony 
(1957); Ansoff (1961); Taylor, (1973), Hofer (1980); Porter (1989); and 
many others within the literature.
This concludes the last of those axiomatic observations which can 
be corroborated by the literature. They form a conceptual foundation for 
the assumptions and findings of the investigation.
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What follows are those observations which can be debated without 
reaching a clear conclusion.
8.1.3 Debatable Observations Within the Literature
There is no escaping the tensions between the views of strategic 
management and the challenges outlined in the literature that debate 
whether this discipline can handle a complex and changing environment 
as predicted throughout the 1990s. Nor was it possible to over look the 
substantial differences in the conflicting theories as to how strategy- 
making should be done, once the essential elements of strategy-making 
are agreed to.
In an effort to outline those issues in which there are some 
disagreements surrounding strategy and innovation, we will discuss nine 
of them as follows:
1. Whether or not that strategic planning based on strategic business 
units, and annual corporate review schemes are valid, and if the setting 
of corporate goals by using an experience curve is a sound method of 
managnent. Despite many within the academic community questioning the 
impact of these principles, it is an empirically- induced fact that most 
executives in the twentieth century uses one or more of them daily.
Further and in support, most of the managers (84.2%) responding to 
our surveys agree that strategic planning is of value. For example, 
respondent AA stated:
"....Before I became a managing director, I questioned the value of 
corporate planning for long term goals, a portfolio approach to 
management, and strategic planning in general. But I would find it 
extremely difficult to understand and manage so many different products 
and markets without them".
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Although, we question the paper-creating process of strategy, we 
will make the observation that the analytical techniques and the 
formulation of goals required in many of these planning schemes do help 
a firm to select a proper strategy. This, in our view, is their best and 
true value. We found that this view of strategic planning having similar 
values was corroborated by Hammermesh (1986); Wheelen and Hunger (1986); 
and Quinn, (1988)
2. The view that technology, environment, and structure are the primary 
determinants within a firm are debatable observations. Their importance 
as confirmed by individual pieces of research are accepted but not 
balanced in our view. The complete failure of earlier writers (Wooddard) 
human resource specialists (Perrow) and current technologists (Roberts) 
to balance the power of the individual to innovate and over look the 
desire of some to resist innovate because it threatens their
organisational power, is a major flaw.
Equally the views that content-descriptive school of strategic 
management comprising the scientific view or the procedural-school of 
management sharply divided our thinking as to which method is best. On 
one side writers such as Ansoff (1961) Hofer and Schendel (1980) Caves 
(1980) and Porter (1980) explore the content and outer context links of 
strategy-making as a rational process, but substantially ignore the
intuitive process of strategy/innovation. And on the other side are the
process strategic researchers such as Pettigrew (1985), Quinn (1980) and 
Mintzberg (1978) with their backs turned away from the rational
deliberate strategy-making process.
For example, we observed that the functionalist's view of 
technology or the humanist's view of innovation are so far apart that 
they are almost impossible to balance. We were intrigued by the 
eagerness of some theorists (Peters, Pettigrew and et al)to distort, 
twist or construct new definitions in mid-air (or mid sentence) in order 
to balance their varying views.
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We treat with caution such statements as 'technology affects 
structure or structure affects technology'. These statements require 
those theorists to demonstrate either empirically or axiomatically that 
each element has a separate integrity if they are to avoid the charge of 
tautology or the circular argument going nowhere. Our view from the 
literature on the contingency theory during and after the investigation 
is mixed.
2. The product life cycle concept as a method of new product management 
and stimulation of innovation has to be accepted but with a jaundiced 
eye. We observe that the length of the introductory period depends on 
external features which have absolutely nothing to do with the product 
development itself. The sales force's distribution system, product 
complexity, postitive market awareness, advertising and promotion and 
the wealth (budget) of an innovator are prime examples.
We believe that a product's usefulness can not be viewed on the 
basis of one product life cycle. Further, we believe that a product 
life can be terminated prematurely by the strategy of a competitor to 
replace it or to reduce its value as a profitable item.
The literature suggests that a product reaches obsolescence when 
the market for it is saturated and that market is considered saturated 
when sales slow down. To us, it is a chicken and egg type of argument. 
However, we sometime think that it should be called a market describing 
cycle model rather than a product life cycle. But it's merit is based on 
one common element found in describing the market or product process of 
deterioration and that is by the concept of time. Thus, we support the 
concept if the literature is trying to stress that each market /product 
has a definite period of development measured in a time dimension. If 
that is the case, then the literature should indicate how speed of the 
process of its development from a idea into commercially- distributed 
product is the key.
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It is speed at all costs, speed in making the decision to innovate 
the moment that an existing problem is identified is the point that we 
observed is critical. But for a firm to develop speed in its strategy 
for innovation does not just happens as it requires a different way of 
management.
In the past, when a firm decides to seek a new product/solution, 
the question arises does it want it fast or just want it right were the 
typical managerial responses to this type of a decision. Now in the 
1990s, the strategic answer is that a firm wants it right the first 
time and faster than any other firm. Yes, both ways; quick and right. 
We argue that a firm can be fast and right if they are working on many 
different innovations for a few years.' This sets the tone that if 
everyone is working constantly as part of their daily task to innovate 
then it is more likely to be right the first time and faster. In this 
type of culture, the development of an innovation is not be held up 
unnecessarily for lack of funds or approval to move ahead. By 
establishing such an entrepreneurial culture, then firms can go from 
conception of an innovation to market consumption in the shortest 
possible time. Indirectly they have extended their product life cycle 
already. The faster they get the product developed right, the longer the 
product cycle. The literature fails to balance out this observation.
The literature portrays it as a bell-shaped curve or a s-curve 
balanced with a definite beginning and end. This is not the 
observation held by most managers as how they see the product life cycle 
as shown in Figure 8.1 versus as to how it is portrayed in the 
literature.
Figure 8.1: THE SHRINKING PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE
1980 s1970's 1990'S
TIME TIME
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Figure 8.1 supports our observation on the product life cycle 
as does the views of Respondent EE, a Follower, and a manufacturer of 
electronic equipment and software, He states,
" Presently strategy in our industry is set to the wrong 
measures. An example is the fabled product life cycle curve.
In the 1970, we would engineer a product, develop it and 
distribute it to the market. The R&D costs were paid back in 
the first half of the product life cycle; the second half was 
a time for profit harvesting. By the 1980’s we saw more and 
more rapid development times and there was no back half of 
the product cycle (he furnished a copy of the diagram in 
Figure 8.1). You can see that in the 1990s it is in spikes, 
not curves, products that exist with life cycles of months, 
not years as before”....
4. The other observation we noticed was the absence of human resource 
strategies as an essential element within the literature of strategy- 
making. We argue that even the best strategies are meaningless if the 
employees do not have the skills to carry them out or if jobs are not 
designed to accommodate the available workers. Their prominence as a 
strategic tool was enhanced by some writers, but depressed into a 
subsidiary role by others. The literature is uneven, at best, on this 
issue and several authors of strategic management textbooks (Glueck, 
Hofer, Wheelen and 1 lunger) fail even to include a chapter on the people 
training- matching process which strategy requires.
The failure of the literature to substantially link human resource 
management strategy to innovation or change is noticeable. Or even for 
its failure to state how a strategy which is required to meet a gap- 
filling goal must strongly rely on the performance of its employees.
We argue further that any strategy will fail if an employee either 
can not improve his/her performance because they are not motivated to do 
so or they are motivated and do not know how. Both are training issues 
\diich require a specific element within the strategy-making process. 
Neither is the issue of occupational obsolescence addressed even when we 
accept the literature view that "innovation is either skills replacing 
or skills enhancing" (Littler).
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This raises the issue whether or not those within the field of 
human resources management are writing of the connection between 
training strategies and innovation in separate journals. If this is the 
case there is little triangulation between themselves and strategic 
researchers and managers’s practices. Otherwise, we feel that this is 
one of the major weaknesses in the field of strategic management.
Our view as to the importance of training and the human performance 
as a strategic element was shared and echoed by Respondent MM, Pioneer, 
and a manufacturer of semi-conductors,
"Strategy only occurs one way through everybody performing to 
the same goal.... Human performance can only be improved in 
two ways- by good quality, and relevant training and by 
personal motivation. As an illustration of this, I would 
like to quote Matsushita Koto of Japan- one of our worldwide 
competitors, 'First we make people and then we make things’
This precisely what we have been doing the past 10 years as
our competitive strategy and probably why we are considered 
a leader".
5 • The flip flop posturing by the literature as to whether certain 
individuals are stimulated into acts of innovation intuitively or 
rationally is another major weakness in the field. No lesser experts 
than ones such as Henry Mintzberg and Herbert Simon admit that this is 
the case. (Mintzberg 1989:61)
The literature outlines no less than five different schools of 
thought about the innovative individual as the core ingredient needed 
for innovation. They range from the sole genius to the corporate
entrepreneur. There seems to be a host of theorists that agree about a
flat organisation, free flow of information and freedom to experiment, 
but there is scant research about a functional strategy of identifying 
and developing one type of employee to innovate over the other. We also 
observe the willingness to assign every possible description why some 
firms are successful in innovation, except in recruiting and developing 
the innovative employee. A case in point is IBM where writers produce
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reams of case studies about its strategic strength, but little about 
what IBM consider their strength, the quality of its workforce.
6. We observe what several business strategy theorists feel is the 
greatest of sins committed in the literature. This occurs in two ways. 
The first is the failure of many textbooks and articles to consider the 
concepts of military strategic principles as they relate to business, 
and the second is the confusion of military terms with business ones. 
In the words of Anthony "they should not be used interchangeably" and we 
accept this after realising the military term for tactics means short 
and final movements during the battle and not to be repeated too often 
as it loses its value as a manoeuvre. Where in business, a short term 
strategy should be repeated to gain the principles of efficiency and 
effective advantages.
7. We observe the ways that the literature confuses the definitions of 
business policy with strategic management. An issue settled after some 
considerable debate by the American Assembly of Collegiate Business 
School, some 15 years ago. The key difference being that business policy 
tends to look inwardly at a firm's strategy whilst strategic management 
looks inwardly and outwardly with a heavier orientation on environmental 
and strategic emphasis. This re-direction of how strategy should be 
developed was even adopted by an international association of corporate 
planning executives. Yet, confusion still reigns about what these terms 
mean.
8. We question some of the universal propositions that form the core of 
traditional management theory. For example, Katz's proposition (1970) 
and Glueck's (1984) of the five strategy-making principles: (1) always 
lead from strength; (2) concentrate resources where a firm already has 
an advantage; (3) only the narrowest possible market-product scope 
should be selected; (4) for dominant firms in an industry, the best 
strategies (in order) are innovation, intense marketing, the least are 
confrontational; and (5) acquisition strategy is best when the firm has
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little knowledge of the product when speed is vital, or other firms own 
key patents or control key resources.
Upon the face of these, we observe that the high ranking of 
innovation holds true even today, some twenty years later. However such 
normative stratgeic propositions are, at best, situational or general. 
They may be used to refine a strategy, but no universal propositions or 
contingency-based propositions have been conclusively demonstrated to be 
valid.
The example of Apple Computer (new to the industry) innovating to 
dislodge IBM (dominant firm) who in turn were able, by confronting and 
by innovating themselves, to beat back Apple's advances, indicates that 
all such normative propositions are treated with a healthy tongue -in- 
cheek attitude by managers. According to Katz and Glueck, it was 
apparent that neither IBM or Apjple Computer were acting in concert to 
their strategic propositions. This gap between the theoretical and the 
empirical was further confirmed in this investigation by the following
post interview held with Respondent RR, Pioneer, and manager of a
Scottish-based division of a worldwide pharmacological company,
" .... One of the biggest changes in our strategic thinking 
was to stop using mathematical models or set guide lines for 
predicting what new market share and products were available 
to us... We became sceptical about relying on predictive 
techniques and start using current information as a basis of
policy making. Naturally you make some predictions in order
to establish direction but it is vital to retain flexibility 
to change your mind if new factors emerge or your assumptions 
become invalid..."
9. We observe that there is a hierarchy of costs associated with 
successful innovation which can be divided by descending order into 
five basic areas: (1) developing the concept; (2) marketing of the 
innovation; (3) investigating or applied research; (4) modifying the 
innovation for commercial use; and (5) applying basic research where the 
innovation is conceptualised. The literature provides a range for these 
costs as shown in Exhibit No. 5 on the next page.
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This distribution of costs depends on whether the process reflects a 
technological innovation or a strategic innovation. We understand that a 
firm attempting to establish what costs will be associated with 
innovation can reasonably project that the marketing of it will absorb 
on average about 50 percent of all costs. However the literature is not 
always clear when talking about innovation costs whether it is the 
technical process or a managerial one being referenced.
This observation is understandable since private firms are 
reluctant to divulge their costs, and larger firms may be adding in 
overhead costs not truly associated with an innovation. There are 
industrial differences, and regional differences as well as how costs 
are accumulated and by whom.
8.1.4 The Shifts and Rnerging Patterns Within the Field
We are not much better at seeing the logic of an emerging paradigm 
before it begins to develop than any other investigator. However we 
observe that in the 1990s, one may find the key assumptions in the field 
of strategic management type of thinking have reached the end of their 
useful lives, even when it is understood that most are offered to be 
true up to a point, or for a time. We illustrated earlier the 
evolutionary principles of strategic management over the past 90 years 
in Table No. 1. We outlined as to how each stage of its development had 
been heavily influenced by the way managers think and that strategy- 
making reflected their thinking. The four main points were as follows:
1. We believe that a shifting paradigm to a disconnected way of making 
strategy is underway from the deliberate all-encompassing theories for 
strategy-making used in the past. To establish this shift, we reviewed 
trends from 1900 to 1990 by examining previous managerial practices.
Table No. 1 shows that from 1900 on for the next fifty years, the 
focus of management shifted from acquiring and consolidating a firm’s 
assets to one of standardizing them. In this period, products were
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largely undifferentiated and the ability to produce at the lowest unit 
cost was the secret to a firm’s success.
This table, also, indicates that by the 1960s most strategies 
began to embrace the market orientation phase of management, and how 
consumer-retailing, services, and technologically-dominated industries 
began to promote the virtues of strategic management, planning and 
strategies to control their business environments. By the early 1980, 
the structure and dynamics of the business environment started to change 
so rapidly that planning, and efforts to control one’s environment, 
became futile.
We observe that firms are now becoming so increasingly confronted 
with novel and unexpected challenges that are so far-reaching that 
Drucker (1985) called this the new era of business as the "Age of
Discontinuity”. Today, change continues at a pace which makes it safe to
predict that the current escalation of environmental turbulence will 
persist for another 10-15 years. This has become the age for a firm to 
innovate or perish. These shifts became very noticeable when the post 
interviews were being conducted. There, some managers indicated a few 
shifts which were not discussed in the literature on strategy-making 
such as training, work force shrinkage, and corporate enterpreneurial 
programmes.
2. We observe a shift due to the change in the product life cycle as
it affects strategic thinking. Respondent KK, who talked above on the
shift in how the product life cycle works, when asked what in his view 
were the implication of this, he stated,
"...We, as other companies, are being forced to manage 
differently. Our strategy is to get the product earlier to 
the market and to increase the profitability at the front 
end, by having increase innovation amongst the workforce is 
the answer. By extending technology from the efforts of 
employees straight through to the customers we gain market 
share and it differentiates itself".
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3. A different attitude is emerging within the managerial ranks on how 
the labour force is viewed. It was implied in most strategies from the
past that people and their skills could be purchased in the quality and
quantity to match the needs of the strategy as it unfolded. Respondent
ZZ, Dependent, a manufacturer of parts for the automotive industry
states
"Due to the predicted shortfall in school-leavers in 
Scotland over the next five years, our firm for the first
time in my working life (28 years) is starting to believe
that our labour force is not easily replaced. It now make 
economic sense for us to invest time and money in building up 
the skills and commitment of the individuals even though the
pay-off is long term. In the past we laid-off people at will
and would buy them again when we needed them. But now our 
strategy is to recruit, train, develop and try to keep them 
with us for a 25 service record. We now hire the type of 
employee that we used to discourage...No more shopping for 
skills at the local market, our people are going to be home­
grown" .
4. We observe that the creation of a single market in Europe by the end 
of 1992 will accentuate the need for a new paradigm for strategy- 
making for some 45 industries directly and many others indirectly 
(Rajan,1990). Creating a rise in human ingenuity to innovate may become 
the most critical factor in business strategy, alongside capacity 
restructuring. A fact that has yet to be fully recognised by the 
business and educational communities. This is the most serious threat to 
the value of a deliberate long term strategy being used for efficiency 
and dominance by market share.
The best example to project what could happen is the experience of 
the tariff-free motor vehicle industry in Europe over the past decade. 
It resulted in fewer producers, concentration of capacity at fewer 
locations, a range of customised products (or services) on the same 
production lines, using more advanced technologies that minimalise
down-time between product lines. Their object would be to achieve 
economies of scale with customised batch outputs.
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This resulted in a different type of strategic thrust being 
underpinned by more research and development, marketing, distribution 
and financial strategies than ever before as an industry pattern. This 
is complicated by an increase in the skill content of work over the 
\rtiole research-design-production-distribution cycle.This is likely to 
continue to obtain even shorter product life cycles in the future.
There are at least six indicators of the response to this shift:
1. Changes in work design, leading to the performance of many 
functions by one person through the efficient use of existing 
technologies.
2. Changes in the organisational design, leading to flatter 
structures and more flexible rules, will be given to those in skill­
intensive, knowledge-based occupations to innovate around and through 
organisational rules.
3. Changes in the repertoire of skills, making it wider and deeper 
in terms of their number and intensity. There will be a need for more 
strategic elements to be built into the formulation process of corporate 
strategies to combat occupational obsolescence.
4. (Changes in the personnel function, leading them to have a 
greater role in the formulation of strategic goals. A pattern being used 
by firms such as Honeywell (post interview indicated that they conduct 
talent surveys to ensure they have the right mix of talent to implement 
a planed strategy) and the electronics industry in general, which will 
be emulated in other industries worldwide.
5. Changes in the training emphasis, resulting in a multi-strand 
approach that develops critical competences beyond learning by doing. 
This would include experimenting on the job, and freedom to work on part 
of the company time to own your own ideas.
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6. Changes in rewarding the more innovative employees, leading to 
the use of a corporate entrepreneurship programme to identify, encourage 
and retain the more innovative employee to innovate under bureaucracy - 
free corporate subsidiaries or in spin-off firms.
8.2 FINDINGS FROM THE FIELD-BASED SURVEYS
In this investigation we conducted a broadly-based survey to business 
unit managers, corporate planning directors and managing directors using 
a questionnaire as shown in Exhibit No. 1. It was geographically- 
limited to reflect the views of international and domestic firms 
operating in Scotland. At this point we can report on the following five 
major findings:
First, most companies (84.0 % overall) in our sample of 190 firms 
remain firmly committed to some type of operating business plan, even 
though only 54 percent have a formal strategy for innovation as shown in 
Exhibit No. 2.
Second, there were 21 different strategic elements which were 
identified as enabling factors for the stimulation of innovation.
Third, 103 firms identified themselves as users of formal 
strategy for innovation and a mission to innovate was an essential part 
of their own corporate strategy. Thirty one of these firms were highly 
innovative.
Fourth, 92.2 percent of the users of a formal strategy to stimulate 
innovation reported that they had some type of innovation 
accomplishment over the past three years. In contrast, only 18.2 
percent of the non-users of a strategy to innovate reported any type of 
innovation being accomplished in the same period of time.
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Fifth, 158 firms could be classified into a typology of seven 
different technological strategies using measurable attributes as to how 
they formulate, implement and monitor their strategies.
As a theoretical backdrop to the interpretations and exploration of 
these findings, the following assumptions were made:
8.2.1 ASSUMPTIONS
We assume that innovation is necessary and good for the survival and 
growth of a firm.
In the preceding chapters, we explored a number of elements \riiich 
were reputed to be the essential forces and influences that determined 
the strategic behaviour of a firm in its effort to stimulate innovation. 
After identifying these elements, we conducted a survey to gather an 
empirical insight into how these elements were being used by firms 
operating in Scotland.
We subdivided these elements into two groups: external and internal 
factors. The first are more properly called environmental elements 
(Chapter Five) since they reflect the resources and information about 
future innovation coming from the environment into a firm.
The second set of elements were internal (Chapter Six), which 
reflects the choices available within a firm based on the performance 
and culture aspirations of its managers; the power and responsibilities 
delegated by a firm's structure; and the combination of strategies 
needed to channel the behaviour of its workforce.
In total, these elements represent a firm's strategic thrust to be 
innovative by seeking a fit to different levels of environmental 
turbulence as shown below in Table No. 10.
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TABLE No. 10: Levels of Environmental Turbulence
Levels
of Turbulence: Stable
Stable ana 
Changing
Reactive- low 
Uncertainty
Reactive-High
Uncertainty
Very High 
Transitional
Market Structure: monopoly oligopoly oligopoly Multi-tiered Unknown
Customer Pressure: none weak strong very strong sporadic
Growth Bate: slow increasing oscillating accelerating discontinuity
Product Lif e-Cycle: long long short shorter shortest
Economies of Scale: high high moderate low low
Frequency
-New products: very low low moderate high very high
Critical
Success Factors: aarket market response of opportunities new needs
control share key buyers new market novel
costs distribution
adapted from Lit tier, 1989; Burgelman, 1984; and Ansoff, 19^9
Table No. 10 indicates as to how the five different levels (ranging
from a stable level of turbulence to a transitional one) affect market
structure, customer pressure, and so on. We observe that the strategic
focus must be adjusted to three key areas: (1) economies of scale; (2)
the frequency that a firm should offer new products; and (3) critical
success factors needed to be innovative.
8.2.2 Assumptions About The Firms to be Surveyed
In an effort to measure a firm’s attempts to be more innovative, we 
have assumed the firms to be surveyed have the following common 
features:
1. Sell products or services to a buyer for profit.
2. Buy their resources from a pool of suppliers
3. Need a body of knowledge called technology
4. Obtain most of their workforce from Scotland.
Also, we have assumed that most of the firms to be surveyed would 
welcome an improved performance from their present position to a more 
desirable one, no matter how small or how large. We project that when a 
firm seeks an improvement of any type, this constitutes an opportunity 
gap. The closing of this gap has-the following dimensions:
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1. Innovation is one of the choices available to a firm, bat
it is the best option; even though, it is the most difficult 
to achieve;
2. If a firm fails to be innovative at some stage in its 
corporate life, over time, it will receive either a reduction 
in profits, or suffer a decline in its market share;
3. A firm can never start too early in stimulating acts of 
innovation amongst its workforce;
4. A firm can start too late because its human and financial
resources will start eroding away in a declining industry.
8.2.3 Assumptions about the Strategic Elements
In exploring the stimulation of innovation as a gap closing opportunity, 
we assumed that people will resist attempts to innovate unless they 
perceive a reward for a change in their behaviour. Further, we assumed 
that a formal strategy would deal with the following elements 
(variables):
1. Environmental need (buyers/markets)
2. Structure for innovation-investigating and assisting
3. Strategic culture
4. Visionary leadership
5. Information processing
6. Managerial and logistic capabilities
7. Behaviour strategies to combat obsolescence
8. Goal-setting
9. Problem-solving
Based on these variables as determining elements for innovation, we 
assumed that each element would work under any of the following 
conditions:
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1. Whether the environment is in a stable condition for certain 
firms (requiring defensive innovation), in a high level of 
uncertainty requiring innovation investigating, or in a 
state of transition to a new level of opportunities requiring 
a more offensive innovation;
2. If the resources in firms were in scarcity or in surplus to 
support a strategic thrust;
3. That the leadership is creating a culture that is innovation- 
investigating and seeking;
4. Whether the innovation investigating activities (R&D, 
ventures, etc.) were either centralised or decentralised;
5. Whether the core skills of a firm were up-graded or 
gradually eroding while a firm was trying to stimulate its 
workforce into innovative behaviour.
8.2.4 Assumptions about Strategic Thrust of A Firm
We assume that each firm must develop some type of strategic focus. 
This focus wouLd reflect the mission of a firm and should attempt 
to match one of the five technological strategies which is the most 
suitable to create a given strategic thrust based on one of the 
levels as shown in Table No. 11 below:
Table No. 11: Levels of Strategic Focus
Strategic Focus: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Its strategy: Defensive Offensive Adaptive Diversifying Innovative
Its thrust: Protecting Expanding Controlling Scanning Stimulating
Goals: Stability Growth Coordination New Markets New Products
Finn's life-cycle: growth rapid growth stable growth decline revitalised
Growth rate: sporadic accelerating slowing fast steady to fast
Changes-Technology: slow • slow fast accelerating unknown-novel
Rate-Obsolescence: slow slow moderate high very high
Firm Structure: simple centralised decentralised geographic matrix-project
Management Style: personal directive delegating Analytical participative
Control System: profit-led standards cost centres 5yr. plan goal-setting
Types- Technology: none few Moderate high very high
Reward System: ownership on merit bonus stock options team bonus
Sources: adapted from Burgelman, 1984; Greiner, 1975; Chandler, 1^62; and Cbannon, 1^73
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8.3 GENERAL CATALOGUE OF RESPONDENTS
The data was captured into five broad sets of elements using 
the survey instrument as shown in Exhibit No. 1. Earlier, the 
scope of these sets was explained in Chapter Seven and in 
Appendix D.
We placed the bulk of the data from this first survey in 
Exhibit No. 2. There, the data is dispersed across 66 different 
fields and divided into two major headings: (1) showing how the 
users of a formal strategy to innovate responded; and (2) to 
contrast how non-users of a formal strategy responded. Their 
overall responses by strategy of the respondents are shown in 
Figure 8.2.
The general catalogue for the 190 respondents is as
follows:
The breakdown of all responses indicates that 87 of them 
were from Scottish firms (45.8%); 50 were from firms with parent 
companies in North American (26.3%); 39 were from United 
Kingdom Firms (20.5%) with headquarters based elsewhere in 
Britain; and 14 were from European and Overseas firms (7.4%) 
located outside the North America. This is indicated in Figure
8.3 to follow and as shown in Table No. 6.
The number of respondents classifying themselves as users of 
a formal strategy were 103. In general they were from mid-sized 
firms in the 301 to 1,000 employment banding. The mode for the 
position held by these respondents was that of a Managing 
Directors/CEO representing 65 percent of this group (Exhibit 
2:1).
The number of respondents classifying themselves as non­
users were 87. They differed from users by a greater number of
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Figure 8^: STRATEGY COMBINING BOTH USERS AND NON-USERS
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Figure 8.3: TECHNOLOGICAL STRATEGY BY PARENT LOCATION
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specialists and chairmen reporting. We observe that this may be 
representative of this group due to its mode size of less than 
300 employees and the fact most of them were closely^controlled 
from Scottish Firms (55.2%).
The stratification by ownership and employment banding 
indicates that the mean size for a reporting unit was 600 
employees and the mean size for a parent company was 2,750 
employees. The largest reported parent had 700,000 employees and 
the smallest had 51 employees. The mean age of firms reporting 
was 35.7 years. The mode of size for all firms was 51-300 
employees as reflected in Table 7.
8.4 CATALOGUE OF STATISTICAL FINDINGS BY NATIONALITY AND STRATEGY
We thought it may be useful to divide the responses by 
typological groupings based on nationality and type of strategy 
that each respondent self-selected as describing themselves, 
foremost. Specifically, by group they were:
8.4.1 Scottish Firms* Respondents
The Scottish group (n=87) had the highest percent of (18.2%) 
firms classifying themselves as "Imitators". This is where a 
firm seeks "to improve an existing innovation to fill to a demand 
within a specified niche” as its overall strategy.
Over 30 percent of the Scottish National firms (n=87) were 
more likely to describe their overall technological strategy as 
"Dependent". This description was used when a firm "innovates to 
customer specifications" rather than engages in R & D. This 
self-nominating description was reported to be three times more 
often than the North American firms, double that of Other 
Overseas firms and other British Nationals.
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Approximately 13.7 percent of the Scottish firms indicated 
they were users of a formal strategy, and 22.7 percent of them 
classified themselves as "Pioneers”. This is an overall strategy 
to "be the first with the newest". This business-marketing 
strategy exhibited itself (formally or informally) by the desire 
of a firm to be the first to try new lines, products or 
processes; to use bold strategies to develop new products for new 
markets; and to finance high risk projects to gain a competitive 
edge over competitors.
The Scottish firms as a group had less firms which 
classified themselves as "Pioneers" than any other nationality 
parent-owner. This group represented less than half the 
percentage of similar groups found in Other Overseas or North 
American firms. Of the 14 percent of the sample (N=190) which 
indicated a high rate of being innovative, Ten were Scottish 
Nationals. They were centred in the areas of manufacturing 
engineering, pharmaceuticals, and electronics.
The Scottish respondents (61%) registered lower than the 
responses of N. American firms (82%) or Other Overseas Firms 
(72%) in how important they thought expansion into new markets 
and the development of new products were for their survival over 
the next three years. Only other UK firms indicate the lowest 
response as a group (58%) compared to the Scottish respondents.
8.4.2 North American Firms* Respondents
The North American firms (n=50) have the second largest numbers 
of users (n=31) and the largest number of firms (n=27) selecting 
the "Pioneer" as their foremost strategy. These firms as 
"Pioneers", however as a percentage of their group (54%) ranked 
below those in the Other Overseas Firms. The reporting unit 
sizefs mean was 800 employees, some 200 employees more than the 
mean of all respondents.
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The North American respondents had the largest percent of 
firms selecting the "Opportunist" at 10 percent of their 
responses. This is the strategy where a firm seeks "to innovate 
in the expectations of receiving a higher than normal amount of 
profits". Out of the firms ranked as being the most innovative, 
eight were North American firms.
8.4.3 Other U.K. Firms' Respondents
This group of other than Scottish firms with headquarters in the 
United Kingdom had the third largest group of pioneers.
We observe that Other UK respondents (n=39) were different 
from the other groups by the complete absence of any firms which 
classified themselves as "Fatalists". This strategy is where the 
firm believes it must "innovate to survive". This is generally 
selected when a firm views itself in a extremely competitive 
position but without having either a government or a dominant 
size to protect it.
The mean of the Other United Kingdom firms' size was 700 
employees and about 100 employees more than the overall mean for 
all groups. Three of this group were rated as being innovative 
overall.
8.4.4 Other Overseas and European Firms' Respondents
In this group no respondents viewed themselves either as a 
"Follower" or as a "Traditionalist". The Follower's strategy is 
a where a firm selects to "follow by a deliberate plan not to be 
the first to offer an innovation". On the other hand, the 
strategy of a Traditionalist is used when a firm prefers "not to 
innovate, but to incorporate tested and proved methods to improve 
efficiencies". These are generally used by high volume, mass 
producers of products and services.
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However we observe that others within this group, by 
contrast, registered the highest percentage (57.1%) of Pioneers 
within any of the groups reporting.
The Other Overseas firms were the smallest group by a 
percentage of the aggregate to classify themselves as users of a 
formal strategy to innovate (6.8%). We observe that the mean of 
their reporting units at 275 employees was considerably lower 
than the overall mean of employees for all groups reporting. The 
users of a formal strategy to innovate indicated a higher than 
average (mean) years for using a strategy at 14.9 years versus
3.4 years for all groups as a \diole. Five of this group were 
rated as most innovative.
8.5 CATALOGUE OF STATISTICAL FINDINGS FOR ALL FIRMS
The statistical findings which reflected empirically the 
responses of the overall survey can be grouped accordingly:
8.5.1 The Range and Types of Innovations Reported
Over 55.2 percent of all firms reported that sometime in the past 
three years they have accomplished some type of innovation. We 
observed that this may reflect a bias as those firms with 
something positive to report were more likely to respond to the 
questionnaire.The ranking of ranges and type of innovations is 
shown in Exhibit No.6.
However we observe in Exhibit No. 2:9-11 that the users of 
the formal strategy (92.2%) reported a five times greater 
receptiveness to innovate than non-users (18.2%). The reasons for 
innovation indicate that the users will innovate in a combination 
of ways and were more likely to innovate to reduce costs and to 
protect their markets than non-users.
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8.5.2 Ways in Which Firms Analysed Their Organisations
The questionnaire probed nine different ways in which firms could 
analyse their organisations. As shown in Exhibit No. 7, the 
number one method reported by frequency was "that of comparing 
outputs to a formal plan". Over 70 percent indicated this was 
used by them. However, it was more likely to be done by a 
Scottish firm than, for example, by an overseas firm.
Most of the nine methods ranked in descending order were 
fairly representative of the sample except the assigning of a 
special department to analyse a firm's strengths and weaknesses; 
using outside experts and reviewing trade publications to 
determine how they did against others in the industry. Exhibit 
No.2:12-19 reflects the differences by contrasting users with 
non-users.
8.5.3 How and Where Firms Projected their Heeds for the Future
The literature revealed six approaches a firm could use to 
project its needs for the future. We observe these areas reflect 
the ranges and ways that a firm could use to do its planning. 
They were key indicators of a firm's strategic thrust.
There was an overwhelming agreement that both users and non­
users, use financial measures, equipment, and manpower needs in 
planning their future as shown in Exhibit No. 8. We observe that 
the literature on strategic management did not reflect the 
importance to manpower planning that our sample did. In Exhibits 
No 2:31; 33, we observe that the users planned for marketing 
activities and efforts to incorporate technological advances were 
significantly different from those of non-users. Users (by some 
20 percent) were more likely to plan for marketing, and will plan 
to incorporate technological advances by more than 23 percent 
than non-users.
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8.5.4 What Were the Most Important Factors Needed to Be An 
Innovator
We listed some ten factors reputed in the literature which are 
needed for a firm to be a successful innovator. This is shown in 
Exhibit No. 9. Only the factor (Strong Visionary Leadership) 
received a 30 percent rating as being the most important when 
considered to others.
We observe that the range and dispersion of the factors 
listed indicated that there is not "one best way" used by the 
managers surveyed. However in Exhibit 2:45, we observe that 
users selected leadership and the use of a formal programne to 
innovate over non-users by a measurable difference. The higher 
percentages (approx. 8%) of non-users selecting small work 
groups may reflect the domination of smaller firm size or a 
general industrial practice.
8.5.5 The Best Way To Motivate Employees In being Innovative
Dispersed throughout the questionnaire were 14 different methods 
reputed in the literature as ways to motivate an employee in 
being more innovative as shown in Exhibit No. 10.
These were placed in juxtaposition to other methods to see 
if one best way would rank overall. The two methods used by most 
firms and ranked as most important were: (1) to attract proven 
entrepreneurial types into the workforce; and (2) to engage in 
open comnunication in solving problems.
3M Corporation was the only firm in the sample which used 
all 14 methods. Firms which used 11 or more of the 14 methods 
available were Hewlett Packard, Digital Equipment Corporation,
Wang Laboratories, and Glaxochem.
Page 278
Observations and Findings -Chapter Eight
EXHIBIT NO. 9
saiuDduJoo j|d jo
o
CM
o
X
<QUJ
ro ro 'r~ lO O CD
LO LO CM o O CO
CO in LO CM CM
LlI Q_
m  LlI
O  LlI
CO
-+->
|
0
E
o
J Z
CO
cn
jz
‘co
O
C L
E
CO
■a
c
D
VI----
C
o
o
o
_D
U>£
t?
O
X
CO
0
o-4—'
CO
E
CO
o
C L
CO
c
0cn
o
>
oL_
C L
C L
D
-+->
0CO
ZJ
o
Q
O
>
o
c
c
E
o
■a
0
0
o
o
c
o
*Q-
E
o
J Z
o
-4—'
o
~oov_
C L
a
cn
X)
L_
o
£
0
page 278 (a)
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Observations and Findings- Chapter Eight
EXHIBIT NO. 10
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8.5.6 What Were the Key factors Reported For Successful 
Innovation
The literature indicated there were 12 key factors that 
successful innovators exhibited. They were listed throughout the 
questionnaire. As the results show in Exhibit No. 11, it was the 
monitoring of customers’ needs which was reported by over 41 
percent of firms surveyed as the leading key factor. The second 
ranking factor was the use of entrepreneurial leadership at the 
top as reported by 51 firms.
We observe in Exhibit 2:56 that there were significant 
differences (about 20 %) between users and non-users in two 
leading factors: how customers needs are monitored and how 
important was leadership at the top.
We observe the close relationship between leadership and 
culture when a firm was creating an entrepreneurial culture. The 
major difference being that entrepreneurial leadership reflects 
current operating methods and culture is generally established 
by the history of the firm over some period of time as explained 
in Chapter Six. The bonding of these two elements together could 
be viewed as the sovereign element to which Drucker (1961), who 
states that it is a combination of a firm’s current leadership 
and its history that will determine how a firm views and plans 
for innovation. Together, they create a firm’s strategic 
framework for future action.
8.5.7 Major Organisational Methods for Innovation
There were nine components developed to explain how firms 
generally operate. They were listed in the questionnaire as shown 
in question no. 31 in Exhibit No. 1. When the responses to this 
question was summarized in Exhibit No. 12 (based on a range of 
responses given 1 through 5), it is clear that most users and
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non-users formally practice the use of operating targets. These 
elements indicate how decisions are made; teams are trained; 
marketing is done; and how results are achieved. Exhibit No.
2:65 even makes it clearer that there are certain strategic 
elements (clear goals, team being trained, and market 
opportunities are identified -tfiich register zero's) that some 
firms never expect to use.
8.5.8 Organisational Conflicts About Issues of Innovation
There were three organsational issues related to innovation that 
created the most conflict amongst the respondents and further 
confirmed in the post interviews as shown in Exhibit No. 13. They 
can be separated out in several ways.
The first is whether a firm should attempt high risk 
projects; be first to try new lines; or how bold a strategy 
should be. Secondly whether any of these strategies are used 
informally from time to time or formally used that created the 
other parts of the controversy. These elements (in Exhibit 
No.2:65;66) reflect a firm's strategic thrust to be more 
innovative may cause organsational conflicts. We observe that 
the wide areas of differences graphically displayed indicate 
whether a firm would formally or informally use them.
8.6 MANAGEMENT AND ORGANISATION PREFERENCES
Respondents were asked to indicate how they mostly-managed their 
tasks, and whether their tasks were centralised or decentralised.
We observe in Exhibit No.2:58-59 that a significant percentage of 
non-users (about 16 %) used a traditional method. The overall 
responses indicated that whether or not tasks were centralised 
or decentralised to stimulate innovation depended on if a R & D 
department was used, as shown in Table No. 12.
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Table Ho. 12: The Types of Organisation and Management Used By Respondents
Discipline Project Traditional Venture Matrix Bov
Parent: Technical Management Managed Directed Osed Toti
Scottish: 22 17 33 3 12 87
Bov Z 25.3 19.5 37.9 3.4 13.8 45.8
Col Z 45.8 38.6 56.9 60.0 34.3
N. American: 15 9 8 2 16 50
Bov Z 30.0 18.0 16.0 4.0 32.0 26.3
Col Z 31.3 20.5 13.8 40.0 45.7
Otb. Overseas: 6 3 3 -o- 2 14
Bov Z 42.9 21.4 21.4 -0- 14.3 7.4
Col Z 12.5 38.5 35.9 -o- 5.7
Other OK: 5 15 14 “O- 5 39
Bov Z 12.8 38.5 35.9 -o- 12.8 20.5
Col Z 10.4 34.1 24.1 -o- 14.3
Colon: 48 44 58 5 35 IS
Z of Total: 25.3 23.2 30.5 2.6 18.4 1C
Table no. 12 deals with five different types of organisations 
that respondents indicated they used. As determined by a cross­
tabulation method, it is noteworthy that none of the Other Overseas 
firms or Other UK firms used a venture-directed structure. We 
observe that one of every three companies preferred the traditional 
way of management (regardless of nationalities).
To see the impact that structure has on the use of formal 
programs, three firms with a formal programme for combatting 
obsolescence within an innovation strategy were interviewed. It was 
revealed that one was generally managed by a venture style in which 
each employee had a voice and a financial stake in what idea/ 
project may be funded. However, two of other respondents interviewed 
indicated they used a matrix style organisation where projects and 
functional disciplines had dual controls.
8.7 THE IMPORTANCE OF TRAINING ACROSS NATIONALITY BY OWNERSHIP
Based on interviews it became apparent that there are major 
differences in how training to stimulate innovation amongst the 
respondents was viewed. In Exhibit No. 1, they were elements listed 
in questions No. 13 (f) and 28 (f).
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We observe that only 4.2 percent of the sample Indicated that it 
was the most important factor and the question arising as to whether 
employees really could be motivated by training, since only four 
firms ranked it as one of the most important of all factors listed. 
Secondly there is little difference as to how users and non-users 
ranked training in Exhibit 2:45. However, interviews with three users 
indicate that training was most important to their overall strategies.
In an effort to understand the degree of differences between 
sample responses and views expressed in the interviews on training, a 
cross-tabulation was done using nationality and training elements in 
questions No. 31 (f); 13(f); and 28(c) as shown below in Table No. 13.
Thble Ho. 13: If a Firm used ?bcaal ‘Ondnlog eo Stimulate 
Etrgracicn and 3bv tanked In Iacortancg To Hoclvste
Did not Cm  
Parent: or Suaect To
Hose Xspoceaoe 
Osed la Strategy
Very Xaportaoe 
Used infon&llT Hbt Use
Sov
Total
87
45.3
Scoeelrfi: 
1or Z 
Col Z
7k
35.1
50.7
1
1.1
12.5
4
4.$
22.2
3
9.1
44.4
3. Mericm: 37 3 9 1 50
tov : 74.0 $.0 18.0 2.0 26.3
Col Z 25.3 37.5 50.0 9.1
Overseas: 11 -0- -0- 3 14
lev Z 78.$ -0- «o- 21.4 7.4
coi : 7.5 -0- 1$.$
Ocher UK: 24 4 5 $ 3
kov : $1.5 10.3 12.3 15.3 20.5
col z 1$.4 50.0 27.3 33.3
Colusa: 14$ 3 18 18 190
Z of local: 76.3 4.2 9.2 9.2 100.0
Table No. 13 attempts to indicate whether there was a positive 
association between certain types of Parent firms (being N. American, 
Other Overseas, UK and Scottish), the training given to employees, and 
a firm’s receptivity to innovation. The table indicates that eight 
firms used training as a part of their strategy, but 76.8 percent 
did not. We observed that the second vertical column reveals that 
none of the overseas firms thought training should be used in 
strategy. Equally revealing is the highest percentage in the first
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column where a dominant percentage of the sample indicates they did 
not use training as part of their business strategy or expect to at 
any time in the future. This is why another survey was launched.
&8 ATTTTUDINAL SURVEY TO TEST TRAINING ISSUE
To probe further the issue of training and a relationship between the 
orientation of the firm toward being innovative, a second 
questionnaire was developed as shown in Exhibit No. 3. From 130 
mailed, there were 105 returned: 74 users and 31 non-users. However 
bfore we could accept the responses of this sample as to how they 
viewed training related to the stimulation of innovation regardless 
of whether they were a user or non-user, it. was necessary to assess 
their orientation toward being innovative. The Varimax rotation 
procedure was selected as a method to assess their orientation 
toward innovation using the statements as described in Exhibit No. 3.
Using a statistical research method to measure innovativeness 
(Pavitt, 1982), we believe that that there are three different factors 
to measure a firm’s receptiveness toward innovation. The first factor 
would be a firm's attitude to change in general. This factor would, be 
exhibited by the way things are done in a firm; whether policies are 
changed to match a new situation; the degree that new ideas are 
tried out; and how quickly decisions are made.
The second factor is a firm's orientation to the future as 
measured by one of the following: (1) people are encouraged to talk 
about the future; (2) the firm tries to incorporate the latest 
discoveries in the way that the firm is run.
The third factor indicates the overall importance a firm 
attaches to new product development; and the development of new 
methods in general. We believe that an assessment of these three 
factors would determine a firm's receptivity toward innovation. This 
was the purpose of Table No. 14 below:
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Table No. 14 : Attitndinal. Survey on Orientation of the Firm
Respondents (n=105)
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Attitude Future New Product
Statement To Change Orientation Development
There are conventional ways -0.735 
of doing things in our firm 
which rarely change.
In our firm, policy changes -0.594 
occur slowly.
Quick decisions and actions -0.616 .544
are not characteristic of 
of our firm.
News ideas are always being 
tried out here.
The setting up of unusual 
plans is encouraged here
The latest discoveries 
make few changes in the way 
this firm is run.
Most people in our firm 
talk about the future.
Our employees are 
encouraged to adopt 
a long-term outlook.
For our firm the 
development of new products 
is of secondary importance.
New product development 
ranks high in our firm's 
priorities.
.616
.566
-0.486
-0.571
.629
-0.771
.709
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In Table No. 14, we observe that the three highly 
interpretable factors were extracted, together explaining 49.6% 
of the total variance.
Factor 1 (a firm's attitude to change) accounts for 23.7% 
of the variance and describes the firm's overall attitude to 
change: virtually all the variables associated with this factor 
described the different aspects of the receptiveness of the firm 
to change.
Factor 2 (a firm's future orientation toward being 
innovative) explains 14.6% of total variance, which loads heavily 
on variables relating to the orientation of the firm towards the 
future. We observe that factor 2 determines whether a firm, 
probably, has a formal strategy for innovation or a mission 
statement to be innovative, a characteristic of a user.
The positive loading of the (negative) statements relating 
to the speed of decision and the action are consistent with the 
firm taking bold steps toward being innovative. We observe that 
this loading indicates the preoccupation with the future over the 
current and that the firm was more likely to consider the long­
term decision using a trade-off of the quality of the decision 
with the speed of the decision-making process. This would be a 
characteristic of an innovative firm whether it was a user or 
non-user of a formal strategy for innovation. This is important 
since all firms earlier indicated they have achieved some form of 
innovation.
Finally, Factor 3 (whether a firm viewed new product 
development as being important) indicates the emphasis placed on 
a firm toward new product development. This factor accounts for
11.4 percent of the variance.
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This method of factor analysis was used because its R— 
factor technique links groups by variables rather than by 
meanings. Thus, factors could be determined (objectively using 
the hidden relationship revealed by the Varimax rotation 
procedure) whether or not the users and non-users which 
received the 2nd questionnaires were indeed innovative. Based on 
the responses, the sample could then be evaluated as being 
dominated by innovative firms or not.
8.8.1 Motivation for Training Differences Between Users and Noo- 
users
The issues of whether the training needs of innovative firms were 
different from those of non-innovative firms was first brought to 
our attention by a respondent firm. The respondent (Director of 
Employment, Manpower and Training for a large American electronic 
firm) indicated that "they noticed that when training individuals 
from other divisions that the motives of those from an innovative 
unit were different from a "dead -end" unit". In order to 
observe whether users tend to have a formal programme for 
innovation and skills updating in contrast to non-users, who used 
only formal courses to combat obsolescence, Table No. 15 was 
constructed from the question no. 11 of the 2nd questionnaire in 
Exhibit No. 3 .
Table No. l5 : Contrast between Users and Non-uaera 
On Motives for Taking Training
Question: " How important was each of the following Motives (five were listed) for 
taking a course?" Mean score of a five -point idkert type scale fra 5s always tc 
!• being not iwportant at all.
*** indicates a T-test with a probability p <0.01
^ Mean
Users Non-users
Element Code Motives Listed (n-74) (n*3l) t-test
Alupdate Tb update existing skills 4.10 4.07 «**
Aladd To add new skills 3.98 4.58 **•*
A1 chance To laprove chance of promotion 2.02 2.70 +**+
Alaasign To receive better assignments 2.35 3.06 ***#
Alacourse Because it was assigned by fin 3.17 1.30 ****
Alapanaor Pin does not sponsor courses -O- -0- n/a
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Table No. 15 indicates that the mean values from the 
respondents in how courses were assigned in the usersf case 
(3.17) can be contrasted with the mean value for the non-users 
(1.30).
We observe that the significant differences seem to be due 
to whether the training course was assigned in the users' case 
versus the view in the non-users 's case that one takes a 
course as the only way to get better assignments. These reasons 
for taking a training course contrast the users from the non­
users. This contrast may indicate that training does have some 
importance on innovation whether it is in a user or non-user's 
firm. This table confirms this view since all respondents (n=105) 
indicate that their firms did sponsor courses.
8.9 THE COMBINATION OF MOTIVATING HJMENTS FOR INNOVATION
The literature indicates that there is a combination of elements 
which could be used to motivate an employee to be more 
entrepreneurial (innovative). There were over 14 of them which 
ranged from using a bonus system to sending employees away to 
off-site training sites.
We observe in Exhibit No. 2:63 that the ranking of these 
elements as the best way to motivate was determined by a scale 
of (1 —5); 1 being the highest. Certain elements (Mbchamp, 
Motime, and Moself job) provided the greatest degree of contrast 
between users and non-users.
The differences based on the nationality of ownership were 
not clear. It raised a series of questions: Does one way seem to
be preferred by one group of firms with the same nationality; or 
are there some elements ( i.e. Opstrato, Moopen and Orginfo) 
would appear to be endorsed equally by both the users and non­
users based on nationality?.
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We thought it would be helpful to link certain strategic 
elements and elements which stimlate innovation and to see how 
they contributed toward the motivation of a workforce. For 
example, if the element (Opstrato) reflecting a firm's strategy 
with a known mission to innovate is known at levels and the way 
information is processed (Orginfo) and other elements were 
correlated. Further, would the combining of the elements for 
updating one's skills by formal training; training supervisors 
to welcome innovation; open comnunication; goal-setting ; and 
small group work would indicate a pattern as how firms would 
motivate their workforce.
In order to determine the impact of those elements and 
whether the nationality of a parent company affects the way that 
a firm motivated its employees, Table No. 16 was constructed as 
shown below:
Table No. 16: Host Important Factors Given for Motivation of Innovation .
Boases Goal Setting Goaraunlca t ions Reward Knowledge Strategy
Welcome 6 Updating Open and For Updated Known at
Parents: Ideas Baployees Qroup Work Innovation Formally All Level
Scottish: 32 7 12 1 12 23
Row X 36.8 8.0 13.8 l.l 13.8 26.4
Col X 38.6 43.8 35.3 33.3 35.3 63.8
N. American: 24 3 9 1 6 7
Row X 48.0 6.0 18.0 2.0 12.0 14.0
Col X 28.9 18.8 26.5 33.3 22.2 19.4
Overseas: 5 4 2 -0- -O- 3
Row X 35.7 28.6 14.3 -O- -0- 26.1
Col X 6.0 25.0 5.9 •O" -o- 8.3
Other OK: 22 2 2 1 9 3
Row X 56.4 5.1 14.3 2.6 23.1 7.6
Col X 26.5 12.5 5.9 33.3 33.3 8.3
Colusn: 83 16 25 3 27 36
X of Tot: 43.7 8.4 13.2 1.6 14.2 18.9
Row
Total
87
45.8
50
26.3
14
7.4
39
20.5
190
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Table No. 16 is a key chart. It deals with the top 
motivating and contributing elements for innovation and how they 
relate across the nationalities of the parent companies. We 
observe that the way Scottish-owned firms indicate that their 
strategies are known at all levels contrasted significantly with 
the other groups. A discussion with four of the Scottish firms 
indicated that they have clear policies (rules) on the ways 
certain things are done and what the goals for their firms were.
The lack of a reward for innovation and a need to formally 
update an employee's knowledge (columns 3 & 4) for Overseas 
firms was a revealing difference between nationalities and parent 
company. Discussion with two of the Other Overseas firms (they 
were Japanese and Scandinavian) indicated that it was more a 
matter of culture and conformity than training that stimulates 
change or innovation, thus, accounting for their zero responses 
in these columns.
In contrast, the executives of N. American firms- Digital, 
3M, and Hewlett Packard- expressed different views as to why a 
training was part of their formal strategy for innovation, but 
all stated that it was their company policies for each employee 
to develop a personal career plan. Key and conmon components 
between them were that each of their employee's plans had to 
project the amount of training scheduled for an employee. They 
varied only whether it was one year to five years ahead.
Table No. 16 , also, indicates how the characteristics of 
an innovative firm are more pronounced among those multinational 
firms which use HRM strategies to combat obsolescence among 
technical and managerial employees. It is noteworthy that none of 
the Other Overseas firms felt that an extra reward was expected 
by an employee when they engaged in developing an innovation.
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Further discussion with the two Others Overseas firms
indicated that in group work the peer pressure to have answers 
and to contribute were greater incentives than a personal 
financial reward. This shows that recognition is often just as 
potent as financial rewards in certain cultures (Scandavian and 
Japanese).
8.10 POST INTERVIEWS-MOST INNOVATIVE FIRMS
These interviews were held with those firms which were ranked as 
the most innovative of the 190 firms surveyed.
We used the "Leadership Rules as developed in Appendix C as a
guide. These rules and how the index were formulated are
discussed in Chapter Seven.
Table No. 17, below, links those elements that were ranked
by the top 26 respondents as to which were the most important
elements to be incorporated into a strategy for innovation.
Table No. 17: ttiat Eleaenta were Deed In A Strategy To St till ate Imovation 
Aa Cceponents In a Fira'a Overall Corporate Strategy
Banked Host Lajortant by Top 26 Pirns
Corporate Tine Allowed fbrnal PrograMnc Visionary Z &
Parent: Cnlture Away Mistakes For Innovation Leadership Total a
Scottish: 6 8 5 4 10 10
Bov Z 60.0 30.8 50.0 15.3 100.0 (11.4/ 87)
Col Z 31.5 53.3 20.8 36.4 50.0
N. American: 8 1 8 5 8 8
Bov X 100.0 ll.l 100.0 10.0 100.0 (16.0/5C
Col Z 42.1 6.6 37.5 45.4 40.0
Overseas: 2 3 3 -0- -O- 3
Bov Z 66.6 100.0 100.0 •O’* -0- (21.4/14)
Col Z 10.5 20.0 12.5 -o- -0-
Other OR: 3 3 3 2 2 5
Bov Z 60.0 60.0 60.0 40.0 40.0 (12.8/2
Col Z 15.7 20.0 29.1 18.8 10.0
Colusa: 19 15 24 11 20
Z of tot. 73.0 57.6 92.4 42.3 76.9
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Table No. 17 reflects the responses of the 26 firms ranked as 
the "most highly innovative firms" of the 190 sample. The highest 
element of those selected by Overseas and N. American firms was 
to allow mistakes (100 %). Visionary leadership and culture were 
also key responses at 76.9 and 73 percent respectively.
The row to the far right provides a count per parent company 
by nationality. Of these firms, 7 were Pioneers; 6 were 
Dependents; 5 were Followers; 3 were Imitators; 2 each were 
Fatalists and Opportunists; and 1 was a Traditionalist
Twenty-four of these firms used a formal strategy and the 
remaining two used an informal strategy. All of the users firms, 
who used a formal strategy with an updating anti-obsolescence 
programme, had more than 501 employees. The two firms with an 
informal strategy were Overseas (Japanese and Danish) and 
employed less than 300 employees.
8.10.1 Responses of the Top 26 Firms On Key Elements
In an effort to assess the leadership rules as to why some of the 
top firms were innovative, a cross-tabulation table was developed 
to show the how users of a formal strategy (n=24) responded to 
certain questions on the questionnaire.
The questions were: if they engaged in manpower planning; 
if it was easy to get feedback from their supervisors; if product 
champions were rewarded; if their employees were trained to be 
innovative or recruited because of their innovativeness; and is 
it easy to get information from their supervisors ?
Table No. 18, below, indicates how those 24 firms responded 
to those six questions.
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Table Wo.18; To Assess The Leadership jhiles The Following Questions were Asked:
Does Your Pirm Engage in Manpower Planning ?; Is it Easy To Gain Data,Approval or 
Feedback from Your Supervisor?; Are Innovation Champions Rewarded, Promoted or 
Recognized ?; Are Your Bnployees Recruited For Their Entrepreneurial Traits Or 
Trained to be So? - N* 24 of the 26 Finos have a formal programme to stimulate 
innovation
Parents: 
Scottish: 
Col X
Manpower Easy To
Plaming-Yes Get Feedback
75
46.6
8
33.3
Champions
Rewarded
3
16.6
Employees 
Recruited / Trained
5
23.8
2
13.3
Based in respect as to how all 24 firms responded, a series 
of interviews were with five users of a formal strategy to 
innovate, who were ranked as most innovative. All interviews were 
held at the offices of these companies.
Info
Spread
4
20.0
N. American: 42 13 12 13 11 3
Col X 26.1 54.6 66.6 61.9 73.3 15.0
.Overseas: 10 2 -0- 1 -O- 10
Col X 6.2 8.3 -0- 4.7 -0- 50.0
Other IK: 34 I 3 2 2 3
Col X 21.1 4.2 16.6 9.5 13.3 15.0
Column: 161 24 18 21 15 20
X of 190: 84.7 12.6 9.4 ll.l 7.9 10.5
During the interviews it became apparent that all interviewees 
agreed that two of the chief determinants for stimulating 
employees to be more innovative were the reaction of their 
immediate supervisor and the ease in which they received 
approval and feedback on a innovative idea. Basically, these 
factors were determined to be management style and tightness of 
control.
For example, North American firms allowed little time away 
to develop an innovation •tfiilst some Other Overseas firms used 
this as a major element. Equally significant was how few 
overseas firms have a formal programme and visionary leadership 
compared to the other parent firm 1 s clusters. This is more or 
less shown in Tables No. 14 through 17.
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We observed during our visits that these were common 
features in the Other Overseas and North American companies. 
They included the informal corporate culture exhibited and the 
fact that many of the key managers interviewed were less than 
forty years of age. All conducted weekly meeting on quality 
complaints and had a companywide information system
The interviews also revealed that all of them stressed a 
common strategy consisting of a search for the self-motivated 
employee. All indicated that they used a generic human resource
policy to attract and hire employees with some type of
experience gained from working with small groups and used to 
working with little or no supervision. The phrase used by
Apple Computer in its advertisement (June, 1989) for new
employees is indicative of this philosophy  'the individual is
at the centre of everything we do and the employee must be able 
to demonstrate how they can create opportunity for themselves and 
others around them1.
We observe in Exhibit No. 2:50 that a fair amount of time as 
indicated by the users on the first questionnaire was expended 
in developing, reviewing, and writing proposals on innovative 
projects . Many of the managers interviewed indicated that being 
directed to write a proposal or review a proposal on the 
development of an innovation made them do much late night reading 
(38 %); while others indicated that problem-solving with
colleagues was the most rewarding part of their job (64 %) Others 
(18 %) indicated that courses stimulated them to assess their 
knowledge and fill in the gaps.
We observe in Exhibit 2:8 the high number of users that 
reported that their programmes for innovation reported to the 
(Managing Direct or/Chairmen/CEO). This supports a belief that 
most users view the development of an innovation as having 
strategic importance.
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Furthermore, Table no. 18 indicates that the issue of 
manpower planning is homogeneously viewed by most of the 
respondents, regardless of a firm's nationality. However, there 
were marked differences internationally as to how other 
supporting elements were used.
8.11 SUMIARY OF THE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS
This analysis was performed on 83 elements identified in the 
survey which may or may not contribute to the development of a 
strategy for innovation. Its aim was to determine the linear 
relationship of independent elements which discriminate best 
between those who used a formal strategy and those who did not. 
It was selected other types of analyses because it maximises the 
separation between the two groups.
Our assumptions and research logic, here, were that "users” 
will have a more consistent pattern of innovativeness than "non- 
users". Whilst both groups will be innovative to a degree, the 
non-users will retreat from time to time into a pattern of 
management of innovation based on their past experiences.
For example, Traditionalists will readily consider 
innovating around matters which will assist their beliefs in the 
economies of size, but will, generally, shy away a bold and 
radical innovation. We have labelled this belief when practiced 
as "the power of the sovereign element", a firm’s experience. It 
forms the implied strategic framework in which a firm will 
objectively or emotionally determine the feasibility and benefits 
of an innovation.
We, also, observe in our review that certain elements seemed to 
have a greater discriminatory power than others in determining 
whether a firm is innovative or not.
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Table No. 19 shown below sunmarises the results of ranking 
those elements using Fisher’s Coefficients and the Wilks’ Lambda 
statistical techniques as explained in (Chapter Seven
TABLE 19: SWHARY TABLE OF DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS
Order Element Fisher's Wilks How each element is described as
of Computer Coefficients Lambda to its purpose and function in
Ranking Label Yes No Analysis the assigned Code Labelling
I. Opstrato 4.598 3.2158 .81344 Known strategic mission to Innovate
2. Keyneeds 0.552 1.075 .77795 Customers needs are surveyed regularly
3. Motime -0.629 -0.106 .75273 Motivated by time off to develop idea
4. Buyin 1.347 0.841 .72962 Practice of firm in buying innovation
5. Vision 0.843 0.337 .71491 Leadership exhibits visionary element
6. Depts 5.749 6.769 .70257 Each department responsible for change
7. KeyR.D 0.592 0.440 .68708 Research and Development Depart, used
8. Mochamp 1.051 0.644 .67036 Others motivated by innovation champions
9. Trained 0.944 0.534 .65452 Staff formally trained to be innovative
10. Orgfirst 1.767 1.415 .63949 Usually first to try new ideas/products
11. Mogoals -0.218 -0.380 .62716 Motivated by goal-setting of employees
12. Keyprog 0.526 0.773 .61574 Formal programme for Innovation is used
13. Ezsystem 0.426 0.702 .60478 Easy to gain approval for a new ideas
14. Fboldup 1.201 1.534 .59519 Funding is available without holdup
15. Keystaff 0.974 0.786 .58703 Staff recruited and trained to innovate
16. Moseljob 0.327 0.739 .57547 Staff is motivated by self-design of job
17. Strategy 1.446 1.267 .56978 Marketing-technological strategy used
18. Ageloc 0.488 0.414 .56346 Age and location of an innovative firm
19. Typeorg 1.405 1.173 .55839 Bow a firm manages its tasks, foremost
20. Keycult 0.282 0.440 .55295 Firm's culture is very entrepreneurial
21. Freward -0.172 -0.758 .54909 Rewards given to enterprising employees
22. Vision .55191 Same description as above
Yes * 103 finis with formal strategy for innovation
No * 87 firms without a formal strategy for innovation 
Canonical Discriminant Functions and Group Co-variance Matrices Data:
Freedom Pooled Score for Canonical
Box's M F Degree Logthm Significance Eigenvalue Correlation Chi-square
373.49 102018.2 15.216896 000.-.05 0.8911 0.6694 105.780
Table No. 19 indicates the results of the final ranking of 
21 elements. In the Table's fourth column, the closer the
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coefficient is to 1.0, the better it contributes to the use of 
formal strategy for innovation.
We observe in Table No. 19 that the number No. 1 ranked 
element was opstrato (firm's mission to innovate is known at all 
levels) at .813 and that only those elements which scored better 
than .549 were ranked from the 83 different elements captured by 
this survey. Thus, the magnitude of the coefficients reflected 
their importance by their rank.
We observe that this ranking order as shown in the Table No. 
19 means that the element coded as (keyneeds) is about 30 
percent more important than element (freward), and about five 
percent less importance than having a strategic mission to 
innovate (Opstrato).
Further analysing the discriminate results in detail shows 
that the most significant element is presented in ranking order 
of importance was the element (Opstrato). This indicates whether 
the company has a organisation-wide strategic mission to 
innovate.
Other elements such as a formal programme being used 
(Keyprog); staff is trained to be an innovators (trained) and 
employee being motivated by time away (Motime) were ranked as 
major determinants that determined whether or not a firm is 
innovative. The lesser important ones are those starting down 
from element (Ezsystem) at .6047 and than in a descending order.
8.11.1 Classifying Functions of Discriminant Analysis
The second function, we thought critical to this investigation, 
was the ability of a discriminant analysis to reclassify groups 
statistically. By this function (called a classification rate), 
it can determine if the data received is useful or too badly
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skewed to be of value based on a proportional chance criterion 
(see definition in Appendix B).
Our overall classification rate was 83.2 percent because 32 
firms (16.8 %) could not be re-classified as being either users 
or non-users.
We observe that this classification rate indicates the data 
was very useful. A better picture of the data's usefulness was 
obtained by using a proportional chance criterion (Azcel, 1989) 
and a Tau measure indicated that this is about 35 percent higher 
than a proportional chance hit ratio (190-103/190-87) and 65 
percent fewer errors than expected by a random chance.
This analysis, also, directs our attention to the fact that 
32 firms had problems defining their firms as having either a 
formal or informal strategy for innovation. As described earlier 
(pp. 14-6) we had established an arbitrary criterion rather than 
a research based one which predicted that true users can be 
classified according to a firm embracing five or more of the 
following nine elements:
1. Mission statement;
2. Three levels of strategies;
3. Formal programme with a name;
4. Budget allocated;
5. Training programme;
6. Technological strategy;
7. Structure openness;
8. Scanning system;
9. Strategic focus;
and a record of innovative accomplishments.
A further review on the responses of the respondents 
selected out by the computer as being improperly classified 
revealed that 15 users and 17 non-users did not meet our
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criteria. The results of our tabulation of these 32 non­
conforming responses are as follows:
Missing In Areas Missing Shown In
User's In the Nine Non-user's
Response Strategic Elements Response
—  Record of Achievement 2
5 Formal Programme 2
5 Mission Statement 5
3 Training Programme 1
2 Budget Allocated 5
17 1?
We observe that two of the users have less than five 
elements (both have 4), and three non-users have exactly five or 
more elements (5,5,6 respectively). Since there was no similar 
empirically-tested and published data readily available, we now 
question our earlier prediction that a firm had to possess five 
of the nine elements to be classified as a user and if this was 
too narrow a standard. And since we did not clearly inform or 
imply to the respondents that these criteria were to be used, we 
wondered whether or not our acceptance of less than five elements 
would violate the purpose of the investigation and if they should 
be extracted and re-classified accordingly.
We decided against changing the data, at this point. Our 
reasons were two-fold: (1) the logic of the investigation
required us, at a later point, to reclassify the respondents 
based on their technological strategy, nationality and size; and 
(2) an effort to manipulate field-based data, unnecessarily, 
would distort the integrity of the responses and contaminate the 
quality of the statistical techniques.
Further, a review of the territorial maps indicated a 
better than expected separation of users and non-users. Group
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centroids were dispersed proportionately with a close pattern of 
function-scores•
The subsequent re-classification of respondents by firm 
sizes, nationality, and strategy indicates that those in firms 
under 301 employees were more likely to mis-classify themselves 
(80.2/19.2 chance) than by nationality (84.6/15.4) or by 
technological strategy (96.4/3.6). Incidentally, published data 
(Aczel 1989:939) indicates these are "very high scores" for a 
broadly-based social study based on people perceptions.
8.12 RE-CLASSIFICATIQN OF FIRMS HfftO A STRATEGIC F0C0S
The re-classification of firms to test their overall strategic 
focus, by the logic of our investigation, was designed to be a 
key indicator of the enabling elements needed to create a 
strategy for innovation.
This re-classification was to be done based on using 
seven technological strategies which were provided to the 
respondents in question no. 12 of our first questionnaire.
These categories were provided because the literature 
(Ansoff, 1964; Freeman 1974) states that the technological 
strategy was the unifying element for all innovation- 
investigating and developing activities within a firm.
We surmised that this element (strategy) combined with 
others would create the" sovereign element" of a firm. They 
reflect the linkage of a firm's management style of control, 
the flexibility of its organisational structure and the 
technological strategy that it prefers to use. In essence, the 
strategic focus is a " triggering" element by which a firm 
intuitively or formally creates a strategic framework for a 
strategy for innovation.
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We further observe that the element for a technological 
strategy (strategy) was ranked 17th out of the 21 elements in 
Table No. 19. It was also ranked some six places below the 
element (Dept) representing a firm's innovation-investigating 
activities; and ranked one place above how a firm manages its 
tasks structurally (Typeorg).
Our hypotheses (a focal point in this investigation and 
evolved from the hypotheses stated elsewhere) was that a firm 
could be located within a "strategic focussing" matrix with 
horizon and vertical axes depending on how these key elements 
were linked to each other. This matrix would indicate how a 
firm, generally, would welcome or resist any type of activities 
for the investigation and development of an innovation.
Restated our hypotheses is that:
A firm's position in this strategic focus matrix, 
would indicate a firm's receptivity to innovate, 
the more flexible its structure and the more 
formal its technological strategy is implemented 
the greater a firm's receptivity to innovate.
The testing of our hypotheses was to be done in three ways:
(1) to re-classify firms around their self-selected technological 
strategies and to create new groups around those elements which 
measure a firm's innovativeness; (2) to create a horizontal axis 
(sliding index of flexibility) to measure the resistance of a 
firm's structure to assist a firm's innovation-investigating 
activities; and (3) to place users and non-users in a vertical 
axis to indicating whether they formally or informally used a 
strategy to coordinate those activities.
Our construction methods and results are as follows:
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8.12.1 Re-classification into New Groups
The first step of the three steps needed to construct a 
strategic focus was to confirm that respondents had classified 
themselves as either a user or non-user properly.
For example, Exhibit No. 2: 43 indicates that when
respondents were allowed to choose themselves, we noticed that 
over 38 percent (average of users and non-users rates) of them 
thought they were Pioneers, and few viewed themselves as 
Fatalists, Opportunists or Traditionalist. Our purpose, here, is 
to confirm their selection or to re-classify them accordingly.
Using the "Select” and (tompute " controls of the SSPSS 
command, we added all firms by their responses to question No. 
12 on the survey instrument in Exhibit No. 1 by frequency and 
count.
Then to complete the first step of a strategic focus 
measuring matrix, we selected some innovativeness measures (the 
same nine elements we arbitrarily established earlier) and 
clustered the respondents according to their self-selected 
technological strategy. The purpose, here, was to determine 
whether those enabling elements for the stimulation of innovation 
could be identified, separated, linked, and grouped into new 
groups. And if this technique could add or subtract respondents 
from one group into other groups.
By the using the various element codes, the formula (strategic 
element) is as follows:
Compute newgroups = Strategy + (opgoals- 
opstratgo) + (Orgtop-Orgadapt) / Mission +
Eopplan + Eprogram + Goodfacl + Typeorg +
Dept + Simvoll-2 + Budgets + Keyinfo, then 
"sort" accordingly.
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Based on this calculation ( given solely as an example to 
illustrate the logic of this analysis) we were able to accomplish 
two findings by devising a "sovereign element formula". First by 
using such a formula, we are now able to reclassify the 
respondents using nine elements rather than just one element. 
This procedure, also, would determine whether or not the 
firms1 self-nominating method matches our computer developed 
profile for each strategic group.
Secondly, the computer could create a new group of 
respondents if any of the 190 firms failed to match an existing 
group profile. By this procedure, 31 firms failed and were placed 
into a new group to be called as "Un-Focused" • The results below 
indicate as to how eight groups were created from the previous 
seven groups and in which of the groups they were redistributed:
% of Numbers Numbers % of
Strategic Before in old in new new
Groups Group Groups Groups Group
Pioneers 38.4 73 57 30.0
Un-Focused — .-- 31 16.3
Dependents 20.5 39 30 15.8
Imitators 14.3 27 14 7.3
Followers 10.0 19 21 11.1
Traditionalists 4.7 9 11 5.8
Opportunists 7.4 14 14 7.4
Fatalists 4.7 9 12 6.3
First, we noticed that the new group of 31
surprisingly similar to the number of respondents that those we 
were unable to classify in the previous Discriminant Analysis. 
Second, we observed the severe reductions of about 78 percent in 
the Pioneer group; 51 percent in the Imitators group; about 24
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percent in the Dependents group; and noticeable changes in the 
other three groups, except the Opportunists group.
The classification function of the Discriminant Analysis 
for the strategic focus indicated a 96.4 percent classification 
rate. There were seven firms marked as not being classified by 
the computer. Based on a personal review of the respondents* 
questionnaires: three were placed in Pioneer, one each into 
Dependent, Follower, Traditionalist and Fatalists. Respondents' 
answers to Budgets, Orgadapt and Orgfirst were responsible for 
mis-classification.
8.12.2 Index of Flexibility
The second step toward creating a horizon axis for the strategic 
focussing matrix consisted of ranking all respondents based on 
their overall innovativeness. This was the same index used to 
rank firms as described in Appendix G.
The scores ranged from .3119 as the lowest rate of 
innovativeness to .94716 for the highest. In an effort to 
determine the central tendency of the data and to protect against 
the influence of extreme observations, the median, mode, and 
means for each group were used. The median for all 190 
observations (respondents) was .63008. Then scores were placed 
into five categories of flexibility based on boundaries of 12 
within each boundary. These were called score classes.
The index of flexibility was created on the computer as
follows:
Index of Flexibility Newgroup / (Stimvoll-2) 
(Typeorg) (Orgadapt) (Busenvi) (Moseljob) 
(Eschedule) (Orgfirst) (Orginfo) (Orgtop) (Key 
R.D) (Keystaff) (Andepart) (Depts.) (Ageloc) 
(Depts.) "Sort” by Frequency.
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These sets of elements directly and indirectly reflect the 
type of managerial controls and structure used by each 
respondent. An example is the element (Typeorg) as reflected in 
question no. 25 of the first questionnaire.
Next, we used a mode based on frequent and count for each of 
the new groups which placed them into a modal class, accordingly:
Score Class Description Index Mean Modal Class
Over .89 Top Quarter .9234 Pioneers
.77 -.83 Very Flexible .8708 Opportunists
.71 - 76 Top Half .6554 Followers
.64 -.70 Flexible .6493 Fatalists
Median Normal Control .6301
.58 -.63 Bottom Half .6287 Imitators
.51 -.57 Tight Structure .5584 Dependents
.44- .50 Bottom Quarter .4867 Traditionalists
.38 & under Tightly Structured .3419 Un-Focused.
We observe, at the worst, this will give us a continuum and 
a sliding index in which each strategic group could be placed 
horizontally and linearly from Un-focused through Pioneers. 
Other than for this use, it has limited value because of 
centrality and symmetrical issues.
8.12.3 Formality of Groups1 Strategy
The third and final step in designing a strategic focussing 
matrix is the vertical axis construction. This step is relatively
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straightforward based on whether a respondent was a users or non- 
users.
We ask the computer to "Sort" by frequency all of the new 
strategic groups by users and non-users categories. Any count of 
users within a strategic group with a frequency rate of more 
than 51 percent of users would be placed above the line 
vertically. Any group with a rate of less than 50 percent of 
users would be placed beneath the line. Based on this technique, 
the following placements were made:
New Users a Vertical 1
Strategic Frequency T Placement j
Groups Rate-% Aoove Below
Pioneers 100 X
Followers 65 X
Imitators 61 X
Traditionalists 55 X
Opportunities 43 X
Fatalists 33 X
Dependents 28 X
Un-focused 0 X
Based on the construction of both the vertical and horizon 
axes, Figure 8.4 on the next page reflects the groups’ positions 
within a four dimensional, two-tiered Strategic Focus Matrix.
Note: To test the conceptual abilities of this matrix, a class
of 17 International MBA students at the University of Glasgow in 
April, 1990 used it. Empirically, it tested 'sdiat strategic 
options that a firm had based on its dominant strategy associated 
with each group, its current position, its mode of 
innovativeness, and its firm’s structure. The options range from 
using a capacity production-based strategy of a Traditionalist to
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a pioneering strategy using innovation. Further implications of 
this strategic focus matrix will be discussed in Chapter Nine.
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Figure 8.4 is a key indicator as to how each firm will, by 
their own unique history and experiences, view the value of 
innovation. The term nescience is further defined in Appendix B 
as this applies to a firm which decides to be totally ignorant of 
what is happening in its environment.
8.13 THE SECOND SYMPOSIUM RESULTS
The results reflects the second symposium of two symposia 
required by the investigation. Its purpose was to contrast, 
collectively, the views of managers to others, whom who may hold 
different ones on strategy and innovation. These areas of 
potential differences were posed in a series of questions.
For example, some of the issues were: if managers and others 
held the same view that the practice of innovation can be taught; 
can innovation be planned upon demand; and questions about 
whether a deliberately-formed strategy was better than an 
informal one. Other details of this symposium are discussed 
in Chapter Seven (p.240-2) and in Exhibit No. 4.
Although there were 22 statements to probe the attitudes and 
opinions of the 36 participants, only eleven statements received 
a rating after discussion. The results are shown in Table No. 20 
on the next page:
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DELPHI 2ND SYMPOSIUM QUBSriOrtlAIRK: ONIVRRSm Of GU3Q0M 
Tahle No. 20 : SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES Of OPINIONS BETWEEN MANAGERS AND OTHERS
Note: Mean scores an a 5 -point Likert scale ranged fra 5 * scrangly agree to 1“ strongly disagree. 
Stateaeots Mere paraphrased fra those questions In Exhibit No. 4; * 2-tailed probability
Means ___
Mwiagers Others
Selected Stateaenta Paraihraaed (n»22) (n»14) X M-W-tT* T-Test*
Ref: Section I
1.There is a definite way to practice Innovation and 
it can be taught, whether science or knowledge baaed.
3.7 3.1 0.041
2. The principles of accountancy penalise a decision to innovate 3.3 2.8
3. Accouotncy ignores that a fin has other goals than profit. 3.5 2.9
S. Rig fine are better at innovating by being efficient; and 
iswilli r fleas are better at innovating by being flexible. 49X 262 0.051
8. A Deliberate long term strategy is a fonaila for failure since 
it locks aanagers into a narrow way of thinking 2.6 4.1 0.038
9. Business strategy is best when is siapiest, and long detailed plana 
Should be avoided.. 4.0 2.6 0.038
10. A strategy which plana for innovation recpiirea a systeaatlc
lagilearntatlon, but lxnovation can not be aade to occur upon desand. 3.3 2.7 0.092
15. In planning five years, you Should plan I year further than competitor. 53Z 312 0.055
Ref: Section n
B. Innovation is either a skill-enhancing or akill-destroylng process. 4.3 4.8
C. Established fins are In a better position to explore an opportunity 
rtwi a new entries within an industry. 53X 312 0.055
0.069
0.014
D. fins In a UK survey (1983) to bring about change used the following 
strategies: Hhicb aethod would you use first, second snd so an 7
Ranking by Mode 
UK Survey Managers Others 
Marketing snd sales approach I 3 ”2
New product developsent 2 2 1
Re1 organisation of fin 3 1 3
financial Controls 4 4 4
We observe that in Table No. 20, there were marked 
disagreements on several of the statements posed. They are 
denoted by either the M-W-U, t-test or X-square techniques. The 
widest difference were in statements no. 5, 8,14, and 15 in 
Section I and in Section II, para. B & G in the Exhibit No. 4 of 
the Appendices.
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8.14 TESTING OF THE HYPOTHESES
The literature indicates that there is a wide range of hypotheses 
developed (pp.286-92) which could be tested. We prefer to test 
just seven of them in a condensed version.
We observe from the implications of Exhibits No. 2 and the 
findings in Exhibits No. 6 though 13; and the summary of 21 
elements as developed by the Wilks’ Lambda in Table No. 19 that 
the following hypotheses can be tested:
It is confirmed affirmatively that more loosely- controlled a 
firm’s structure and the more a firm's innovation investigating 
and developing tasks are decentrally-managed and the more 
flexible its method of management and the more formal its 
strategic thrust to innovate the greater a firm’s receptivity to 
innovate. Specifically:
(a) It is confirmed affirmatively that the more formal and 
better known a firm's strategic mission is known for innovation 
within its environment consisting of buyers, prospective 
employees and suppliers the greater a firm’s receptivity to 
innovation;
(b) It is confirmed affirmatively that an employee's 
receptivity to innovate increased \dien time is given off to 
innovate, and the more an employee’s bosses welcome suggestions 
and supply feedback, and the more group work of an employee is 
reinforced by a firm’s experience and the more defined a firm's 
goals are to innovate by a formal strategy the greater a firm's 
receptivity to be innovative.
(c) It is confirmed affirmatively that the more innovative 
the firm is perceived by its environment, and the greater the
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attention and importance attached to planned manpower 
development, and the more a firm recruits certain types of 
individuals from its environment the greater its strategic 
thrust the greater a firm’s receptivity to be innovate;
(d) It is confirmed affirmatively that the greater the 
importance the firm attached to the collection of new information 
and its dissemination to employees of all level for application, 
the greater a firm's receptivity to innovation;
(e) It is confirmed affirmatively that the more time spent 
on training of employees in innovation and the greater attention 
spent in initially hiring an employee who is entrepreneurial and 
the more resources allocated for rewarding product champions 
within a formal programme for innovation, the greater a firm's 
receptivity for innovation;
(f) It is negatively infirmed that the greater effort needed 
by an employee to gain project funding, time away, feedback or 
approval to innovate, the less innovative a firm will become; 
and
(g) It is confirmed affirmatively that the greater the 
firm's willingness to cooperate in field trials and training with 
the customers, and the more a firm participates in joint ventures 
with other firms, and the more a firm motivates its employees 
to be more entrepreneurial, the greater a firm's receptivity for 
innovation.
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
9.0 AIMS
Let us conclude this investigation by asking three questions
1.What did the literature tell us about how strategy-making 
should be developed ?
2. What did the managers tell us about how they stimulated 
innovation?
3. What conclusions did we reach about both?
We will proceed to answer these questions in the same sequence.
9.1 THE LITERATURE
First of all our analysis of strategic techniques on each level 
of strategy-making has proved to be a fruitful undertaking. 
After the enquiry phase of this investigation, we were better 
able to understand the arguments of Ansoff (1965) and Andrews 
(1971) about why there is a need to have different levels of 
goals and business strategies within a firm, how each was 
developed, when implemented, and how they were related to the 
each other. The following comprise the three reasons for our 
enquiry.
First t the meanings of the term strategy in both a 
descriptive and normative sense were misleading. This created a
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confusion because the term was being used by many different 
disciplines within the field of management. This confusion 
created an equally perplexing map within the literature as to 
which was the clearest research path for us to follow. This 
implied a need for us to define and describe each of the terms as 
precisely as possible.
Second, in order to see more clearly the link between 
strategy-making and innovation, it was necessary to look at the 
evolution of strategy in some detail. This was prompted when our 
literature search indicated that there was a relative lack of 
research on the origin of and the history of strategy as a 
business concept. This was a surprising finding. Our review of 
nineteen different textbooks here and in the USA (Dartmouth's 
Amos Tuck Business School, Harvard's Baker Library and MIT's 
Sloane Business School) found only three that devoted any space 
at all to this . Two of these sources were published in the past 
five years.
Third, in analysing the impact and use of strategy, we 
found it necessary to develop our own concepts and definitions. 
This helped us to better understand the impact, the variety, and 
range of approaches being fostered by others, both academically 
and empirically. For these reasons we developed a glossary in 
Appendix B explaining some of the terms we discovered and how we 
have used them.
From this enquiry we have concluded that there are four main 
arguments within the field of strategic management.
(a) That there is a debate raging in the field of strategic 
management. It is a debate questioning whether a strategy is best 
executed deliberately- formed by a plan or informally- developed 
by a pattern of action. However, we believe that our 
investigation supplements rather than supplants the controversy
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as to whether strategies for innovation are best nurtured by a 
formal process or an informal one. To avoid entering this 
circular debate, we used, as a theoretical starting point, the 
definition of Baker.
"a formal process [strategy] being where there is 
a distinct hierarchy similar to that found in a 
military organisation. Limits of authority and 
responsibility to being set forth in a programme 
which are very clearly laid down. There is an 
exhaustive set of written standards [covering most 
eventualities from hiring of personnel to funding 
employee’s ventures]. An informal method 
[strategy] being when there is no clear hierarchy 
(as to how innovation will be stimulated]. 
Authority/ responsibilities being based more on 
ability than on a formal structure [to innovate]. 
There are few, if any, written rules, programmes 
or procedures•"(1975:147)
This was theoretically stretched into a conceptual framework by the 
works of Quim, Mintzberg and James, who state,
"Strategies may be looked at as either a priori 
statements [formal] to guide actions or a posteriori 
resulting from actual behaviour [informal]... One, 
therefore, must look at theactual emerging patterns of 
the enterprise's operant goals, policies and programs 
to see what its true strategy is... whether 
consciously set forth a understanding resulting from a 
stream of decisions "(1988:4,14-20).
then, after we refined this contextually and reviewing the words 
of Terborg, Van de Ven, Pettigrew, Porter, and et al, it was 
determined that there was a need to develop an empirical study.
Their counsel formed almost a unifying view (which is 
unusual since this view is coming from many different schools of 
management ranging from organisational development theorists to 
structural strategists) which has been underscored and argued 
elsewhere when appropriate throughout the investigation that:
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"choice and decision process models being done by
strategic management scholars lack the context of
how a firm is structured and the insights as to 
what individual and purposeful actions were 
designed to do by the actual makers of strategy 
and change, the practising manager".(Pettigrew 
1987:5-12)
(b) That there are three main arguments within the field of
strategic management that are compelling. One argument related
to this investigation is how strategy- making is directly linked 
to management effectiveness and its competitiveness. The second 
argues how the field of strategic management does not fill a 
specific and defined purpose in management in the formulation of 
a firm's goals. The third is the issue of using informal methods 
to run one's firm.
The first argument outlines how there is a divided body of 
opinion among those concerned with improving the theory and 
practice of management. Here, there is one side which believes 
that the formulation of a goal of a firm's corporate strategy 
does not give a much sharper focus to management thinking. The 
other side represents the formulation strategists. They argue 
that the discipline of strategy-making requires a carefully 
devised analysis of a firm's strengths and weaknesses in relation 
to the risks and opportunities existing in a firm's environment. 
Generally, they believe this can only occur by the formulation of 
a strategic goal, first. Then, the best choice is selected as an 
output by a strategic model which evaluates all the alternatives 
available to a firm. These theorists can be classified as 
resting squarely in the rational school of management. At the 
other end of the continuum we place the intuitive 
incrementalist s.
The second argument deals with the variety of strategic 
options available to a firm. The pluralistic school of management 
argues that, at first sight, one might infer from the manner in
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which companies operate that there is an infinite variety of 
strategic models available to a firm. On the other hand, the 
universalist school of management argues that upon closer 
inspection there are only a limited number of alternatives which 
are useful for strategy. They claim that the few alternatives 
available to the formulation of corporate and business strategy 
owe many of their principles to military thinking. They argue it 
is how these few strategies are implemented that is the key to 
their success.
The third argument is whether innovation can be stimulated 
upon demand. One side argues that innovation occurs through 
"serendipity", a term coined by Walpole in the 1754. This is a 
place where nothing is planned and all accidents turn out to be 
pleasant discoveries. There are several dimensions within this 
school of thought that informality is best. The danger in 
believing in such an informal strategy is argued against by the 
Rationalist on the grounds that it disguises a firm's ability to 
fully understand the potential of innovation from a strategic 
standpoint.
With such a wide range of views about innovation and 
strategy, it was important to study, and codify the basic 
principles of ancient military and business strategy. From our 
review, we were able to determine and suggest which effective 
elements of strategy were essentially structural and which ones 
were peripheral to the topic of innovation.
9.1.1 STRATEGY
We embraced conclusively Ansoff’s definition and modified it to 
be:
" strategy is the unifying thread of all 
activities within a firm ....and the pattern 
of major objectives, purposes or goals and 
essential policies and plans for achieving 
those goals, stated in such a way as to
Page 315
Conclusions and Implications - Chapter Nine
define what business the company is in or is 
to be in " (1965).
We conclude that that all companies have some type of a 
strategy albeit that only a relatively small proportion of them 
have ever developed an explicit plan or a statement of exactly 
what the goal for their strategies might be. It is one of the 
premises of our investigation that \diether it is formal or 
informal is not the question, but whether a firm consciously 
decides to accept one method over the other. For that reason, we 
expanded Ansoff's definition away from his concept of narrow 
goals into the broader ones of Andrews that goal-setting is part 
of the strategic process. A view not held by Ansoff.
Our attempts to explore a full variety of strategy from 
military concepts to generic strategic models in Chapters Two 
through Four were deemed essential to this research. They 
provided us with a fundamental understanding of the strategic 
process and its applicability to the stimulation of innovation.
We started off our investigation with an exploratory review of 
the ancient concepts of strategy.
Unfortunately, this is a step which too many researchers 
fail to do before launching a newer version of a strategic model. 
Anthony supports this:
1 • • the absence of any military-diplomatic 
principles of strategy constitutes a significant 
gap in the management field for planning and the 
lack of relating these "conjugate principles" to 
set the limits and comnon aspects of strategy to 
other fields is a major flaw'.(1965:27)
The seven major conclusions of strategic elements as 
developed from the review of ancient and military strategy were:
(1) by a clear mission statement of the grand strategy being 
employed, a leader is able to attract and mobilise those around
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him/her into action; (2) the flow of information is vital; (3) 
surprise is a major ingredient for success; (4) the simpler the 
strategy the more effective it is; (5) the behaviour of men on 
the field of battle will be no better than how they have been 
trained off the field; (6) the acts of innovation were the 
deciding factors for how war was fought; (7) and the leader must 
recognise that there are varying reasons for going to battle and 
should appeal to as many of them as possible.
The analogy between the military and commerce can be boiled 
down into five basic patterns: to attack, flank, defence, raid or 
develop new warfare.
First, in a military sense, one may decide to attack the 
enemy head-on. In a business context, the frontal assault could 
be compared to a pricing competition or by innovating with a new 
product to directly compete with an existing one.
Second, when a military strategy uses a flanking tactics, it 
is generally because a competitor’s weaknesses or strengths are 
noticeable and an army compensates by using a manoeuvre to 
exploit or avoid them respectively.
In a conmercial context, a flanking strategy may be similar 
to a policy of indirect competition based upon the creation and 
promotion of product differences. Clearly such a policy places 
considerable emphasis upon new product development carrying the 
elements of surprise. In the words of Bruce Henderson (1990), the 
creator of the Boston Box Strategic Model and the founder of 
Boston Consulting Group... 'one must induce your competitors not 
to invest in those products, markets and services where you 
expect to invest the most... this is the fundamental rule of 
strategy'.
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Third, when the military seeks to defend its territory or 
troops against attack, it gains a superior position (higher 
ground, friendly lands, or greater resources) which would 
discourage any advancing armies from attacking it without heavy 
losses. In business when a firm seeks to defend its product or 
markets against others, it differentiates its products. It does 
this in such a way that there is not any sizeable segment of 
its market profitable enough to warrant the development of a 
differentiated good or service by a larger competitor.
Fourth, for a military leader to consider a raiding action, 
it is tantamount to a negative decision accepting that the enemy 
is superior. Therefore, the effort is to have the enemy pay a 
price while accepting the inevitability that the enemy can not be 
defeated by direct action. In the context of commerce, such 
action would be to offer a product at such a low profit margin in 
the hope that other more profitable products related to it could 
be sold to recover some of the loss, but not to compete head-on. 
The selling of camera film at a below market price to induce 
customers to use a firm's film processing services set at a 
higher profit margin would be an example.
The final strategy is the one which most frequently leads to 
a decisive outcome, in both the military and business contexts, 
is the strategy of innovation. In simple terms, the results of an 
innovation can change a competitive situation so completely that 
one party previously vested with one type of weaponry superiority 
is replaced by a newer type of superiority. History indicates how 
warfare went from the long bow to gun powder and the current day 
concept of nuclear war heads. Then as each new invention created 
a new way of fighting, so it is with business.
In a business context, the advance of a technological 
innovation can result in the creation of a product so different 
from anything which has preceded it that a firm automatically
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gains a superior position. Classic examples of this are the 
Polaroid camera and the process of xerography.
We end this section by stating that the direct transfer of 
military concepts to business has three major flaws:
(1). The idea of having a direct and identified adversary is 
a misguided one. With the exception of PepsiCo and Coke Cola 
Company, there is usually no way a firm can identify a single and 
direct competitor. Even though, a large majority of firms do 
practice this tendency. This is not the case in the military, 
generally, one knows the real enemies and can prepare 
accordingly.
(2). There is not necessarily a direct win/lose scenario in 
business as there is in military. A firm can be profitable and 
grow without there being a direct loss registered by another. 
This is particularly true in innovation, as new markets and old 
customers will consume innovation differently.
(3) In business one can be a partner in one market and a 
competing force in another. This seldom happens in warfare, the 
line is drawn and co-operation is seldom achieved without the 
complete submission of one to another.
9.1.2 The FIELD OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
Let us begin by stressing once again that the field of strategic 
management is an entirely modem phenomenon. The first managerial 
ranks did not even appear until the 1900's and business strategy 
as the term of business policy did not even get a name until 
1910.
Our review on the development of strategy over the past 
ninety years has only touched upon the major factors that helped
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to shape the field of strategic management. Since most of them 
came into being in the late nineteenth century, the field of 
strategic management has changed many times. Table No. 1 and 
Appendix A have only hinted at the variations and the subtleties 
of this constantly changing pattern.
Another one of our premises which was concluded as being 
true is that the rate of development for the field of strategic 
management overall was led not by the academic community but in 
the way that the leading business firms developed their strategic 
focus.
i
In spite of these many changes, firms still go through a 
ritual of change. From a one-person firm to a huge international 
conglomerate, the stages are clear and distinct. Some do it in 
months (e.g. Apple Computer Company), but most do it in years, 
even decades. It is also the same with strategic management as 
the evolutionary strategic focus within a firm can be divided 
into four different stages as depicted below:
Diagram 9.1: Evolution of Strategic Focus Within A Firm
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This diagram reflects some of the concepts as Gluck (1980) 
maintains in his article, " Strategic Management for Competitive 
Advantage". Briefly, the four phases of managements are: Stage 
I- in this stage, the strategy of meeting a payroll and the 
training of staff to be functional dominates the mind of a 
managing director/owner; Stage II- is the gap-filling stage where 
the decision-making unit (EMU) is expended from a closely-held 
team of a few to a multi-layered one of many which starts to 
think strategically; Stage III- is where the more complicated 
market/product mix forces the M U  to assess opportunities and 
threats in the environment on a two to three years time frame; 
and Stage IV- is where a firm seeks to shape the environment in 
which it competes and innovation is one of the options that are 
considered.
Our investigation concludes that these first stages of 
development also reflect the views of management as being in a 
"sovereign strategic element" of comfort. This is when a firm by 
its history decides to remain internally-focused, it prefers to 
plan erratically based on current problems and opportunities and 
seeks to be very action-oriented, best classified here as an 
informal strategy. Only in Stage II through III, does the 
likelihood of a formal strategy encompassing a strategic focus 
emerging. A firm starts to develop this strategic focus, 
generally, about half way from being a firm that is totally 
internally-focused to one of becoming aware externally of the 
opportunities available to it.
We further argue that a firm can become so forecast and 
planning driven to the point that it becomes nescient when a M U  
starts to practice a belief that it has discovered the recipes 
as to how to compete, "the one best way".
It is in Stage IV that a firm learns the difference between 
accumulating data and useful information. It may revert back to
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managing as previously in Stage II with the outward look of Stage 
IV, it is that point that a strategy for innovation is more 
likely to be made formally.
We believe that the use of innovation as a strategic tool 
will become the debate of the 1990's. It will be similar to the 
past debates about why and how a firm develops a " strategic 
focus". This is a focal point of a long running argument 
between consultants and academics begining with 1950.
Our review, from 1950 through the 1980’s, indicates that the 
debate was about whether a firm should use strategies of low 
costs, market, or product differentiations. Seldom was the third 
strategy of being a technological leader or being one of the more 
innovative firms ever mentioned as a viable alternative. When it 
was discussed, it was generally recommended for certain 
industries such as electronics and chemicals.
The strategy of being a low-cost producer is a relatively 
easy goal to achieve, but there is a finite limit to how much 
costs can be reduced. Once this limit was reached, companies 
learned to differentiate themselves from other low-cost 
producers.
By the late 1970's, arising from this need to compete 
differently, differentiation by market share or by innovation 
were some of the other strategies investigated. However, 
innovation requires a firm to create a different type of 
"strategic mission" and communicate it with equal force to a 
triad of customers, suppliers and employees in order for it to 
work. These types of strategies can be distinguished by how they 
embrace a new concept of strategic value which is the capstone of 
the book, by Peters and Waterman, "In Search of Excellence". We 
call this the trinity of values approach of strategic management.
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This is an integrated system based on a firm creating
values beyond price for its customers; a shared value of profit, 
comnon interest and accomplishment from its suppliers; and a 
shared value with its workforce to the extent that each
individual within a firm feels that they can create a future for 
their firms. Unfortunately, this trinity of values is best 
understood by firms in Stage IV and was emulated without success 
by firms in a lower stage.
The debate, now, is how innovation and new product
development should be actively promoted. It is difficult to
recall a time when innovation being stimulated by onefs workforce 
was of greater interest to managers, consultants and academics 
than it currently seems to be. Competitive pressures on all 
fronts have driven many organisations to expect more and more 
from their workers.
We concluded that firms and others studying their strategic 
behaviour fall into one or more fundamental traps: (1) they use 
or reconmend unrealistic criteria to assess a company strengths 
or weaknesses; (2) they are either not aware of or forgot the 
lessons from ancient strategy that an act of innovation can 
change the balance and competitive position of a firm overnight; 
and (3) they rationalise industrial changes based on government 
policies, and interest rate fluctuations, etc. using 
sophisticated strategy-making models.
We further conclude that firms are now seeking new ways of 
managing their future and the stimulation of innovation amongst 
their workforces is now being viewed as one of the most desirable 
and most profitable ways to do it.
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9.1.3 INNOVATION
The need for this investigation has been justified by the 
observation that there is an extensive body of literature, both 
theoretical and normative, pointing to the process of innovation 
within the firm as being important.
The literature review in the field of strategic management 
suggested that there are serious problems in using existing 
management theories to explain how the elements of strategy can 
be linked to the stimulation of innovation, primarily because of 
the wide variety of definitions given to innovation.
Therefore, we conclude that the best definition of 
innovation is:
"the ability of a firm to replace existing 
product, processes, services and ideas with new 
ones to gain a competitive advantage and over time 
a firm will learn to use what works best for it".
Our definition is similar to the one voiced by others such 
as Downs and Mohr (1979) that the study of innovation rejects a 
universal innovation theory. They support a conclusion that we 
reached that a definition of the process for innovation should be 
applied as broadly as possible. Our investigation linking the 
nine essential elements of strategy-making (Table No.9) to the 
following internal elements needed to stimulate innovation can be 
summarised as follows:
1. Innovation must be welcomed and encouraged by a firm;
2. Leadership and vision by top management is critical;
3. All, if not the bulk, of a firm's employees should be 
committed to innovate and motivated accordingly;
4. Circumstances will lead an actor to innovate a solution 
when existing methods, products or ideas become
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obsolete; and
5. The realization that the benefits and potential of an 
innovation can be determined.
We were able to identify seven intertwining reasons why a 
strategy for innovation pose a special strategic challenge. They 
are:
1. collapsing of the product life cycle;
2.environmental turbulence which prevents accurate forecasting;
3. rapid change caused by the advancement of technology;
4. occupational obsolescence within a firm’s workforce;
5. uncertainty about where the next competitor will come from;
6. greater uncertainty about key customer needs and wants; and
7. no guarantee that an innovation can be developed profitably.
This challenge by itself is enough to stimulate many of 
today’s managers as many in the 1940’s turned to the concepts of 
strategy as a way to cope. Documented by the high responses to 
our survey, managers are showing above average interest in the 
topic of innovation.
Similarly, there are a number of writers in the literature 
sketching out innovation indelibly as a topic worthy of study and 
treating strategy not as a discipline branching out from a 
narrow field of management, but as a broad one. But it is because 
the gap is widening between the actual practice of innovation 
and the theoretical process of innovation that it is of interest 
here. Exploring the linkage between the two has been neglected 
in the overall field of strategic management.
9.2 IMPLICATIONS FROM LITERATURE
In our review of the literature, we could not ignore the tensions 
of a great debate. The desire for an informed debate on the
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causes and promotion of innovation has spawned several very 
penetrating and influential studies, including those already 
mentioned in the literature sections of this study. This is made 
all the more so by the telling insights of writers such as Kanter 
(1985) and Waterman (1990).
Their comnents seems to stand out among the mass of literature, 
and commentary reviewed here. Their messages are disturbingly 
the same, and may be paraphrased as follows: "
fIn today's increasingly uncertain, competitive 
and fast-moving world, companies must rely more 
and more on individuals within their firms to 
come up with new ideas, to develop creative 
responses and to push for change before 
opportunities disappear or minor irritants turn 
into catastrophes. Innovation whether it is in 
products, markets, strategies, technological 
processes or work practices must be stimulated'
(Kanter, 1985).
The implications from the literature can be reduced down into 
five major conclusions:
1. The basic message seems to be that strategy and 
motivational elements to stimulate innovation and organisational 
development are inextricably linked. The impetus for change and 
competitiveness through the 1990's will rely more and more on an 
innovative and entrepreneurial workforce. The broad arguments for 
and against a formal strategy being used for innovation are open 
to various interpretations. No matter how they are viewed, they 
fortell wide implications as to how organisations will develop 
their strategies in the future.
When we finished cataloguing the processes by which 
organisations make their strategies, it turned out to be far more 
more complicated than imagined in our research design phase. In 
fact, at one point, we started to believe that the term, 
strategic planning is a misnomer, that there was not a systematic
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way to create a strategy for innovation. In an attempt to make 
sense of the research on structure and innovation, we found it 
necessary to use charts and configurations of others as well as 
developing a fair share of our own.
2. The importance of an organisational structure as it 
relates to the stimulation of innovation became evident. We re­
discovered the importance of structure, and made a finding 
consistent with the research of Burgelman, who stated " structure 
and strategy exist in a reciprocal relationship to each other. 
Depending on which part of the strategic process is observed, 
both structure follows strategy and strategy follows structure 
can be correct propositions”
We found ourselves coming back to the impact of structure 
on a firm's ability to innovate as documented by Bums and 
Stalker over and over again in seeking insights as to how 
strategy-making evolves. Given the range of organisational issues 
posed in the literature, it should not be surprising that the 
most striking finding about the respondents in this investigation 
was that they all managed innovation and strategy in their own 
unique ways, but we argue they still seemed to cluster around a 
limited amount of variations as to the types of structure that 
the managers deemed useful.
3. We have concluded that while strategic planning is 
difficult to implement, its concepts are fundamentally very 
simple. They are simple because they, in the final analysis, are 
nothing more than a series of decisions and action to be taken 
over time. They turn difficult when managers seek to make sound 
and executable decisions requiring a vision to see things as they 
are and take a risk about what they may be in the future.
4. We, also, found that it was not devising a strategic 
planning technique which was the challenge, but the developing of
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a strategic focus within a strategic framework. This is the 
strategic focus in which all options are evaluated by a firm. The 
formulation of doing it requires much forethought and some 
energy.
5. We found no evidence that present and popular strategic 
models can address the stimulation of innovation, completely. In 
fact, our review supports this conclusion and the statement of 
Hofer and Schendel (1971:137) /sdiich states " In general we still 
know very little about technological innovations and its effects 
on competitive strategy, except that it can have a profound 
impact on a business's chances for long run survival”
We conclude this section and start the next by offering the 
conclusions from the field study.
9.3 WHAT COR FIELD-BASED SURVEY TOLD US
The fundamental perspective of this study is more Schumpeterian 
(1934, 1942) than neo-classical. Thus, all of our conclusions to 
follow are based on Schumpeter's principles; distinguishing the 
time sequence between the technological transfer and its 
application constitute the competitive edge.
In first six chapters, we developed a set of concepts and 
findings (pp. 168-70) about how strategy works and the impact of 
innovation. The supporting data cited throughout those chapters 
provided us with a theoretical description of how strategy 
should works, but more significantly the field-based data 
discused in Chapter Eight which showed us how strategic planing 
is actually used in practice.
We subscribe to the belief that innovation and 
entrepreneurship have proven central to a firm's advantage. Why 
firms and individuals innovate and why they are more effective
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in certain firms and not in others will be the focus of much of 
what follows.
First, we will outline those conclusions affirmatively 
determined by the investigation. Then we will present two precis 
indicating the body of data in Exhibit No. 2 , corroborated by 
some of our interviews with 26 managers, and our enquiry into the 
field of management. These created the empirical framework in 
which the following twelve conclusions were formulated about 
innovationin Scottish-based companies.
1. We were able to identify, isolate, and establish links 
between those enabling elements in strategic management and those 
that stimulate innovation within a strategy for innovation.
While there are endless lists of strategic elements (over 
137 being offered in the literature that shape strategic 
decisions), we discovered in this investigation that there were 
only four general categories of elements which are critical and 
inherent to the study of innovation: environmental elements; 
distinctive elements (such as structure, technological strategy, 
etc.); contingent elements; and motivational elements as to how 
the behaviour of the individual is motivated. These four general 
categories are made up by 21 elements identified and isolated by 
a discriminant analysis.
Using the sunmary of 21 elements as shown in Table No. 19 , 
we were able to prove that there is a positive association 
between those elements in formulating a strategy for innovation 
and a firm's innovativeness. We were able to show that there is a 
definite ranking as to how a specific element or a series of 
elements would stimulate innovation, one This was confirmed 
affirmatively by the progressive improvements in the discriminant 
function as shown below in Diagram 9.2:
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DIAGRAM 9.2: Discriminant Improvement Chart
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DIAGRAM 9.3: Seduction in Wilks1 Lambda Chart-21 Elements
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The Environmental Elements reflect the overall strategic 
focus of a firm to scan and make strategic sense of its 
environment. They indicate how a firm gains an understanding of 
its customers needs, whether it engages in a pattern of buying 
innovation from other innovators as modified by its age and 
geographic location to support a strategy to innovation.
The Distinctive Elements are those elements which a firm's 
DMU uses to create, promote, and structure innovation - 
investigating and developing activities. They are the major 
stimulants of a firm's overall mission to innovate. They are
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called distinctive because as individual elements they distinctly 
give a firm the competitive advantage which separates it from 
other firms. They can be used in isolation by either users or 
non-users with equal effectiveness or can be used in combination 
with other elements.
The Motivational Elements are those internal elements used 
by a firm to create, reward, and stimulate a desired behaviour of 
innovativeness amongst its workforce. They are propelled forward 
by a series of behavioural and human relations management 
strategies. These elements range from giving an employee time off 
to innovate to a financial reward for being innovative.
The Contingent Elements are elements which are more short 
term and are used specifically, at one point in time, to meet a 
current and long term mission to innovate. These elements are 
directly affected by the amount of resources allocated to them 
and the style of leadership being exhibited at any one time 
within a firm. It is for these reasons that they are labelled as 
being contingent. They range from whether a firm uses a 
centralised department to develop an innovation to the type of 
corporate culture exhibited by a firm’s values and its past 
history of being innovative.
It was also further confirmed affirmatively that users and 
non-users have distinct and different ways in how and which 
elements that they will use. The users were more likely to have 
a mission statment; grant employees time -off to innovate; use a 
separate department for research and development and engage in 
the formal training schemes for their employees in an effort for 
them to be more innovative. In contrast, the non-users seem to 
exert more efforts in getting to know the key needs of their 
customers; relied more on an entrepreneurial type of leadership; 
and use culture as a stimulant for innovation. These ar^i few of 
the 21 elements identified above and they can be separated
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accordingly. This was confirmed by using the mode of users and 
non-users to see which group was more likely to use one element 
over another. Below is Diagram 9.4 as to how the users used 13 of 
the 21 elements.
Diagram 9.4: Seduction in Wilks' Lambda-Users' Elements
REDUCTION IN WILKS' LAMBDA 
FOR USERS OF A FORMAL INNOVATION STRATEGY
Opstr ato
a 18
a 14
»  a to
Motime Euyin
gO. 06
amp Trained 
/  Orqf
Mocl-
irst K ayproc
Funding Ke)staff
Str ati
Elements contributing to Innovation
Diagram 9.4 shows that users by mode (51 percent or 
higher) within a group preferred thirteen of the elements versus 
eight by non-users. After the Opstrato element, the next two 
elements in the chain were Motime and Buyin were the elements 
that are noticeable above the .02 reduction axis. It is
important to state that while an element could be picked by both 
groups, it is the mode that determines its placement, e.g. 
Opstrato was selected by 68 percent of the users, but only 31
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percent of the non-users. Thus it was classified as a user's 
element.
DIAGRAM 9.5: Reduction in Wilks' Lambda- Non-users* Elements
| REDUCTION IN WILKS' LAMBDA
IFOR NON-USERS OF A FORMAL INNOVATION STRATEGY
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Diagram 9.5 shows thatthe pattern of non-users were more 
likely to cluster under the reduction axis value of less than 
.02 with the exception of Keyneeds. This could be interpreted to 
mean that there was a greater spread of responses around an 
element. This finding was correlated by the data in Exhibit 2 
that respectively most non-users have less formal methods to 
conduct their business. Further, they are less likely to exhibit 
a set of developed patterns as to how they think strategically.
2. Based on the above ranking of elements, we agree with a 
majority of academics and managers that a common problem is the
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sustained development of an innovative effort (Taylor, Tushman 
and Naylor). We conclude that the four major groups of elements 
into which all other elements can be grouped accordingly provide 
this substantially. It is by their linkage that an innovative 
strategy by a firm is sustained. The differences between users 
and non-users in Diagrams 9.4 & 9.5 are noted accordingly.
3. It is confirmed affirmatively that a firm's grand 
strategy (opstrato) is the paramount element for a firm having an 
effective strategy for innovation. We hypothesise that elements 2 
through 21, in concert, reflect a firm's sovereign element and 
forms the strategic framework in which all management decisions 
are made.
4. It is confirmed that a firm's technological strategy 
(strategy) can exert a major influence on a firm's mission to 
innovate. However, the fact that it was ranked 17th out of 21 
elements indicates that a combination of other elements may be 
more important. We hypothesise that the technological strategy 
reflects a firm's position when compared to other elements as to 
how a firm will evaluate strategic options available to it and 
how it prefers to compete. It forms a pattern of management which 
is incrementally- used to give a firm a sense of strategic 
direction. It is best used as a lower ranked strategy, similar 
to a military manoeuvre.
5. Whether users of a formal strategy will exhibit a higher 
degree of innovativeness was deemed initially as being 
inconclusive by the investigation. There are two reasons for 
this. The first being the fact that three of the 26 firms ranked 
as being the most innovative of the sample were, non-users. They 
represented about 11 percent of that group. Second, the criteria 
for evaluating users was too broad. This was further confirmed by 
the fact that having a formal programme for innovation (keyprog)
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was ranked as only 12th of the 21 elements, although 68 percent 
of the users indicated they used one.
However, after reviewing the initial self classification by 
the firms and by a subsequent re-classification, it was confirmed 
affirmatively that these three non-users were indeed users by the 
criterion of them having five or more of the nine essential 
features \diich were used to classify users of a formal strategy.
6. It was confirmed affirmatively that the older the firm and 
the more its strategic mission is extemallyfocused, the more 
innovative was its strategy. We further hypothesised that all 
successful firms are innovative and a firm's efforts to combat 
obsolescence are key contributing factors. These were confirmed 
over and over again in the post interviews, by our Tables no. 13- 
15, and in Exhibit No.2.
7. We conclude in Chapter Two that the first core of 
strategic management should deal with all aspects of strategy 
formulation (p. 60) and the second phase of implementation should 
address the organisational design and behaviour patterns of a 
firm's managers. It is owing to a poor implementation of 
motivational and contingent elements in a firm's second phase of 
strategy-making that most firms fail.
8. We accept the importance of the experience of a firm as a 
soverign strategic element for a strategy for innovation 
(Andrews, 1975 and Stephen, 1976) as stated in Chapter Three.
9. We accept the beliefs that the four generic strategies of 
business are directly based on the military. Further, we 
hypothesised that by using their principles, a typological 
ranking of eight or more strategies could be developed (Appendix 
B and Figure 8.4. on p.305).
Page 336
Conclusions and Implications - Chapter Nine
10. Furthermore, we agree with Newman, Katz, Hbfer and 
Schendel, and others cited elsewhere that a master (grand in 
military terms) strategy requires a mission statement and a goal- 
setting process within its strategic formulation process. This 
forms the comnon and unifying thread of strategy that Ansoff 
refers to. This is confirmed by Cyert and March who state that 
the negotiating of goals within a firm creates this thread of a 
comnon goal which all stakeholders can agree to.
11. We also agree that a theory of competitive advantage 
and synergy (Ansoff1 s) should be blended with the components of 
sequencing, timing factors, and a technological strategy 
(Newman). These in turn should be modified by the development and 
updating of a firm's competences-skills, and core technology- 
as critical success factors (Andrews), and the use of a resource 
allocation system (Hofer & Schendel).
For the creation of a strategy for innovation versus other 
generic strategies, one must add a series of behavioural- 
rewarding strategies (Adams, Forster). We suggest that the 
punctuated strategic conceptsare needed to reinforce and update 
the workforce from time to time (Forster). And the use of a 
formal programme for innovation-investigating (Pinchot, Drucker 
and Kanter). We hypothesise that most innovations developed in- 
house by a firm arising from a programme will come from less than 
five percent of its workforce, (Type II).
These features, in total, constitute the nine elements as 
set out in paragraph 8.11.1 which classify a user of a formal 
strategy. These were the theoretical sources of the criteria 
used earlier to determine if a user had at least five of these 
elements in their responses.
12. In the assessment of the Leadership Rules as shown in 
Table No. 18, only a small percentage of the sample (less than 11
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%) indicated that they used them explicitly. It was confirmed 
conclusively that there is "not a one best way to innovative", 
except over 84 percent of the sample indicated that financial and 
manpower planning was a vital component of a strategy for 
innovation. We hypothesised that this supported the need for an 
organisational development plan to be placed parallel to a 
strategy to innovate. It is needed to balance and fund a long 
term strategy.
Further, in an effort to support the objective of how 
innovation can be stimulated, and to validate this 
investigation, the following statements of Paul Cook, founder and 
Chief Executive Officer of Raytheon, ( the Harvard Business 
Review, March-April, 1990, pp.97-103) are submitted:
' To be an innovative company, you have to ask 
for innovation. You assemble a group of talented 
people and put them in an environment [culture] 
where innovation is expected. We get innovation 
because our corporate strategy is premised on it.
You won’t get innovation without pressure and you 
learn to spend as much selling it as developing 
it. Most people want to be creative and they all 
respond to recognition for being so. You must make 
sure that people are talking to each other and 
this is done regularly.. Also by innovating, we 
avoid competition, in fact we use partnerships 
with others competing firms .....it's that simple- 
and that hard...Every company is innovative or it 
just isn't successful. It is just a question of 
degree how innovative.'
9.3.1 PRECIS -FORMAL USERS OF STRATEGY
r
The precis for users of a formal strategy for innovation as taken 
from Exhibit No. 2is as follows:
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(a) The users as a group were more likely have a combination 
of innovation accomplishments versus the responses of the non­
users (Exhibit 2:10).
(b) Users exhibited more of a proactive type of management 
than non-users. They were more likely to innovate in order to 
exploit new opportunities and to gain a competitive advantage 
than non-users. (Exhibit 2:11).
(c) Users were almost evenly divided about using outside 
experts to stimulate innovation amongst their workforce (Exhibit 
2:12).
(d) Users were twice more likely than non-users to view 
their workers as being innovative and trained and ranked them as 
one of their greatest strengths (Exhibit 2:24)
(e) By one and a third margin, the users were more likely to 
project their future needs for promotional and marketing 
activities than non-users (Exhibit 2:31).
(f) Users were one and a half times more likely to 
incorporate technological advances as an element of their 
planning than the non-users (Exhibit 2:33).
(g) Users indicated by mode of responses that most of them 
would plan from 3 to 5 years ahead versus non-users, who 
indicated a mode of responses clustered around 1 to 2 years ahead 
(Exhibit No. 2:34).
(h) Over two-thirds more users indicated they used a mission 
statement for being in business than non-users (Exhibit 2:36).
(i) In the use of manuals as an element of their business 
plan, one out every two users indicated they used them as in
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comparison about two-thirds of non-users indicated they did not 
use them at all (Exhibit 2:37).
(j) Over two-third of users had a programme for innovation 
which was about six and a half times greater than non-users 
(Exhibit 2:42).
(k) A greater percent of users viewed themselves as Pioneers 
than non-users (Exhibit 2:43).
(1) Users by a three to one margin seemed aware that 
innovation requires greater investment and risk than non-users 
(Exhibit 2:48).
(m) Users as a group expressed a greater belief in using 
innovation purchased from the research results of universities 
and from making licensing arrangements as options in being 
innovative than non-users. However, four out every ten users 
expressed a preference for developing innovation "in-house" 
rather than purchasing it and noted the questionnaire accordingly 
(Exhibit 2:50)
(n) Users by a two to one margin believe in performing a 
pilot project first in developing an innovation when compared to 
what non-users suggested (Exhibit 2:50).
(o) Users indicated a greater number of responses for 
allocating time for employees to develop a proposal for 
innovation than non-users (Exhibit 2:50).
(p) Users indicated the hiring of entrepreneurial personnel 
as one of the key factors for one to be successful in developing 
innovation. This was not equally represented in the responses of 
non-users (Exhibit 2:52).
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(q) Over 68 percent of the users had an innovation- 
investigating department (Exhibit 2:55).
(r) The differences between users and non-users when 
innovation-investigating were noticeable by how they ranked the 
importance of R & D and the use of employee suggestion programmes 
(Exhibit 2:57).
(s) Users used a greater variety of organisational 
structures than non-users (Exhibit 2:59).
(t) Users indicated significant differences by means and 
standard deviations when compared to non-users as to how a 
strategy is developed for innovation and how management 
articulates its mission (Exhibit 2:65).
(u) Users indicated major differences in the means and 
standard deviations when compared to non-users as to what extent 
management makes bold, wide-ranging strategies and is the first 
to introduce a product or service (Exhibit 2:66)
The most representative interview of the users1 group was 
from Respondent YY, Opportunist- User, Deputy Director of a 
Japanese Electronic Firm,
"... We practice that a strategy for innovation lies 
within each employee. When they are exposed to all 
aspects of the business, their abilities are stimulated 
to be more innovative which we do by re-assigning them 
every two to three years... We do not believe in the 
product life cycle. They are no more than logarithmic 
projections after the fact. They are false to a degree 
because of two rate factors. The rate that the market 
will absorb an innovation and the rate that an employee 
will absorb the complicities of an innovation... You, 
theorists forget that distributors do not always accept 
a new product because it is new, they have financial 
commitments to existing stock. They will only want 
what their customers are demanding. And customers do 
not like to replace one product with another unless 
there are significant costs reduction techniques in it
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being purchased or a huge profit generator for them.
WHEN ASKED ABOUT HOW THEY GENERALLY MANAGED.. Each 
supervisor is allowed to manage anyway he feels fit, 
the number of hours, type of employee he hires, and so 
on. But don't forget once a person become a 
supervisor, we generally know how they are going to 
manage. HOW DO YOU SEE YOUR FIRM OVERALL AS AN 
INNOVATOR... Being one step ahead of production,
. walking side by side with the marketing department 
and customers, and one step behind our 
competitors. WHY ONE STEP BEHIND? ... We make 
profits and customers off their mistakes, we 
improve where their products are the weaknesses.
IS YOUR FIRM'S MISSION TO INNOVATE (MARLY 
UNDERSTOOD.. It seems like it is repeated everyday 
WHAT IS THE BIGGEST MISCONCEPTION WE (researchers)
HAVE ON STRATEGY? .... Your business school models 
are too simple, I personally like them more 
detailed outlining exactly the big picture...
/
9.3.2 PRECIS-INFORMAL USERS OF STRATBCT
✓
The precis for the non-users of a formal strategy is as follows:
(a) Non-users were more likely than the users to say that 
they would explore the need to innovate, foemostly as a mean to 
protect their markets. This could be interpreted to mean they are 
more reactive to their competitor than users (question No. 14- 
Exhibit 2:11).
(b) Non-users were one and a half times less likely to use 
an expert to stimulate innovation amongst their workforce 
(Exhibit 2:12).
(c) Non-users were three times less likely to view their 
facilities and location as their greatest strengths (Exhibit 
2:26).
(d) Non-users indicated that a lesser amount of them than 
users felt their strategy was best for them (Exhibit 2:44).
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(e) Non-users expressed a greater tendency to use small work 
groups and goal- setting sessions as one of the ways to motivate 
their workforce than users did (Exhibit 2: 45).
(f) Non-users by a three to one margin indicated that one of 
the negative results which would happen if they innovate is that 
a competitor would copy it before long (Exhibit 2:48).
(g) One of every four non-users believe the best way to 
purchase innovation is to acquire the firm that perfected it 
(Exhibit 2:50).
(h) Non-users indicated overwhelmingly that they would be 
more successful at innovation if they had a clearer vision on 
what is possible (Exhibit 2: 52).
(i) Non-users1 responses on the way their firms were 
organised correlated closely with the fact that they were non­
users of a formal strategy. Over 56 percent of them did not have 
an innovation-investigating department of any type (Exhibit 2:
55).
(j) Non-users' responses clustered around knowing customers 
needs and having a visionary leadership at the top as the key 
factors for a firm being innovative. None indicated that they 
would establish links with innovator (Exhibit 2:56).
(k) Non-users were more likely to use a traditional method 
of managing by delegating downwardly compared to users (Exhibit 
2:59).
(1) Non-users were more likely by a one to four margin to 
operate by using profit centres than users (Exhibit 2:62).
Page 343
Conclusions and Implications - Chapter Nine
(m) Non-users ranked that the number one way to motivate 
personnel in being more entrepreneurial was the nurturing of 
product champions (Exhibit 2: 63).
9.3.3 SETS OF C0L1BCTIVE GONffiUSIONS FROM USERS AND NON-USERS
Although the sample exhibited a wide range of responses as to how 
innovation can be stimulated, there were three sets of 
conclusions which users and non-users, collectively, have to 
offer. They should not be considered as supporting a belief that 
there is one best way, but a ranking of what empirically was 
found best for the respondents.
The first set of conclusions was the five main components 
for operating an innovative company. They ranged from a firm 
setting precise operating profit targets at 86.3 percent to how 
marketing opportunities are emphasised at 60.3 percent. How 
respondents differ as whether they informally or formally used 
them is displayed in Diagram 9.6 below:
DIAGRAM 9.6: Five Main Operating Components Chart
FIVE MAIN COMPONENTS FOR
OPERATING AN INNOVATIVE COMPANY N= 190
1.6%
5.8%
OPERATING TARGETS USED
10.5%
RESULTS IDENTIFIED &  ACHIEVED
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E223 Formally used 
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EZ3 Infrequently used 
E 3  May consider using 
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MARKETING EMPHASISED
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The second set of conclusions to which they, collectively, 
substantiated were that there were three major types of 
organisational methods which both the users and non-users found 
effective.
The major organisational methods (informally and formally 
used) range from a firm using precise operating goals as business 
objectives at 84.8 percent; operating by a known strategy at 66.9 
percent; and operating by market segments at 66.3 percent. Some 
firms used all three, but the majority of them (2 out of every 
three) used at least two of the methods as shown below in Diagram 
9.7:
DIAGRAM 9.7: Major Organisational Methods
MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL METHODS
FOR INNOVATION N =190
£53 Formally usee 
E 3  Informally usee 
(S i infrequently used 
May c o n s id e r  us inc 
EED Never exDect to  use
STRATEGY IS KNOWN
0.5%
,4.2%l
■0.0!
G TO GOALS
33.7% 20.5%
32.6% g
OPERATED BY MARKETS
These indicators are separated as whether they were formally 
used, informally used,infrequently used, may consider using or 
never expected to be used. They are excerpted from Exhibit No. 2,
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the percentage of each group fs responses as to whether they were from 
either users or non-users are tabulated, accordingly.
The third set of conclusions reached, collectively, by both users 
and non-users were the ranking of factors they determined were needed 
to be a successful innovator They are presented in Diagram 9.8 below:
DIAGRAM 9.8:
Most Important Factors for An Innovative Firm
THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS NEEDED 
TO BE A SUCCESSFUL INNOVATOR
N =  190
Strong visionary leadership  
C orporate culture  
Sm all groups used 
Form al p rogram m e used 
Founder set practices  
Open com m unication  in group  
Training of personnel 
Easy feedback &  approval 
Bosses welcom e suggestions  
Rewards to em ployees
30.0%
17.4%
14.2%
11.1%
v/mm
IB
COMPAN
5  2 0  2 5  3 0  3 5  4 0  4 5  5 0  5 5  60
Frequency
9.3.4 HYPOTHESISED IMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM THE INVESTIGATION
There are seven implications arising from the investigation. The first 
is the implication that managers must constantly fight
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first is the implication that managers must constantly fight 
againstmanagerial ignorance as a psychological factor. This is 
based on whether or not they have been successful in stimulating 
innovation. This we refer to as the "nescience factor". It is 
the chief ingredient in which a gap-filling analysis of a IMJ’s 
strategic focus is formed against.
The second implication is that a fair number of firms used 
to have a more formal system of planning, but choose to 
discontinue using it. The third implication is that a 
technological strategy either locks in or opens up the variety 
of strategic options that a firm may reasonably pursue. Depending 
on whether a firm is a Follower, or Pioneer, etc., this forms the 
strategic options and constraints available to a firm.
The fourth implication is the importance of the 
organisational development plan to fuel and balance a strategy 
for innovation. This infers the fifth implication as to how a 
strategy for innovation should be placed in parallel to a firm’s 
organisational development plan in order to describe \riiat we call 
as the "polyvalent firm". This is the type of firm which is able 
to deal effectively with current operational problems, whilst 
developing an innovation for the future.
The sixth implication is how the product life cycle concept 
can be used in the stimulation and management of innovation. The 
seventh and final implication is a model to verify the updating 
of a firm's core competences and the importance of a human 
resource model to combat obsolescence as part of a strategy for 
innovation. All of these implications were sources of interest 
from the interviews held with respondents as outlined elsewhere.
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9.3.4.1 NESCIENT GAP-FILLING MODE
The first premise on which this investigation was based is that 
all firms have a strategy of some type. It is the degree of 
knowledge to which the DMU seeks that is the key. It may ranges 
from being very aware environmental changes or not aware at all 
that makes the difference. This factor represents the nescience 
approach of management. It may be why some firms prefer an 
informal (unwritten) strategy as a method of directing their 
businesses. Diagram 9.9 below indicate the type of strategic 
options a gap-filling analysis may consider.
DIAGRAM 9*9: Direction-Gtowth Gap Analysis
This diagram as developed by Stanford Business School 
(Taylor 1977 :164) indicates that there are four basic options 
available to a firm as strategies to greater growth and profits. 
The analysis is calibrated by a series of five hash marks 
(representing one year each) will indicate how long it would 
take as an average to reach the objective. The easiest way (one
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year or less) is to raise the efficiency in a firm's present 
business proceeding through the most difficult (over five years) 
which would be the acquiring of new businesses in un-related 
fields away from a firm's core competences.
We believe that a DMU in the throes of ignorance and 
skills obsolescence generally will opt for using innovation to 
improve its firm's efficiency and seldom considers new product 
development. This raises issues for future research
9.3.4.2 EMPIRICAL VIEW OF PLANNING
The second implication we explore is that a typical non-user 
respondent was more likely to avoid the process of formally 
planning for the stimulation of innovation unless there is some 
assurance that the process will work. Several non-user firms 
expressed this view and one in particular, Respondent W  at the 
2nd symposium. His following statements may be representative as 
to how other non-users think:
" the irreversibility of starting such a strategy 
has wide implications in the event we fail, and no 
one has spelled out the exact consequences of our 
firm not forming a strategy for innovation. We had 
a bottom line about 14 percent greater this year 
than ever, why should we change?....If we believe 
what we read and hear about how fast the world is 
changing, and if the business world is suppose to 
change so rapidly what if we do jump on the 
bandwagon and find it going in a different 
direction than we planned."
This view has currency, even though firms such 3M corporation, 
Digital Equipment Company and others are showing the way. Many 
are eschewing the opportunity to take on innovation regardless of 
what their examination of the strategic models reveal. They just 
do not see the trade-offs being offered by innovation as large 
enough to compensate for the way they are presently operated.
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Instead many firms are succumbing to a tremendous pressure 
to superficially attack their problems. This could be traced to 
how the future is being portrayed as increasingly more hostile in 
a rapidly changing environment. When a theorist writes that the 
environment is turbulent we think he/she probably means that 
something is going to happen or happened that they did not 
anticipate. Yet in theory an organisation can control its future 
to a certain degree by the use of planning.
In fact, if one reads the same authors starting in the 
1950’s, 1970's and straight through, (Drucker is a good example)
they are constantly predicting that the enviroiment is in a 
turmoil and going through turbulent period. They were probably 
right, but that is the way the world always has been and 
planning can not cure a changing world. But it can provide a 
strategic view as to how fast the environment is changing.
The other observation on this implication was that a fair 
amount of firms in the sample (we hypothesised that about 10 
percent of the non-users in the 301 to 1,000 employees band) 
returned back to an informal system after abandoning a more 
formal process. This is more or less confirmed by the words of a 
non-user Respondent LL, below:
" One of the strategic things that we tried here 
was a long range planning system. It was dynamite 
when we first put it in place, it made our 
thinking fresh, the form and process was 
painless.... Then, some eight years later the 
meetings got longer, the covers of the reports 
got harder, the diagrams became more and more 
sophisticated. The process kept getting longer and 
longer. Last year, we cut back and start meeting 
into group of seven or less and we became idea- 
oriented again. The freshness is back."
The implications of this respondent and others are the 
foundations for further research whether firms are
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deliberately selecting an informal way of planning after 
using a formal method.
9.3.4.3 HYPOTHESISED STRATEGIC FOOJS MATRIX
The third implication arising from this investigation was 
how the strategic focus embodied in a firm’s technological 
strategy determines which strategic option a firm can 
pursue.
We hypothesised that a key component of a technological 
strategy is the ability of or the inability of a firm to 
scan its environment and make sense of what it sees. It was 
designed around these elements.
Based on its construction, using a firm 's 
organisational structure, its formality of using a strategy, 
and its degree of innovativeness, we propose the following 
model in Diagram 9.10. as indicated on the next page.
This strategic focussing matrix implies how it can be 
used to formulate a firm's grand strategy. One of the few 
axioms in the literature is that a firm will go through 
several sequential stages in use of strategic principles.
However, one of the misconceptions that most 
researchers in the field of strategic management fail to 
realise is that a firm will go through the strategic changes 
(internally) depending to a large degree on its history of 
being successful with one type of a technological strategy.
We believe that a firm using a Traditionalist’s strategic 
focus will probably only consider strategic options that are 
compatible to its initial strategy. The stages of 
development that a firm will go through have very little to
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DIAGRAM 9.10: Strategic Focus Matrix
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do with its age or size, we believe it will generally only 
consider to do more or less of a on-going strategy and from 
this, a new strategy evolves. A firm seldom strays from its 
basic strategy except in a hostile environment which
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generally forces a firm because of external changes. But, 
even under external and hostile pressures to change
(debtors, new competitors, etc.), a firm (unless it has
consciously decided to be innovative) will consider most of 
its options around its previous technological strategy.
For example, take a firm in position no. 1 in the 
upper-left comer of the matrix using Diagram 9.10. This 
position implies that the firm is tightly- structured, 
using recipe solutions for problem-solving, and using an 
informal planning system or an un-focused management style 
in general. These are traits \diich are symptomatic of a 
closely-held firm. The management in a scan of a benign 
environment determines that a growth strategy is feasible at 
this time. It has several strategic options available to it 
immediately.
From position No. 1, a firm can become more specialised 
and develop into a key prime sub-contractor in a niche- 
filling strategy. If that is the case, over time, the firm 
become a Dependent, position No. 3 where the firm is 
stimulated by the needs of key customers. There, a firm's 
tight controls and centralised decision-making are at an 
advantage.
Or, over time, the firm can become known for making 
a few standardised products. When a firm starts to 
manufacture these few products in larger batches, then it 
can move to position No. 2. This is the position of the 
Traditionalist. There, the technological strategy is to 
evaluate methods and innovations which will improve on costs 
and higher volume production. In the final analysis, it is 
actually more of an existing technological strategy that it 
previously used in position no. 1.
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The main strategic feature of the matrix indicates that 
a firm is more likely to move up and down and sideways by 
one position at a time unless it innovates. Then, the firm 
can proceed to positions 4 or 5. Position No. 5 should be 
avoided because generally it is controlled by large capital 
-intensive firms in a rapidly moving business environment.
A major innovation with a breakthrough could even 
move a firm to positions no. 7 and 8. However, the firm has 
to have a sharply-focused strategy to do this and a well 
trained workforce.
The option for a Pioneer firm in position no.8 is to 
engage in a series of programnes and punctuated 1IRM 
strategies in order to sustain its position and profits.
This firm fs strategies should be directed to ’’downsizing 
manoeuvres " which is a series of methods to reduce staff 
and overhead or a retrenchment strategy. We hypothesised 
that large hi-tech firms will be considering these types of 
strategies with some frequency over the next decade. For 
example, IBM, in the first time in its history had a 
reduction in its workforce of some 150,000 employees and 
plans to do more of the same in 1991.
9.3.4.3.1 PURPOSES OF THE FOCUSSING MODEL
We hypothesise that once a firm becomes locked into a 
recipe strategy regardless of its size and industrial 
position, it takes on the recipe strategy of firms in 
position no. 1. The difference being that a larger and older 
industrial leader can prolong its existence by acquisitions, 
spin-offs and mergers with more innovative firms.
The implication of how a firm implements its 
technological strategy by using this focussing matrix
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supports the view, here, that successful innovation depends 
upon a firm's scanning abilities. It is from a scanning 
activity that a firm gains an awareness that determines how 
it will act in the future and what type of strategic 
options are pursued.
Another feature of the matrix is that it can indicate 
to a firm how it should adjust its organisational structure 
and management style from an informal mode of strategy into 
a formal one, and when.
This strategic focussing matrix provides a factual 
basis for future strategy-making and has implications for 
further research.
9.3.4.A-5 HYPOTHESISED IMPLICATIONS FOR A NEW STRATEGIC 
FRAMEWORK
These fourth and fifth implications were first prompted by a 
direct question from a respondent as to how a strategic 
framework for innovation should be designed and how it 
would differs from a normal strategic plan. Research, into 
how other innovative firms have done it, produced the 
following:
"It should be simple, complex strategies 
are an exercise in self-delusion" Waterman 
(1989:48) and from Kanter (1985:204) ..
• "it [ her Chestnut Ridge Experience] must be 
parallel to an existing organisational 
structure; be linked by core skills and 
competences; has specific and formal 
programmes to stimulate innovation; needs 
a hierarchy with specialised tasks and 
functional groupings which cut across the 
entire sponsoring firm"
Based on the field work and on the re-analysis of landmark 
studies in the field of strategic management, we propose the 
model, as shown in Diagram 9.11 on the next page.
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DIAGRAM 9.11: HYPOTHESISED BUSINESS PLAN FOR DTOVATION
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This schematic of a strategic framework for innovation has 
several features. First, its most unique feature is that it shows 
three fundamentally different strategic processes going on 
simultaneously in a medium to large complex firm.
The top layer (operational plans) reflects the 
organisational development plans of a firm as it corresponds to a 
production-driven method of efficiency and meeting current 
operations, markets and products. From there, the funds are 
generated and loyalties (delivery, price and quality) to existing 
customers are kept. These are three elements which all future 
strategic concepts must build from.
The middle layer (elements of a formal stratgey to innovate) 
indicate the six strategic options available to a firm in setting 
forth its strategy to innovate. They range from diversification 
by acquisitions, and licensing of an innovation to special hiring 
and training methods which are needed sometime in the future.
The specific programmes for innovation may include a funding of 
employee suggestions to launching a fully developed innovation in 
a pilot study.
The bottom layer (punctuated strategies) reflects the 
strategic focus of management as modified by a firmfs sovereign 
element. This is the element triggered by a DMU's concept of 
risk, history of successful innovating and behaviour of employees 
to accept change. This focus is directly transferred as to how a 
firmfs corporate, competitive and functional strategies are 
implemented.
The relationship between the punctuated strategies of 
management, the elements of a formal strategy to innovate and the 
organisational development plan are critical links. It considers 
all the options which a firm may pursue from diversification, a
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decision to innovate internally and what the feedback from
suppliers and buyers provides.
It should be clear by now that the strategic model 
presented here (Diagram 9.11) is more complete than some of the 
strategic models in the past as discussed in Chapter Four.
The dovetailing of a formal plan to innovate juxtaposed and 
between a firm's conventional strategies and its organizational 
development plan is one central feature; a clear mission
statement is the other; but it, also, addresses most of the 
limitations of the earlier paradigms.
For instance, this strategic management paradigm combines 
Ansoff's narrow view of goal-setting and Andrew's broad view of 
it. This observation does not imply, however, that in some 
cases, strategies and objectives are not formulated 
simultaneously. Nor does it imply that strategy formulation and 
mission formulation processes do not overlap substantially. The 
key point is that the stimulation of innovation which is placed
parallel to these two layers, should be and is distinct as to
purpose and focus. Many of the other generic models do not 
recognize that possibility.
The other distinguishing elements, internally affecting the 
paradigm are:
(1) the elevation and importance of the mission statement 
being supported by a compatible reward system, culture- 
orientation assessment, and human resource strategic plan;
(2) the explicit identification of a firm's control for 
guiding the desired human reaction toward innovation were 
missing altogether from most of the models reviewed;
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(3) the recognition that the macro-organisation process is 
directly influenced by a firm's existing structure, and its 
culture is a key feature. By recognising this the personal 
choices of its managers to modify a strategy based on their own 
experiences is blocked. Thus, each of these elements has a 
dynamic feature and life of its own; and
(4) the model outlines how an or anisation's strategy is 
reflected in its structure as to how it would handle the issue of 
culture, tell supervisors how to react to attempts at innovation 
and the results of group work satisfaction to innovate. The 
combination of these factors, in reality, determines whether a 
firm will reach its stated strategic objective and are 
implications for future research.
9.3.4.6 A STRATEGIC PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE CONCEPT
The advantages of the product life cycle in stimulating 
innovation has been cited elsewhere (p. 139). However, the gap 
between the literature and the responses from the interviews led 
us to hypothesise that a blend of the experience curve and the 
product life cycle features for the purpose of stimulating and 
controlling efforts of a firm to innovate.
From a competitive and strategic viewpoint, there are major 
implications arising from their use. These range from how prices 
will fall once a certain volume is reached to predicting how to 
price an innovation in order to reach break-even point.
However the literature (Abernathy and Wayne, 1974) often 
argues that excessive use of the experience curve and the product 
life cycle concepts can impede a firm's efforts to innovate.
We hypothesise that the combination, using the concepts of 
Utterback (1933), and the rate of product life deterioration
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will determine at what point that an innovation can be devised. 
Ilis research indicates that there are four types of stimulants 
during a product life that stimulate an innovation.
For example, in the first stage, a firm should realise that 
most successful innovations are best directed to meet the needs 
of the market for an improved product or service that maximises 
performance; and the other stages are best stimulated by 
technology, costs and output rate improvement equipment.
These three stages are depicted below in Diagram 9.12 below:
DIAGRAM 9.12: Hypothesised Three Stages Innovation Cycle Chart
Product innovations
Process innovations
Need- ^  
stimulated
Technology-
stimulated
Output-rate- 
stimulated >
II1 2 3
Uncoordinated processes I---------------------- ----------- ■ — Integrated processes
Performance maximization ■ ■ J   1 1 !| ► Cost minimization
Stage o f Development
This chart outlines how a firm should innovate a product or 
process depending on what stage the product is in and how each 
stage is stimulated differently by a customer’s wants
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representing either cost reduction efforts, output rate 
improvement, technology, or market need.
At each of the three stages, the formality of the innovative 
activities moves from an un-coordinated process into a more 
formal integrated process as the firm has greater experience with 
the product and as its useful life matures. This model does 
establish these relationships and the innovative process over a 
period of time in a strategic sense. It provides a view to an 
innovating firm on, generally, at what stage that a market-buyer 
would probably be seeking performance maximisation or costs 
minimisation from an innovation.
One of the problems with the experience curve and product 
life cycle analyses is that they do not consider a product having 
components with different levels of obsolescence. Thus, a firm 
has to develop an experience curve chart or product life cycle 
for each one. Secondly, their concepts are more internally- 
directed on how a firm will modify a product rather than 
externally directing a firm’s strategy as to what a buyer may 
need. One of the prime features of this model is overcome this 
strategic shortfall from happening. Thus, there is an implication 
for future research here.
9.3.4.7 DIAGNOSTIC MODEL FOR COMBATTING OBSOLESCENCE
The seventh implication came from the interviews with the 
respondents in respect of their efforts to prevent the erosion of 
their core skills and competences. The importance of occupational 
obsolescence and its strategic effect was discovered at the first 
symposium held with firms in June, 1988.
It was ranked as the number one concern of the respondents as 
outlined in Table No.5 (p.229) as it was the obstacle most likely 
to prevent their firm from achieving its goals as an innovator. A
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review of the overall conceptual model (p.230-3) as developed 
from meetings with some of the respondent firms, it was 
suggested that it could be used to develop a human resource 
assessment strategic tool to motivate learning and self­
achievement by employees. Below is a reduced version of the 
conceptual model (Figure 8.2: p. 230) as a reference:
DIAGRAM 9.13: Diagnostic Use of The Conceptual Model
u>
Diagnostic and Research Model
Within this model there are five main variables which could 
be used to combat occupational obsolescence: Entrepreneurial
Output (E0); Management Strategies (W); Group Work (I); 
Environmental Factor (EQ); and a Firm Work’s Experience (II).
We hypothesise that the combination of these variables 
could be linked into a human resource management (IIRM) strategy 
in several different ways:
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1. Entrepreneurial Output (EO) equals Updating practices 
(A+B+ C+ D + E) times Management Strategies (W) times 
Environmental Factors in an individual (EQ) as directly reflected 
in a firm’s Management Practices (X.J.K )
Or, it may be stated that Updating Practices (A+B+C+D+E) 
less Reward (F) and Recognition (G) plus Group work (I) and Firm 
Experience (II) equals Entrepreneurial Output (EO)
These combinations imply that the updated, innovative 
employee is the result of many factors: past formal education, 
the extent of self-achievement and task orientation, the effects 
of supervisory behaviour, actuation of management policies which 
stimulate learning, peer group reaction, on-the-job learning, and 
strategies to innovate. The linkage of these variables could be 
used to test a firm's strategy to combat obsolescence needed in 
an effort to be innovative.
2. The model, in turn, could test a firm’s strategy to 
innovate against its existing corporate culture (Box J) and what 
new supervisory skills (Box K) are needed to make changes 
internally which are compatible with the environment.
3. The model could be used to make a review of the firm’s 
current experience (Box H) and the achievement of its group work 
in meeting past tasks (Box I).
In stimulating innovation and combatting obsolescence, these 
measures are needed in the first strategic stages as to how a 
firm should assess the level of core skills updating needed to 
meet a strategic objective. Within each group, each employee is 
tested to see whether he/she shows evidence of being fully- 
motivated or not (Boxes A through G). It could be called the 
strategic point for future updating in the model. It can be said
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that (EQ + X.J.K) is multiplied by (I + II) = W + 
(A.B.C.D.E.F.G.).
These variables, operationally defined, could be used as a 
device for assessing an individual's level of obsolescence as 
well as his/her work group level of obsolescence.
Used as such, it could become a diagnostic tool for 
determining where training and updating of employee should be 
used to correct approaching obsolescence which will affect a firm 
strategically. In such an approach, there would be two main 
types of employees:
9.3.4.8 TO ASSESS EMPLOYEES CLASSIFIED AS TYPE I
For a Type I person, (the younger employee) there is a need to 
test which of his/her skills will be made obsolete by a new 
innovation.
Since this employee is generally the last to be hired, 
he/she should be the easiest to update if a radical innovation 
is revealed in the environment or a new strategy is being 
considered by a firm. Using the model, a firm should be able to 
assess what changes are occurring in a firm's business 
environment (EQ) and what new business strategy (Box W) should be 
developed by a firm's leadership (Box X) to accommodate them.
9.3.4.9 TO ASSESS EMPLOYEES CLASSIFIED AS TYPE II
For a Type II person (the older employee, who is entrepreneurial) 
there maybe a need to evaluate the future success of a project 
that he or she is proposing for funding from a firm's formal 
programme of innovation. Or to determine which of the older 
employees in several different groups should be selected to 
manage a new project.
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A look at the cumulative experience ([(EQ.W + EO).K]) of 
the group in being innovative in which the employee worked; the 
overall experience of the firm ( X.J] + EO (I +11) ) in being 
innovative and entrepreneurial; and the factors exhibited by the 
individual ([A+B+O D+E] + [ (F + G). L) should project a firm !s 
future innovative outputs (EO) of a project with this Type II 
person in charge. The equation would be: [(EQ.W + EO)K + X.J] + 
EO (I +11) which is multiplied by [A+B+C D+E] + [(F + G). L], This 
quantity is equal to future EO (entrepreneurial outputs).
The implication as to the value of such a diagnostic tool is 
a subject for future research. Since the role of human resource 
management is to be increased as part of the strategy-making 
team, the value for this type of strategic model should be 
measured.
9.4 SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The results of this investigation demonstrate the complexity of 
innovation as well as the difficulty in causing it to happen. 
Yet, the facility and capability to develop successful innovation 
activities within a firm are crucial to the well-being and long­
term survival of all businesses. The competitive pressures to 
generate greater productiveness and success are forcing firms to 
recognise that there is a need to enhance their ability to 
develop, and launch new products and processes in ever-decreasing 
time-frames.
This need to innovate is accelerating exponentially by the 
high level of new product failure, of small firms failing to make 
the transition to more mature organisations and conversely, the 
market share losses of many well-established multinationals who 
bring about their own demise by stifling their ability to 
innovate.
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These observed business phenomena indicate that there is a 
vital temporal dimension linking strategy and innovation which is 
missing and must be understood:
(a) why are some organisations more innovative than others at 
some point in time; and
(b) why do some organisations continue to be innovative over a 
long period of time whilst others experience significant 
difficulties after initial successes?
In examining and evaluating these patterns of development, 
we have come to the view that the problem of innovation, or 
challenge if you wish, does not usually arise from a lack of 
usable technology. It is, however, commonly connected to a set of 
strategic and organisational pathologies. They, in turn, are 
directly stimulated by four groups of elements linked to a 
technological strategy within a firm's overall corporate 
strategy: (1) contingent elements; (2) motivational elements; (3) 
distinctive elements; and (4) environmental elements (see pp. 
330-8). It is clear that the firms which use most of these 
elements in a strategy are more successful than non-users. And 
the more of these elements are used, the greater a firm's 
receptivity to innovate is registered.
Furthermore, this investigation supports the conclusion that 
there is no one best way to incorporate these elements into a 
strategy for innovation. This conclusion holds true whether or 
not a firm's strategy-making is implemented in a formal or 
informal manner, an issue which is still open to further debate 
and research.
Whilst the literature on strategy-making containing a wide 
range of diversity, it is crystal clear that a firm with an 
integrated human resource component, a flexible organisational
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structure and the presence of a evolving strategic focus will 
improve its ability to innovate. This proposition is supported 
by the fact that this investigation established that 34 of the 36 
responding firms in Appendix G which exhibited an above average 
receptivity for innovation were users of a formal strategy that 
encompasses these three factors. This is further supported by the 
sample in which 92 percent of the users indicated some type of 
innovative accomplishment when only about 18 percent of non-users 
indicate the same. This finding in Exhibit No. 2:9 makes this a 
clear conclusion.
At first glance, it may appear that there is a bias skewed 
to the cluster of 36 "most innovative" firms because of the 
industry they are in, such as the electronic sector of Scottish 
industry. However, the spread is representative of all industries 
surveyed: electronic firms being the biggest group with a total 
of 11 represents about 30 percent of this group. Others were 10 
manufacturing firms; 8 service firms; and 7 pharmaceutical firms. 
Our investigation indicates that it is more important whether the 
firm used a corporate strategy consistent to its technological 
strategy rather than what type of industry it was in (i.e. 
Fatalist, Followers, Pioneers, etc). North American firms within 
this ranking were all electronic firms. This is because over 67 
percent of population of the 93 North American firms residing in 
Scotland are electronic. Overall, the number of firms owned by 
Scottish Nationals dominated the ranking of being the most 
innovative within the sample. Since over 50 percent of the total 
sample were Scottish, this finding is consistent as shown in 
Table No. 6.
One of the confusions arising from this investigation is the 
term of innovation versus innovative accomplishment. Innovation 
is treated here as a process, whilst any innovative 
accomplishment resulting from this process is viewed as an 
investment into the future. However, the innovative
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accomplishment must gives a firm a competitive edge by replacing 
the existing with an improved facilities, manufacturing process, 
operating structure, new product, etc.
9.4.1 RESULTS OF THIS INVESTIGATION
The investigation has set out to consider those elements linking 
strategy to innovation which is taking place, empirically, in 
firms located in Scotland. More specifically, the study was 
intended to investigate the primary objective as follows:
Whether those enabling elements which stimulate innovation 
within a firm and whether those strategic, elements which create a 
formal strategy for innovation can be identified, isolated, 
linked, and measured
This investigation was able to isolate 21 out of 83 elements 
which could be used to stimulate innovation. The most sovereign 
element of them was a firm history combined with a strategic 
element as to whether it was known by the employees that their 
companies had a strategic mission to innovate. This element of 
having a strategic mission to innovate linked the association of 
the other elements and the flexibility of a firm’s organisational 
structure to organise innovation -investigating and developing 
activities.
Equally, this investigation confirmed that the strategic 
framework to transform a firm into an innovative company was 
linked by some of the following elements: (1) a feedback system 
from the supervisory ranks to encourage an employee to innovate; 
(2) the use of a formal entrepreneurship programme with 
supporting services; (3) a budget for innovation investigating 
and developing activities; and (4) a scanning system which was 
responsible for the surveillance of those environmental elements 
most critical to a firm fs success.
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The strategic focussing matrix developed within the 
investigation provides a strategic choice of being reactive 
(waiting for events to take shape clearly before responding) or 
proactive (anticipating the shape of events and acting quickly).
This investigation demonstrated affirmatively that a group 
of firms could be classified into different types of 
technological strategies. This has major import on how certain 
types of companies would handle future technology. These 
strategies indicated whether they would welcome innovation boldly 
or conservatively. This typology was based on a combination of 
the vision exhibited by the management of a firm, its 
organisational structure and degree of innovativeness which 
formed these strategies.
The investigation, therefore, adds to the growing body of 
empirical evidence that points to a relationship between nine 
essential strategic elements established in the literature and 
management practices to stimulate innovation. It also revealed a 
link, empirically and internationally, between the practices of 
innovation and the updating of skills training and how some 
international companies stimulated their employees to be 
innovative differently from Scottish firms.
It has to be underlined, however, that there is no 
suggestion in this investigation that the stimulating of 
innovation can guarantee a firm’s future success in being 
innovative. Other factors such as whether or not its research 
and development is being done within a formal department as 
well as the type of management structure and leadership quality 
of the management team are important considerations. The impact 
of these factors has been demonstrated in numerous other studies.
The investigation was able to determine that the abilities 
of a firm to create an entrepreneurial organisational climate
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are critical to the rise and stimulation of innovation. In such 
a climate Aether a formal strategy is used or not, strong 
visionary leadership and small group work can cause innovative 
accomplishments within a firm. But in a formal strategy to 
innovate, the amount of freedom given to an employee to take 
time away from operational tasks was viewed as crucial.
9.5. IMPLICATIONS FOR FOTORE RESEARCH
As discussed earlier, in paragraph 9.3.4 (pp. 346-64), there are 
seven inplications arising from this investigation that warrant 
further research. They are:
1. that most firms are innovative to some degree, but it is 
the degree of ignorance which a Decision Making- Unit (DMU) 
operates in that determines whether a gap-filling strategy will 
embrace innovation. This raises an opportunity for more research. 
Specifically, this should begin to address issues related to 
whether or not a IMJ 's managerial ignorance toward innovation is 
a psychological factor or formed by the type of technological 
strategy that a firm selects to use.
2. that firms which, in the past, used a formal strategy- 
making mode are reverting back to an informal method of planning. 
This is an issue for further research. Analysis should focus on 
those firms which abandon the practice of making strategy-making 
after using it for a period of time. The experience of these 
firms and their reasons for this change may indicate an emerging 
trend developing within the field of strategic management.
3. that the strategic focus of a firm is directly reflected 
in its technological strategy. The use of the Strategic Focus 
Matrix as shown in Diagram 9:10 for future strategy-making within 
a firm has implications for further research. Additional 
research should determine whether or not a firm’s strategic focus
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will change over time. And if so, does it only consider future 
strategic options that are compatible to its original 
technological strategy in two basic directions: either to become 
more formal in its strategy-making or to become more flexible in 
its organisational structure.
4. that innovation requires a different type of strategic 
framework to which a hypothesised business structure was proposed 
(p. 356) and the merit of its use requires more research. 
Specifically, whether there are any advantages in using a three­
tiered strategic framework to stimulate innovation rather than a 
single tiered or matrix type of strategic structure.
5. that the culture and structure of a firm combined with a 
mission statement to innovate in which employees are rewarded 
according to their ability requires additional research. Current 
research is already addressing these aspects, but there is a need 
to focus attention on the specific effects as to how a new 
innovative culture can be established in an existing structure 
by the training of a firm’s supervisors. Thus, further research 
measuring the effects of a firm ’s mission to innovate using 
supervisors trained in how to handle innovative attempts by 
their employees is needed.
6. that a strategic product life cycle chart is needed in 
which a firm can project at what stage that a customer would seek 
innovation in an existing product or process. This is shown in 
Diagram 9.12 in which there are three distinct stages. Research 
should be directed as to how each stage will stimulate a 
different type of innovation.
7. that a human resource strategic model is needed to 
combat occupational obsolescence occurring in two distinct 
different types of employees is a subject for further research. 
This should be set out to look at the effects of updating the
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core skills of Type I and Type II employees as a triggering force 
to combat obsolescence and stimulate innovation at the same time.
9.5.1 FURTHER RESEARCH ISSUES
The issue of innovation within multinational corporations (MNCs) 
is one topic which has received relatively little attention
within the field of strategic management (see p. 22). Research on 
MNCs’ strategy and structure largely examines how the head office 
and its foreign subsidiary interact. The consequences from the 
perspectives of how MNCs manage innovation across physical, 
cultural and organisational boundaries is a topic worthy of 
further research (Tushman and Moore, 1988:499-517).
With respect to future research directly related to this
investigation, there seem to be three directions available:
First, the replication of this investigation in other areas 
of the world which would establish whether the relationships 
between these elements could be uncovered elsewhere.
Second, a longitudinal and more detailed study of the link 
between strategy and innovation with the most innovative firms in 
this sample would offer another opportunity for future research. 
This could also address the issue of size and age of a firm by 
incorporating firms with less than 51 employees and have been
operating less than seven years into the sample.
Third, there is an opportunity for further research into the 
testing of the seven hypothesised implications as outlined 
earlier.
In conclusion, it is important to mention that current and past 
research seem to indicate that all possible types of 
organisational innovation (formal or informal) cannot be
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bracketed together. This tends to reject a unitary innovation 
theory as the one best way to innovate. However, there is a 
linkage in which several elements will dominate in producing a 
more sophisticated method of strategy-making in which a firm can 
innovate. This investigation clearly indicates that innovation 
does occur when a synergy is created between employees, 
customers, and suppliers in some type of strategy.
Thus, any future research as to the linkage between forms 
of strategy-making and the stimulation of innovation is a topic 
that will be welcomed by all quarters of the academic and the 
business communities and would definitely advance the field of 
strategic management.
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EXHIBIT NO. 1
page 1 of 8
SURVEY ON INWATICN & STRATEGIES PCRIJLATION
Please return by SAE to:
Errol D. Alexander-1989 
Glasgow Business School 
Uhiversity of Glasgow 
57 Southpark Avenue 
Glasgow G12 8LF 
Glasgow Business School
h h i  Should be returned within two weeks of receiving
PART ONE: RESPONDENT AND FIRM PROFILE [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ] [ ]
1. I am completing this survey because:! tick one below)
a), i t  was addressed tome 1.[ 3
b). delegated to me by addressee 2.[ ]
c). forwarded from addressee to me 3.C.]
2. I^ y Name is:____________  ._________ ______________________
Title of Position held: ______________________________ __________
The Conpany:___________________________________________ _________
No. of Employees in this location___________ Parent Conpany size__________
Description of Business: estimate your years in business at this location_____
(tick one below for your core business purpose)
Mfg. 6.[ ] Service 7. [ ] Oobbing 8. [ ] Research 9. [ ]
Instructions and Notes far completing this survey:
For the purpose of this survey, an innovation accomplishment is any new management 
action/plan which gives your conpany a competitive edge. It  could be either: a new 
operating structure, new product/inarket opportunity, new sales policy, new facilities, new 
mfg. process, new assy, method, new equipment, etc.
There are 32 questions and will take over a half hour of your time to complete them. 
Together they assess how strategies for innovation are formed. So i t  is important to 
. answer every question.
Sometime a question will not accurately reflect what your organisation is doing now. 
Then you may give a response based on your opinion or what: your company should do. All of 
these responses and your written comments will be combined anonymously in a research 
report.
THMK YOU for assisting us and contributing in this important undertaking.
mm
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3. At present, my conpany has a formal strategy, progranme or policy that encourage 
innovation: (tick below)
a. Yes 10. [ ]
b. No 11. [ ]
3a.) I f  answered Yes, the name of our Progranme_________  _
For how many years ; Reports to vtfiom__________V-- / . / • ■ : /
4. In the past three years, my organisation has developed or invested in several 
innovation aoconplishnents...see exanples in mentioned on front page (tick accordingly)
Yes 12. [ ]
No 13. C ] ( i f  no, go directly to question no. 5)
4a. Please state briefly which one, vtfiy and Wien in the spaces below: 
Type of Imovation Purpose Which Year?
(Please attach another sheet i f  more space or a greater explanation is needed)
5. An organisation, from time to time, should perform an analysis of its strengths and 
weaknesses. Our organisation does such an analysis by: (tick any below that applies)
a.) Conmissioning outside experts to do so 14. [ ]
b.) Conducting internal audits in each department 15. [ ]
c.) Completing an annual piami'ng work sheet 16. C ] > ,
d.) Forming a committee of management personnel 17. [ ]
e.) Assigning i t  to a special department 18. C 3
f.)  Surveying our customers and their needs 19. [ ] J
g.) Corrparing outputs to a formal business plan 20. C ]
h.) Reviewing trade and business publications 21. [ ]
I.)  None of those stated above 22. [ ]
6. An organisation should know its strengths and weaknesses. Our organisation believes its  
greatest strength is in: (tick three and rank your three choices either 1, 2 or 3 )
a.) its name and size-reputation 23. C 3
b.) marketing expertise and market position 24. [ J
c.) management systems and culture 25. [ J
d.) research and development activities 26. [ ]
e.) an imovative and trained workforce 27. [ ]
f.)  distribution network and financial position 28. [ 1 ”
g.) operations-faci 1 ities and location 29. [ ]
h.) leadership and vision of its management 30. C J
v_______   J
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7. An organisation should understand its external environment, its corrpetitors and new 
opportunities arising within the market in which its operates. In our organisation, we 
believes, i t  is most inportant to know: (tick one)
a.) the market shares of our key corrpetitors 31. C ]
b.) tfiy customers purchase our products or services 32. C 5
c.) what is needed in the market place 33. [ ]
8. An organisation should project its needs for the future. Our organisation does this in 
the following areas: ( tick where i t  is done)
a.) financial requirements 34. C 3
b.) manpower needs 35. [ ]
c.) promotional and marketing activities 36. C ]
d.) facilities and equipments needs 37. [ ]
e.) plans to conform to governmental regulations 38. C ]
f .)  how to incorporate technological advances 39. C 3
9. A plan should be long and short term in order for a firm to be conpetitive. To that 
purpose, we plan: ( tick one)
a.) less than 1 year in advance 40. [ ]
b.) 1 year to 2 years in advance 41. C 3
c.) 3 years to 5 years in advance 42. [ ]
d.) 6 years and more in advance 43. C 3
10. An organisation should review its business plans formally because conditions can 
change. Our organisation reviews its plans (tick the smallest time interval you use 
between reviews):
a.) not reviewed at all 44. [ ]
b.) quarterly 45. C 3
c.) monthly 46. [ ]
d.) weekly 47. [ ]
e.) annually 48. C 3
11. An organisation should have a plan with several different elements to i t .  Our 
organisation believes its business plan should have( tick as many as apply below):
a.) mission statement for being in business 49. [ ]
b.) policies -departmental manuals 50. C ]
c.) operating plan 51. [ ]
d.) buckets 52. [ ]
e.) Standing operating procedures 53. C
f.)  schedule of activities 54. [ ]
g.) progranmes for innovation 55. [ ]
h.) none of the above 56. C
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PART TWO: QUESTIONS ABOUT STRAIBGY fH) UNOVATIGN
12. When i t  comes to stimulating innovation (ref to question no. 2 for exanples) by a 
strategy, i t  is best to describe my organisation foremost as being: ( tick one)
a.) a pioneer- seeks to be firs t with the newest 57. [
b.) a follower- enters the market late by plan 58. [
c.) an inritator-inproves on someone's innovation 59. t
d.) a dependent- innovates only to customer's needs 60. [
e.) a traditionalist- does not innovate by plan 61. [
f .)  an opportunitist-imovates for very high return 62. C
g.) a fatal i st-i movates to survive against others 63. [
because:
in my opinion why we are the type of organisation (as I ticked above) is
13. In my opinion, we are successful at being innovative ( or what is needed for us to be 
more successful at innovation) by having: (tick five and rank them either 1,2,3,4,or 5)
a.) formal progranmes for developing innovation 64. [
b.) rewards for innovative suggestions by employees 65. [
c.) effective small groups for decision-making used 66. [
d.) strong visionary leadership 67. C
e.) corporate policy set by founder(s) 68. [
f .)  personnel trained to be more entrepreneurial 69. C
g.) open carmunication within groups 70. [
h.) feecback and easy approval system to make change 71. [ 
I.)  corporate culture which nurtures innovation 72. [
0.) Supervisors vrfio welcome suggestions and changes 73. [
14. In my opinion, I believe we should explore being more innovative in the future so i t  
will help us to: ( tick two)
a.) reduce or stabilise our costs against carpet i tor 74. [ ]
b.) protect our existing markets against others 75. C ]
c.) exploit new opportunities for growth 76. [ ]
d.) gain a corpetitive advantage 77. 11
e.) meet new customer specifications 78. [ ]
15. In my opinion, when an organisation starts to innovate, the following happen: (tick 
four in a ll- two bad factors and two good factors that may oocur from the lis t below)
a.) new type of contracts or customers are won 80. [ ]
b.) employees are taught to be more innovative 81. C 5
c.) the relationship with our suppliers inproves 82. [ ]
d.) some current operating problems are solved 83. [ ]
e.) image in being a progressive conpany inproves 84. [ ]
f.)  additional sales or profits are generated 85. [ ]
g.) greater investment risk and losses maybe incur 86. [ ]
h.) conpetitor will copy i t  before long 87. C ]
I.)  a fair amount of operational time is distracted 88. [ ]
0.) resources are stretched and less get done 89. C ]
J
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16. In my opinion (or from our conpany experience), i t  is best to "buy" into an 
innovation rather than to develop i t  "in-house" from: (tick one from lis t below)
a.) the acquisition of the firm vrtiich perfected i t  90. [ ]
b.) a licensing arrangement to use i t  91. C 3
c.) research results of a university or institute 92. [ ]
d.) a patent purchased from inventor 93. [3
17. From our conpany experience ( or in my opinion), before a new product, innovation or 
process is developed, firs t one of the following things should happen: (tick one 
accordingly)
a.) customer research is done
b.) pilot project is launched
c.) enployees given time to develop a proposal
d.) benefits for the innovation is determined
e.) none of the above
18. From our conpany experience (or in my opinion), the maximum time for development and 
an investment period generally given for an innovation to prove itself is: (tick one)
a.) less than 6 norths 99. [ ]
b.) 7 months to 12 months 100. [ 3
c.) 13 months to 18 months 101. [ ]
d.) 19 months to 24 months 102. [ 3
e.) 25 months to 30 months 103. [ 3
f.)  31 months to 36 months 104. [ ]
g.) No maximum time lim it established 105. [ ]
19. In my opinion, we could be more successful at innovation when we: (tick one)
a.) acoept more risk 106. [ ]
b.) welcome change as being good 107. [ ]
c.) receive a clearer vision on what is possible 108. [ ]
d.) hire more entrepreneurial personnel 109. [ 3
20. In my opinion, we w ill, generally, fail on a new project which may produce a 
worthwhile innovation i f  we: (tick two and rank them 1 & 2)
a.) inpose too short a time lim it for i t  to work 110. [ 3____
b.) hold back on funds and per some! when asked 111. [ J
c.) make i t  difficult for i t  to be approved 112. [ j
d.) fail to reward the product charpion properly 113. [ J
e.) do not allow mistakes and failures by innovator 114. [
f .)  take away the time and freedom of the innovator 115. [
21. In our experience (or my opinion) a proper return of an investment for an innovation 
to be conrmerciany successful is when we: (tick one)
a.) realise profits greater than normally received 116. C 3
b.) reach break-even on investment as planned 117. [ 3
c.) able to recoup development costs plus interest 118. [ 3
d.) capture new customers and new markets 119. [ 3
94. [ 3
95. [ 3
96. C 3
97. [ 3
98. [ 3
J
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22. I believe (or by our experience) that the key factor for one to be successful in 
developing innovation is to: ( tick five and rank them 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5)
a.) learn to monitor customer changing needs 120. C ]
b.) encourage and reward innovative personnel 121. [ I
c.) engage in more outside ventures with innovators 122. [ I
d.) exhibit entrepreneurial leadership at the top 123. [ I
e.) invest in ways to inform and educate customers 124. [ J
f.) develop a network of information about changes 125. [ I
g.) conduct a survey of potential users for demand 126. C J
h.) nurture budding "in-house" entrepreneurs 127. [ J
I.)  develop a formal progranme for innovation 128. [ J
3.) create an entrepreneurial corporate culture 129. C I
K.) launch more projects into spin-off enterprises 130. [ J
1.) establish a research and development department 131. C J
PART TWEE: ORGANISATION FOR ENCOURAGING INNOVATION
23. In our organisation, we have a separate department for Research and Development
(R & D), corporate venturing and new product development ( tick yes or no accordingly):
a.) yes-all three types-R&D, venturing,new products 132. C ]
b.) yes-but functionally conbined in one or two depts.133. [ ]
c.) no- we do not have separate departments for any 134. [ ]
24. To stimulate innovation within an organisation, I believe i t  is best that: (tick two 
of the following)
a.) efforts be centralised; one service others 135. [
b.) efforts be decentralised; each develop its own 136. [
c.) efforts be done by an innovation comnittee 137. [
d.) an enployee suggestion system be developed 138. [
e.) corporate entrepreneurship progranme be used 139. [
f .)  research and development department be developed 140. [ ]
25. In my opinion, I believe i t  is best to describe the tasks being performed within our 
present organisation as mostly-managed from a perspective of being: (tick one of the lis t 
below)
a.) Discipline-based; work based on technical skills 141. [ ]
b.) Project-based; organised based on projects only 142. [ ]
c. ) Traditional-based; being delegated downward 143. C ]
d.) Venture-based; decided by consensus of comnittee 144. [ ]
e.) Matrix-formed; projects and disciplines reporting 145. [ ]
26. The business environment in which nrry organisation operates is extremely competitive 
because we are constantly faced with: (tick one or leave unaswered i f  not competitive)
a.) Supplier uncertainty; pricing or sources changing 146. [ ]
b.) Technological uncertainty; tighten quality specs 147. [ ]
c.) Market uncertainty; changing market shares 148. C ]
d.) Specific uncertainty; key customers are changing 149. [ ]
e.) Production uncertainty; shortened delivery dates 150. [ 3
f.)  Product uncertainty; declining product life  cycle 151. [ ]
______________  J
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27. In our organisation, we generally allocate our budgets for new product development, R
& D, innovation or production by one of the following methods, (tick one)
a.) using a percent of turnover; norm to industry 152. [ ]
•' b.) basing on a projected level of profits 153. t 3
c.) increasing last year by a set percentage 154. [ ]
d.) allocating i t  by the needs of projects 155. [ ]
e.) on operating costs and profit centres 155. C ]
f .)  quality of proposals and plans being approved 157. [ ]
g.) ratio to cash generators; core business needs 158. C 3
h.) percentage of profits earned 159. C 3
I.)  None of those above * ' 160. [ ]
28. In our organisation ( dr in my opinion), the best way to motivate each enployee to be 
more entrepreneurial is for us to: (tick five and rank them 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5)
a.) use a bonus reward system to promote enterprise 161. [ ]_____
b.) attract proven entrepreneurial types to workforce 162. [ J
c.) conduct on-site training prograrmes on innovation 163. C J
d.j promote problem-solvers over other employees 164. [ T
e.) give enployees time away to develop ideas 165. [ T
f .)  train supervisors to encourage innovators 166. [ T
g.) nurture product chanpions to be successful 167. [ T
h.) recognise formally a worker's innovative efforts 168. C T
I .)  create an open conmunication system of problems 169. C T
3.) use small groups and goal setting sessions 170. [ T
K.) stimulate personnel by using outside experts 171. [ T
1.) job-rotation and self-job design schemes 172. [ T
M.j find enployee's initiated project for development 173. C T 
-N.j employees to off-site training and seminars 174. I T
29. In our organisation  ^ in an effort to stinulate innovation we allocate( or should 
allocate) a certain percent of our turnover each year for development of new product and 
other innovation aocaiplishment. The amount should be: (tick one)
a.) less than 2 percent of turnover 175* [ ]
b.) ...2  to 5 percent of turnover 176. [ ]
c.) ...6  to 9 percent of turnover ; 177. [ ]
d.) ...10 to 13 percent of turnover 178. [ ]
e.) ...14 to 17 percent of turnover 179. C ]
f .)  ...18 to 21 percent of turnover 180. [ ]
30. In this section, there is space below for any personal corments which you would like 
to express on the topic of innovation in Scottish-based companies or about this survey.
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PART FOUR: ASSESSING YOUR ORGANISATION ABILITIES ID BE DNVATM
In the next two areas, we are asking you to assess the innovation quotient currently in 
your organisation. You may assess the degree of each of the following statements or 
questions by circling the most aocurate nurber from the answer scale as i t  applies to 
each.
Not at A Some- Quite Very 
All Little What A Bit Much
1 2 3 4 5
31. Vhat Ane Your Current Methods of Operating:
a.Business objectives are clearly defined and the company operates to them. 1 2 3 4 5
b.Market opportunities are identified and results achieved by co-ordination.1 2 3 4 5
c.Pricing policy matches prices to markets and not to production costs. 1 2 3 4 5
d.The conpany has a clear understanding of money and its use as a resource. 1 2 3 4 5
e.Decision making procedures are sound and supported by good information. 1 2 3 4 5
f.Management team is well trained to meet changing business needs. 1 2 3 4 5
g.Precise sales and profits targets are key elements in the business goals. 1 2 3 4 5
h.Business opportunities are identified by product/market segnentation. -1 2 3 4 5
I.Strategy is developed for innovation and management articulate i t  well. 1 2 3 4 5
32. Haw Hell Do Employees and Management Vtork Together in Your Organisati on?
a.To what extent are enployees receptive to each other ideas and problems? 1 2 3 4 5
b.To what extent do enployees keep each other informed about business? 1 2 3 4 5
c.To what extent can an enployee make a suggestion to top management? 1 2 3 4 5
d.To what extent is the conpany quick to use a new inproved work method? 1 2 3 4 5
e.To vtfiat extent is there a strong enphasis on the marketing of new products 1 2 3 4 5
f.To what extent has there been changes in new products or services lines? 1 2 3 4 5
g.To vtet extent has there been a proclivity for high risk projects? 1 2 3 4 5
h.To what extent does management make bold, wide-ranging strategies? 1 2 3 4 5
I.To vrtiat extent is your conpany firs t to introduce a product or service? 1 2 3 4 5
j.To what extent does management adjust and tries to understand uncertainty? 1 2 3 4 5
j
EXHIBIT NO.2
SURVEY DATA; SELECTED RESPONSES OF 190 FIRMS OPERATING IN SCOTLAND
Computer X (n**103) X (n=87)
Element Label-Value Users of a Non-Users
Label Description Formal Strategy Informal Strategy
1.Title Title of respondent:
* CEO/Managing Director 65.0 49.4
Managers 16.5 10.3
Specialist 10.7 21.8
Chairman 6.8 17.2
Others 1.0 
2.Parent Nationality of firm's parent company:
1.1
Scottish 37.9 55.2
N. American 30.1 21.8
Other UK 25.2 14.9
Other Overseas 6.8 8.0
3.Nonemply Size of Reporting Unit in Scotland < mean
mean
is 600 employees; 
of age 35.7
51 to 300 27.2 67.8
301 to 1,000 56.3 22.8
1,001 plus 16.5 10.4
4.Totsize Size of Parent Company size <mean is 2,750 employees;
largest was 700,000?
51-1,000 35.9 34.5
1,001-2,500 18.4 20.7
2,501-5000 6.8 16.1
5,001-10,000 5.8 10.3
over 10,001 33.0 18.4
5.Corebusi Core business purpose
Manufacturing 74.8 64.4
Service 20.1 29.9
Research 2.9 -0-
Others 1.0 2.3
6.Formalst If a formal strategy for innovation was being used?
Yes 100.0 000.0
* Note: All data is presented under the users* column with 
the largest response being first; non-users *
placement reflecting the order of users.
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Users: Non-nsers;
7.Howlong Hov long in years that the f i n  had a formal strategy?
less than 1 year 1.9
1 yr. to 3 yr. 39.8
4 yr to 6 yr 21.2
7 yr to 9 yr 6.7
10 yr to 12 yr 10.6
13 yr to 15yr 6.8
15 yr and over 13.0
8.Reports What is the level within the f i n  that formal programme for innovation 
reports to ?
CEO/ Managing Director 58.6
Specialist 12.6
Special Committee 11.7
At HQRS. of parent 9.7
Special department 3.9
Not disclosed 2.9
Others-consultant,etc• 1.0
9. Delvest Have yon innovate the past three years?
yes,we have 92.2 18.2
no, we have not 7.8 81.8
lO.Typeinvo The type of innovation accomplished
A combination of below: 48.5 29.9
just new equipment 1.0 5.7
just new product 16.5 12.6
just new sales policy 9.7 8.0
Hone at all 7.8 19.5
just new systems 6.8 12.6
just new manufacturing/process 6.8 3.4
just new assy method 1.0 2.3
none of the above 4.9 1*1
11 .Purpose Why did your f i n  innovate, tick the primary purpose?
To gain new market 28.2 27.6
To reduce costs 17.5 10.3
To exploit a technology 16.5 21.8
To protect their market 15.5 8.0
Others reason- culture,founder 10.7 3.4
N/A 7.8 19.5
To meet competition 3.9 9.2
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Users: Non-users:
12.Anexpert Do yon use outside experts to analysis your firm (SWOT)?
Yes 51.5 29.9
No 48.5 70.1
13. An audit If a special auditing team use to analysis your firm (SWOT)
Yes 56.3 41.4
NO 43.7 58.6
14.Anplan If a business plan include a SWOT?
Yes 51.5 34.5
No 48.5 66.4
15.ANgroup If an ad hoc group is formed to a SWOT?
Yes 53.4 34.5
No 46.6 65.5
16.Andepart If assigned to a department for a SWOT?
No 89.3 5.7
Yes 10.7 94.7
17.Anbuyer If buyers are surveyed by your firm in a SWOT?
Yes 68.9 51.7
No 31.1 48.3
18.Anoutput If outputs are compared to a business plan?
Yes 78.6 60.9
No 21.4 39.1
19.Ansource If trade and business publications in the SWOT
No 61.2 65.5
Yes 38.8 34.5
20.Namesize Does your firm believes its greatest strength is:
its reputation, name or size?
Most important 25.2 26.4
21.Marktpos Does your firm believes its greatest strength is its market position?
Most important 13.6 11.5
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Users: Non-users:
22.Syculture Does your firm believes its greatest strength is its systems 
and culture?
Most important 4.9 8.0
23.R.D Does your firm believes its greatest strength is its research and 
development activities?
Most important 10.7 3.4
24 .Worker Does your firm believes its greatest strength is its innovative
workers?
Most important 21.4 10.3
25 .Network Does your firm believes its great strength is its financial or
distribution network?
Most important 1.9 1.1
26. Facloc Does your firm believes its greatest strength is its facilities 
and location?
Most important 16.1 4.9
27 .Vision Does your firm believes its greatest strength 
is its visionary leadership?
Most important 17.5 23.0
28.Exenviro In understanding our environment, we believe it is most important
to know:
What is needed in the market place; 70.8 70.1
Why customers buy our products;or 21.4 18.4
The market share of key competitors; 7.8 11.5
29. Fubudget If your firm uses financial systems to manage by?
Yes 96.1 92.0
No 3.9 8.0
30.Fuworker Does your firm projects its manpower needs?
Yes 86.4 82.8
No 13.6 17.2
31.Fumarket Does your firm projects its marketing activities?
Yes 80.6 60.9
No 19.4 39.1
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Users: Non-users:
31.Futools Does your firm projects its plant equipment needs?
Yes 96.1 82.8
No 3.9 17.2
32.Fugovern If your firms projects the impact of government regulations?
Yes 59.2 44.8
No 40.8 55.2
33.Futech If your firm projects how to incorporate technological advances?
Yes 76.7 47.1
No 23.3 52.9
34.Timeplan How far ahead in years does your firm plan?
3 to 5 yr ahead 58.3 27.6
1 to 2 yr ahead 31.1 48.3
less than 1 yr 7.8 19.5
6 yr or more 2.9 4.6
35 .Review How often does your firm review its plans?
Monthly 41.7 36.8
quarterly 35.9 39.1
Annually 18.4 12.6
Weekly 3.9 6.9
36.Emission Does your firm's strategy have a mission statement for 
being in business?
Yes 66.0 41.4
No 34.0 58.6
37.Emanuals Does your firm use manuals to control your strategy?
Yes 50.5 36.8
No 49.5 63.2
38. Eopplan Does your firm use an operating organisational plan?
Yes 92.2 75.9
No 7.8 24.1
39.Ebudgets Does your firm's strategy uses budgets?
Yes 96.1 86.2
No 3.9 13.8
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Users: Non-msers:
40.Esop Does your f i n  use standard operating procedures?
Yes 63.1 51.7
No 36.9 48.3
41.Eschedule Does your f i n  use a schedule of activities?
No 55.3 62.1
Yes 44.7 37.9
42.Eprogram Does your f i n  use a formal programme for innovation?
Yes 65.0 9.9
No 35.0 90.1
Note: 47 Users had a name for their programme 
(e. g. pathfinders for 3M Corp.)
43. Strategy Will you select one of the following that foremostly 
describes your fin?
Pioneer-first with the newest 45.6 31.0
Dependent-innovates/customer * s needs 14.6 27.3
Imitator-improves on other's products 13.6 14.9
Follower-enters market late by plan 9.7 10.3
Opportunist-innovates/very high returns 9.7 4.6
Traditionalist-does not innovate 4.9 4.6
Fatalist-iunovates to survive industry 2.9 6.9
W.Why Why did you describe your f i n  that way? Because in my opi
This way for more opportunities/growth 48.5 43.7
Not disclosed 16.5 27.6
That this strategy works best for us 16.5 6.9
Constraints force us to be this way 15.5 16.1
45.0f the following (10 elements), the most important way to be innovative 
is to have:
Vislead Strong visionary leadership 34.0 25.3
Culture Culture nurtures innovation 18.4 16.1
Formal Formal program for innovation 13.6 8.0
S-group Small work groups 10.7 18.4
Founder Policies inherited from Founder 9.7 6.9
Trained Personnel trained for innovation 4.9 3.4
Opencom Open comunication within group 4.9 9.2
Bosswelc Boss welcome suggestions 2.9 2.3
Rewards Rewards/innovative suggestions 1.0 3.4
Ezsystem Feedback/easy approval for change -0- 6.9
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46. Explorl 1 believe we should explore ways in being more innovative because:
They will exploit new growth 42.7 39.1
They will reduce our costs 33.0 26.4
They will protect markets 18.4 26.4
They will give us an edge 5.8 8.0
47.Goodfacl 1 believe when a firm starts to innovate, 
the following good things happen:
New contracts and customers are won 54.4 50.6
Image as a progressive firm occurs 17.5 18.4
Employee are taught to be innovative 12.6 12.6
Relationships with suppliers improve 7.8 8.0
Some operating problems are solved 7.8 10.3
48. Badfacl I believe when a firm starts to innovate,
the following bad things happen:
Greater investment and risk occur 63.1 18.4
Fair amount of time is stretched 18.4 21.8
Competitors will copy before long 18.4 57.5
49. Buy in How a firm should buy its innovation rather than develop it
Firm should gets it from a University 40.8 10.3
Firm should liscense it from others 27.2 43.7
Disregard this method as an option 24.2 9.7
Acquire patents from inventors 6.8 5.7
Acquire firm which perfected it 1.0 27.6
50.First Nhat is the first thing a firm should do before an innovation is developed
Conduct a customer survey 37.6 55.2
Do a benefit analysis 35.9 33.3
Allocate time for a proposal 15.8 4.6
Perform a pilot project first 10.7 5.7
Maxtime The maximum time to be given in the development of an
19 to 24 months given 22.3 27.6
7 to 12 months given 19.4 32.2
No maxium time established 18.4 17.2
13 to 18 months given 16.5 11.5
25 to 30 months given 11.7 2.3
30 to 36 months given 7.8 6.9
less than 6 months given 3.9 2.3
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52.Bemore I believe my firm could be more successfully at innovating if ve:
Welcomed change as being good 35.0 29.9
Had a clear vision on what is possible 24.3 46.6
Hired more entreprenuerial personnel 23.3 13.8
Accepted more risk 17.5 10.3
53.Fimpose I believe we, generally, fail on innovation
when we do one of the following:
Imposing too short a time limit 48.5 41.4
Not allowing mistakes and failures 18.4 17.2
Holding back on funds when requested 17.5 27.6
Making approval difficult to get 8.7 4.6
Not giving freedom to innovate 5.8 6.9
Failing to reward Product Champion 1.0 2.3
54 .Return I believe that a proper return on an investment for an innovation 
is when:
New buyers and markets are captured 46.6 43.7
More profits than normally is received 34.0 33.3
Planned Breakeven point is reached 12.6 11.5
Able to recoup all costs & interest 6.8 11.5
55.Depts Does your firm have separate departments for venturing,
R & D, and new products?
No, we combine them into one 44.7 33.3
Tes, we have separate departs 23.3 10.3
We have no departs at all 32.0 56.3
56.Keyfactor For successful innovation, the most important
of the following key factors are:
Keyneeds Customers's needs are monitored 18.4 29.9
Key lead Leadership at the top 50.5 14.9
KeyCult A firm entrepreneurial culture 17.5 36.8
Keyusers A survey of potental users 2.9 2.3
Keylink Establish links with innovators 2.9 -0-
KeyRD R & D department is used 2.9 4.6
Keystaff Encourage and reward staff 1.9 3.4
Keyprog Formal programme of innovation 1.9 -O-
Keylnfo Network of information is used 1.9 2.3
Keyideas Nurture ideas from workforce 1.0 3.4
Keyspin Launch more spin-off projects 1.0 1.1
Keymedia Ways to inform customers -0- -0-
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57.Siminovl To stimulate innovation, centralised, it is best that:
R & D Dept be used 38.8 37.9
Corporate entrepreneurship be used 27.2 29.9
Employees' suggestion system be used 19.4 24.1
Innovation committee be used 13.6 14.9
58.Siminvo2 To stimulate innovation, decentralised, it is best that
Iteployees* suggestion system be used 39.8 43.7
Corporate entrepreneurship be used 32.0 35.6
R & D Dept be used 17.5 12.7
Innovation committee be used 10.7 8.0
59.Typeorg My firm is mostly-managed by one of the following ways:
Project-based:organised projects only 26.2 19.5
Matrix-managed: projects/disciplines 25.2 10.3
Traditional-based: delegated downward 23.3 39.1
Discipline-based: based on skills 22.3 28.7
Venture-based: consensus by committee 2.9 2.3
60.Busenvi My firm operates in one of the following environment:
Market uncertainty 44.7 47.1
Product uncertainty 14.4 9.2
Technological uncertainty 13.6 5.7
None of those listed in question 10.7 6.9
Supplier uncertainty 7.8 10.3
Production uncertainty 4.9 9.2
Specific uncertainty/ customers changing 3.9 9.2
61. Opinion If an opinion was expressed in question no. 30:
Negative- questionnaire design 2.3
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62.Budgets In my firm, we allocate budgets for innovation by
The needs of the project; allocated 38.8 28.7
Quality of the proposal when approved 16.5 14.9
Norm to industry:percentage of turnover 11.7 9.2
None of those methods listed 10.7 21.8
Projected level of profits to be made 6.8 6.9
On operating costs/profit centres 5.8 13.8
Ratio to cash generators/core business 3.9 1.1
Increased by set amount each year 3.9 3.4
Percentage of profits earned 1.9 —0—
63. The best way (1st choice) to motivate enployees to be entrepreneurial is to
Motypes attract more entrepreneurs 19.4 19.5
Moopen create open communication system 17.5 18.4
Mobonus use a bonus system to reward 15.5 11.5
Mogoals use small groups to set goals 11.7 15.3
Moboss train supervisors to stimulate 8.7 5.7
Moaward recognise employees' efforts 9.7 12.6
Mosolver promote problem-solvers 5.8 5.7
Mochamp nurture product champions 5.8 4.9
Moseljob use self job design scheme 1.9 6.4
Moexpert use expert to stimulate 1.0 -0-
Motime give them time off to innovate 3.9 —0—
Motrain train employees on-site -0- 4.6
Mo fund fund employees' projects -0- 1.1
Moffsite train employee offsite -0- -0-
64.Allocate As a percentage of turnover for innovation, I suggest that: 
The least amount to be: < question not framed properly, little value?
less than 5 percent 40.8 39.1
less than 2 percent 24.3 47.1
less than 9 percent 16.5 8.0
less than 13 percent 11.7 5.7
non-disclosed 3.9 -0-
less than 17 percent 1.9 -0-
over 20 percent 1.0 -0-
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Respondent Name:
EXHIBIT BO. 3
Date:
;irm name: Tel. No. _ _ _ _ _ _ _
j will be attending the symposium of being scheduled for the 5th of May, in the Senate Room in 
he University of Glasgow yes[ ] No [ 3 see enclosed RSVP card
i
0 assist us as you have done in the past, we are asking you to take ten minutes to assess the 
olloving statements by circling the most accurate number from the answer scale as it applies t 
our firm. Not From time
At all Seldom_____ To time Generally Always
1 2 3 4 5
. There are conventional ways of doing things in our firm which rarely change.1 2 3 4 5
. In our firm, policy changes occur slowly. 1 2  3 4 5
L Quick decisions and actions are not characteristic of our firm. 1 2  3 4 5
, News ideas are always being tried out here.l 2 3 4 5 
, The setting up of unusual plans is encouraged here.l 2 3 4 5
1 The latest discoveries make few changes in the way this firm is run. 1 2  3 4 5
| Most people in our firm talk about the future. 1 2  3 4 5
Our employees are encouraged to adopt a long-term outlook. 1 2  3 4 5
For our firm the development of the new is of secondary importance.] 2 3 4 5
. New product development ranks high in our firm*s list of priorities. 1 2  3 4 5
. Please indicate the foremost reason for you taking a training course?
please circle Not Barely Somewhat Very
below: Important Important Important Importance Important
1 3 3 4 5
update existing skills 1 2  3 4 5 To gain new and needed skills 1 2  3 4 5
improve chance of promotion 1 2  3 4 5 To receive better assignment 1 2  3 4 5
:ause it was assigned 1 2  3 4 5 My firm does not sponsor courses 1 2  3 4 5
Overall, how important are new ventures and/or new product development to your Firm ? 
Explain Please: use space below or the back.
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[ ] 
[3 
[ 3 
[ 3
[ 3
[ 3
I have been in this profession f o r  years.
SECTION I
1 Innovation is based on leamable and repeatable skills. There 
is a definite way to practice innovation, whether science 
based or knowledge based.
Scale before discussion Scale after discussion
a) I strongly agree [ ] a) I strongly agree 3
b) I agree [ ] b) I agree l
c) No opinion [ ] c) No opinion i
d) I disagree [ ] d) I disagree 3
e) I strongly disagree [ ] e) I strongly disagree 3
2 Accountancy "is based on the return of assets, and often 
penalises a decision to innovate, because it makes the new 
project share in overheads or other charges which don't 
measure the long term value of the decision."
Anthony/106/
Scale before discussion Scale after discussion
a) I strongly agree [ ] a) I strongly agree t 3
b) I agree [ ) b) I agree [ ]
c) No opinion [ ] c) No opinion ( ]
d) I disagree [ ] d) I disagree [ ]
e) I strongly disagree [ ] e) I strongly disagree [ ]
V__________  J
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D E L P H I
Please classify yourself:
1 As a business manager of
a) a Scottish-owned company
b) a North American-owned company
c) an overseas/European-owned company
d) a UK-owned (but not Scottish) company
2 As an academic
My speciality is .....................
3 As a specialist in ...................
University of Glasgow —
Management Studies Exhibit no. 4
8 A formal strategy is often based on policies and programmes 
already approved. A long range plan covering 5 years is 
locked in by events which may or may not occur, or at best it 
is a one year plan extrapolated forward. Thus, a deliberate 
long term strategy is a formula for failure, as it locks in 
managers to a narrow way of thinking and thus should not be
used by firms.
Scale before discussion Scale after discussion
a) I strongly agree [ ] a) I strongly agree [ ]
b) I agree [ ] b) I agree [ ]
c) No opinion [ ] c) No opinion [ ]
d) I disagree [ J d) I disagree [ ]
e) I strongly disagree [ ] e) I strongly disagree [ ]
9 Business strategy is supposed to be formed from military 
principles. However, the key military points of all plans are 
that they should be clear, direct and be executed to their 
fullest. The simplest plan is preferred. Then business 
theorists should stop recommending long detailed plans.
Anthony/58/155
Scale before discussion Scale after discussion
a) I strongly agree [ ]
b) I agree [ ]
c) No opinion [ ]
d) I disagree [ ]
e) I strongly disagree [ ]
a) I strongly agree
b) I agree
c) No opinion
d) I disagree
e) I strongly disagree
10 Strategy planning for innovation is essential to growth. The 
opportunities to solve problems or to create new products do 
not arise according to a timetable or to demands by top 
managers. They generally occur by accident or informally. 
'‘Systematic implementation' through the whole company must be 
done or strategy fails.
Scale before discussion Scale after discussion
a) I strongly agree [ ] a) I strongly agree [ ]
b) I agree [ ] b) I agree [ ]
c) No opinion [ ] c) No opinion [ ]
d) I disagree [ ] d) I disagree [ ]
e) I strongly disagree [ .] e) I strongly disagree [ ]
page 390 (b)
University of Glasgow _
Management Studies Exhibit no, 4
3 It is very doubtful whether the profit/loss goals of 
accountancy truly reflect the business goals of an 
organisation. It ignores the fact that the organisation has 
many goals other than profit. But are there ways to overcome 
this?
Scale before discussion Scale after discussion
a) I strongly agree [ J .a) I strongly agree [ ]
b) I agree [ } b) I agree [ ]
c) No opinion [ ] c) No opinion [ ]
d) I disagree [ ] d) I disagree [ ]
e) I strongly disagree [ ] e) I strongly disagree [ ]
4 One researcher has said that the manager in the 1990's will 
need to have new skills in being entrepreneurial (whatever 
that means). He must establish nexus communications (flexible 
links) with his supplier, employees and customers, and try to 
create a polyvalent managerial approach, balancing short term 
operational problems with long term strategical concerns. To 
many of you this situation is already a reality in your 
organisation and managers should establish these approaches.
Scale before discussion Scale after discussion
a) I strongly agree [ ] a) I strongly agree [ ]
b) I agree [ j b) I agree [ ]
c) No opinion [ ] c) No opinion [ ]
d) I disagree [ ] d) I disagree [ ]
e) I strongly disagree [ ] e) I strongly disagree [ ]
5 Big firms are better at innovating by being efficient and 
smaller companies are better at innovating by being flexible.
Scale before discussion Scale after discussion
a) I strongly agree [ ] a) I strongly agree [ ]
b) I agree [ ] b) I agree [ ]
c) No opinion [ ] c) No opinion [ ]
d) I disagree [ ] d) I disagree [ ]
e) I strongly disagree [ ] e) I strongly disagree [ ]
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APPENDIX A
INTRODUCTION
This appendix, as a supplement to Chapter Two and Table No. 1, 
provides a discussion of the nine major influences leading to 
the development of strategic management as a field of study.
It also outlines the key chronological events, the rise and 
fall of strategic management as a discipline and the coinage of 
the term, strategic management.
Key Factors Leading to Business Strategy
The nine factors leading up to the development of strategy into
a field of study are enumerated below:
1. Business Environment became more hostile.
2. The spread of foreign markets and operations.
3. Unforeseen decline of markets and products.
4. Rise in technical and pecuniary economies theories.
5. Investment cycles became longer and risk greater.
6. Organisational structure became more complex.
7. Management education providers increased.
8. Wealth-creation opportunities in management,
9. Standardization of strategy as a managerial tool.
Foremost of the reasons why business strategy was developed as 
one of the emerging rational approaches for managing change were 
the following:
1. The overall business environment became more hostile.
Due to a world wide depression in the 1930*8, a propensity for
business mergers, the rise of unionism and increased statutory
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regulations, the environment for business became more uncertain 
and less controllable. An inability to cope with these negative 
factors required managers to develop new competences later to 
be described by Andrews (1961) and Ansoff, (1965) as elements 
for strategic planning.
2. Foreign markets and operations were becoming commonplace 
to business after the 1900*s. By 1914 scores of leading U.S. 
firms had factories in Europe; many had four plants or more. 
Within less than ten years later, most USA automobiles 
manufacturers, some consumer goods producers and all of its 
major oil firms had satellite foreign companies. Literature by 
Vaupel, (1969) and Wilkins, (1970) examined the spread of these 
international operations in the 1900's. The entry of technology 
needed new management skills to forecast the effects of these 
off-shore plants, strategy-making being one of them.
3. The unforeseen decline of certain products and market 
share reduction due to the strategies of challengers became more 
pronounced in this period. Kotler (1986) described how the 
slow-growth period in the late 1930's forced many firms to 
attack the before ignored markets of its competitors. In this 
era, planning was mostly centred around strategies that 
protected a market. Basically, protection of one's existing 
products or services required a more balanced strategic defence 
around economic realities than a strategy of growth. 
Challengers at the expense of market leaders would select 
strategies to take advantage of their regional, size and price 
differences by undercutting market leaders's pricing • A 
primary thrust of business tactics in this period was pricing.
4. The rise in the 1920 and 30*s of theories for 
technical and pecuniary economies were key factors for a more 
managerial approach to strategy. These were methods using a " 
critical mass size " objective as a basis for business planning. 
The use of technical economies principles as functional
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strategies were geared to alter the physical production process 
inside the firm. They also provided an strategic window for 
management to engage in vertical and horizontal integrations 
outside the firm.
Pecuniary gains realised by using functional strategies 
enabled a firm, as a large volume buyer, to pry lower prices 
from its suppliers. The use of volume discounts reflects not 
only monopoly power, but efforts to exert market power against 
the rise of a new competitor strategically.
The theories (economies of Scale, the scientific 
management techniques and macro-economists theories on 
industrial barriers) became accepted as the major guide lines 
for strategic planning by the 1930's. Whilst these theories 
received their births in the early 1900's, they are still very 
popular among business planners today such as the concept that 
the average cost curve of doing business declined as a firm 
became bigger. Bain (1975) argued that " the need to achieve a 
certain size for an economy of scale " was the major factor why 
many industrial organisations sought growth. The other appeal of 
these theories to many managers is that they are easily 
understood in an operational context. The results of using them 
are easily measured in higher profits when costs are lowered. 
Also the results of using them appear almost immediately upon 
implementation. They were viewed as a "quick fix " for fast 
profits, but were seldom used as a strategy for growth.
5. Business investment cycles became longer and risk became 
greater. From 1937 through 1950 (Shepherd, 1979 and Adam, 1986) 
firms became larger and more complex in size and product range. 
Capital expenditures for larger plant and equipment required 
longer pay-off investment cycles which caused owner equity to be 
recasted into larger debt. This debt to equity ratio increased 
resulting in greater financial risk. These longer debt 
schedules forced many a growing firm to project their plans
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over longer term periods than before and to take greater care as 
to what the future may bring than was the rule previously.
6. The organisational structure and decision-making 
processes became more complex. With a more hostile environment 
and larger workforce to control coupled with higher risk 
investment cycles, managing a growing business was no longer the 
province of the one man boss. All of these conditions induced 
many large and private business owners to forego some of their 
responsibilities and to delegate the policy-making area of 
management to employees. For the first time in any significant 
number, they sought professionals to ease the burden of 
ownership. The setting and agreeing type of meetings on strategy 
became the major directive to how absentee owners delegated 
their control to managers.
7. The formation of management education providers as a 
resource outside the companies training programmes. To meet the 
demand for trained employees stated above, management schools 
and business courses (Howell, (1959); and Pierson, (1959) ) were 
being formed to supply the larger family owned firms with 
managers schooled in business logic. From this attempt to 
educate and reward potential managers on how to think like 
owners, the topic of policy-making was introduced into the field 
of management. It was first introduced as a business topic in 
1901 by the Dartmouth Amos Tuck Business School, primarily to 
acquaint employees how to make policy which enhance the rights 
of absentee owners.
8. Wealth-creation opportunities were being created for a 
rising new social class called the professional manager. The 
motivation for some managers to be wealthy is an often 
overlooked reason for the development of strategic theories. 
Studies done by Monsen, (1968)and Lewellen, (1971) indicated how 
in the 1940's, for the first time, the wages of these 
professional managers depended more on the size of their
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facilities and number of employees reporting to them rather than 
loyalty to the owner or family as in the past. Therefore, it was 
financially and personally rewarding for employees to engage in 
strategies which would increase the size of an employer *s 
company. In this period strategy was used as a growth mechanism 
by many managers as a way toward advancement to personal wealth 
and power.
9. The rise of professionalism and standardization of 
strategy formulation techniques as a topic and a discipline by 
management associations, consultancy and journals became 
evident. The appurtenances of professionalism- societies,
journals, university training, and specialized consultants- 
began to flourish in the 1920's. Managers began to attend the 
same schools, read the same articles and developed the same 
common outlook on how business should be operated.
This diffusion of new managerial and administrative 
procedures was accelerated by the founding of the American 
Management Association in 1924. This organisation for top and 
middle management created a need for the exchange of methods and 
decision-making. In doing so, regional societies were formed, 
journals published , and more professional development courses 
were established in major colleges and universities. The 
formulation and implementation of business policy consumed a 
larger and larger proportion of attention by these institutions.
The other concrete evidence of this professionalism was the 
appearance of the management consultant. Chandler (1977) 
indicates that the first firm established for the purpose of 
business policy and strategy was Mckinsey in 1925. Within five 
years there were 42 other firms offering advice on functional 
activities including personnel and marketing.
In the next two decades following, a wave of books 
appeared in accounting, finance, marketing and organisational
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concerns mostly written by the instructors at the Harvard 
Business School and the University of Chicago. In the early 
1940*8, it was estimated that up to one-third of the articles 
appearing in the Harvard Business Review dealt with topics 
related to the integration of these separate disciplines.
KEY CHRONOLOGICAL EVENTS FOR STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
After World War II, industrial firms continued to grow by 
adding new units. In their efforts for the internalizing of 
these activities, they began to use methods of co-ordination. 
Separate departments were created solely for the purpose of 
planning and the deployment of resources and their exchange 
between these multi-units. Haspeslagh (1982) expressed the rise 
of planning units in Fortune 1000 companies, "each year in this 
period another 25 to 30 organisations joined the ranks by having 
a planning department".
Concomitantly over 2.5 million American armed forces 
service men were returning back to industry and began to express 
their concepts of business co-ordination in military terms... as 
was true in other parts of the developed western world. Equally, 
business publications with writers with the same wartime 
experiences were able to understand these terms and popularised 
them in literature for management.
It was in these publications that concepts and terms such 
as management strategic thinking and planning became more 
focused. The lessons carried over from the military were that 
planning should be deliberate around five steps: initiation,
concept development, plan development, plan review and, finally, 
supporting tactics.
This process of "deliberate planning" evolved into the 
belief of Clausewitz that " commerce can and should be compared
page 396
to war". Gardner (1986: 26.14) reviewed the nine principles of 
war and how they could be translated to the world of commerce.
These nine principles were enumerated to be: (1) establish 
objectives that are clearly defined, decisive and achievable; 
(2) an offensive action is superior to a defensive one...seize, 
retain and exploit the initiative; (3) seek to develop mass and 
concentrate the most resources at the right place and at the 
right time; (4) allocate the minimum power to secondary efforts; 
(5) manoeuvre to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage 
by being flexible; (6) concentrate an unity of effort under one 
commander for each objective; (7) never permit the enemy to 
acquire an unexpected advantage; (8) always seek to surprise the 
enemy at a time, in a manner or place for which they are least 
prepared; and (9) prepare a clear and simple plan which can be 
placed in action by a clear and concise order.
Further it should be stated that these principles being 
executed will not be a substitute for a desire to win or to 
replace judgement by a decision-making unit.
A review of some of the philosophies germane to strategy 
by prominent generals illustrate this in the following 
citations: D. MacArthur..."gain the most while losing the least 
by hitting them where their supplies and strengths are not...let 
them die on the vine"; Sun Tsu, who wrote 2500 years ago..."in 
war, information is power and be like eggs, the freshest the 
better" to G. Patton, the American General, who said "understand 
first the situation, visualize what could happen, and grasps the 
opportunities but understand the risks" and the statement by D. 
Eisenhower as Commander in-Chief of the Allied Forces, " the 
plan is nothing, but planning is everything".
How Research Lagged Behind Business Strategy
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Attempts to convert the principles and generalship of war into 
strategy for commerce dragged years behind actual practice.
In fact, Paul (1978) estimated that writing about 
developing the elements of strategy in business journals was no 
more than around 25 years old. The gap between understanding the 
practice of "strategic thinking " as executed by business 
executives and academics writing about it has a mismatch going 
back some 75 years.
For example, in 1914, Henry Ford made a landmark strategic 
decision to offer five dollars for eight hours of labour. The 
prevailing wage was $2.90 for nine hours of labour at the time 
with a great labour surplus so many questioned his judgement. 
This decision was discussed in business journals and in academic 
circles as the first step toward bankruptcy to the extent that 
none of his competitors followed suit for up to three years 
after.
A more complete review of Ford's decision as related by 
Mr. Charles Sorensen, a top Ford employee, is given space here
because it provides a key landmark on the insight on the
strategic nature of this action. He writes (1941)
'In fact we made $3 million profit in the first 
year of the wage change and tripled our profits 
the second and so on. It was purely a decision 
made after we had a strike in Manchester, England 
on December 13, 1913. Upon my return Mr. Ford and 
I spent many a hour discussing ways to discourage 
that from happening here. We also reviewed an 
persistent labour problem with workers leaving to
work for competitors on a week to week basis when
they offered a penny more.
We also tried to forecast if a strike would 
happen to a competitor (General Motors) how could 
we gain from it. We both agree higher wages would 
be unexpected by our competitors and discourage 
the workers from striking or leaving us for 
another job. Above all, we could plan at least six 
months ahead on a stable workforce if we made that 
a condition of service for receiving this higher
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wage. In Ford's judgement we could control the 
market if we could in the next six months
produce more units to the increasing popular 
demand for the motor car'.
History proved Ford's strategy to be correct. Against new and 
existing competitors, over the next seven years it increased 
its market share from 25 percent to over 60 percent. The 
decision embodied many of the military principles of 
strategy.... Clear objectives, an element of surprise, 
developing the right concentration of resources at the right 
time with an offensive action .
Another example of doing business in accordance with the 
facts and circumstances of this industry was in 1921 when
Sloane (1964) indicates how General Motors (GM) when it was 
losing both market share and revenue, its Chairman Pierre du 
Pont established a special planning committee. The aim was 
to chart the "true best course for the future".
At the time, GM's policies and plan of action were 
directed to creating a number one objective.."GM was to make 
money by lowering costs and attracting more customers than 
Ford through better product line over the next couple years
"(pp. 82-94). This marked the change of GM from an
entrepreneurial entity to a managerial one.
Again, literature in business journals on the whole
failed to understand Pierre du Pont's generalship at GM in 
formulation of a long term product strategy. The literature 
being written (Taylor, Going, Knight, Robb, Shaw, Kimball, 
Butler, Diemer, Jones and many others) was directed more to 
accountancy, marketing, economics, personnel, and engineering 
tactics than to the study of strategy. Most business pundits 
ignored the significance of this type of planning activities.
THE RISE AND FALL OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
At first many of the business strategies being used in the 
period of 1950 through the 1960's centred around product.
These were mostly planning-product modes; if a firm had 
a product or service, then it developed a product market 
strategy for it. The hallmarked titles to achieve in this 
period as a professional planner were "strategic planner", 
when the staff reported directly to top management and 
"corporate planner", when the firm had developed layers of 
strategies. It was at this time, larger firms began to 
convert overall corporate goals from divisional or product 
ones.
General Electric (GE) of the USA became the pioneer in 
strategic planning by establishing a formal planning
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department in 1948. Its staff of 60 professionals 
developed models of planning which were directed to 
identify emerging markets and the development of new products 
to exploit them. One of GE' s senior directors managed this 
department and possessed "go or no go authority" over new 
and existing projects.
At this time GE was the most respected planning group in 
the world and its techniques of industry attractiveness 
charts for business strategy were used without modifications 
by many industries. Annual meeting of stockholders at GE
included charts and projections from this staff for over 25 
years (Gardner 1986 ). It was the flagship of strategic
planning.
Using GE as a model, hundreds of firms began to emulate 
the planning principles using strategic business unit methods 
as a guide, then the fall...
Suddenly in almost every industry and in companies which 
dominated their markets in the 1960's, sales plummeted.
This was true even with those using formal planning 
departments. By the early 1980's GE, for example, had cut 
its staff from 60 to less than 30. Dozens of the top firms 
did the same. Planning theory was being attacked in business 
journals and board rooms (Business Week, September 18, 1984) 
..."line managers are successfully challenging the power and 
influence of professional planners".
Methodologies and planning approaches once held in 
esteem were being questioned. The planning functions went 
from development of growth strategies to retrenchment. 
Strategic planners when retained were used more for the 
analysis of capital and resources allocation than strategy 
formulation. They became skilled in "number-crunching" 
computerised schemes and began to pore over reports from the 
field for errors and deviations from the corporate plan.
At the same time, executives like Harold Geneen of ITT, 
Matthews Edwards of British Leyland and Ian MacGregor of 
British Steel became known as "streamliners of cost and 
functions". They represented the new style of "hands 
on"management. Planners were ignored as a whole. Many left 
the corporate world and joined the faculties of universities.
Also, this was the era (1971-1982) in the USA where 
business schools came under their most severe attack and 
academics in turn questioned the style, decision-making and 
abilities of many business leaders to manage (Peters 1981:34 
). The gap between how and why decision-making was done in a 
theoretical sense and how and why it was being done in a 
pragmatic sense became widened.
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To fill this gap between the theories of the academic 
community and the practioners of management, the use of 
management consultancy firms became the fashion. They in turn 
offered portfolio planning devices, some fresh buzzwords, new 
organisational theories and simplified planning techniques. 
In this epoch, Drucker's (1973) "Get back to profits using 
basic managing principles" seemed to set a key theme.
The Return of Strategic Management
Throughout the early eighties, organisations became more 
concerned with the delivery of products and services in the 
most profitable ways rather than pure growth strategies. At 
this point, to some degree, business strategists became 
mainstream with the publications of four key pieces of 
literature.
The first publication to signal a return to the use of 
strategic management principles was a book by Michael Porter 
(1980), a Harvard Professor.
Porter wrote about the market positioning techniques 
being taught by him over the past three years. His analysis 
of the five forces of competition outlining the strategic 
relationships between suppliers, customers, direct 
competitors, substitutes and new competitors made sense to 
many business executives. It regenerated interest in strategy 
implementation as well as strategic formulation. Planners 
(and new business school graduates) who understand the 
inherent planning concept were being hired to implement its 
strategic principles.
The second key piece of literature was an article by 
Gluck (Harvard Business Review July/August 1980), who argued 
that like everyone else managers in companies react to 
trends.
" strategic management is not merely a 
collection of methodologies nor is it a 
collection of systems and procedures and 
planning, it required a whole new type of 
dimensions. Strategic management requires 
a frame of mind and a set of behavioural 
patterns that must be reinforced through an 
organizational culture for a strategy to 
work. These patterns should be based on 
the belief that change is good, should be 
welcomed and nurtured through the training of 
its people as a strategic objective"
This article clearly uplifted the old concept and 
limitations of strategic planning into the more complex
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process of strategic management. It outlines how the process 
must integrate culture, change, people, systems, and 
innovation.
The third publication was a book by Waterman and 
Peters (1982) in which an edict of eight rules were furnished 
to assist firms in reaching for excellence.
This book built on the principles of the McKinsey's 
"7-S" model indicated that change in an organisation is 
possible through a network of people, in and out of the 
company. The seven "S" dealt with systems, style, structure, 
shared values, skills, staff, and strategy. These "S's" 
highlighted how the strategy had to be interweaved with the 
style and culture of a company to be effective. From a study 
of 62 companies, a list of about a dozen American companies 
were used as examples as to how it should be done. Their 
argument was that the qualitative goals of a strategy were 
the true engine to propel a company to be competitive rather 
than the quantitative process of strategic planning (pp. 34- 
38).
The fourth piece of literature was an article in 
Fortune Magazine (April 30,1984) where 13 companies were 
profiled for making profits and gaining market share at the 
expense of their competitors.
This was written in the period of 1974-83 when many 
firms were losing market share. Yet, these firms enjoyed an 
average return on equity of over 20 percent. Their success 
reinforced the view that strategically-managed companies 
which accepted and exploited change were to be the winners 
throughout the eighties.
THE COINAGE OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
All four of the above writings spoke of strategic management 
as the key feature for corporate success when it is 
combined with a complex relationship between suppliers, 
customers and employees. Some feel that an overall strategic 
theory is emerging ( Moss, 1981; Kay, 1984; Porter, 1980 
and Kanter, 1986).
With strategic management now being viewed in a 
favourable light again, many practioners argued for a more 
encompassing corporate title for strategic planning. In May, 
1981, at the North America Society of Corporate Planners, Ken 
Ohmae spoke about the new planning requirements in an ever 
increasing complex and changing world.
"It is time for us to think of a more 
accurate word for us than corporate planners.
Our present name is misleading and isolates 
us from other types of managers. A better
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expression may be strategic managers, 
corporate development specialists, or 
corporate path-finders, anything but 
planners.
Strategic management as a theory of 
management require a host of new skills and 
knowledge not imagined just five years ago.
We now must deal with new technologies, 
strategic partnering, spin-offs, new products 
with a life cycle of months, and even view 
former competitors as partners in joint 
ventures. Customers which are thousands of 
miles apart with language differences but who 
all understand the same values. Gobalization 
requires us to be prepared for the unexpected 
from Europe, Japan as well as across the 
street". It is time for a change.
It was unanimously passed that the name of this society be 
changed to the Society of Strategic Management Personnel. 
Secondly, a certificate programme was implemented for the 
rank and title of a certified Strategic Manager. These 
changes will form a basis for the development of an overall 
theory when managers and academics have a common 
understanding of this field of study.
SUMMARY
Looking more closely at strategic planning through the past 
80 years, it became clearer during this enquiry phase of the 
investigation why some of the principles of planning before 
1960 and through 1970 were doomed to fail.
A contributing factor to its failure as a planning 
discipline, was the inadequate understanding of how 
implementation for strategy-making should be done and the 
lack of, or perfunctory, involvement by senior managers. The 
other misgiving was that while management recognized the role 
of the planners, the motivation of the managers was needed 
to make a strategy happen. The legitimacy of strategic 
management as a managerial tool suffered because of this 
shortfall.
This shortfall in the mis- understanding of the key 
strategic concepts was even true of the academics during this 
period of time. Certain articles written on strategic 
management (Ansoff, 1965; Andrews,1971) had the same basic 
weaknesses. Generally, these articles stress the formulation 
of data, but fail to explain how the accumulation of this 
data cannot be substituted for poor implementation. Overall 
this section shows how, we, academics failed to keep abreast 
with what was happening in the business world as shown by the 
Ford Motor Company's case study, 1914.
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APPENDIX B
Glossary of Terms
Business Policy: A study of management that looks inwardly as to how 
a firm's resources can be formulated toward a common goal.
Business Strategy: The second of three levels of strategy-making, its 
should determine how a firm should compete against others in the same 
industry by its major strengths, and weaknesses (Porter).
Certainty: In decision making, this is a condition in which how each 
decision will react and the consequent of a decision is known for 
sure.
Classical School of Management: A school of managerial thought
emphasizing rationality. It includes bureaucracy, scientific 
management and administrative principles. Fostered By Weber, Taylor, 
and Fayol respectively.
Context-descriptive Model: A model describing in greater details the 
relationship of all variables and their impacts upon the other.
Content-prescriptive Model: A model describing in a particular
situation what a firm should do.
Contingent Elements: This is a group of elements that reflect the 
configuration and range of activities with a firm. They are dependent 
on the amount and quality of three resources (people, monies, and 
contracts) at any one time.
Corporate Strategy: One of three levels of a firm's strategy-making, 
it addresses what business a firm should be in, what percentage of a 
firm's resources should be invested in each business and how each of 
them should be managed (Hofer, Murray and Pitts).
Core Competences: Those skills (physical, mental, and human
processes) needed to produce resources into core products/services.
Critical Success Factors: Essential factors which are valued by
customers that separate a firm's strengths from a competitor's.
Culture: Socially-shared and transmitted beliefs of knowledge, myths, 
customs, and values passed from one generation to another.
Decision-making Unit: The body of leadership that can make a
commitment which can not be changed without its consent.
Distinctive Element: This is a element that will stimulate a firm, 
singularly by its presence or when used in combination will overcome 
the absence of other elements.
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Element: An essential factor affecting a decision, condition, or 
attitude. It can be stimulated by events occurring within a firm's 
organisational structure or arising from its external environment.
Empirical-rational Strategy: This is a strategy assuming that when
people are presented with all the facts, knowledge and information 
available, they will act in their own best interest and change their 
behaviour accordingly.
Extrinsic Sewards: These are social or economic incentives that are 
external to the firm and the task being performed.
Functional Strategies: These are the lowest ranking of the three 
types of strategies used by a business. Their main purposes are to 
assure that a host of a firm's functional areas (technological, 
manufacturing, admistrative, etc.) are in tune with current changes.
Gap Analysis: An emotionally-based process of a firm being aware that 
there is a strategic gap between a desired and an anticipated 
outcome. It is the first step in strategy-making (Glueck and Jauch).
Goals: Objectives that the firm seeks to accomplish in support of a 
stated mission.
Individual Risk taking Propensity: The degree to which managers take 
or avoid chances based on their own risk-taking experience.
Innovation: Any new process, idea, plan, service, that supplants and 
improves an existing process, idea, plan, service or concept.
Innovation-Investigating and Developing Activities: These include R 
&D efforts, conceptualising, funding, testing, marketing and 
designing of an innovation before it is sold for a profit.
Intrinsic Sewards: Internal incentives that are psychologically
motivated by the performance of the tasks being performed.
Intuitive Strategy: This is a strategy based on a manager's
experience, common recipes within an industry on what to expect, and 
a personal reaction to how to handle a problem.
Learning Curve: A pattern of how resources are consumed; where the 
costs of initial units are higher and the costs to produce later 
units will be progressively lower.
Life Cycle: The useful life of a product in a particular market; 
includes the stages of development, growth, maturity and decline.
Management Science-based Strategy: This is a strategy employing
scientific, rational and economic influences to make the best choice 
available.
Model: This is a scaled-down representation and a view of something 
real; it is used to show variables that can predict or explain.
page 405
Mission: An expressed purpose of a firm in general and specific terms 
formulated by its Decision-making Units as to where they aspire their 
firm to be xxx amount of time from a given point. It is a higher 
level than goals which are assigned to the detailed planning of a 
firm. A firm can have economic, financial, business and intangible 
missions simultaneously.
Motivational Elements: A group of elements used to motivate employees 
based on the principles of the Expectancy Reward Theory.
Nescience Principle: A belief that most managers act in ignorance 
because they are not aware of or lack techniques to consider other 
more rational solutions. It is emotionally-based.
Nexus -Strategic Structure: This is a structure using a flexible link 
between members of an organisation that are autogenus to each other 
(products, innovation, customer) but share the same strategic goal.
Normative-reeducative Change Strategy: A strategy assuming that 
people have attitudes and value systems and when presented with facts 
and knowledge and information directed at these attitudes and values, 
they will change accordingly. It is stimulated by internal and 
external elements.
Occupational Obsolescence: This is a condition where an employee's 
skills and knowledge erode away over time until they are no longer 
useful or current.
Policy: A statement serving as a guide for action and a desired 
behaviour.
Polyvalent Firm: This is a firm which is structured simultaneously to 
deal with current problems, whilst innovating for its future.
Polyvalent Workforce: This is a workforce in which most employees
are trained to be highly efficient in meeting current job obligations 
while simultaneously are trained to innovate for the future.
Power-coercive Strategy: The use of political, personal and economic 
influences to force a change in behaviour.
Procedural—How To Do It Model: A model constructed in a series of 
solutions in sequence for solving a particular problem.
Product Life Cycle: A concept used to describe the chronological 
stages of demand for a product based on its useful.
Project: A one-shot set of activities, a venture with a definite 
beginning and ending point.
Proportional Chance Criterion: This indicate the percentage above 50 
percent to indicate by an expected percentage of correct 
classifications if assignments were made randomly. It is defined as:
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Cprop * p + (1-p) where the proportion = firms answered " yes" and 
1-p = the proportion of firms answered "No".
Risk: In decision problems, a condition in which the ultimate state
of nature is not known for sure, but probabilities are estimated.
Strategic Business Unit: This is any unit within a firm that has its 
own markets, personnel, name, resources, and goals that are 
measurable as part of a larger business entity.
Strategic Focus: The awareness of the DMU that is directly
proportional to a firm scanning system and historically, how a firm 
prefers to do business, and the ability of the DMU to link the past 
achievements of a firm and its future goals together successfully.
Strategic Management: An integrated and continued process of using 
culture, people *s aspirations, systems, corporate venturing, and 
innovation to meet a negotiated series of goals in a changing 
environment. The preferred term to business policy (Gluck).
Strategic Planning: The process of linking a firm's current
mission and its environment; and then setting forth a guide for 
tomorrow's decisions and results.
Strategy: An unifying element in which all of a firm's activities are 
linked (Ansoff). A complete plan as to where a firm is headed (Game 
Theory). A process of planning before being engaged in battle
(Military). Strategy sets the direction of an enterprise. It becomes
a master strategy when the dimensions of timing and targets are
attached to it.(Newman). The allocation of resources toward a broad
goal (Andrew). What Business are you in? (Drucker).
Sovereign Element: The supreme element (based upon a firm's
cumulative history of being successful or the newness of a 
situation) in which all other elements- culture, ventures, boldness 
of strategy,etc. reacts to and is dependent upon it for guidance.
SWOT: An analysis of a firm strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats. This is the second step in a firm's strategy-making.
Tau Measure: This compares the errors made in the classification 
using the function with errors expected by a random assignment.
Technology: The scientific expertise in blending skills, knowledge,
labour usage, capital gains, and management into useful outputs.
Time: In strategy-making, the planning horizon and speed in which 
decisions are made and realized.
Managing for a Triage: The abilities of management in assigning a 
limited amount of resources to get the maximum effect.
Triggering Strategic Element: The one reason which forces a
decision-making unit take action. In the constellation of
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circumstances theory, it is an incident (loss of profit, new 
technology, customer complaints, etc) which trigger a decision that 
some type of action must be taken.
Uncertainty: In strategy-making, a condition in which the
probabilities surrounding a decision are not known.
Value System: An individual's or a firm's beliefs as to when a
concept is desirable, good, or bad.
II. The following are detailed descriptions* of some Business 
Strategies:
Adaptive Strategy: This is a reacting type of strategy which is 
triggered by changes in the environment. It seeks to negotiate with a 
complex environment for a position of survival. The strategic focus 
is directed to the solving of current problems rather than exploiting 
opportunities.
Dependent Strategy: This strategy depends on customers to supply the 
specifications needed for innovation. Its leadership seeks a 
continuous dialogue between suppliers, and customers acting as a 
bridge between the two parties. The organisation is partly 
controlled by customers* needs for certain kinds of quality, 
production and marketing specifications which are formally written 
and the suppliers' ability to be flexibility. The overall 
technological strategy is informal since the firm engage in little 
or no research (e.g. Marks and Spencers, jobbing shops).
Disconnected Strategy: This is a strategy in which the members or 
subunits of a firm are loosely coupled to the rest of the 
organisation, deliberately. These subunits can act in direct 
contradiction to the culture, common skills, and core products of the 
organisation at large, but have the sponsorship to do so. They are 
controlled by formal channels of communications (proposals, and 
regular reports), funding, pre-determined objectives, and withholding 
approval to continue pending the review of previous efforts (e.g. 
skunkworks, intrapreneurs, new product development divisions).
Entrepreneurial Strategy: This is a random and unfocused strategy 
tightly controlled by a personal unarticulated vision of a single 
leader or by a relatively small leadership unit. Its objectives are 
intuitively-formed and its leadership is extremely erratic in 
stimulating and reviewing new innovations and business opportunities. 
It is most effective operating in a protected niche within a 
moderately changing environment when its leadership is still 
ambitious. It becomes non-innovative within a short period of time 
because of having a great success or failure (e.g. McAlpine 
Industries).
♦Adapted from Quinn, Mintzberg and James (1988:16); Littler (1985:93- 
97); Baker (1975:147); Newman and Logan (1976) and Rothschild (1979)
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Fatalist Strategy: This is a neo-technological strategy used by firms 
(who must innovate to survive) within a sector of an industry 
dominated by other innovators. The leadership unit is a strong 
management centre of financial controls, and generally controls by 
the screening of investment projects and the use of short-term 
payback criteria to eliminate the weak ones. They must establish 
research departments, and to acquire other more innovative firms 
which are loosely linked to the core business in order to grow • The 
overall strategy is informal by delgating downward to each business 
unit using a flexible combination of process and disconnected 
strategy methods (e.g. GEC, Hanson, Tarmac, BTR).
Formal Strategy for Innovation: It has a mission of innovation
clearly defined as an objective and value of its business. There is 
a hierarchy of strategies: corporate strategies, competitive
strategies, organisational short term operating plans, and 
functional strategies. It seeks to establish working relationships 
with suppliers and customers, who also welcome innovation. There is 
an exhaustive set of written operating procedures covering most 
eventualities (hiring, training, acquiring of patents, scanning of 
the environment, funding of employees' experimentation, and 
licensing) which the mission to innovate may create.
Follower Strategy: This is a marketing or technological strategy in 
which a firm seek to be second, or third to enter a market with an 
improved differentiated version of an innovation developed earlier by 
a pioneering firm. It may have actively developed an improved version 
almost simultaneously as the pioneer, but have postponed the final 
marketing of the product/process until the demand is great enough to 
ensure it of quick profits or an established market position.
Functional Strategy: This is an administrative type of strategy used 
to coordinate the flow of information and supplies needed to 
complete a task shared by several departments (e.g. How the 
marketing department would receive only the information it needs, 
and no more, from the departments of sales, production, and 
finance). It balances the practical needs of one particular 
department for supplies, information, and technical support, etc. 
without burdening another department, unnecessarily.
Imitator Strategy: This is a technological, and niche-filling
strategy based on improving an innovation to the needs of a few 
customers. The leadership unit seeks volume to obtain economies of 
scale by offering major desirable features of an innovation at a 
lower cost in a more functional form. It generally enters the market 
in the late growth or maturity stages when technology is established 
and well diffused. The strategy is formal, and its organisational 
structure is partly- controlled by specialists (partial informal) 
operating to defined objectives (e.g. Amstrad's Computers).
Imposed Strategy: This is controlled by patterns and demands being 
imposed on its leadership unit from external forces in the 
environment (by outside owners, suppliers, governments, and 
customers). The formulation of these strategies are done by informal
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methods (pressures of strong customers, reacting to competitors, 
etc.) although once formulated are executed formally.
Pioneering Strategy: This is a neo-technological strategy that is 
used when a firm decides to be the first to apply the newest 
technology ahead of its rivals as a mission statement for its 
business. Its leadership is committed to innovation and all levels of 
supervision have clearly defined limits of authority and 
responsibility to do so. Because it possess large and significant 
amounts of financial and marketing resources, it uses a formal 
strategy (written procedures and programmes) to offset any risk in 
being innovative. It deliberately spends a significant amount of its 
resources in basic research, R & D, training its employees, and 
educating its customers. It is most effective using a very 
flexibility organizational structure which is multi-structured with 
specific programmes to attract, and motivate an enterprising 
workforce ranging from the professional researcher to intrapreneurs. 
It uses disconnected strategies (informally) and functional 
strategies( formally) to maintain a leadership role within its 
industry (e.g. IBM, 3M Corporation, Linn Products, Glaxo).
Process Strategy: In this strategy, a leader controls the process 
aspects of strategy (who gets hired, promoted, and is able to 
influence strategy by the type of structures they create for 
employees to work within, etc.) leaving the actual content of a 
strategy to others; these strategies are partly formal (concerning 
the process) and partly informal (concerning contents) and 
deliberately informal about stimulating innovation and new business 
opportunities.
Production-driven Strategies: These are either capacity-based,
proprietary equipment/system-based; efficiency-driven; supply-driven 
and deployment-driven (by customer demands) types of strategies.
Punctuated Strategy: This type of strategy is done in bursts and 
starts. It is highly flexible, feeds off a flow of new information 
and a motivated workforce. It uses a concerted pattern of short term 
plans. They are best used by the finance, human resources and 
technical areas of a firm to support a long term strategic goal, and 
acts very similar to tactics used by the military, except repeated.
Opportunist Strategy: This type of strategy responds quickly to
market opportunities in which products have short life cycles and 
requires a minimum of R & D. It innovates in order to gain great 
profits by strategic venturing with a large variety of products and 
processes peripheral to its core business. The leadership unit is 
divided over several business streams and geographic areas. Its 
organisational structure is very flexible, much like a matrix by 
function. The overall strategy is best characterised as being 
informal giving each business unit an opportunity to innovate, to 
pursue or drop new products and new markets at will (BP, Cadbury 
Schweppes, Gulf-Western).
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Technological Strategy: A strategy based on a firm willingness to 
purchase, acquire, develop, or use any process or product that is 
skill-enhancing or skills-destroying for an economic advantage 
(Rothschild). It is a business-second level strategy (Hofer:78:29)
Traditional Strategy: The mission of this strategy is precisely
formulated and articulated by a central leadership unit, and backed 
up by formal controls to ensure a surprise-free implementation. It 
believes in purchasing and applying innovation that reduces labour 
costs, and the substitution of current material for cheaper ones, but 
does not undertake any R & D, itself. It operates best in an 
environment that is benign, controllable, or predictable; and most of 
its tactics are highly deliberate and formal (e.g. Clark Footwear, ).
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APPENDIX C
PRE-SURVEY INTERVIEWS AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
This section summarises the findings of the pre-survey interviews 
held between May and December, 1988 and is in three parts.
The names and a brief description of each of those interviewed 
follows the first section, Summary of Comments. Section III provides 
copies of the innovation rules and leadership discussion guides which 
were developed from these interviews. Most of the interviews took 
over several hours, although one was for less than 45 minutes. All 
comments and terms of the participants will be in quotation marks.
Section I: Summary of Comments
They were asked: (1) what rules and procedures do you recommend that 
any firm can follow to stimulate its workforce; (2) do you believe in 
the concepts of a strategy for innovation; and (3) how should they be 
tested in interviewing other companies.
The first question about rules and procedures that they
recommend:
They stressed that "innovators always appoint themselves "and 
the company should provide a system (plan, strategy, or programme) to 
identify them and then to encourage them. They recommended that an 
idea should not be "handed-over" to someone else to implement and 
should remains with the innovator. One of those interviewed, Mr. 
Brand of 3M Corporation, stated these beliefs were two major points 
in 3M’s programme.
The next major point was to let those who are "deciders" ( 
bosses, or innovation committee members) meet as soon as possible 
with those who are proposing to be the "doers ". At that point 
resources (time, monies or approval) should be allocated for the 
project to go ahead or reasons be given at that time why the idea 
will not work.
There should be a variety of programme, policies, and ways for 
an idea to be tested. Above all, there should a corporate policy as 
to how long and to what degree a project will receive sponsorship 
within the company before it is placed on a "back burner", but never 
let it be forgotten. "Be patient and allow a fair amount of mistakes 
and failures... but praise and recognise the most innovative 
employee."
"Go to the marketplace as soon as possible-making a little and 
selling a little to find out what will work commercially. They 
recommended that supervisors should openly request any new ideas no 
matter how small".
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The second q u e s tio n  about what makes up a s tra te g y  fo r  in n o v a tio n :
The key point to which they all agreed to was that the 
concepts of a strategy for innovation should be devised so a series 
of "informal ways were available and each employee should be given 
the freedom to tinker and experiment without having to answer to a 
lot of people about what they are doing... There must be clear goals 
and a mission to innovate.•• there must be controls about the time 
and resources expended by employees". Thus, they recommended a series 
of policies be developed to that purpose.
Ms. Patterson of Motorola Corporation stressed that a series of 
training programme be made available as part of any company decision 
to launch a strategy for innovation. She stated " once you have 
discovered who is the innovator there must be a process to develop 
them to their fullest potential".
Several of the participants of the larger firms stated that a 
strategy for innovation should be parallel to other strategies in 
which the company was involved... "Not part of and answerable to any 
one sector of the company ".
It was further recommneded that cross-functional teams and 
working relationships should be established in the development of an 
innovation as soon as it is possible to do so. However its ownership 
and who will be considered the driving force of an innovation should 
be made clear at the beginning. "Turf-fighting or turf-defending is 
why many innovative ideas become side-tracked" stated Mr. Watson, 
manager of a 1200 person transportation firm.
The third question on how to test other companies as to how they 
innovate was answered a couple different ways.
This question was answered by Professor Quinn of Amos Tuck 
Business School, who stated, " talk to as many managers as you can 
in groups and later one on one, but first get out and survey them so 
when you meet there will be something for them to argue with or agree 
to ".
The next point made by most of those interviewed was that the 
informal cooperation often dictated which of a firmfs goals were 
important. Those from the smaller organisation stated, "if you 
believe in something in a close group, you must visibly show it or 
the employees will get mixed signals about what the true goals ".
One of the examples given was a company*s policy to always 
offer the higher price on a bid. If you don*t practice that yourself 
as boss, in time, everybody will be offering lower bids. It is the 
same with innovation, you must show how you want it handled".
The final points by several of the managers gave me some 
insight on how that the appearance and wording of the survey 
instrument should be structured to encourage participation. "Don*t 
use the word strategy, try the word "plan" instead if you can. This
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is the word which 90 percent of most managers use in place of 
strategy on a daily basis.
" Where the word strategy has many different and specific 
meanings...corporate, product, functional, etc. The word "plan M 
means we have some input and strategy means that what the top 
management has decided on after receiving the planning documents from 
all the divisions, worldwide.•• • we learned long ago if we want 
employee participation, we give it a name and called it a programme."
When asked, what in their opinions,made up a good programme for 
innovation, several specific features were given. Based on their 
comments, as later reflected in the research model (Figure 7.2), it 
was recommended that any survey instrument should test if the 
sponsoring firm has provided, at least, four sub-components:(1) 
separate budgets; (2) a formal system of scanning to determine the 
strategic implications of a new product/idea being developed an 
employee or a firm; (3) a support service to advise and motivate the 
employees; and (4) a network system to. publicise the programme and an 
employee*s effort regardless of the success of the project
II. Names of Persons Interviewed
Exploratory discussions were held with the following individuals:
Professor James Brian Quinn is the William and Josephine Buchanan 
Professor of Management at Amos Tuck School of Business 
Administration at Dartmouth College in the USA. Professor Quinn is an 
authority in the fields of strategic Planning, the management of 
technological change and entrepreneurial innovations. In addition to 
consulting with the leading US and overseas companies and publishing 
quite extensively, he is the dean of a Japanese business school.
Mr. William Whiland, Chairman and Managing director of Whiland & Son 
located in Dumbarton, Scotland. His firm is closely-controlled and 
engages in steel fabrication and manufacturing. He employs about 45 
persons and negotiates projects throughout Europe. His firm, at the 
time of the interview, is best classified as using a dependent 
strategy.
Mr. Adam Brand is the Director of 3M United Kingdom Ltd*s Pathfinder 
programme in Bracknell, England. He manages a staff of 31 persons, 
who are responsible for corporate entrepreneurship and implementing 
an Europe- wide corporate strategy for the stimulation of 
innovations. His parent firm grossed over $10 Billion of which more 
than 23 percent was derived from new products. It uses a pioneering 
strategy.
Ms. Jill Patterson is the Director of Personnel, Manpower Planning 
and Training at the Motorola Plant in East Kilbride, Scotland.
Her division employs 1,400 person and is part of an international, 
multi-billion dollar electronic firm located in Chicago, Illinios, 
USA. Their strategy is best classified as pioneering.
page 414
Mr. Frazier Falconer is the General Manager of the Goodwill 
Industries in Glasgow, Scotland. His company is a associate member of 
the Goodwill, International and employs 95 persons. In addition to 
providing contract services to industries, it manages 5 retail 
outlets which specialised in repairing and re-selling second-handed 
goods.
His firm has increased its sales and services by more than 300 
percent in the past two years under his stewardship and plans to 
expand throughout Scotland. The strategy used by this company is 
niche-focused or an imitator.
Mr. George Watson is the Managing Director of Clydeside Bus, Ltd in 
Paisley, Scotland. His firm within of the State of Scotlandfs Bus and 
Transit Group employs about 1200 persons, with 420 vehicles for 
hire, grosses over £21 million, and it is considered one of the most 
innovative within this group.
His environment is fiercely competitive. At the time of his 
interview, he was implementing an organisational plan to convert a 
traditional, and tightly- structured organisation with a formal 
planning type of strategy into one characterised as being 
opportunistic.
Other contributors were Ms. Cathy Smith, who was a researcher at the 
British Institute of Management on the topic of Intrapreneurship; 
James Mackinnoch, the Training Director of the Inland Revenue 
Services in East Kilbride; and Mr. James Harvey , the Managing 
Director of Glaxochem UK.
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Con’t of Appendix C
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1. Self-selection. Most Innovators prefer to appoint themselves to their role and receive the corporation's blessing for the 
self-appointed task. Despite this, some corporations foolishly try to appoint people to carry out innovation.
Does your company encourage the self-appointed Intrapreneur? How, do you have a  programme?
2. No handoffs. When the Innovation process involves switching the people working on an Idea-that is ‘handing off* a 
developing business or product form a committed Intrapreneur to whomever is next in line-often someone not as 
committed as the originator of a project.
Does your company provide ways for ’Enterprising employees' to stay with their project?
3. The doer decides. Some organizations push decisions up through a multilevel approval process so the doers and the 
deciders never even meet.
Have you separated the doers from the deciders?
Are people In your company permitted to do the Job In their own way, or are they constantly stopping to 
explain their actions and adk for permission?
4. Corporate ‘slack.* Enterprising employees need discretionary resources to explore and develop new ideas. Some 
companies give employees the freedom to use a percentage of their time on projects of their own choosing, and set 
aside funds to explore new ideas when the occur. Others control resources so tightly that nothing is available for the new 
and unexpected. The result is nothing new.
Has your company evolved quick and Informal ways to access the resources to try new Ideas?
5. Ending the home-run philosophy. Today's corporate cultures favor a few well-studied, well-planned attempts to hit a 
home run. in fact, nobody bats 1000. and it is better to try more times with less careful and expensive preparation for each.
Has your company developed ways to manage many small and experimental products and businesses?
6. Tolerance of risk, failure, and mistakes. Innovation cannot be achieved without risk and mistakes. Even successful 
innovation generally begins with blunders and false starts.
Is your system set up to encourage risk taking and to tolerate mistakes?
7. Patient & money. Innovation takes time, even decades, but the rhythm of corporations is annual planning and profits 
immediate.
Can your company decide to try something and stick with the experiment long enough to see If It wSI work, 
even when that may take years and several false starts?
8. Freedom from turfiness. Because new ideas almost always cross the boundaries of existing patterns of organizations, a 
jealous tendency to turfiness blocks innovation.
Are people In your company more concerned with new Ideas or with defleding their turf?
9. Cross-functional teams. Small teams with full responsibility for developing an enterprise solve many of the basic problems 
of innovation. But some companies resist their formation.
How easy Is It to form functionally complete, autonomous teams In your corporate environment?
10. Multiple options. Entrepreneurs live in a multioption universe. If one venture capitalist or supplier can't or won't meet their 
needs, there are many more to choose from. Corporate innovators, however, often face single-option situations that may 
be called internal monopolies.
They must have their product made by a certain factory or sold by a specific sales force. Too often these groups lack 
motivation or are simply wrong for the job and a good idea dies an unnecessary death.
Do employees In your company face Internal monopolies or are they free to use the resources of other 
cBvlslons and outside vendors If they choose differently?
These Rules developed from interviews and 
secondary research: Pinchot 1986;Drucker 1985
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APPENDIX D
This section supplements the descriptions of the five broad 
categories of questions used in the first questionnaire and mentioned 
in Chapter Seven (para.7.5). This is to used as a guide to the 
questionnaire to Exhibit No. 1 and their tabulation in Exhibit No.2 
as to which questions were used and for what purpose.
1. Typological Elements
Two major elements contained in questions no.3 & 4 were used to 
develop a typology of users of a formal strategy and non-users: 
namely (1) a dichotomous (yes/no) variable by indicating whether or 
not a formal programme for innovation was used; and (2) the number 
of innovations and training arising from its use. Using question 
no. 3, each of the firms in the sample was to tick one of the two 
groups as follows:
Strategy Users . This question reflected those firms employing a 
formal programme and was accepted by the investigator provided that 
the firm could establish that its had a name, budget, at least one 
year old, record of innovative accomplishments and had support 
services allocated to it.
Strategy Non-users . This question reflected those firms, who 
did not employ a formal programme ( w h i c h  had a name, budget, and 
supporting services), but could have done so, at least, in principle.
2. Strategic Eleaents
The strategic elements are to indicate the foremost way that a firm 
could be described by its market-technological strategy as contained 
in question no. 12 (i. e. whether they were pioneer, follower, etc.- 
as explained in Appendix B). It would be used in concert with other 
questions that assessed an organisation's abilities to be innovative.
3. Organisational Eleaents
Beyond the classification of the respondents as users/nonusers, the 
following types of elements were:
The group of elements, in questions no. 1-8, to be used as 
standard descriptors: nationality; reporting unit size; years it
operated in Scotland; description of business; nationality of 
ownership; and parent company size.
The contingent elements, in Questions no. 23-25, are to 
indicate a firm's structure and how it was organised for the 
stimulation of innovation.
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4. General Eleaents and Innovative Measures
To understand how firms motivated their workforce to stimulate
innovation and the methods they used, there were five areas covered
by a series of the questions and dispersed throughout the
questionnaire. These elements were for the measures of a firm's 
innovativeness•
1. Elements for stimulating innovation. Any question using a 
five point rating scale (5= "very important", l-"not very important'1) 
was to measure the range of methods used to stimulate innovation and
the importance given to them by the respondents.
2.Importance of analysis tools. Question no. 6 using a 
comparative three-point rating scale (1= "most important", 2= "next 
important", 3= "important") was to measure which of the eight 
categories used in determining their company's strengths and 
weaknesses are relative to innovation, and their importance.
3. Technological Environment. A series of questions about risk 
and uncertainty in a firm's production process, perceived 
environment, and perceived rate of development were included. They 
were to measure six possible descriptive categories of uncertainties 
facing company (supplier, technological, market, production, product, 
and lose of key customers).
4. Organisational and Operating Conflicts. This series of 
questions are found in question no. 31 which is used to measure the 
type of conflicts arising in a firm when certain business objectives 
are used in contrast to a firm's pricing and marketing policies.
5. The Best Ways to Motivate Innovation. These questions 
provided a list of reputed methods which are available to a firm as 
to how it can motivate its employees to be more innovative. They will 
measure (by the frequency of ticks received from respondents, in 
total) how users or non-users feel about their effectiveness.
5. Distinctive Elements to assess Strategy and Innovation
The combination of how the above stated elements were linked was 
dispersed throughout the question no. 32. They were to measure a 
firm's culture and other elements which allow it to be the first to 
try a new line of products, and how employees and management worked 
together.
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STATISTICAL PROFILE OF
EUROPEAN AND OVERSEAS COMPANIES IN SCOTLAND
APPENDIX E
1. COMPANIES BY EMPLOYMENT BANDING
Employment Banding No. of Companies Employment
1-10 
11-50 
51-100 
101-200 
201-300 
301-400 
401-500 
501-900 
901 +
13
39
22
17
8
2
4
4
3
79
862
1725
2215
1885
675
1845
2799
2350
TOTAL 112 14435
EMPLOYMENT IN OVERSEAS COMPANIES 
IN SCOTLAND BY EMPLOYMENT BANDING
1-10(05%)
11-50 (60%)9 0 1  «• (16 3 % )
51-100(120%)
101-200 (15.3%)501-900 (194%)
201-300(131%)
401-500 (12 8%)
301-400 (4.7%)
Source: Scottish Development agency: Business Information Department 
Overseas and European Companies Manufacturing in Scotland, September, 
1987
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STATISTICAL PROFILE OF
NORTH AMERICAN COMPANIES MANUFACTURING IN SCOTLAND
AP P E N D I X  E
Employment Banding No. of Companies Employment
1-10 15 113
11-50 45 1211
51-100 25 1878
101-200 37 5498
201-300 19 4681
301-400 12 4429
401-500 12 5570
501-600 2 1034
601-700 2 1280
701-800 5 3717
801-1000 4 3642
1001-3000 11 16438
TOTAL 189 49491
EMPLOYMENT IN NORTH AMERICAN COMPANIES MANUFACTURING 
IN SCOTLAND BY EMPLOYMENT BANDING
1-1 0 (0.2%) 
11-50 (24%)
51-100(3.8%)
101-2 0 0 (11.1%)
1001-3000 (33.2%)
201-300 (9.5%)
301-400 (8 9%)
801-1000 (7 4%)
401-500(11.3%)701-800 (7.6%)
601-700(20%) 501-600(21%)
Source: Scottish Development agency: Business Information Department 
North American Companies Manufacturing in Scotland, October, 1987
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APPENDIX F
This is the list of variables used by the SPSSX as taken from the 
first questionnaire.
These are 137 variables used for frequency and cross-tabulation: 
Data List File * Data Records * 2
/I Ident 1-3 Source 4 title 5 Parent 6 No.emply 7 Totsize 8 Ageloc 
9-11 Corebusi 12 Formalst 13 Howlong 14-16 Reports 17 Delvest 18 
Typeinvo 19 Purpose 20 Whenyr
21 Anexpert 22 Anaudit 23 Anplan 24 Angroup 25 Andepart 26 Anbuyer 27
Anoutput 28 Ansource 29 Anone 30 Namesize 31 Marktpos 32 Sycultur 33 
R&D 34 Workers 35 Network 36 Facloc 37 Vision 38 Exenviro 39 Fubudget 
40 Fuworker 41 Fumarket 42 Futools 43 Fugovern 44 Futech 45 Timeplan 
46 Review 47 Emission 48 Eraanuals 49 Eopplan 50 Ebudgets 51 Esop 52 
Eshedule 53 Eprogram 54 Enone 55 Pioneer 56 Follower 57 Imitator 58 
Dependnt 59 Traditnt 60 Opportnt 61 Fatalist 62 Why 63 Formal 64 
Rewards 65 S-groups 66 Vis lead 67 Founder 68 Trained 69 Opencom 70
Ezsystem 71 Culture 72 Bosswelc 73 Explorel 74 Explore2 75 Goodfacl
76 Goodfac2 77 Badfacl 78 Badfac2 79 /
/2 Buyin 1 First 2 Maxtime 3 Bemore 4 Fimpose 5 Fholdup 6 Fapprove 
7 Freward 8 Forgive 9 Freedom 10 Return 11 Keyneeds 12 keystaff 13 
Keylink 14 Keylead 15 keymedia 16 keyinfo 17 keyusers 18 keyideas 19 
keyprog 20 keycult 21 keyspin 22 KeyR&d 23 Depts 24 Siminvol 25
Siminvo2 26 Typeorg 27 Busenvi 28 Budgets 29 Mobonus 30 Motypes 31 
Motrain 32 Mosolver 33 Motime 34 Moboss 35 Mocharap 36 Moaward 37
Moopen 38 Mogoals 39 Moexpert 40 Moseljob 41 Mofund 42 Moffsite 43 
Allocate 44 Opinion 45 Opgoals 46 Opresult 47 Opprice 48 Opmoney 49
Opdecide 50 Opteara 51 Optarget 52 Opmarket 53 Opstrato 54 Orgidea 55
Orginfo 56 Orgtop 57 Orgnew 58 Orgmarkt 59 Orglines 60 Orgrisk 61 
Orgbold 62 Orgfirst 63 Orgadapt 64/
Total of variables used for Discriminant Analysis:
Used 12 Formalst;5 Parent; 8 Ageloc; to discriminates against the 
following:
23 Dept, 21 Anexpert 22 Anaudit 23 Anplan 24 Angroup 25 Andepart 26
Anbuyer 27 Anoutput 28 Ansource
30 Namesize 31 Marktpos 32 Sycultur 33 R&D 34 Workers 35 Network 36 
Facloc 37 Vision 38 40 Fuworker 41 Fumarket 42 Futools 43 Fugovern
44 Futech 47 Emission 50 Ebudgets 51 Esop 52 Eshedule 53 Eprogram
55 Pioneer 56 Follower 57 Imitator 58 Dependnt 59 Traditnt 60 
Opportnt 61 Fatalist 63 Formal 64 Rewards 65 S-groups 66 Vislead 67
Founder 68 Trained 69 Opencom 70 Ezsystem 71 Culture 72 Bosswelc
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COH'T OF APPENDIX F
Buyin 1 First 2 Maxtime 3 Bemore 5 Fholdup 6 Fapprove 7 Frevard 8 
Forgive 9 Freedom 11 Keyneeds 12 keystaff 13 Keylink 14 Keylead 15 
keymedia 16 keyinfo 17 keyusers 18 keyideas 19 keyprog 20 keycult 21 
keyspin 22 KeyR&d
26 Typeorg 27 Busenvi 28 Budgets 29 Mobonus 30 Motypes 31 Motrain
32 Mosolver 33 Motime 34 Moboss 35 Mochamp 36 Moaward 37 Moopen 38
Mogoals 39 Moexpert 40 Moseljob 41 Mofund 42 Moffsite
45 Opgoals 46 Opresult 47 Opprice 48 Opmoney 49 Opdecide 50 Opteam 51
Optarget 52 Opmarket 53 Opstrato 54 Orgidea 55 Orginfo 56 Orgtop 57
Orgnew 58 Orgraarkt 59 Orglines 60 Orgrisk 61 Orgbold 62 Orgfirst 63 
Orgadapt 64/
Variables Labels
Part I: Questions Describing the respondents
Ident "ID Number of Company"
Source "Survey Source from addressee or not"
Title " Title of Respondent"
Parent "Parent Company Size"
Noeraply "No. of Employees in Scotland location"
Totsize "Parent Company Size"
Ageloc " Years in business at this Scottish location"
Corebusi "Core Business Purpose"
Formalst "If a formal Strategy was being used"
Howlong "No. of Years which company has a formal strategy"
Reports "Level to which the formal strategy reports "
Delvest "Past three years of innovation accomplishments"
Typeinvo "Type of Innovations"
Purpose " Purpose for Innovation"
Whenyr "The year when accomplishments were done"
Anexpert "If an expert is used to analysis for Swot"
Anaudit "When auditing team is used for SWOt"
Anplan "If a business plan is used for Swot"
Angroup "If ad hoc group is formed from managment personnel"
Andepart "If a department is used for SWOT"
Anbuyer "If buyers are surveyed by company in a SWOT"
Anoutput "If outputs are compared to a business plan"
Ansource "If sources as publications are reviewed"
Annone" None of those earlier stated are used"
Namesize" Name and size are ranked as a strength"
Marktpos" Marketing position is ranked as a strength"
Sycultur "system and culture of corporation are ranked"
R&D "Research and development activities are ranked"
Worker" If innovative workers are ranked as a strength"
Network "financial position or distribution network are ranked"
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Facloc" Facilities and location are operational strengths" 
Vision " Leadership and vision of raanagraent are ranked" 
Exenviro"external environment is understood by company "
Fubudget "If financial budgets are projected"
Fuworkers "If manpower needs for workers are projected" 
Fumarket "If promtional and marketing are projected"
Futools"If facilities and equipments are projected"
Fugovern "If governmental regulations are considered"
Futech "If technological advances are incorporated"
Timeplan "How far ahead in years a company plans in advance" 
Review " How often plan is reviewed by an organisation "
Emission "If mission statement is in a business plan"
Emanuals "If manuals are used to control the business plan" 
Eopplan "If an operating plan is used by companies"
Ebudgets " If budgets are used"
Esop "If standard operating procedures (sop) are used" 
Eshedule"If a schedule of activities are used"
Eprogram "If a programme for innovation is used"
Enone "none of those stated above are used"
Part II: Questions about Strategy and Innovation
Pioneer "first with the newest"
Follower "follow market leaders by plan"
Imitator ’’improves on others innovation"
Dependnt "innovates to needs of customers"
Traditnt "does not innovate by a plan"
Opportnt "innovates for high return"
Fatalist "must innovate to survive by industry"
Why "Why a firm picked one of the above strategies"
Formal "formal programme used to be an innovative company"
Rewards "employee are rewarded to be an innovative company "
S-groups "small groups are used to be an innovative company"
Vis lead "visionary leadership is used by an innovative company" 
Founder "founder set practices of innovation"
Trained "training of personnel used to be entreprenuerial" 
Opencom "open communication between employees is used" 
Ezsystem "feedback and approval are easy to receive"
Culture "Corporate culture is why a company is innovative" 
Bosswelc "bosses welcome suggestions"
Explorel "explore innovation"
Explore2 "explore innovation"
Goodfacl "good factors that occurs from Innovation"
Goodfac2 "Good factors ocurring from Strategy"
Badfacl "bad factors ocurring from innovation"
Badfac2 "bad factors occurring from Strategy"
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S tra te g y  "The te c h n o lo g ic a l S tra te g y  used"
Buyin "How or if a company should buy into an innovation"
First "First thing a company should do to innovate"
Maxtime "Maximum time a company will develop an innovation" 
Bemore "Ways to be more innovative"
Fimpose "Imposing time limits is why some fail"
Fholdup "holding back on funds are why some fail"
Fapprove "Approval being difficult to get is why some fail" 
Freward "Not rewarding a product champion causes failure" 
Forgive "Not forgetting past mistakes is what cause failure"
Freedom "lack of freedom for innovator causes failure"
Return "ROI is estimated for innovation"
Keyneeds "needs of customers are keys"
Keystaff "staff encouraged to be innovative is key"
Keylink "links with outside innovators is key"
Keylead "enterpreneurial leadership at top is key "
Keymedia "media to inform and educate users is key"
Keyinfo "information is key"
Keyusers "potential users for demand is key"
Keyideas "ideas are welcomed is key"
Keyprog "programme for innovation is a key"
Keycult "climate as entreprenuerial is a key"
Keyspin "spin-off projects are keys"
KeyR&D "research and development progamme is key"
Depts " departments are used for innovation"
Siminvol "how innovation is stimulated"
Siminvo2 "how strategy is stimulated"
Taskorg "How tasks are managed and type of organisation"
Busenvi" What is the business environment" and how competitive"
Budgets "How innovation budgets are allocated"
Mobonus "Motivate by bonuses to employees "
Motypes "Motivate by types of employees 
Motrain "Motivate by training"
Mosolver "Motivate by solvers of problem"
Motime "Motivate by time to develope ideas"
Moboss "Motivate by boss encouraging others 
Mochamp "Motivate by champions of new products"
Moaward "Motivate by awarding efforts"
Moopen "Motivate by open communication on problems"
Mogoals "Motivate by goals setting by employees"
Moexpert "Motivate by experts being used "
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Moseljob "Motivate by job being self-designed"
Mofund "Motivate by funding ideas of employee"
Moffsite"Motivate by off-site training"
Allocate" What percent of turnover used for innovation"
Opinion" An expressed opinion on innovation"
Opgoals "Operating to goals"
Opresult "Results identified and achieved"
Opprice "Prices matches markets"
Opmoney "Money used as resource"
Opdecide "Decisions using Info."
Opteara "Team trained"
Optarget "Operating Targets are used"
Opraarket "Operated by markets"
Opstrato "Strategy is expressed in a mission statement"
Orgideas "ideas are exchanged"
Orginfo "Information is spread "
Orgtop "Top level accepts suggestions"
Orgnew "New methods are tried"
Orgraarkt "Marketing is emphasised"
Orglines "product lines are changed"
Orgrisk "High risk projects are tried"
Orgbold "Bold strategies are used”
Orgfirst "First to try new lines"
Orgadapt "Adapts to change easily"
LABELS USED FOR THE ATTITUDINAL SURVEY
Alculture "Firm exhibits a culture which nurture innovation"
Aladd "To add new skills"
Alupdate "To update existing skills"
Alchance " To improve the chances of a promotion"
Alcourse "Firm does not sponsor courses"
Alassign "Courses assigned by Firm"
Alorient "orientation of the firm is be innovative"
Alnew "firm practice new ventures or new product development"
Alchange " There are conventional ways of doing things in our firm 
which rarely change"
Alpolicy " In our firm, policy changes occur slowly"
Alspeed " Quick decisions and actions are not characteristic of our 
firm"
Alideas " News ideas are always being tried out here"
Alplan " The setting up of unusual plans is encouraged here"
Allatest "The latest discoveries make few changes in the way this
firm is run"
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Alfuture
Alview
Aldevnew
Allist
" Most people in our firm talk about the future"
"Our employees are encouraged to adopt a long-term outlook" 
" For our firm the development of the new is of secondary 
importance"
" New product development ranks high in our firm’s list of 
priorities"
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APPENDIX G
RANKING OF THE HOST INNOVATIVE FIRMS IN SCOTLAND
INDEX FOR DETERMINING THE MOST INNOVATIVE FIRMS
The factor loading index was based on responses to how the sample
compared to a weighted scale of responses taken from the 
questionnaires of 3M Corporation, Hewlett Packard, and Pilkington 
Optics. The indexing scale was further modified by independent 
variables as to whether or not the 187 firms had ticked the specified 
nine elements indicating a formal programme for innovation (questions 
5-11 by frequency and total count); their profile of ranking specific 
responses (questions 13, 22, and 28); and how they assessed
themselves against questions no. 31 and 32.
This index was programmed on SPSS, by its "ONE WAY" procedure 
which required a dependent variable (DELVEST) and the independent 
variables grouping into one value with a minimum and maximum range. 
The range was based on > 0.05 alpha to exclude and produce a matrix
outputs of showing the counts, means, and standard deviation of the
variables stated above.
Based on this index, 36 firms were identified as being innovative and 
scheduled for a post interview.
Including the 3M Corporation, Hewlett Packard,and Pilkington 
Optics, the following 14 firms were ranked as being "the most 
innovative" of the sample: Glaxochem; John McGavigan & Co; Digital 
Equipment Corporation; Ferranti International; F. J. Lilley; SCI UK 
Limited ; Cannongate Technology; Flexible Technology; Spider Systems; 
Johnson Control MacLauren; and De La Rue Systems. The rating in this 
group ranged from 80 to 95 percent.
The next 12 firms with a greater than 65 percentiles ratings 
were Apple Computer; Biotechnology Group of United Distillers; Devro 
Limited; Weir Paper Products; Rippin Group Limited; Honeywell U.K.; 
Vetco Gray; Surgikos, Inc.; Wang Laboratories of Scotland; Motorola; 
and the National Cash Register.
And those 10 firms with a greater than 50 percentiles ratings 
were Norson Power, Ltd.; Optima Enclosures Ltd.; Roche Products 
Company; Veeder-Root Limited; Scottish Heritage Trust, pic; The 
Miller Group; Walter Alexander; Shanks & Me Ewan Group; The Royal 
Bank of Scotland; and Thomas Reid & Sons.
THE PURPOSE OF THE POST INTERVIEWS
These interviews completed the fifth phase of the investigation and 
included Mr. Michael Small and two Representatives of the Scottish 
Development Agency as subject matter experts. The bulk of the 
interviews were conducted from July, 1989 through November, 1989.
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The purpose was to clarify any findings arising from the 2nd 
symposium and the first questionnaire. Using the Leadership Rules in 
Appendix C as a guide, questions were asked on how they managed 
innovation.
Other issues that were discussed included: (2) the best type of 
organisational structure; (3) which methods for training 
personnel/supervisory were being used ; (A) the strategic use of 
the product life cycle theory; and (5) the effects of having or not 
having a management policy/strategy for innovation were discussed.
Excerpts from some of the post interviews were stated where 
appropriate to illustrate an observation and dispersed throughout 
Chapter Eight
LIST OF INDIVIDUALS, MHO AGREED TO BE INTERVIEWED
Interviews were held with 26 of 33 respondents as listed below:
TIT U N I T S SURNAME JOBTITLE COPPANYCOMPANY
•>» W 0 Kaclean financial Cont'oile' Baker Oil Tools (UK)
P' C B Pattullo Group Chief Exec.B Dep.-Governor Bank of Scotland
w- Dc-eld Camobell Design Engineer Barr & Stroud Ltd.
•I' J A Jones Morks Director Beecham Pharmaceuticals
Mr Oavio Horsburgh Regional Director - Scotland Booker Cash and Carry
Hr e g Duncan Panaging Director Briggs oil
*r J * F Alexander Director Burmah Oil Trading Ltd
P- Kenneth P Duerde.n Traffic Panager Caledonian Pacbrayne Limited
»• Gc'dcr, A Eadie Panager CHH Technology (Crouch and Hogg)
pr John Do Ian Panaging Director Compaq Computer Manufacture's
Mr G H Bowen Panaging Director Compug'aphics International Limited
P' Co’ir. G Carnie Partner Crouch and Hogg
M' W A Archibald Director of Marketing De La Rue Systems
Pr G'aeme Alexander Operators Director Devro Ltd, Gartferry Road
Ps C a r d  P Slaven Panufacturing Parketlng Panager Digital Equipment Corp.
Pr Oavid Lawrence Panaging Director Digital Equipment Scotland Ltd
Pr N E Ritchie Chief Engineer Ethlcon Limited
Pr John Patrick Wimbush Panaging Director : ferranti Indus. Electronics Ltd.
P' jon-' PcAleenan P A to the Chief Executive FJC Lilley pic
P' A J H 6road«ay Panaging Directo' John Gardiner (Contractors) Ltd
Pr Travis Poore Technical Director Gates Rubber
P' R 1 Noodger Factory Panager Glaxochem Limited
Sir Patthe. Goodwin Chairman Hewden Stuart
M' R S Bye's Panaging Director Hewltt-Roblns lnt'1 Ltd
M' David Dack PP Labs, Hewlett Packard
P' A P Parshall Assistant Panaging Director Hughes Microelectronics Ltd
p> Janes A Paskell Managing Director Johnson Controls P a d a r e n  Products
Pr Jack PcGowan
Tiefenbrun
Panufacturing Panager 
P D
Keystone Valve (UK) Limited 
L1nn Products Ltd
Pr Norman Cadenhead Personnel Panager Joy Panutacturlng Co. (UK) Ltd
Pr David Kilmurry Panaging Director John RcGavigan & Co Ltd
Pr Alastair Punro Technical Director John PcGavilan t Co Ltd
Those interviewed were re-identified according to Table No. 8 to 
indicate their firms* technological strategies (i.e. Follower, etc) 
and by a double lettering system (i.e. Respondent KK) so the pledge 
of confidentiality could be kept
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